25 years of research on the use of geometry in spatial reorientation: a current theoretical perspective

The purpose of this article is to review and evaluate the range of theories proposed to explain findings on the use of geometry in reorientation. We consider five key approaches and models associated with them and, in the course of reviewing each approach, five key issues. First, we take up modularity theory itself, as recently revised by Lee and Spelke (Cognitive Psychology, 61, 152–176, 2010a; Experimental Brain Research, 206, 179–188, 2010b). In this context, we discuss issues concerning the basic distinction between geometry and features. Second, we review the view-matching approach (Stürzl, Cheung, Cheng, & Zeil, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 1–14, 2008). In this context, we highlight the possibility of cross-species differences, as well as commonalities. Third, we review an associative theory (Miller & Shettleworth, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33, 191–212, 2007; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 419–422, 2008). In this context, we focus on phenomena of cue competition. Fourth, we take up adaptive combination theory (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2006). In this context, we focus on discussing development and the effects of experience. Fifth, we examine various neurally based approaches, including frameworks proposed by Doeller and Burgess (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5909–5914, 2008; Doeller, King, & Burgess, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5915–5920, 2008) and by Sheynikhovich, Chavarriaga, Strösslin, Arleo, and Gerstner (Psychological Review, 116, 540–566, 2009). In this context, we examine the issue of the neural substrates of spatial navigation. We conclude that none of these approaches can account for all of the known phenomena concerning the use of geometry in reorientation and clarify what the challenges are for each approach.     

Interactive effects in transfer-appropriate processing for event-based prospective memory: The roles of effort, ongoing task, and PM cue properties

Past studies (e.g., Marsh, Hicks, & Cook Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 31:68–75, 2005; Meiser & Schult European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 20:290–311, 2008) have shown that transfer-appropriate processing (TAP) effects in event-based prospective memory (PM) depend on the effort directed toward the ongoing task. In the present study, we addressed mixed findings from these studies and examined monitoring in TAP and transfer-inappropriate processing (TIP) conditions. In two experiments, a semantic or orthographic ongoing task was paired with a PM cue that either was matched in processing (TAP) or did not match in processing (TIP). Within each condition, effort was varied across trials. The results indicated that PM accuracy was higher in TAP than in TIP conditions, regardless of effort condition, supporting the findings reported by Meiser and Schult. Ex-Gaussian functions were fit to the mean reaction times (cf. Brewer Journal of Psychology 219:117–124, 2011) in order to examine monitoring across conditions. The analysis of distributional skew (τ parameter) showed sensitivity to ongoing task instructions and properties of the PM cues. These results support Meiser and Schult’s suggestion that TIP conditions require more attentional processing, and they also afford novel discussion on the interactive effects of ongoing task condition, PM cue properties, and manipulations of effort.     

When disfluency is—and is not—a desirable difficulty: The influence of typeface clarity on metacognitive judgments and memory

There are many instances in which perceptual disfluency leads to improved memory performance, a phenomenon often referred to as the perceptual-interference effect (e.g., Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer, & Vaughn (Cognition 118:111–115, 2010); Nairne (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 14:248–255, 1988)). In some situations, however, perceptual disfluency does not affect memory (Rhodes & Castel (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137:615–625, 2008)), or even impairs memory (Glass, (Psychology and Aging 22:233–238, 2007)). Because of the uncertain effects of perceptual disfluency, it is important to establish when disfluency is a “desirable difficulty” (Bjork, 1994) and when it is not, and the degree to which people’s judgments of learning (JOLs) reflect the consequences of processing disfluent information. In five experiments, our participants saw multiple lists of blurred and clear words and gave JOLs after each word. The JOLs were consistently higher for the perceptually fluent items in within-subjects designs, which accurately predicted the pattern of recall performance when the presentation time was short (Exps. 1a and 2a). When the final test was recognition or when the presentation time was long, however, we found no difference in recall for clear and blurred words, although JOLs continued to be higher for clear words (Exps. 2b and 3). When fluency was manipulated between subjects, neither JOLs nor recall varied between formats (Exp. 1b). This study suggests a boundary condition for the desirable difficulty of perceptual disfluency and indicates that a visual distortion, such as blurring a word, may not always induce the deeper processing necessary to create a perceptual-interference effect.     

