Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings

Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway. Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.     

Redeeming Apartheid's Legacy: Collective Guilt, Political Ideology, and Compensation

This paper reports two studies among white South African students on feelings of collective guilt about apartheid and attitudes to affirmative action. Study 1 reports on 21 in-depth interviews, Study 2 on results from 180 survey questionnaires. Substantial proportions of the participants in both studies displayed feelings of collective guilt. Among participants in both studies who identified strongly with white South Africans, some displayed strong feelings of collective guilt while others displayed no such feelings. Our survey data suggest that political ideology functions as a moderator. Strong feelings of guilt were found among students who identified strongly with white South Africans and defined themselves as liberals. If they defined themselves as conservatives then no feelings of collective guilt were observed. Strong feelings of collective guilt were accompanied by positive attitudes toward affirmative action. The influence of political ideology on attitudes toward affirmative action was mediated by collective guilt.     

Blameless Guilt: The Case of Carer Guilt and Chronic and Terminal Illness

My ambition in this paper is to provide an account of an unacknowledged example of blameless guilt that, I argue, merits further examination. The example is what I call carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs. Nurses and carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However, in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has the capacity to provide sufficient care; he has, in his view, done all he can. These carers cannot legitimately be blamed for failing to meet their own expectations. Yet despite acknowledging their blamelessness, they nonetheless feel guilty. My aims are threefold: first, to explicate the puzzling nature of the carer guilt phenomenon; second, to motivate the need to solve that puzzle; third, to give my own account of blameless guilt that can explain why carers feel guilty despite their blamelessness. In doing so I argue that the guilt experienced by carers is a legitimate case of guilt, and that with the right caveats it can be considered an appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of someone for whom we care.     

Guilt and Child Soldiers

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child soldiers experience are not self-censure; rather their guilt arises from their attempts to come to terms with what they see as their own morally ambiguous motives. Their guilt is appropriate because it reaffirms their commitment to morality and facilitates their self-forgiveness.     

“Patriotism à la Carte”: Perceived Legitimacy of Collective Guilt and Collective Pride as Motivators for Political Behavior

Intergroup emotions motivate behavior, yet little is known about how people perceive these emotional experiences in others. In three experiments (Ns = 109, 179, 246), we show that U.S. citizens believe collective guilt is an illegitimate emotional motivator for ingroup political behavior, while collective pride is legitimate. This differential legitimacy is due to the perception that collective guilt violates the norm of group interest, while collective pride adheres to it; those who believe ingroup interests are more important than outgroups’ exhibited this illegitimacy gap. The perception that the intergroup emotion promoted ingroup entitativity mediated the relationship between emotion (pride vs. guilt) and legitimacy; this relationship was especially strong for those high in the belief in the norm of group interest. Collective guilt can have prosocial consequences, yet the perception that it is illegitimate may hinder such consequences from being realized.     

How Different Guilt Feelings Can Affect Social Competence Development in Childhood

The authors examined how the two different dimensions of guilt feelings, needed for reparation and fear of punishment, could influence social conduct, such as prosocial and aggressive behaviors, and how they are linked to popularity in childhood. The authors hypothesized a theoretical model that they tested, fitting it with empirical data obtained from a sample of 242 Italian children 9–11 years old. Both dimensions of guilt predict prosocial and aggressive behaviors. Specifically, the feeling of guilt linked to the need for reparation tends to negatively predict aggressive behaviors, and positively predict prosocial behaviors. The feeling of guilt linked to the fear of punishment, on the contrary, tends to positively affect aggressive and negatively affect prosocial conducts in children. These results highlight that the different feelings of guilt can represent a relevant risk or protective factor for the development of social competence in childhood. Limitations, strengths, and further development of the present study are discussed.     

Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties

G.E.M. Anscombe argued that we should dispense with deontic concepts when doing ethics, if it is psychologically possible to do so. In response, I contend that deontic concepts are constitutive of the common moral experience of guilt. This has two consequences for Anscombe's position. First, seeing that guilt is a deontic emotion, we should recognize that Anscombe's qualification on her thesis applies: psychologically, we need deontology to understand our obligations and hence whether our guilt is warranted. Second, the fact that guilt is a deontic moral emotion debunks Anscombe's claim that deontic concepts are a relic of the Western, religious past: guilt feelings–hence the idea of moral duty as well–can be found in cultures without an ethics of divine command. Modern moral philosophers' interest in oughts and obligations is not an academic hobbyhorse, but a vital concern arising out of a primeval human emotion.     

