Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed’s Long Road to Skepticism

Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: (1) contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, (2) these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, (3) knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributabilism that is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful that many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any direct argument for the truth of maximal attributabilism. Therefore, we need not be persuaded by Reed's new argument for skepticism.     

The Metaphors of Knowledge and Academic Impact

This essay discusses critically the ways in which different metaphors employed to illustrate the practices of knowledge production and knowledge acquisition as well as scientific and scholarly research shape our understanding of the academic form of life. The essay examines the metaphors of knowledge and their role in academia by means of philosophical analysis and a rhetorical analysis of language, thereby defending the core values of academic freedom. It focuses on two pairs of metaphors highly relevant to the tensions characteristic of contemporary academic work: verticality and horizontality, on the one hand, and change and stability, on the other. The entanglement of perspectives from philosophy and historical rhetoric serves a metaphilosophical goal here: to show that our philosophical understanding of the nature of inquiry will be considerably enhanced if we seriously, and with both historical and literary sensibilities, study the metaphors we use in characterizing our epistemic and cognitive projects.     

Correspondence truth and scientific realism

I argue that one good reason for Scientific Realists to be interested in correspondence theories is the hope they offer us of being able to state and defend realistic theses in the face of well-known difficulties about modern physics: such theses as, that our theories are approximately true, or that they will tend to approach the truth. I go on to claim that this hope is unlikely to be fulfilled. I suggest that Realism can still survive in the face of these difficulties, as a claim about the kind of theories we want to aim for. I relate this conception of Realism to various contemporary discussions, both by realists and antirealists.     

Autonomy and Objectivity of Science

This article deals with the problematic concepts of the rational and the social, which have been typically seen as dichotomous in the history and philosophy of science literature. I argue that this view is mistaken and that the social can be seen as something that enables rationality in science, and further, that a scientific community as well as an individual can be taken as an epistemic subject. Furthermore, I consider how scientific communities could be seen as freely acting and choosing agents. Fundamentally, this boils down to the question whether we accept the voluntarist conception of human beings, one consequence of which is that scientists possess, in principle, the capacity for deliberative reflection and choice. If this is accepted, we can talk about the degrees of autonomy that communities possess. I also examine what kinds of decisions an autonomous community should make in order to produce objective knowledge. My suggestion is that objectivity be understood as intersubjectivity: a view is objective when it has been exposed to critical reflection from various points of view, and due to this, transcends subjective idiosyncrasies.     

Trust in the Normative Domain

Abstract

Pessimists about trust in the normative domain believe that (i) forming normative beliefs on the basis of trusting others is problematic, (ii) forming normative beliefs in other ways is not so problematic and (iii) forming non-normative beliefs on the basis of trust is not so problematic. Whilst there is substantial disagreement over the best way of accounting for pessimist ideas about trust, it is widely accepted that the intuitively problematic character of forming normative beliefs on the basis of trust cannot be explained in terms of the idea that trust cannot be a source of normative knowledge. This paper argues that the dismissal of scepticism about trust as a source of normative knowledge is unwarranted. It does so by developing a sceptical explanation of pessimist ideas, arguing that the obvious arguments against the sceptical explanation fail and arguing that the sceptical explanation has the resources to resolve the considerations that present problems for existing explanations.     

初一学生数学学习的学科领域知识表征特点

学科领域知识由学理内容知识、认知过程知识和问题条件知识组成。本研究以529名七年级学生为被试,测查学生在数学学习中的学科领域知识表征特点,结果发现:(1)三种类型知识表征存在显著差异,学理内容知识表征水平最高,问题条件知识表征水平最低;(2)学优生的学科领域知识表征水平显著高于中等生和学困生;(3)认知过程知识表征、问题条件知识表征水平与数学学业成绩显著相关;(4)学生对学理内容知识重要性评价最高,问题条件知识最低。     

Lewis' Strawman

In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, David Lewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, 'Strawman'. His case against Strawman focuses on four central theses which Lewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. The theses concern (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk-psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. We respond to Lewis, arguing (amongst other things) that he underestimates Strawman's theoretical resources in a variety of important ways.     

Pursuit of Bodily Excellence: Paul Weiss’s Platonic (Religious) Imagination of Sports

Almost thirty years ago, Warren Fraleigh wrote that Paul Weiss’s intellectual contribution to the philosophic study of sport was like a tributary, converging with others to eventuate in numerous scholarly colloquia, a new academic society, new courses and curricula, articles and books. Paul Weiss contends in Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry that sport is a pursuit of bodily excellence. Weiss tells a story about bodily excellence; it is a bodily good that can be realized in the practice of sport. His metaphysic and teleology provide the content and context for his philosophy of sport. For him, sport bodies speak or give voice to a particular metaphysical tradition that I argue is problematic. Weiss’s metaphysic and teleology swallow and sublate sportive bodies and the concomitant goods intrinsic to embodiment and the practice of sports. The net effect is dematerialization and depersonalization of bodily performances and personal identity, respectively. More recently, Feezell and Dombrowski advance theses about sports with Weiss as their primary interlocutor, if not foil. What I put forth travels a different path than Dombrowski and Feezell in that I plumb Weiss’s narrative arc, Platonic imagination and metaphysic, more extensively as it tells a certain story about human embodiment, and thus, grounds his ideal of excellence.     

Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?

If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism—the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in which knowledge has to be robust . Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology's supposed conceptual core is not as epistemically unchallengeable as we might have assumed to be the case.     