Perceptual and motor inhibition of return: components or flavors?

The most common evidence for inhibition of return (IOR) is the robust finding of increased response times to targets that appear at previously cued locations following a cue?Ctarget interval exceeding ~300?ms. In a variation on this paradigm, Abrams and Dobkin (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 20:467?C477, 1994b) observed that IOR was greater when measured with a saccadic response to a peripheral target than with that to a central arrow, leading to the conclusion that saccadic responses to peripheral targets comprise motoric and perceptual components (the two-components theory for saccadic IOR), whereas saccadic responses to a central target comprise a single motoric component. In contrast, Taylor and Klein (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 26:1639?C1656, 2000) discovered that IOR for saccadic responses was equivalent for central and peripheral targets, suggesting a single motoric effect under these conditions. Rooted in methodological differences between the studies, three possible explanations for this discrepancy can be found in the literature. Here, we demonstrate that the empirical discrepancy is rooted in the following methodological difference: Whereas Abrams and Dobkin (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 20:467?C477, 1994b) administered central arrow and peripheral onset targets in separate blocks, Taylor and Klein (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 26:1639?C1656, 2000) randomly intermixed these stimuli in a single block. Our results demonstrate that (1) blocking central arrow targets fosters a spatial attentional control setting that allows for the long-lasting IOR normally generated by irrelevant peripheral cues to be filtered and (2) repeated sensory stimulation has no direct effect on the magnitude of IOR measured by saccadic responses to targets presented about 1?s after a peripheral cue.     

The root cause of the attentional blink: First-target processing or disruption of input control?

Identification of the second of two targets (T2) is impaired when presented shortly after the first (T1). T1-based theories ascribe this attentional blink (AB) to a T1-initiated period of inattention. Distractor-based theories ascribe it to a disruption of input control caused by post-T1 distractors. The finding that an AB occurs without intertarget distractors (Nieuwenstein, Potter, & Theeuwes, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 35:159-169, 2009) seemingly disconfirms distractor-based theories. The present experiments addressed different ways in which distractor-based theories might account for that finding. Intertarget events were varied in four experiments. Experiment 1 replicated Nieuwenstein, Potter, and Theeuwes??s findings. The next two experiments tested two ways (lack of visual stimulation, violation of expectation) in which the blank intertarget interval might cause an AB. Experiment 4 explored whether backward-masking of T1 can account entirely for the larger AB obtained with intervening distractors or whether distractors also disrupt input control. The results disconfirm predictions from distractor-based theories and support the claim of T1-based theories that T1 processing alone is sufficient for the AB. Simulations based on the eSTST (Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 35:787-807, 2009) and the B&B models (Olivers & Meeter, Psychological Research, 115, 836-863 2008) were compared. Predictions were more accurate from the T1-based theory (eSTST) than from the distractor-based theory (B&B).     

Looking like a criminal: Stereotypical black facial features promote face source memory error

The present studies tested whether African American face type (stereotypical or nonstereotypical) facilitated stereotype-consistent categorization, and whether that categorization influenced memory accuracy and errors. Previous studies have shown that stereotypically Black features are associated with crime and violence (e.g., Blair, Judd, & Chapleau Psychological Science 15:674?C679, 2004; Blair, Judd, & Fallman Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 87:763?C778, 2004; Blair, Judd, Sadler, & Jenkins Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83:5?C252002); here, we extended this finding to investigate whether there is a bias toward remembering and recategorizing stereotypical faces as criminals. Using category labels, consistent (or inconsistent) with race-based expectations, we tested whether face recognition and recategorization were driven by the similarity between a target??s facial features and a stereotyped category (i.e., stereotypical Black faces associated with crime/violence). The results revealed that stereotypical faces were associated more often with a stereotype-consistent label (Study 1), were remembered and correctly recategorized as criminals (Studies 2?C4), and were miscategorized as criminals when memory failed. These effects occurred regardless of race or gender. Together, these findings suggest that face types have strong category associations that can promote stereotype-motivated recognition errors. Implications for eyewitness accuracy are discussed.     

