TWO PSYCHOTIC PLAYWRIGHTS AT WORK: THE LATE PLAYS OF AUGUST STRINDBERG AND TENNESSEE WILLIAMS

August Strindberg and Tennessee Williams both became severely deranged during their playwriting careers. Both emerged from the most intense form of their derangement and wrote plays afterward. Strindberg, however, wrote his greatest plays after his psychosis; Williams, before his. Strindberg's psychosis spurred his creativity; that of Williams severely damaged his. This paper proposes that Strindberg mastered his psychosis and that in his late plays he dramatically symbolized psychotic processes. Williams, on the other hand, could neither access nor master his, and his late plays embody the repeated, unsymbolized acting out of his psychosis within an aesthetic context. These differences between the two playwrights become clear not through analysis of dramatic characters, but through changes that each playwright made to the dramatic medium itself.     

Conscientisation in Castalia: A Freirean Reading of Hermann Hesse’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Glass Bead Game</Emphasis>

This paper considers Hermann Hesse’s novel, The Glass Bead Game, in the light of Paulo Freire’s educational philosophy. The Glass Bead Game is set in Castalia, a “pedagogical province” of the 23rd century. It is argued that the central character in the book, Joseph Knecht, undergoes a complex process of conscientisation. Knecht develops an increasingly critical understanding of Castalian society, questioning some of its most cherished assumptions while nonetheless deepening his appreciation of the beauty of the Glass Bead Game. He becomes less certain of his certainties as he grows older, and eventually decides to give away his prestigious post as Magister Ludi (Master of the Glass Bead Game) to pursue a quiet life as a tutor. Dialogue plays a key role in the development of Knecht’s critical consciousness. Freirean theory is seen to provide a robust framework for the analysis of key themes in Hesse’s text. At the same time, The Glass Bead Game is helpful in demonstrating the meaning and significance of conscientisation and dialogue for educational lives.     

Can power be self‐legitimating? Political realism in Hobbes,Weber, and Williams

Political realists seek to provide an alternative to accounts of political legitimacy that are based on moral standards. In this endeavor, they face the challenge of how to interpret the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating. In this paper, we argue that work by Bernard Williams sheds light on the possible answers to this challenge. While Williams aligns himself with the realist tradition, his account of legitimacy contains an implicit critique of political realism. This is evident, we show, in his rejections of the views of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber. Williams is not satisfied with Hobbes because he conflates legitimacy and political order, eliminating space for criticizing power. Weber's view, however, offers a non‐moralist standard of legitimacy that has critical purchase. This critical purchase emerges from the demands made on rulers to uphold the values that underlie their legitimation, combined with the ethic of responsibility. The resulting grounds for criticism are thus consistent with the maxim that power cannot be self‐legitimating—the very maxim that Williams puts at the heart of his realism. By showing that Williams's partial rejection of Hobbes and Weber cannot be sustained only on realist grounds, our analysis clarifies the limits of political realism.     

道德运气

康德主义者认为,道德只跟动机相关,不受运气影响。威廉斯以未尽基于真实历史事实的高更和小说人物安娜为例展开讨论。高更这位画家为了自己的艺术追求,背逆、冲撞了社会的道德要求。如果他最后成功了,他将能为自己提供理性辩护,失败了则不能。而最初,没谁(包括他自己)知道他的追求是否结出正果——这有一部分依赖于运气。威廉斯对这一阐论中的几个关键概念做出辨析,运气(指的不是意外受伤之类,而是内在于其计划的运气),成功(不是功效主义意义上的,而是指他最终成为他曾希望会是的那个人),辩护(理性辩护可以回溯性的,且不一定能为所有人接受)。他尤其详细地阐发了行为者憾恨的概念。本文的结论是:道德并不免受运气影响。     

Benjamin Franklin and shock-induced amnesia

Shock-induced amnesia received considerable attention after Cerletti popularized electroconvulsive shock therapy in the late 1930s. Yet, often overlooked is the fact that Benjamin Franklin recognized that passing electricity through the head could affect memory for the traumatic event. Franklin described his findings on himself and others in several letters from the mid-1700s, 2 of which were published in his lifetime. What he observed was confirmed in 1783 by physician Jan Ingenhousz, who was one of his correspondents. Although Ingenhousz had lost his memory for his electrical accident and was confused immediately afterward, he felt strangely elated and unusually sharp the next morning. Hence, he called for clinical trials with patients with melancholia who were not responding to more conventional therapies. After Franklin received Ingenhousz's letter, he also called for clinical trials. Neither man, however, tied the possible new cure for melancholia to the memory loss--nor did the operators that began to treat some patients with melancholia successfully with cranial shocks. Only much later would the amnesia be thought to be associated with the cure.     

