Evil and the many universes response

I formulate and defend a version of the many universes (or multiverse) reply to the atheistic argument from evil. Specifically, I argue that (i) if we know that any argument from evil (be it a logical or evidential argument) is sound, then we know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. I then argue that (ii) there might be a multiverse and (iii) if so, then we do not know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. It follows that we cannot know that the atheistic argument from evil is sound, in which case we cannot be certain that the argument succeeds, and so it is rational to refuse to reject theism because of such arguments.     

An Error Concerning Noses

We identify a strategy for getting beliefs from fiction via three assumptions: (1) a certain causal generality holds in the fiction and does so because (2) causal generalities in fiction are (with noted exceptions) carried over from what the author takes to be fact; (3) the author is reliable on this topic, so what the author takes to be fact is fact. We do not question (2). While (3) will, in particular cases, be doubtful, the strategy is vulnerable more generally to the worry that what looks like a causal generality may be instead an authorial intervention of a kind from which no causal connection can be inferred; in such cases (1) turns out to be false though it may seem at first sight to be true. In consequence we have extra reason for being careful in forming beliefs based on fictions.     

The rationality of conditional cooperation

InMorals by Agreement, David Gauthier (1986) argues that it is rational to intend to cooperate, even in single-play Prisoner's Dilemma games, provided (1) your co-player has a similar intention; (2) both intentions can be revealed to the other player. To this thesis four objections are made. (a) In a strategic decision the parameters on which the argument relies cannot be supposed to be given. (b) Of each pair ofa-symmetric intentions at least one is not rational. But it is impossible to form symmetric intentions to cooperate conditionally. For the condition on which the decision depends cannot be fulfilled without deciding. (c) If one's intention has to be ascertained on the basis of information about one's past performance, it is straightforwardly rational to intend to cooperate, but there is no reason to do so in a single-play PD. (d) The argument cannot be extended ton-person games which are Gauthier's principal concern.     

The Trouble with Harrison's 'The Trouble with Tarski'

In 'The Trouble with Tarski', The Philosophical Quarterly , 48 (1998), pp. 1–22, Jonathan Harrison attacks 'Tarski-style' truth theories for both formalized and natural languages, on the grounds that (1) truth cannot be a property of sentences; (2) if it could be, T-sentences would have to be necessary truths, which they are not; and (3) T-sentences are not necessarily true and can even can be false. I reply that (1) cannot be an objection to Tarskian truth theories, since these can be formulated in terms of whatever truth bearers might be. Thesis (2) is unjustified: Harrison's argument for it depends on an equivocation. Thesis (3) is false, since the right-hand side of a T-sentence is a meta-language translation of the object-language sentence described on the left-hand side, and this guarantees its truth.
email: boisvert@phil.ufl.edu     

Reflections on some early events related to behavior analysis of child development

A series of events related to the early application of behavioral principles to child behavior and development is described. The events began in the 1930s at Columbia University with a solicited letter from John B. Watson suggesting a master's degree thesis problem, and continued through the 1950s and 1960s at the University of Washington. Specifically, these happenings resulted in (a) research demonstrating that Skinner's laboratory method for studying nonhuman organisms could be profitably applied to the laboratory study of young normal children; (b) a demonstration that by successive approximations, a normal child can be operantly conditioned to respond to an arbitrary situation; (c) research showing that the effects of simple schedules of reinforcement obtained with nonhuman organisms could be duplicated in young normal and retarded children; (d) the demonstration that Skinner's operant laboratory method could be adapted to study young children in field situations; (e) research showing that operant principles can be successfully applied to the treatment of a young autistic boy with a serious visual handicap; (f) laboratory studies showing that mothers can be trained to treat their own young children who have behavior problems; (g) an in-home study demonstrating that a mother can treat her own child who has behavior problems; (h) a demonstration that operant principles can be applied effectively to teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic to children with retardation; and (i) publication of a book, Child Development: A Systematic and Empirical Theory, in collaboration with Donald M. Baer, by Prentice Hall in their Century Psychological Series.     