A motor similarity effect in object memory

In line with theories of embodied cognition (e.g., Versace et al. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 21, 522–560, 2009), several studies have suggested that the motor system used to interact with objects in our environment is involved in object recognition (e.g., Helbig, Graf, & Kiefer Experimental Brain Research, 174, 221-228, 2006). However, the role of the motor system in immediate memory for objects is more controversial. The objective of the present study was to investigate the role of the motor system in object memory by manipulating the similarity between the actions associated to series of objects to be retained in memory. In Experiment 1, we showed that lists of objects associated to dissimilar actions were better recalled than lists associated to similar actions. We then showed that this effect was abolished when participants were required to perform a concurrent motor suppression task (Experiment 2) and when the objects to be memorized were unmanipulable (Experiment 3). The motor similarity effect provides evidence for the role of motor affordances in object memory.     

Improving memory after environmental context change: A strategy of “preinstatement”

A change in environmental context between study and test can produce detrimental effects on memory. For instance, when a change in the environment occurs after an event, memory for the event declines. However, the negative effects of context change can be eliminated when participants are provided with contextual cues. Here, we report that, as predicted by the Lehman–Malmberg model (Lehman & Malmberg Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 35(4):970, 2009, Psychological Review, 2012), participants can overcome a change in the environment by recalling the future test environment while studying, a strategy referred to as preinstatement.     

Modeling judgment of sequentially presented categories using weighting and sampling without replacement

In a series of experiments, Kusev et al. (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 37:1874–1886, 2011) studied relative-frequency judgments of items drawn from two distinct categories. The experiments showed that the judged frequencies of categories of sequentially encountered stimuli are affected by the properties of the experienced sequences. Specifically, a first-run effect was observed, whereby people overestimated the frequency of a given category when that category was the first repeated category to occur in the sequence. Here, we (1) interpret these findings as reflecting the operation of a judgment heuristic sensitive to sequential patterns, (2) present mathematical definitions of the sequences used in Kusev et al. (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 37:1874–1886, 2011), and (3) present a mathematical formalization of the first-run effect—the judgments-relative-to-patterns model—to account for the judged frequencies of sequentially encountered stimuli. The model parameter w accounts for the effect of the length of the first run on frequency estimates, given the total sequence length. We fitted data from Kusev et al. (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 37:1874–1886, 2011) to the model parameters, so that with increasing values of w, subsequent items in the first run have less influence on judgments. We see the role of the model as essential for advancing knowledge in the psychology of judgments, as well as in other disciplines, such as computer science, cognitive neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and human–computer interaction.     

Correcting the correction of conditional recency slopes

Farrell (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 324–347, 2010) presented some analyses of free recall data that suggest that recency items initially become more accessible as recall progresses, in contrast to the assumptions of temporal drift models. Moran and Goshen-Gottstein (2013) present some challenges to Farrell’s (2010) analyses of the change in conditional recency across output position in free recall. Simulations using a very basic free recall model that controls conditional recency across recall show that Farrell’s (2010) analyses are not substantially biased, while the procedure proposed by Moran and Goshen-Gottstein introduces a substantial underestimation of the true slopes. The null slopes observed in immediate recall by Moran and Goshen-Gottstein are not informative of the true slopes characterizing the data. Accordingly, Farrell’s (2010) results continue to present a challenge to temporal drift models.     

