An investigation of reciprocity and reinforcement theories of bargaining behavior

The three experiments reported here investigated some determinants of a negotiator's bargaining. The first two experiments, investigating the effects of an opponent's concessions, revealed that the negotiator does not reciprocate the opponent's concessions nor does he retain the expectation that his own concessions will be reciprocated. Rather he repeats those concessions that are reinforced by large opponent concessions. The third experiment examined the effects that opponent reinforcements (concessions) and constituent reinforcements produced in the negotiator's bargaining. It was found that constituent reinforcements altered the negotiator's bargaining and the opponent reinforcements interacted with those of the constituent to affect the negotiator's behavior. However the opponent reinforcements produced no main effects.     

Constructivism,representation, and stability: path-dependence in public reason theories of justice

Synthese - Public reason theories are characterized by three conditions: constructivism, representation, and stability. Constructivism holds that justification does not rely on any antecedent moral...     

A feminist argument against statism: public and private in theories of global justice

Cosmopolitanism and statism represent the two dominant liberal theoretical standpoints in the current debate on global distributive justice. In this paper, I will develop a feminist argument that recommends that statist approaches be rejected. This argument has its roots in the feminist critique of liberal theories of social justice. In Justice, Gender, and the Family Susan Moller Okin argues that many liberal egalitarian theories of justice are inadequate because they assume a strict division between public and private spheres. I will argue that this inadequacy is replicated in statist approaches to global justice. To demonstrate this, I will show how an analogue of Okin's critique of Rawls's A Theory of Justice can be extended to his The Law of Peoples. I will conclude that statist theories inevitably assume a strong divide between public and private spheres and that by doing so they allow for situations marked by gross injustice which anyone concerned with the welfare of the world's most vulnerable should find unacceptable.     

Justice and personality: Using integrative theories to derive moderators of justice effects

Although organizational justice has been shown to have behavioral consequences, there remains a surprising amount of variation in how individuals react to fair and unfair treatment. The present study drew on three integrative theories in the justice literature—fairness heuristic theory, uncertainty management theory, and fairness theory—to identify personality traits that could explain such variation. From these theories, we identified trust propensity, risk aversion, and morality (rooted in circumplex models of personality) as potential moderators. A laboratory study provided some support for the prediction that the three traits moderate the effects of procedural, interpersonal, and distributive justice on task performance and counterproductive behavior. The moderating effects of the three traits explained more variance in the outcomes than moderators based in the justice literature (equity sensitivity, sensitivity to befallen injustice) or the five-factor model of personality. Taken together, the results suggest that the three integrative theories can inform the search for personality-based moderators of justice effects.     

Evidence of more immanent justice responding in adults than children: A challenge to traditional developmental theories

Three studies investigated developmental changes in immanent justice responding by asking participants to respond to vignettes in which a person's bad behaviour was followed by a negative consequence. Study 1 consisted of 152 sixth graders and 128 college students and presented participants with a vignette that examined the notion of bad people deserving to get ill. Study 2 consisted of 185 sixth graders and 154 college students and examined whether children and adults reasoned that that bad behaviour would actually cause the illness. Study 3 consisted of 96 third graders, 115 fifth graders, and 114 college students, and presented participants with vignettes that examined negative behaviours and consequences. Contrary to expectations based on traditional and contemporary developmental theories, all three studies demonstrated more evidence of immanent justice responding among adults than among elementary school children. These results call into question the comprehensiveness of traditional and contemporary developmental theories, and suggest the need to examine cognitive reasoning in adulthood when constructing developmental theories.     

Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining

In two experiments we investigated the relation between power and deception in ultimatum bargaining. Results showed that recipients of an ultimatum used deception to obtain better offers and that more recipients did so in a low power position. Further analyses showed that the recipient’s use of deception was mediated by concerns about receiving a low offer. For allocators, being in a low power position did not increase the use of deception. Instead, allocators increased their offer when they were in a low power position. The results are discussed in terms of an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) may refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals.     