A moral justification for killing in self-defence

In the first part of this paper I will argue that for a case to be one of killing in self-defence at least the following three important conditions need to be met: (i) the defender's death must seem to him/her to be imminent; (ii) there must be a choice forced upon the defender between being killed or killing his/her attacker; (iii) the responsibility for (i) and (ii) must be the attacker's. I go on to point out that a lethal use of force which meets conditions (i)—(iii) is thought by most people to be morally permissible. However we believe also that everyone has the right to life and this cannot be taken away under any circumstances. But if this is so, how can we justify one person intentionally killing another? Or to put the point differently: what, in our moral assessment of such cases, are we to claim an attacker has done that is so morally wrong we are prepared to argue that if one of them has to be killed, it is the attacker? I hope to answer this question in the second part of my paper by developing a strand of ethical thought, associated with Kant.     

Role of Moral Identity and Moral Courage Characteristics in Adolescents’ Tendencies to Be a Moral Rebel

Extending prior research on the characteristics potentially associated with adolescents’ tendencies to be a moral rebel, the present study found that adolescents themselves, their peers, and their teachers agreed on adolescents’ tendencies to (a) possess a moral identity, (b) possess moral courage characteristics, and (c) be a moral rebel. Although moral identity (when considered independently and in combination with the moral courage characteristics) did not consistently predict the tendency to be a moral rebel, all indices of the adolescents’ moral courage characteristics positively predicted the tendency to be a moral rebel.     

“Equal access” without “establishing” religion: The necessity for assessing social perspective-taking skills and institutional atmosphere

We concur withMoshman (1990) that in public high schools there should be unimpeded religious freedom if an empirical assessment shows students have the proficiency to evaluate and freely choose religious systems and practices and to discern attempts by authorities to establish a religion. We differ with Moshman,however, regarding (a) the relative importance of a school's ethical, moral and political climate in influencing the exercise of free religious and political choice; (b) his focus on religious over political freedoms; (c) what kinds of proficiencies need to be assessed; (d) how to assess these proficiencies; (e) his claim that that the reasoning ability of high school and college students is similar; and (f) the manner in which decisions permitting religious clubs in high schools should be made. Reasoning proficiency must be assessed in high school, as well as post-high school, populations of students, teachers, and administrators using a social perspective-taking task with establishment of a religion content. A school's institutional atmosphere must be assessed.     

Socio-Cultural Learning as a 'Transcendental Fact': Habermas's Postmetaphysical Perspective

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz writes, 'Our perceptions are always true, it is our judgments that come from ourselves that deceive us' (section 14). Leroy Loemker in his 'Leibniz's Doctrine of Ideas' criticizes this account of error. His main worry can be presented in the form of the following syllogistic argument, which he derives from Leibniz's doctrine of ideas: (a) There cannot be a false perception; (b) All judgments are perceptions; and therefore (c) There cannot be a false judgment. However, in this paper I argue that Leibniz can distinguish between a perception and a judgment in their semantic aspect. The sense in which a perception turns out to be false (or true) for Leibniz is different from the sense in which a judgment turns out to be false (or true). This is because, while a perception, understood in Leibniz's terms, lacks truth-conditions, a judgment, in being representational, has such conditions. Thus while a perception remains true always, a judgment can be false. Pointing to the equivocal use of 'false' in (a) and (c) above, I conclude that (c) does not follow from (a) and (b).     

Milliseconds matter: an introduction to microstrategies and to their use in describing and predicting interactive behavior

Interactive behavior is constrained by the design of the artifacts available (e.g., a mouse and button) as well as by the ways in which elementary cognitive, perceptual, and motor operations can be combined. Any 2 basic activities, for example, (a) moving to and (b) clicking on a button, can be combined to yield a limited number of microstrategies. The results of an experimental study suggest that alternative microstrategies can be deployed that shave milliseconds from routine interactive behavior. Data from a usability study are used to explore the potential of microstrategies for (a) bracketing the range of individual performance, (b) profiling individual differences, and (c) diagnosing mismatches between expected and obtained performance. These 2 studies support the arguments that the microstrategies deployed can be sensitive to small features of an interface and that task analyses at the millisecond level can inform design.     