Self‐Harm Focus Leads to Greater Collective Guilt: The Case of the U.S.‐Iraq Conflict

Collective guilt from harm one's group has caused an out‐group is often undermined because people minimize or legitimize the harm done (i.e., they generate exonerating cognitions). When a group action has harmed both the in‐group and an out‐group, focusing people on “self‐harm”—ways in which the in‐group has harmed itself—may elicit more collective guilt because self‐harm is less likely to be exonerated. In Study 1, American participants who focused on how the invasion of Iraq had harmed the United States expressed greater collective guilt over harm inflicted on the people of Iraq than those who focused on Iraqi suffering. Study 2 showed that this effect is due to reductions in exonerating cognitions among people focused on self‐harm. We consider the implications of these findings for intergroup reconciliation, particularly in situations where two groups have been involved in open conflict.     

Collective guilt,moral outrage,and support for helping the poor: A matter of system versus in‐group responsibility framing

We examined how the framing of responsibility for reducing socio‐economic inequality affects individuals' emotional reactions towards the poor and the willingness to engage in prosocial actions. Attribution of responsibility to either the system (government and institutions), the less deprived in‐group, or the disadvantaged out‐group (poor) was measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2). Consistent with our hypotheses, moral outrage was higher than collective guilt when system responsibility for inequalities was put forth, but collective guilt arose to reach the level of moral outrage when in‐group responsibility was emphasized. Moreover, distinguishing between collective guilt for action and for inaction, we found guilt for inaction more difficult and thus less likely to arise, unless responsibility was put on the in‐group. Collective emotions were also found to be negatively linked to system justification motivation illustrating the palliative function of legitimization processes. Finally, moral outrage predicted the willingness to act upon socio‐economic inequalities both when the system's and in‐group's responsibility was emphasized, whereas collective guilt for action (but not for inaction) predicted support for prosocial actions only when the in‐group's responsibility was engaged. These findings suggest that the specific group‐based emotions in response to poverty depend on whether the system or the in‐group is held responsible and differentially predict individuals' commitment to act.     

Nostalgia for America's past can buffer collective guilt

This research examined when, and for whom, American collective nostalgia can relieve feelings of collective guilt. In the Pilot Study, path analyses revealed that national glorification is associated with collective nostalgia, and collective nostalgia is associated with lower collective guilt. Our experimental studies test the role of these variables in determining responses to the elevated salience of past ingroup harm doing. Collective nostalgia was associated with lower collective guilt especially after reminders of America's harm doing in Study 1 . In Study 2 we predicted and showed that reminders of American harm doing would evoke spontaneous collective nostalgia for participants high in national glorification. The remaining studies tested the hypothesis that collective nostalgia serves to buffer collective guilt. Collective guilt was lower after reminders of past harm doing for participants who engaged in collective nostalgia ( Study 3 ), and this was especially pronounced for participants high in national glorification ( Study 4 ).     

Can Collective Responsibility for Perpetrated Evil Persist over Generations?

In the first part of the paper an argument is developed to the effect that (1) there is no moral ground for individual persons to feel responsible for or guilty about crimes of their group to which they have in no way contributed; and (2) since there is no irreducibly collective responsibility nor guilt at any time, there is no question of them persisting over time. In the second part it is argued that there is nevertheless sufficient reason for innocent individual members of a group (that persists over time) to take on responsibility and guilt for the evil other (earlier) members have committed. The reason depends on the acceptability of a particular psychological theory of personal identity.     

Joint Commitments

I question the adequacy of Margaret Gilbert's account of collectivefeelings of guilt as collective judgments which do not necessarilyhave any phenomenological components. I question whether joint commitment theory in its present form helps us to understand orresolve social conflicts.     

Identification with a wrongful subgroup and the feeling of collective guilt

The present study examined the relationship between group identification and the feeling of collective guilt. This study argued that identification with a subgroup of one's ingroup (subgroup identification) would predict the feeling of collective guilt better than identification with the whole ingroup (whole‐group identification). To manipulate the level of subgroup identification, we instructed participants to imagine the presence of a close friend (vs a friend of one's close friend) in a fictitious subgroup. In Experiment 1, we predicted and found that high subgroup identifiers experienced less collective guilt compared to low subgroup identifiers, regardless of their degree of whole‐group identification. In contrast, the results from Experiment 2 indicated that when the presence of the third party was made salient, high subgroup identifiers experienced more collective guilt in comparison to low subgroup identifiers. The importance of interpersonal connections for collective responsibility and the facilitating role of the third party for reconciliation of the intergroup conflicts are discussed.     

THE MORAL LEGACY OF COMMUNAL WRONGS: ETHNIC IDENTITY GROUPS AND INTERGENERATIONAL MORAL SENTIMENT

Abstract: Many individuals experience feelings of collective guilt or shame for the blameworthy historical acts of the nations or ethnic groups to which they belong. I reject the idea that collective moral sentiment rests on inherited moral responsibility. I suggest that the possibilities for individual action inherent in membership in ethnic identity groups can be a source of special moral duties. I argue that collective guilt and shame are moral emotions that individuals experience in response to complex assessments of their groups' histories and of their own practical responses to those histories. The approach I take to analyzing the concept of an ethnic identity group makes use of tools developed by Max Weber. Weber's conceptual work on social groups and related phenomena has been strongly criticized in a widely discussed book by Margaret Gilbert. I show that Gilbert's arguments fail to discredit Weberian analyses of social groups and their properties.     

