Social desirability response bias as one source of the discrepancy between subjective weights and regression weights

This study of the judgment process investigated whether social desirability response bias is more closely associated with directly weighted subjective weights than less directly assessed regression weights. Graduating college students indicated their preferences for 11 job characteristics in four different tasks: (a) a statistical weighting task completed honestly, (b) a statistical weighting task completed to “look good” to a recruiter, (c) a subjective weighting task completed honestly, and (d) a subjective weighting task completed to “look good” to a recruiter. Predicted judgments were calculated from the weights obtained in each condition. Pearson correlation coefficients using these predicted judgments were computed between conditions; the relationship between the honest and positive impression predicted judgments derived from subjective weights was significantly greater than the relationship between honest and positive impression predicted judgments derived from regression weights for 19 of 23 participants. It was concluded that social desirability response bias was more closely related to subjective weights than to regression Weights.     

Hindsight bias in insight and mathematical problem solving: Evidence of different reconstruction mechanisms for metacognitive versus situational judgments

This article presents two experiments that used insight and mathematical problems to investigate whether different factors would affect hindsight bias on metacognitive and situational judgments. In both studies, participants initially rated their likelihood of solving each problem within a certain amount of time (metacognitive judgments) and rated the importance of each component of the problem for finding the solution (situational judgments). Next, participants attempted to solve each problem. In Experiment 1, all participants were given solution feedback information, but in Experiment 2, participants were not given any solution feedback. After 1 week, participants were asked to recall their original judgments. Hindsight bias was assessed by comparing the initial with the final ratings. Insight problems and math problems showed different patterns of hindsight bias effects on the metacognitive and situational judgments. The results suggest that two competing models of hindsight effects are actually complementary explanations for judgment reconstruction on different types of judgment tasks.     

Individual and group modelling of aesthetic judgment strategies

Individual differences in aesthetic judgments were investigated by comparing quantitative group and individual performance models of the judgment processes. Aesthetic judgments of beauty over novel, formal, graphic patterns were collected from 34 non‐artist college students using a two‐step ranking‐rating procedure. Their judgment processes were individually modelled using Judgment Analysis. The participants showed noted individual differences. Certain features of the stimulus material, which were considered to contribute to the picture's beauty by one participant, were used in an opposing fashion by another. A group model was derived based on the average ratings of the patterns' beauty. It was concluded that the group model was not an adequate representation of the present data, whereas the data revealed systematic judgment processes at the individual subject level.     

The effects of unidirectional versus bidirectional rating procedures on college students' judgments of response-outcome contingency

Studies of human contingency judgment often reveal substantial bias and inaccuracy in ratings of cause-effect relationship. This study examined the effects of different rating procedures on contingency judgment. In two experiments, college students responded to and rated a range of positive, negative, and zero contingencies presented in a free-operant format. Experiment 1 found that judgments made along a unidirectional 0 to 100 “control” scale were less sensitive to variations in contingency (especially negative ones) and were based on less sophisticated judgment strategies than judgments made along a bidirectional − 100 to + 100 “prevent-cause” scale. Experiment 2 found that informing subjects given the unidirectional scale that their responding may either cause or prevent the outcome eliminated the tendency to underestimate negative contingencies and improved the sophistication of strategy use but did not increase judgment sensitivity to the level of subjects given the bidirectional scale. Taken together, these results suggest that the bidirectional “prevent-cause” scale contributes to highly accurate and unbiased ratings of response-outcome contingency.     