Extending a class of motion stimuli to study multiattribute texture perception

We present a class of stimuli that makes it possible to study the interaction of visual attributes in forming textural patterns. These stimuli are obtained in a simple manner from a class of motion stimuli that we described earlier (Papathomas & Gorea, 1988). The main advantages of the texture stimuli presented in this paper are: (1) each attribute can be arranged simultaneously with, but independently of, other attributes, (2) an arbitrary number of attributes can be used, (3) the interaction of attributes can be studied systematically, (4) direct comparison of two attributes is possible with stimuli in which the two are arranged to form competing patterns, and (5) because of the similarity to the motion stimuli, the relationship between texture and motion mechanisms can be investigated.     

Nursery school children’s observation responses to novel,complex, and asymmetrical complex stimuli

Children’s observation responses to novel stimuli was found to be a function of (1) adaptation level induced by repeated presentations of a simple stimulus, (2) complexity of the stimulus, (3) asymmetry of the stimulus for some Ss, and (4) individual differences on a “stimulus differentiation” dimension. Retesting a month later showed these functions to be stable.     

The general factor of personality: Substance or artefact?

While it is now widely recognized that a general factor (GFP) can be extracted from most personality data, this finding has been subject to numerous critiques: (1) that the GFP is an artefact due to socially desirable responding; (2) that it is factorially indeterminate; (3) that it can be more parsimoniously modelled using blended variables; (4) that it shows less genetic variance due to dominance than should be true of a fitness trait; (5) that it correlates more weakly with g than would be predicted from Life History theory; (6) that it cannot be recovered across personality inventories. We present new evidence and argument to show that each of these critiques is open to reasonable doubt.     

A phenomenological survey of auditory verbal hallucinations in the hypnagogic and hypnopompic states

The phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) occurring in hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) states has received little attention. In a sample of healthy participants (N = 325), 108 participants reported H&H AVHs and answered subsequent questions on their phenomenology. AVHs in the H&H state were found (1) to be more likely to only feature the occasional clear word than to be clear, (2) to be more likely to be one-off voices than to be recurrent voices, (3) to be more likely to be voices of people known to the individual than unknown persons, (4) to be more likely to talk directly to the person rather than not, and (5) to only rarely give commands, ask questions, or to result in an interactive conversation. Their phenomenology was similar to normative AVHs in wakefulness (as established by previous research) in that the voice-hearer was usually the target of the voice, and the voice was more likely to be of a recognized person. However, H&H AVHs differed from AVHs in wakefulness in that commands and questions were rare, and there was typically no dialogical engagement with the voice. We conclude by proposing that two distinct types of H&H AVHs may exist (which we term “dialogic” and “monologic”), based on an analysis of the phenomenology of the experience, and suggest avenues for future research.     

Community Violence as It Affects Child Development: Issues of Definition

The state of the art of definition of community violence as it relates to child development was examined in terms of the definitions used in 23 empirical studies. In all cases community violence was defined in terms of what were assumed to be measurements obtained as linear combinations of a priori numerical weighting of responses to questions--asked either of a child or of the parent of a child--about experiencing and/or witnessing and/or hearing about instances of violence. Thus, the definitions can be seen to represent the perspectives of 2 kinds of observers--the child or the child's parent--and 3 levels of closeness to violence--experiencing, witnessing, or hearing about violence. Combining these perspectives and levels, the following 8 different definitions could be seen to be used in the practice of 1 or more of the 23 empirical studies: Child Self-Report (perception) of either (1) experiencing, or (2) witnessing, or (3) experiencing and witnessing, and hearing about violence; or Parent Report (perception) of the Child (4) experiencing, or (5) witnessing, or (6) experiencing and witnessing and hearing about violence, or (7) = (1) + (4), or (8) = (3) + (6). In almost all the examples of research definitions it was assumed implicitly and without test of the assumption that different violent events were interchangeable, and usually it was assumed (again without test) that the magnitudes of different violence events were equal. Usually, an unstated theory of stress appeared to guide the measurement definition, but in one study definitions were developed and tested in terms of a clearly-stated theory of learning. It was concluded that definition of community violence is a measurement problem; that very likely it is multidimensional; that it could be more nearly solved if better attention were given to specifying it in terms of theory that can be put to test and by attending to basic assumptions and principles of measurement.     

