Do we perceive a flattened world on the monitor screen?

The current model of three-dimensional perception hypothesizes that the brain integrates the depth cues in a statistically optimal fashion through a weighted linear combination with weights proportional to the reliabilities obtained for each cue in isolation (Landy, Maloney, Johnston, & Young, 1995). Even though many investigations support such theoretical framework, some recent empirical findings are at odds with this view (e.g., Domini, Caudek, & Tassinari, 2006). Failures of linear cue integration have been attributed to cue-conflict and to unmodelled cues to flatness present in computer-generated displays. We describe two cue-combination experiments designed to test the integration of stereo and motion cues, in the presence of consistent or conflicting blur and accommodation information (i.e., when flatness cues are either absent, with physical stimuli, or present, with computer-generated displays). In both conditions, we replicated the results of Domini et al. (2006): The amount of perceived depth increased as more cues were available, also producing an over-estimation of depth in some conditions. These results can be explained by the Intrinsic Constraint model, but not by linear cue combination.     

Do we need visual subjects?

It is widely accepted within contemporary philosophy of perception that the content of visual states cannot be characterized simply as a list of represented features. This is because such characterization leads to the so-called ‘Many Properties’ problem, that is, it does not allow us to explain how the visual system is able to distinguish between scenes containing different arrangements of the same features. The usual solution to the Many Properties problem is to characterize some basic elements of content as subjects, to which features are attributed by a predication-like relation. In this paper, I reconsider this solution and claim that the Many Properties problem can be solved without postulating such subjects. What is more, I argue that an alternative approach has stronger justification given the empirical data concerning human vision.     

Do we weep for Cordelia?

Abstract

Much of the contemporary debate concerning the nature and role of fictive emotions has argued that we do feel garden-variety emotions for fictional characters; the puzzle has been to account for this, given our knowledge of their fictional status. In this paper I argue that many of the emotional responses we have towards fictional characters are nothing like the emotions we feel in ordinary life. The implications for our engagement with literary fictions are subsequently examined.     

Do we conceptualize every color we consciously discriminate?

Mandik understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of nondemonstrative concepts for those colors and so does not pose a threat to conceptualism. But even if Mandik has shown that we deploy such concepts in these experimental conditions, there are cases of conscious states that discriminate colors but do not involve concepts of those colors. Mandik's arguments sustain only a theory in the vicinity of conceptualism: The view that we possess concepts for every color we can discriminate consciously, but need not deploy those concepts in every conscious act of color discrimination.     

Do we look happy? Perceptions of romantic relationship quality on Facebook

Does the information that people share about their romantic relationships on Facebook influence how other people perceive their relationship quality? Across 2 studies, people's accuracy at inferring others' relationship quality based on their Facebook profiles and how Facebook profiles influenced others' judgments of people's relationship quality and likability were investigated. Perceived relationship quality corresponded to self‐reported relationship quality (Study 1), and people with more visible relationships were perceived as having greater relationship satisfaction and commitment (Studies 1 and 2) and being more likable (Study 2). High disclosure about the relationship predicted greater perceived relationship quality but lower likability (Study 2). These findings illuminate how sharing information about one's relationship influences other people's impressions of the individual and the relationship.     

Do haphazard reviews provide sound directions for dissemination efforts?

Comments on The dissemination and implementation of evidence-based psychological treatments: A review of current efforts (see record 2010-02208-010) by Kathryn R. McHugh and David H. Barlow. The lead article in the February–March issue by McHugh and Barlow (2010) emphasized the need for “dissemination and implementation of evidence-based psychological treatments.” The authors identified a number of intervention programs as evidence based and in need of dissemination. One is multisystemic therapy (MST). They claimed that this program is among “the most successful dissemination efforts...pursued by treatment developers” (p. 79). McHugh and Barlow’s (2010) discussion of the implementation of MST in Hawaii is troubling, because it neglected to mention concerns about the perceived lack of cultural sensitivity of the MST program in that state.     

One sound or two? Object-related negativity indexes echo perception

The ability to isolate a single sound source among concurrent sources and reverberant energy is necessary for understanding the auditory world. The precedence effect describes a related experimental finding, that when presented with identical sounds from two locations with a short onset asynchrony (on the order of milliseconds), listeners report a single source with a location dominated by the lead sound. Single-cell recordings in multiple animal models have indicated that there are low-level mechanisms that may contribute to the precedence effect, yet psychophysical studies in humans have provided evidence that top-down cognitive processes have a great deal of influence on the perception of simulated echoes. In the present study, event-related potentials evoked by click pairs at and around listeners' echo thresholds indicate that perception of the lead and lag sound as individual sources elicits a negativity between 100 and 250 msec, previously termed the object-related negativity (ORN). Even for physically identical stimuli, the ORN is evident when listeners report hearing, as compared with not hearing, a second sound source. These results define a neural mechanism related to the conscious perception of multiple auditory objects.     

Information overload or search-amplified risk? Set size and order effects on decisions from experience

How do changes in choice-set size influence information search and subsequent decisions? Moreover, does information overload influence information processing with larger choice sets? We investigated these questions by letting people freely explore sets of gambles before choosing one of them, with the choice sets either increasing or decreasing in number for each participant (from two to 32 gambles). Set size influenced information search, with participants taking more samples overall, but sampling a smaller proportion of gambles and taking fewer samples per gamble, when set sizes were larger. The order of choice sets also influenced search, with participants sampling from more gambles and taking more samples overall if they started with smaller as opposed to larger choice sets. Inconsistent with information overload, information processing appeared consistent across set sizes and choice order conditions, reliably favoring gambles with higher sample means. Despite the lack of evidence for information overload, changes in information search did lead to systematic changes in choice: People who started with smaller choice sets were more likely to choose gambles with the highest expected values, but only for small set sizes. For large set sizes, the increase in total samples increased the likelihood of encountering rare events at the same time that the reduction in samples per gamble amplified the effect of these rare events when they occurred—what we call search-amplified risk. This led to riskier choices for individuals whose choices most closely followed the sample mean.     

Do we all look alike to computers?

People are better able to recognize faces of their own race than those of other races. One explanation is that this 'other-race effect' is caused by lifelong experience in which faces from some races are more common than other races. A recent article by Furl et al. tests experience-based accounts of the other-race effect by giving computer algorithms of face recognition training on preponderantly Caucasian faces. The only algorithms that reliably produced other-race effects were those that created face representations distorted to emphasize features that individuated faces.     

Do we need a concept of disease?

The terms “health”, “disease” and “illness” are frequently used in clinical medicine. This has misled philosophers into believing that these concepts are important for clinical thinking and decision making. For instance, it is held that decisions about whether or not to treat someone or whether to relieve someone of moral responsibility depend on whether the person has a disease. In this paper it is argued that the crucial role of the ‘disease’ concept is illusory. The health/disease distinction is irrelevant for most decisions and represents a conceptual straightjacket. Sophisticated and mature clinical decision making requires that we free ourselves from the concept of disease.     

Do we access meaning when we name Arabic digits? Electrophysiological evidence

In this study, we evaluated whether the naming of Arabic digits required access to semantic information. Participants named pictures and Arabic digits blocked by category or intermixed with exemplars of other categories while behavioural and electrophysiological measures were gathered. Pictures were named slower and Arabic digits faster in the blocked context relative to the mixed context. Around 350–450 ms after the presentation of pictures and Arabic digits, brain waves were more positive in anterior regions and more negative in posterior regions when the blocked context was compared with the mixed context. The pattern of electrophysiological results suggests that pictures and Arabic digits are both processed semantically and they are subject to repetition effects during the naming task.