对不公正历史事件的情绪反应—— 群体内疚

只要个体把自己归于施害群体, 并且承认所属群体对不道德的行为负有责任, 而无需自己参与其中, 就会体验到群体内疚, 它是一种自我聚焦的情绪。内群体责任、伤害行为的正当化、知觉到的补偿困难等认知因素都会影响群体内疚程度, 而个体的优先价值观和国家认同等会造成成员间群体内疚体验的个体差异。群体内疚的体验会促进施害群体对受害群体的道歉和补偿支持。将来伤害行为的群体内疚, 以及与其他情绪的综合考察方面还需要进一步研究。     

On Irrational Guilt

A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare, but they are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed, and in my paper I aim to give such an explanation. In particular, I will first provide a brief review of the explanations of irrational guilt that are compatible with the cognitive theories of emotions, that is, theories that presuppose that there is a causal or a constitutional connection between emotions and cognitive factors, such as judgments, beliefs or thoughts. Following many other reviewers, I found most of the explanations of irrational guilt unsatisfactory, although my reasons for critical conclusions will partly differ from the usual ones. After the review, I will defend a solution according to which it is possible to believe that an act does not have any moral costs and at the same time to have an impression that is has, which explains the guilty feelings.     

Anticipated Guilt as Behavioral Motivation

The current study posits that messages used to elicit behaviors to help unknown others must present substantial perceptions of a threat and efficacy to be successful. Given that many prosocial helping messages depict a threat to unknown others, the current investigation proposed that anticipated guilt is a motivating force behind individuals' willingness to engage in behaviors to avert the unknown‐other‐directed threat. Specifically, this study hypothesized that messages which induce substantial perceptions of (a) threat, (b) response‐efficacy, and (c) self‐efficacy would result in feelings of anticipated guilt that subsequently motivate behavioral intent and, ultimately, behaviors to avert the threat to unknown others and avoid the future guilt that they might feel personally. Brehm's (1966) psychological reactance theory, however, notes that such appeals might result in reactance and thus decrease compliance with a message's prescribed actions. Two research questions were posed to determine (a) whether or not individuals experience reactance and (b) what effect, if any, reactance has on compliance. Additionally, participants' accuracy in forecasting guilt was assessed. The proposed model and research questions were tested by focusing on the topic of bone marrow donation. Participants were assigned randomly to one of three message conditions (control and two experimental messages), completed a questionnaire and returned to complete a follow‐up survey 7–10 days later. The data were consistent with the proposed model, and additional findings indicated that participants did not experience psychological reactance and were not accurate when forecasting future feelings of guilt.     

群体内疚:界定、心理机制、行动倾向及干预策略

当个体认为内群体为外群体受到的不道德伤害负有责任时会体验到群体内疚。该情绪常见的触发情境包括过往历史的伤害事件、当下的群际冲突、不公正的社会关系及未来的伤害事件。群体认同、内群体责任和不当性评估是影响群体内疚产生的三大心理机制。群体内疚会导致施害群体对受害群体表现出积极行动,如友善态度,冲突和解、群体补偿及群际支持。通过群体肯定、自我肯定、促进共同认同、强调内群体责任及展现已有补偿行为等干预策略可以引发施害群体的群体内疚。未来的研究应澄清群体内疚的成因机制,进一步探索群体内疚与补偿行为间的作用关系。     

Guilt and focusing in decision-making

In this paper we examined the impact of a specific emotion, guilt, on focusing in decision-making. Through the focusing mechanism, when making decisions, individuals tend to restrict their thoughts to what is explicitly represented in the decisional task, disregarding alternatives. In this paper, three experiments are performed to investigate whether an emotional state of guilt can critically guide individuals' focusing, and even prevailing over the focusing mechanism. Guilty emotional state was induced by asking participants to write about a guilty related life event. The emotional state was thus neither generated by nor related to the tasks used in the experiments. Results of the first two studies show that guilt affects focusing in decision-making in the case of only one explicitly specified option (a positive or a negative one). Guilty participants, when presented with a stated option that has predominantly positive characteristics, prefer other, unspecified options over the positive one. Guilty participants faced with a stated option that has predominantly negative features tend to prefer it to other, unspecified, options, instead. Finally, experiment 3 shows that guilty participants presented with two different options (a negative vs. a positive one) having different degrees of explicitness (i.e. they are not equally represented in the decision frame), focus on the negative option, even though the latter was not explicitly represented but only hinted at the end of the text. Overall, these results suggest that guilt emotion state can play a crucial role in either strengthening or reducing the focusing mechanism. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.