Five commandments for APA

The author delineates 5 rules of scientific review and publishing and argues that these norms need to be upheld even when to do so proves politically difficult. The 5 rules are: (a) Scientific articles should be judged only by their logic and the strength of their evidence; (b) the results of a competent peer review should be accepted; (c) disagreements with scientific articles should be aired in peer reviewed commentaries; (d) efforts to judge scientific articles on the basis of political concerns should be resisted; and (e) the explicit rules and normative expectations of peer review should not be arbitrarily altered.     

What's so special about medicine?

Health care has increasingly come to be understood as a commodity. The ethical implications of such an understanding are significant. The author argues that health care is not a commodity because health care (1) is non-proprietary, (2) serves the needs of persons who, as patients, are uniquely vulnerable, (3) essentially involves a special human relationship which ought not be bought or sold, (4) helps to define what is meant by ‘necessity’ and cannot be considered a commodity when subjected to rigorous conceptual analysis. The Oslerian conception that medicine is a calling and not a business ought to be reaffirmed by both the profession and the public. Such a conception would have significant ramifications for patient care and health care policy.     

Micko's “halo”-model for multidimensional ratio scaling

It is argued that (1) the halo-model of Micko is probably too restrictive to fit empirical data, (2) the model misrepresents unrelated percepts as bipolar structures, (3) all variations will probably be interpreted as qualitative, (4) the model requires all dimensions to be bipolar, (5) interpretations of orthogonality of factors and of factor loadings become problematic, (6) the halo may be regarded as a sort of “surface variation,” (7) the common part of two percepts is inadequately defined, and (8) the opposite part of two percepts is neglected.     

The Need to Be Different: Primary Trait Structure and Impact on Projective Drawings

The value set on behavioral variation for its own sake (or the need to be different) is a personality variable nested within social learning theory; a strong need to be different should, in theory, predispose the individual toward originality (including creativity). A self-report inventory measuring this need value (the vDiffer scale; Joy, 1998) motive was administered to undergraduates who also completed the 16 Personality Factor inventory (16PF; Cattell, Cattell, & Cattell, 1993) and House-Tree-Person (H-T-P; Buck, 1948) drawings. Three advanced art therapy graduate students rated the H-T-P protocols for technical proficiency, creativity, and personal adjustment. The need to be different correlated strongly with four primary traits: positively with Q1 (Openness to Change) and M (Abstractedness) and negatively with G (Rule-Consciousness) and Q3 (Perfectionism). Several other moderate correlations also emerged. Judgments of the technical proficiency and creativity of H-T-P drawings correlated significantly with the vDiffer score. The need to be different significantly predicted the quality of these projective drawings even when the influence of intelligence (16PF Scale B) was controlled for. The need to be different is associated with a distinctive pattern of traits and higher quality artistic expression.     

Influence of impulsivity-reflexivity when testing dynamic spatial ability: sex and g differences

This work analyzes the possibility that the differences in the performance of men and women in dynamic spatial tasks such as the Spatial Orientation Dynamic Test-Revised (SODT-R; Santacreu & Rubio, 1998), obtained in previous works, are due to cognitive style (Reflexivity-Impulsivity) or to the speed-accuracy tradeoff (SATO) that the participants implement. If these differences are due to cognitive style, they would be independent of intelligence, whereas if they are due to SATO, they may be associated with intelligence. In this work, 1652 participants, 984 men and 668 women, ages between 18 and 55 years, were assessed. In addition to the SODT-R, the "Test de Razonamiento Analitico, Secuencial e Inductivo" (TRASI [Analytical, Sequential, and Inductive Reasoning Test]; Rubio & Santacreu, 2003) was administered as a measure of general intelligence. Impulsivity scores (Zi) of Salkind and Wright (1977) were used to analyze reflexivity-impulsivity and SATO. The results obtained indicate that (a) four performance groups can be identified: Fast-accurate, Slow-inaccurate, Impulsive, and Reflexive. The first two groups solve the task as a function of a competence variable and the last two as a function of a personality variable; (b) performance differences should be attributed to SATO; (c) SATO differs depending on sex and intelligence level.