Ideas of justice and reconstructions of Confucian justice

Confucianism tends to play only a marginal role in current theorizing about justice, which is a global pursuit dominated by Western theory and its strong tendency to assume that justice refers to some substantive conception of distributive, socioeconomic justice. This article examines and compares reconstructions of Confucian justice by Joseph Chan, May Sim, and Fan Ruiping. Each reconstruction makes reference to both classical and modern Western justice theory and thus each involves a comparative approach; indeed, each reconstruction seeks ultimately, in its own distinctive fashion, to present a version of Confucian justice that is comparable with modern Western justice theory. In this article we assess, critically and comparatively, the tertium comparationis and the arguments in each reconstruction. While our analysis does not wholly endorse any of the reconstructions, it shows that there is a richness and vitality to Confucian justice theory that merits proper consideration in justice theory conceived as a truly global and cosmopolitan discipline.     

Evaluability of outcomes in ultimatum bargaining

In bargaining, two components are important for assessing the utility of a decision outcome: self-interest and fairness. Each of these components corresponds to a comparison of possible outcomes—an interpersonal comparison for fairness, and an intrapersonal comparison for self-interest. We propose that the relative weights these components receive in ultimatum bargaining depend on their evaluability. In two studies, we show that varying the evaluability of these components influences the reactions of recipients towards the offer. Moreover, we show that the relative importance of fairness as well as the perceived fairness of the offer mediate between the evaluability of these components and acceptance rates. Results are discussed in relation to other findings on outcome and procedural framing effects in social decision-making.     

Online bargaining and interpersonal trust

The presented study explores the effect of interacting over the Internet on interpersonal trust when bargaining online. Relative to face-to-face negotiations, online negotiations were characterized by (a) lower levels of pre-negotiation trust and (b) lower levels of post-negotiation trust. The reduced levels of pre-negotiation trust in online negotiations (i.e., before any interaction took place) demonstrate that negotiators bring different expectations to the electronic bargaining table than to face-to-face negotiations. These negative perceptions of trust were found to mediate another aspect of the relationship, namely, desired future interaction. Those who negotiated online reported less desire for future interactions with the other party. Online negotiators also were less satisfied with their outcome and less confident in the quality of their performance, despite the absence of observable differences in economic outcome quality.     

Initial ownership in bargaining: introducing the giving, splitting, and taking ultimatum bargaining game

In three experiments, the authors studied the role of initial ownership of property in bargaining behavior. For this purpose, they created three new variations of the Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG): giving, splitting, and taking UBGs. On the basis of insights of loss aversion and the do-no-harm principle, the authors predicted and found that allocations to the recipient were highest in the taking UBG and lowest in the giving UBG. Additional measures to study the underlying mechanism of this effect indicate that the game type effect was mediated by perceptions of entitlement, which allocators did not want to infringe on. Moreover, the effect was not affected by strategic options as provided by deception or power.     

Effects of alternatives in coalition bargaining

A critical factor in bargaining and coalition formation is the alternative outcomes of the bargainers if an agreement cannot be reached. In some situations bargainers have individual alternatives while in other situations their alternatives must be negotiated with others. The purpose of this study was to contrast the effects of one-person and two-person alternatives on coalition outcomes. The second purpose of the study was to contrast the predictions of four theories of coalition formation: bargaining theory, equal excess model, Shapley value, and a special case of equity theory. The results indicate that one-person alternatives enhance the bargaining strength of the stronger players more than two-person alternatives. The predictions of the equal excess model and the Shapley value were more accurate than the predictions of bargaining theory and equity theory. However, the greater accuracy of the equal excess model and the Shapley value may be restricted to situations in which the bargainers have one-person rather than two-person alternatives.     

Descriptions and Uniqueness

Philosophical Studies -     

Deference and Uniqueness

Philosophical Studies - Deference principles are principles that describe when, and to what extent, it’s rational to defer to others. Recently, some authors have used such principles to argue...     

Trust and trustworthiness in a sequential bargaining game

We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ‘inconsistent trusters’ seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.