Hierarchical modeling of contingency-based source monitoring: A test of the probability-matching account

According to the probability-matching account of source guessing (Spaniol & Bayen, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 28:631–651, 2002), when people do not remember the source of an item in a source-monitoring task, they match the source-guessing probabilities to the perceived contingencies between sources and item types. In a source-monitoring experiment, half of the items presented by each of two sources were consistent with schematic expectations about this source, whereas the other half of the items were consistent with schematic expectations about the other source. Participants’ source schemas were activated either at the time of encoding or just before the source-monitoring test. After test, the participants judged the contingency of the item type and source. Individual parameter estimates of source guessing were obtained via beta-multinomial processing tree modeling (beta-MPT; Smith & Batchelder, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 54:167–183, 2010). We found a significant correlation between the perceived contingency and source guessing, as well as a correlation between the deviation of the guessing bias from the true contingency and source memory when participants did not receive the schema information until retrieval. These findings support the probability-matching account.     

The conditional-recency dissociation is confounded with nominal recency: Should unitary models of memory still be devaluated?

The conditional-recency dissociation between immediate and delayed free recall FR; Farrell (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, 324–347, 2010) has critical implications regarding the prolonged debate between unitary and dual-store models of memory. In immediate FR, when the availability of items is controlled for, the recency of the final list item increases across the first few output positions. No such increase is found in delayed FR, with a trend in the opposite direction. This dissociation challenges temporal context TCM; Howard & Kahana (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 46, 269–299, 2002) and distinctiveness SIMPLE; Brown, Neath, & Chater (Psychological Review, 114, 539–576, 2007) unitary models of memory and suggests the involvement of a short-term buffer in immediate FR. We show that this dissociation is confounded with the different magnitudes of nominal recency (i.e., the prevalence of the final list item) found in immediate as compared to delayed FR. By reshuffling output orders and comparing the empirical results to those of a null hypothesis of no output-order effect, we controlled for the greater prevalence of the final list item that has been observed in immediate FR. Under this control, we found no evidence for a dissociation in the tendency to recall the final list item across output positions. This finding suggests that the conditional-recency dissociation imposes no new constraint on unitary models of memory. More generally, we demonstrate how biases that influence measures of output-order tendencies (e.g., conditional recency) can be controlled for, thus yielding “purer” measures of these variables.     

Dissociating location-specific inhibition and attention shifts: Evidence against the disengagement account of contingent capture

The study of attentional capture has provided a rich context for assessing the relative influence of top-down and bottom-up factors in visual perception. Some have argued that attentional capture by a salient, irrelevant stimulus is contingent on top-down attentional set (e.g., Folk, Remington, & Johnston, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 18:1030?C1044, 1992). Others, however, have argued that capture is driven entirely by bottom-up salience and that top-down factors influence the postallocation speed of disengagement from the irrelevant stimulus (e.g., Theeuwes, Acta Psychologica 135:77?C99, 2010a). In support of this speed-of-disengagement hypothesis, recent findings from the modified spatial-cuing paradigm show that cues carrying a no-go target property produce reverse, or negative, cuing effects, consistent with inhibition of the cue location from which attention has been very quickly disengaged (Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72, 326?C341, 2010). Across six experiments, we show that this inhibitory process can be dissociated from shifts of spatial attention and is, thus, not a reliable marker of capture. We conclude that the data are inconsistent with the predictions of the disengagement hypothesis.     

Negative Emotions Moderate the Relationship Between Self-Efficacy and Achievement of Filipino Students

The study tested the hypothesis that negative academic emotions moderate the relationship between self-efficacy and achievement. The moderating effect of four negative academic emotions (anger, anxiety, shame, and hopelessness) was investigated in 1345 university students of trigonometry, who answered the Academic Emotions Questionnaire-Math (Pekrun et al. Educational Psychology Review 18:315–341, 2005) and a self-efficacy scale (Pintrich et al. Journal of Educational Psychology 82:33–40, 1991). Results of the moderation analysis indicated the higher self-efficacy was related to higher grades among students who reported lower levels of negative academic emotions. Self-efficacy had minimal or no effect on grades among students who reported higher levels of negative academic emotions. The results are discussed in terms of how negative emotions may indicate negative appraisals of the value of the task and/or task outcomes, and thus weaken the positive links between cognitive and motivational variables and learning.     