A Comparison of Different Methods for the Elicitation of Attribute Weights: Structural Modeling,Process Tracing,and Self-Reports

This study investigates whether structural modeling, process tracing, and self-reports are able to provide similar information about attribute weights in multiattribute evaluation processes. In three experiments subjects had to evaluate a large number of profiles of fictitious persons described on a number of attributes. The experiments differed in type of judgment task, type of subjects, and number of attributes. Subject attribute weights were derived in all cases by fitting a statistical model (statistical weights), by analyzing verbal protocols (verbal protocol weights), and by directly asking the subject how important the attributes are for the judgments (subjective weights). Correspondence between the three sets of weights is examined in two ways: by computing the correlation between three sets of weights and by calculating how adequately the different sets of weights, applied in a linear model, can predict the subject′s judgments. The first method appears to be inappropriate for investigating correspondence. The correlations are rather unstable because of the small number of attributes, and apart from that, they tend to underestimate real correspondence when the weights in the respective sets are approximately equal. The second method shows that the three sets of weights are about equally adequate in predicting the actual subject judgments. It is concluded that this method convincingly demonstrates that the three different ways of eliciting attribute weights yield similar results.     

专业背景、主观印象和情绪对量刑决策的影响

为了考察司法决策者对案件当事人的主观印象如何影响刑罚决策及情绪在其中的作用,本研究要求法律与非法律专业被试对案情相同但对案件当事人的主观印象不同的刑事案件进行刑罚强度决策,并要求被试对犯罪行为所引发的情绪强度进行评定。研究结果发现,被试对施害人的消极印象比积极印象条件下产生更强的愤怒和厌恶情绪,更少的同情情绪,同时,给予的刑罚更重;被试对受害人的积极印象比消极印象条件下,低年级组被试对施害人给予的刑罚更重,但在高年级组被试中不存在显著差异,两组被试在情绪强度上也没有显著差异。法律专业比非法律专业被试对犯罪行为所产生的情绪强度更低。被试的专业背景对量刑决策没有显著影响。中介效应检验发现,在施害人的主观印象对刑罚决策的影响过程中,愤怒和同情表现出部分中介效应,厌恶情绪表现出完全中介效应。     

Subjective ratios and differences in perceived heaviness

In previous studies, judgments of ratios and differences in subjective magnitude have yielded similar orders, consistent with a hypothesis that a single perceived relation underlies both judgment tasks. In the present research, 15 subjects estimated heaviness differences between 28 pairs of eight weights and each of 8 groups of 10 subjects evaluated heaviness ratios of eight variable stimuli with respect to a different standard stimulus. Presenting stimuli that were equally spaced on a cube-root scale of weight enhanced expected ordinal discrepancies between ratio and difference estimates, and employing independent groups for each standard stimulus in ratio estimation eliminated a possible bias due to varying standards within the presentation sequence. Differences in orders of ratio and difference estimates together with differences in scales obtained from non-metric analyses in terms of a difference model indicated that the judgments were based on two perceived relations that are ordinally consistent with arithmetic operations of ratios and differences. A ratio scale of heaviness was derived from the combined orders of subjective ratios and differences.     

How cognitive load affects duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

A meta-analysis of 117 experiments evaluated the effects of cognitive load on duration judgments. Cognitive load refers to information-processing (attentional or working-memory) demands. Six types of cognitive load were analyzed to resolve ongoing controversies and to test current duration judgment theories. Duration judgments depend on whether or not participants are informed in advance that they are needed: prospective paradigm (informed) versus retrospective paradigm (not informed). With higher cognitive load, the prospective duration judgment ratio (subjective duration to objective duration) decreases but the retrospective ratio increases. Thus, the duration judgment ratio differs depending on the paradigm and the specific type of cognitive load. As assessed by the coefficient of variation, relative variability of prospective, but not retrospective, judgments increases with cognitive load. The prospective findings support models emphasizing attentional resources, especially executive control. The retrospective findings support models emphasizing memory changes. Alternative theories do not fit with the meta-analytic findings and are rejected.     

Accessing short-term memory with semantic and phonological information: A time-course analysis

The time course for accessing short-term memory representations on the basis of item, phonological, and semantic information was measured with a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) variant of a recognition probe task. Subjects studied 5-word lists and then judged whether a test word (1) was in the study list (item judgment); (2) rhymed with a word in the study list (rhyme judgment); or (3) was a synonym of a word in the study list (synonym judgment). Analysis of the SAT retrieval functions demonstrated that judgments based on phonological and semantic information were slower and less accurate than judgments based on composite item representations. The slower retrieval dynamics for rhyme and synonym judgments suggest that judgments based on component properties of the memory trace are mediated by either a generate or recall process distinct from the parallel or direct-access mechanism used in item judgments.     