Ideal and Non‐ideal Theory and the Problem of Knowledge

This article analyses a hitherto neglected problem at the transition from ideal to non‐ideal theory: the problem of knowledge. Ideal theories often make idealising assumptions about the availability of knowledge, for example knowledge of social scientific facts. This can lead to problems when this knowledge turns out not to be available at the non‐ideal level. Knowledge can be unavailable in a number of ways: in principle, for practical reasons, or because there are normative reasons not to use it. This can make it necessary to revise ideal theories, because the principle of ‘ought implies can’ rules out certain theories, at least insofar as they are understood as action‐guiding. I discuss a number of examples and argue that there are two tendencies that will increase the relevance of this problem in the future: the availability of large amounts of sensitive data whose use is problematic from a normative point of view, and the increasing complexity of an interrelated world that makes it harder to predict the effects of institutional changes. To address these issues, philosophers need to cooperate with social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences. Normative theorising can then be understood as one step in a long process that includes thinkers from different disciplines. Ideal theory can respond to many of the charges raised against it if it is understood along these lines and if it takes the problem of knowledge and its implications seriously.     

Rhetoric and “doing philosophy”

By drawing new distinctions labelled appeal and response to replace traditional rhetorical modes of written discourse, the essay sketches a new perspective about what philosophers are doing rhetorically in doing philosophy. To think of philosophers as simply engaged in argument is an oversimplification and a distortion of what philosophers do. Crucial to doing philosophy are four activities: (1) definition and redefinition of problems and issues that form both the focus of the canonical historical literature of philosophy and what goes on in contemporary philosophy as a discipline, (2) the development and use of formal languages and technical vocabularies to abbreviate and label complexity and to disambiguate and precise distinctions necessary to deal with problems and issues, (3) the development and exploration of argumentative appeals for acceptance or refutation of answers to questions raised by the philosophical problematic, and (4) the development and exploration of explanatory responses to questions raised by the problematic. In so far as these four activities are driven and sanctioned by the current, self-defining philosophical problematic, contemporary philosophy as a body of knowledge is historical, cumulative, and marked by progress, and the doing of philosophy is fundamentally the making of written appeals and responses about its problematic.     

Is There a Natural Sexual Inequality of Intellect? A Reply to Kimura

The noted psychologist, Doreen Kimura, has argued that we should not expect to find equal numbers of men and women in various professions because there is a natural sexual inequality of intellect. In rebuttal I argue that each of these mutually supporting theses is insufficiently supported by the evidence to be accepted. The social and ethical dimensions of Kimura's work, and of the scientific study of the nature-nurture controversy in general, are briefly discussed.     

On the Historicity of Scientific Objects

The historical variation of scientific knowledge has lent itself to the development of historical epistemology, which attempts to historicize the origin and establishment of knowledge claims. The questions I address in this paper revolve around the historicity of the objects of those claims: How and why do new scientific objects appear? What exactly comes into being in such cases? Do scientific objects evolve over time and in what ways? I put forward and defend two theses: First, the ontology of science is so rich and variegated that there are no universally valid answers to these questions. Second, we need a pluralist account of scientific objects, a pluralist metaphysics that can do justice to their rich diversity and their various modes of being and becoming. I then focus on hidden objects, which are supposed to be part of the permanent furniture of the universe, and I discuss their birth and historicity: They emerge when various phenomena coalesce as manifestations of a single hidden cause and their representations change over time. Finally, I examine the conditions under which an evolving representation may still refer to the same object and I illustrate my argument drawing upon the early history of electrons.     

Epistemic dependence and collective scientific knowledge

I argue that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge, in a sense to be specified and defended. I first consider some existing proposals for construing collective knowledge and argue that they are unsatisfactory, at least for scientific knowledge as we encounter it in actual scientific practice. Then I introduce an alternative conception of collective knowledge, on which knowledge is collective if there is a strong form of mutual epistemic dependence among scientists, which makes it so that satisfaction of the justification condition on knowledge ineliminably requires a collective. Next, I show how features of contemporary science support the conclusion that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge in this sense. Finally, I consider implications of my proposal and defend it against objections.     

Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals

This paper argues that contemporary philosophical literature on meaning in life has important implications for the debate about our obligations to non-human animals. If animal lives can be meaningful, then practices including factory farming and animal research might be morally worse than ethicists have thought. We argue for two theses about meaning in life: (1) that the best account of meaningful lives must take intentional action to be necessary for meaning—an individual’s life has meaning if and only if the individual acts intentionally in ways that contribute to finally valuable states of affairs; and (2) that this first thesis does not entail that only human lives are meaningful. Because non-human animals can be intentional agents of a certain sort, our account yields the verdict that many animals’ lives can be meaningful. We conclude by considering the moral implications of these theses for common practices involving animals.     

当代知识论:出场路径及其作为方法论和认识论

<正>当代知识论(contemporary theory of knowledge)作为哲学运动,是两股支流的汇合:一是它作为关于"知识是信念"的理论,乃孕育于作为方法论的分析哲学;二是它作为关于主体之经验直观能力的理论,乃是对从笛卡尔到康德的传统认识论的延伸。这决定了它包括两个部分,分别作为方法论和认识论。     

ALL THE (MANY,MANY) THINGS WE KNOW: EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE*

In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level.     

School psychology publishing contributions to the advancement of knowledge, science, and its application: an introduction to the themed issue

This introductory article briefly reviews the studies and commentaries making up this themed issue on the process and products of professional publications in school psychology. Each article highlights important considerations for advancing scholarly scientific publishing in the field of school psychology. A case is made that enhancing the quality of scientific publications, as well as accumulating scholarly findings over time, serve as the primary mechanisms for improving practice for children, families, and school professionals. This article highlights features of the studies and commentaries directly related to advancing knowledge, science, and its application in school psychology.