Global dot integration in typically developing children and in Williams Syndrome

Williams Syndrome (WS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder that results in deficits in visuospatial perception and cognition. The dorsal stream vulnerability hypothesis in WS predicts that visual motion processes are more susceptible to damage than visual form processes. We asked WS participants and typically developing children to detect the global structure Glass patterns, under “static” and “dynamic” conditions in order to evaluate this hypothesis. Sequentially presented Glass patterns are coined as dynamic because they induce illusory motion, which is modeled after the interaction between orientation (form) and direction (motion) mechanisms. If the dorsal stream vulnerability holds in WS participants, then they should process real and illusory motion atypically. However, results are consistent with the idea that form and motion integration mechanisms are functionally delayed or attenuated in WS. Form coherence thresholds for both static and dynamic Glass patterns in WS were similar to those of 4–5 year old children, younger than what is predicted by mental age. Dynamic presentation of Glass patterns improved thresholds to the same degree as typical participants. Motion coherence thresholds in WS were similar to those of mental age matches. These data pose constraints on the dorsal vulnerability hypothesis, and refine our understanding of the relationship between form and motion processing in development.     

Global dot integration in typically developing children and in Williams Syndrome

Williams Syndrome (WS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder that results in deficits in visuospatial perception and cognition. The dorsal stream vulnerability hypothesis in WS predicts that visual motion processes are more susceptible to damage than visual form processes. We asked WS participants and typically developing children to detect the global structure Glass patterns, under “static” and “dynamic” conditions in order to evaluate this hypothesis. Sequentially presented Glass patterns are coined as dynamic because they induce illusory motion, which is modeled after the interaction between orientation (form) and direction (motion) mechanisms. If the dorsal stream vulnerability holds in WS participants, then they should process real and illusory motion atypically. However, results are consistent with the idea that form and motion integration mechanisms are functionally delayed or attenuated in WS. Form coherence thresholds for both static and dynamic Glass patterns in WS were similar to those of 4–5 year old children, younger than what is predicted by mental age. Dynamic presentation of Glass patterns improved thresholds to the same degree as typical participants. Motion coherence thresholds in WS were similar to those of mental age matches. These data pose constraints on the dorsal vulnerability hypothesis, and refine our understanding of the relationship between form and motion processing in development.     

Memory and identity

Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features of memory that must be part of a complete account.     

Short-Term Memory Deficits Are Not Uniform in Down and Williams Syndromes

Neuropsychological investigation of the development of the mnesic function in mental retardation has primarily focused on evaluating short-term memory (STM). Studies have often documented a reduced verbal short-term memory span in individuals with mental retardation and with Down syndrome in particular, compared to groups of mental age-matched controls. However, recent evidence suggests that verbal short-term memory is not equally impaired in all individuals with mental retardation. Findings in children with Williams syndrome are particularly relevant in this regard. Also, data concerning STM for visual information suggest that visual-object and visual-spatial working memory may be differently compromised in people with mental retardation. In particular, individuals with Williams syndrome exhibit specific difficulties in visual-spatial but not in visual-object working memory tasks compared to typically-developing children matched for mental age. Instead, people with Down syndrome show reduced performance in both visual-spatial and visual-object tests. Taken together, these results reinforce the view that intellectual disability is not a unitary condition characterized by homogeneous slowness of cognitive development but a variety of conditions in which some cognitive functions may be more disrupted than others. The finding that the working memory deficit in individuals with Williams and Down syndrome may be qualitatively differentiated also supports the hypothesis that it is not simply a manifestation of general cognitive impairment but, rather, the expression of a specific deficit of a discrete cognitive ability.     

Vision, Interpretation, and the Interactive Field

Interpretation is discussed relative to ways in which an analyst sees the material in question. Michael Fordham's approach to projective identification and 'defences of the self' is criticised and contrasted with one that orientates in 'third areas' between analyst and analysand. Through clinical material, these different approaches are discussed. The works of Jung and Bion are related, and Fordham's approach to interpretation is seen as originating from a vertex K, in particular his concept of childhood, in distinction to the vertex O which is the orientating position for processes in the third area. It is argued that in Fordham's approach O is saturated, that K does not evolve from O, and, furthermore, that his examples demonstrate that, contrary to what he says, in his activity he does not eschew memory, desire, and knowledge.     