Effects of modality on subjective frequency estimates and processing of spoken and printed words

Previous research (Garber & Pisoni, 1991; Pisoni & Garber, 1990) has demonstrated that subjective familiarity judgments for words are not differentially affected by the modality (visual or auditory) in which the words are presented, suggesting that participants base their judgments on fairly abstract, modality-independent representations in memory. However, in a recent large-scale study in Japanese (Amano, Kondo, & Kakehi, 1995), marked modality effects on familiarity ratings were observed. The present research further examined possible modality differences in subjective ratings and their implications for word recognition. Specially selected words were presented to participants for frequency judgments. In particular, participants were asked how frequently they read, wrote, heard, or said a given spoken or printed word. These ratings were then regressed against processing times in auditory and visual lexical decision and naming tasks. Our results suggest modality dependence for some lexical representations.     

Memorability judgments for high- and low-frequency words

Five experiments were conducted in order to examine subjects’ judgments of the memorability of high- (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words in the context of a recognition memory task. In Experiment 1, the subjects were provided study/test experience with a list of HF and LF words prior to making memorability judgments for a new list of HF and LF items. The findings were consistent with previous evidence (Greene & Thapar, 1994; Wixted, 1992) suggesting that subjects are not explicitly aware of the greater recognition memorability of LF words. Experiments 2–5 embedded the memorability judgment task within the recognition test itself. In these experiments, the subjects consistently gave higher memorability ratings to LF items. The contrast between the pattern of results found when the subjects made their judgments at the time of list presentation (Experiment 1) and that when they made their judgments during the recognition test (Experiments 2–5) is consistent with recent evidence that even seemingly highly related metamnemonic judgments (e.g., ease of learning judgments vs. judgments of learning for the same items) may be based on very different factors if they occur at different points in the study/test cycle. The present findings are also consistent with the possibility that very rapid retrieval of memorability information for HF and LF words may affect recognition decisions and may contribute to the recognition memory word frequency effect.     

Anchoring,Familiarity, and Confidence in the Detection of Deception

Anchoring in judgments is the tendency for the final judgment to be biased toward the initial estimate through insufficient adjustment. In the context of the detection of deception, it has been used to explain phenomena such as negative absolute leakage and the truthfulness bias. We examined the influence of order of judgment type on attitude ratings, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias. Receivers of communications should tend to anchor their judgments on the sender's attitudinal position if asked to make attitude judgments first and on the sender's behavior if asked to make truthfulness judgments first. The results partly support these predictions. Negative absolute leakage, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias were not significantly different for those who made attitude judgments before truthfulness judgments. However, results show that accuracy decreased as the session continued and there was no difference in the confidence with which truth and deception judgments were made, but there was a positive relation between confidence and truthfulness bias.     

Positive and negative remember judgments and ROCs in the plurals paradigm: Evidence for alternative decision strategies

Using old-new ratings and remember-know judgments we explored the plurals paradigm, in which studied words must be distinguished from plurality-changed lures. The paradigm allowed us to investigate negative remembering—that is, the remembering of a plural-altered study item; capacity for this judgment was found to be poorer than or equivalent to the conventional positive remembering. A response-bias manipulation affected positive but not negative remembering. The ratings were used to construct ROC curves and test the prediction of the most common dual-process theory of recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2001) that the amount of recollection can be independently estimated from ROC curves and from remember judgments. By fitting the individual data with pure signal detection theory (SDT) models and dual-process models that combined SDT and high-threshold components (HTSDT), we identified two types of subjects. For those who were better described by HTSDT, the predicted convergence of remember-know and ROC measures was observed. For those who were better described by SDT, the ROC intercept could not predict the remember rate. The data are consistent with the idea that all subjects rely on the same representation but base their decisions on different partitions of a decision space.     