Hegelians Axel Honneth and Robert Williams on the Development of Human Morality

An individual is in the lowest phase of moral development if he thinks only of his own personal interest and has only his own selfish agenda in his mind as he encounters other humans. This lowest phase corresponds well with sixteenth century British moral egoism which reflects the rise of the new economic order. Adam Smith (1723?C1790) wanted to defend this new economic order which is based on economic exchange between egoistic individuals. Nevertheless, he surely did not want to support the moral theory of British egoism. His book The Wealth of Nations suits well into the world view of British moral egoism, but in the book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he presents a moral theory which is the total opposite of moral egoism. Contemporary German intellectuals saw contradiction in Adam Smith??s moral (social) philosophy which they called as Das Adam-Smith-Problem. Smith himself didn??t think that there is any contradiction in a situation where in economic sphere (civil society) individual act egoistically and in ethical sphere (encounter with the imagined Other) he feels humanity and compassion toward his fellow men. Hegel was a passionate reader of Adam Smith and he acknowledged Das Adam-Smith-Problem. He set the task of his social philosophy to overcome this paradox. He wanted to create a theory of a social totality where economic egoism and feelings of humanity are not in contradiction. In the same time Hegel wanted to create a theory on Bildung process where human spirit develops from moral un-freedom (heteronomy) to moral freedom and maturity (autonomy) taking care both aspect of love and reason. In certain Hegel??s texts notion of recognition plays crucial role. That is why modern Hegelians Ludwig Siep, Axel Honneth and Robert Williams consider the notion of recognition to be elementary in Hegel??s threefold theory of developing human spirit from family via civil society to sittliche state. For Hegel family is a sphere where people love their ??concrete other?? and where feeling surpasses reason. Civil Society is a sphere of private contracts and economic exchanges where cold egoistic and calculative reason surpasses feelings. In the sphere of State the contradiction between family and Civil Society (Das Adam-Smith-Problem) is solved by ??rational feeling??. According to Hegel State should protect citizens from alienating effect of egoistic reason of Civil Society and cultivate ??family-feelings?? to rational feelings which integrate citizen into ??sittliche community?? through reciprocal process of recognition. In this article I want to consider Hegelians Honneth??s and Williams??s relevance to the theory of moral development.     

Memory impairment following ruptured aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery

This study reports the case of a 42-year-old man who suffered a ruptured aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery. His memory capabilities were assessed after a considerable recovery period during which many of his memory deficits ameliorated. His scan revealed a left frontal lesion and many of his deficits were characteristic of frontal impairment. He was impaired on temporal discrimination, and he showed marked source forgetting. He also performed badly on the Brown-Peterson task, and we suggest that this is another task that may be characteristic of frontal impairment. In contrast, the patient showed normal or near normal performance on some memory tasks but not on others. It is concluded that the patient's frontal signs are similar to those found in Korsakoff's Syndrome, but that his memory impairment is qualitatively different from that encountered in patients with the amnesic syndrome.     

Bain on Neural Networks

In his bookMind and body(1873), Bain set out an account in which he related the processes of associative memory to the distribution of activity in neural groupings—or neural networks as they are now termed. In the course of this account, Bain anticipated certain aspects of connectionist ideas that are normally attributed to 20th-century authors—most notably Hebb (1949). In this paper we reproduce Bain's arguments relating neural activity to the workings of associative memory which include an early version of the principles enshrined in Hebb's neurophysiological postulate. Nonetheless, despite their prescience, these specific contributions to the connectionist case have been almost entirely ignored. Eventually, Bain came to doubt the practicality of his own arguments and, in so doing, he seems to have ensured that his ideas concerning neural groupings exerted little or no influence on the subsequent course of theorizing in this area.     

The Mother Relationship and Artistic Inhibition in the Lives of Leonardo da Vinci and Erik H. Erikson

In four earlier articles, I focused on the theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, and suggested that the melancholic self may experience humor (Capps, 2007a), play (Capps, 2008a), dreams (Capps, 2007c), and art (Capps, 2008b) as restorative resources. I argued that Erik H. Erikson found these resources to be valuable remedies for his own melancholic condition, which had its origins in the fact that he was illegitimate and was raised solely by his mother until he was three years old, when she remarried. In this article, I focus on two themes in Freud’s Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood (1964): Leonardo’s relationship with his mother in early childhood and his inhibitions as an artist. I relate these two themes to Erikson’s own early childhood and his failure to achieve his goal as an aspiring artist in his early twenties. The article concludes with a discussion of Erikson’s frustrated aspirations to become an artist and his emphasis, in his psychoanalytic work, on children’s play. Donald Capps is Professor of Pastoral Psychology at Princeton Theological Seminary. His books include Men, Religion, and Melancholia (1997), Freud and Freudians on Religion (2001), and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor     

The logical structure of Michael Williams's response to skepticism

This paper aims to reconstruct the overarching logical structure of Michael Williams's response to philosophical skepticism. One goal is to forestall overhasty dismissals of his position based on failures to understand the logical relations among his various anti-skeptical claims and arguments. In many places, Williams suggests that the strategy he calls “theoretical diagnosis” is sufficient to defuse the skeptical challenge and that, accordingly, his anti-skeptical strategy consists solely in developing theoretical diagnoses. According to the account developed here, this claim is misleading—in need of significant qualification, if not outright false. Even so, the paper concludes that, in its essentials, Williams's response is structurally sound, given his understanding of the problem posed by skepticism. The paper ends with a brief assessment of the merits of that response.     

Relativism of Distance - a Step in the Naturalization of Meta-Ethics

Bernard Williams proposed his relativism of distance based on the recognition “that others are at varying distances from us”. Recent work in moral psychology and experimental philosophy highlights the prevalence of folk relativism in relation to spatial and temporal distance. However, Williams’ relativism of distance as well as recent empirical findings which seem to support some of Williams’ main ideas on this issue have received scant attention. In this article, we would like to focus on the phenomenon of moral relativism regarding spatiotemporal distance as an entry point to the nature of folk moral relativism and the methodology of meta-ethics. To do so, we first introduce Williams’ relativism of distance. Then we compare Williams’ approach on this matter to recent experimental approaches on folk relativism. On this score the main result is that Williams’ proposal is consistent with several well-established insights on the experimental study of folk relativism. Williams’ relativism of distance is not only empirically plausible, but it is also of relevance for shaping the methodology of an empirically informed meta-ethics. We close this paper by stressing this methodological contribution.     

Remembering and repeating in multiple personality

This paper is a case-history of a student in his early twenties tortured by different personalities of different ages and sexes vying for control of his body. Guilt over an incestuous relationship with his mother is uncovered and understood in the context of his whole life. Confusion between memories of fantasies, memories of sleep dreams, memories of daydreams, and memories of actual memories are described, the elucidation of which lead to clearer thinking and memory, and more tolerance for the previously distorted affectladen situations of his past. Thus his belief that he was experimented on in an alien spaceship becomes the memory of an operating-room diagnostic experience.

A hypothesis is put forward that the separate personalities in the multiple personality are not simply the products of ego splits, but are at the instant they are formed a ‘doubling’ of the personality that is being copied. Immediately thereafter, splitting mechanisms create differences between the two separate personalities, using projective and introjective mechanisms. Integration of the various personalities, the ultimate goal in treatment, is made difficult by the patient's fear of loss of self through fragmentation, when the self is felt to be in danger of being intruded upon.     

The kidnapping of W. S. Gilbert

Gilbert's probable screen memory of having been kidnapped, along with his persistent preoccupations with babyhood, remembering and forgetting, stress the intensity of his struggle against remembering the painful experiences from his childhood. His creative efforts function as an obsessional defense; they divert his attention from the experiences themselves to a fascination with the process of remembering and forgetting, while the painful affects are reversed into playful, good-natured humor. The results are some of his most treasured anecdotes. Watson (1918) quotes Gilbert's story of the amateur burglar who badly bungled an attempted robbery and ended up being arrested and jailed under the most humiliating circumstances. For years afterward, every time he though of the incident, he felt wretchedly uncomfortable, and he tried vainly to drive the occurrence from his mind. The story concludes with a statement which, remarks Watson, only Gilbert could have written: "Gradually one detail after another slipped from my recollection, and one lovely morning last May I found to my intense delight that I had absolutely forgotten all about it" (p. 94).     

Long-lasting perceptual priming and semantic learning in amnesia: a case experiment.

An investigation of perceptual priming and semantic learning in the severely amnesic subject K.C. is reported. He was taught 64 three-word sentences and tested for his ability to produce the final word of each sentence. Despite a total lack of episodic memory, he exhibited (a) strong perceptual priming effects in word-fragment completion, which were retained essentially in full strength for 12 months, and (b) independent of perceptual priming, learning of new semantic facts, many of which were also retained for 12 months. K.C.'s semantic learning may be at least partly attributable to repeated study trials and minimal interference during learning. The findings suggest that perceptual priming and semantic learning are subserved by two memory systems different from episodic memory and that both systems (perceptual representation and semantic memory) are at least partially preserved in some amnesic subjects.     

Beyond “Beyond A- and B-time”

This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought to deny that the B-theory is a (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly should be rejected.