Relational Judgments in an Influence Context

We contend that communication episodes tend to focus interactants’attention on one or the other of two relational judgments: dominance or affiliation. Further, when one judgment is relatively more salient, individuals will use the salient judgment as the basis for inferring other aspects of the relationship. To test that notion, a judgment study was conducted in which participants viewed a set of influence messages that varied in degree of dominance and explicitness. The influence context was chosen because it naturally highlighted dominance. After viewing the messages, participants provided ratings of dominance, explicitness, and two aspects of affiliation: liking and involvement. When the resulting data were submitted to a structural equation analysis, it was found that judgments of liking depended on judgments of explicitness and dominance. Judgments of involvement depended on judgments of liking and dominance. Both findings support the claim that one relational judgment may provide the basis for another.     

Recency and primacy in causal judgments: Effects of probe question and context switch on latent inhibition and extinction

Traditional associative models assume that associative weights are updated on a trial-by-trial basis. As a result, it is usually expected that responses based on these weights will tend to reflect the most recently presented contingencies. However, a number of studies of human causal judgments have shown primacy effects, wherein judgments obtained at the end of a series of trials are more strongly influenced by a contingency that was in force early in the sequence than by a contingency that was in force later in the sequence. The experiments described in this article replicated other work showing that requesting causal judgments during a sequence can reverse primacy and produce strong recency effects. Evidence was also obtained to suggest that primacy effects are produced by an interaction between latent inhibition and extinction processes and that requesting a judgment affects both of these processes.     

The effect of the induction of involvement on psychophysical judgments

The present investigation was based on the concept of invariance, which holds that identical principles govern the judgment of stimuli arrayed on both physically and socially defined scales. Two experiments were conducted in which involvement was manipulated through the use of instructions presented in conjunction with category judgments obtained in a training session. This was followed by an anchor session. Experiment 1 employed a series of weights as stimuli, while Experiment 2 used random pattern dot slides. The experiments were similar, except for the inclusion of two additional features in the weight study. These were: (1) positive feedback, introduced as an independent variable between the judgment sessions and tested for its effect as an enhancer of involvement; and (2) two stimuli in the anchor session not part of the original stimulus series. These weights provided a test for the generality of involvement set. Among various hypotheses tested in both studies was the expectancy that the introduction of involvement associated with the formation of a judgment scale would lessen the impact of an anchor on judgment. This expectancy was based on the observed effects of involvement in social judgment contexts. Results of both experiments supported the judgment maintenance hypothesis.     

Interpersonal Moral Conflicts Between Couples: Effects of Type of Dilemma, Role, and Partner's Judgments on Level of Moral Reasoning and Probability of Resolution

Forty-two male–female couples completed Kohlberg's test of moral development and made moral judgments about the most recent interpersonal moral conflict they had experienced in their everyday lives. Participants made lower stage moral judgments about their interpersonal moral conflicts than about the dilemmas on Kohlberg's test. The type of interpersonal moral conflict participants experienced and their role in the conflict were related to the types of moral judgments they made. Participants who reported philosophical conflicts made more mature moral judgments than participants who reported antisocial conflicts, especially if their role in the antisocial conflict was that of a transgressor. Conflicts were most likely to be resolved when partners' moral judgments about their conflict were similar in moral maturity. The implications of these findings for models of moral judgment are discussed.     

In search of the optimal measure of awareness: Discrete or continuous?

Studies of perceptual awareness require sensitive measures reflecting subjective judgments of visibility. Two scales have been proposed for this purpose: the Continuous Scale (CS) and the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). Here we compare the scales in the context of the Gabor patch orientation discrimination task and propose a Continuous Perceptual Awareness Scale (C-PAS) that aims to combine their advantages. The results of the study shown no differences in sensitivity between the scales. However, we observed differences between the scales in awareness ratings frequencies and accuracy associated with the lowest ratings. We concluded that visibility ratings are often biased, and thus, the scale sensitivity may not be optimal. Furthermore, based on the additional analyses, we argued that there is an advantage of using C-PAS over CS. The scale allows to use an additional variability of judgment within PAS categories and thus it may enable more fine-grained measurement of visibility at near-threshold conditions.