Vindicating Virtue: A Critical Analysis of the Situationist Challenge Against Aristotelian Moral Psychology

This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from four paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27:100–108, 1973), Isen and Levin (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21:384–388, 1972), and Milgram (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67:371–378, 1963). It then presents ten problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After challenging the situationists on these grounds, the article then proceeds to challenge the situationist presentation of the Aristotelian conception, showing that situationists have provided an oversimplified caricature of it that goes against the grain of much Aristotelian text. In evaluating the situationist challenge against the actual results from empirical research as well as primary Aristotelian text, it will be shown that the situationist debate has advanced both an extreme, untenable view about the nature of characteristics and situations, as well as an inaccurate presentation of the Aristotelian view.     

Mindful Learning: A Moderator of Gender Differences in Mathematics Performance

Past research has demonstrated that males outperform females in mathematics (Hyde, J. S., Fennema, E., & Lamon, S. J., Psychol Bull 107:139–155, 1990a). Research has also shown that encouraging mindful learning–learning information in a conditional rather than an absolute way–can increase mathematics performance in females (Ritchhart, R., & Perkins, D. N., J Social Issues 56:27–47, 2000). This paper examines the moderating role of mindful learning for gender differences, by manipulating mindful learning for females’ and males’ performance on a novel math task. The results from this study show that males performed better than females when mindful learning was not encouraged (absolute instruction), but males and females performed equally well when mindful learning was encouraged (conditional instruction). Thus we find that mindful learning moderates gender differences in math performance.     

Assessing the local identifiability of probabilistic knowledge structures

Given a collection Q of problems, in knowledge space theory Doignon & Falmagne, (International Journal of Man–Machine Studies 23:175–196, 1985) the knowledge state of a student is the collection K ? Q of all problems that this student is capable of solving. A knowledge structure is a pair (Q, ), where is a collection of knowledge states that contains at least the empty set and Q. A probabilistic knowledge structure (PKS) is a knowledge structure (Q, , π), where π is a probability distribution on the knowledge states. The PKS that has received the most attention is the basic local independence model BLIM; Falmagne & Doignon, (British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 41:1–23, 1988a, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 32:232–258, 1988b). To the best of our knowledge, systematic investigations in the literature concerning the identifiability of the BLIM are totally missing. Based on the theoretical work of Bamber and van Santen (Journal of Mathematical Psychology 29:443–473, 1985), the present article is aimed to present a method and a corresponding computerized procedure for assessing the local identifiability of the BLIM, which is applicable to any finite knowledge structure of moderate size.     

It depends on how you look at it: Scanpath comparison in multiple dimensions with MultiMatch, a vector-based approach

Eye movement sequences??or scanpaths??vary depending on the stimulus characteristics and the task (Foulsham & Underwood Journal of Vision, 8(2), 6:1?C17, 2008; Land, Mennie, & Rusted, Perception, 28, 1311?C1328, 1999). Common methods for comparing scanpaths, however, are limited in their ability to capture both the spatial and temporal properties of which a scanpath consists. Here, we validated a new method for scanpath comparison based on geometric vectors, which compares scanpaths over multiple dimensions while retaining positional and sequential information (Jarodzka, Holmqvist, & Nystr?m, Symposium on Eye-Tracking Research and Applications (pp. 211?C218), 2010). ??MultiMatch?? was tested in two experiments and pitted against ScanMatch (Cristino, Math?t, Theeuwes, & Gilchrist, Behavior Research Methods, 42, 692?C700, 2010), the most comprehensive adaptation of the popular Levenshtein method. In Experiment 1, we used synthetic data, demonstrating the greater sensitivity of MultiMatch to variations in spatial position. In Experiment 2, real eye movement recordings were taken from participants viewing sequences of dots, designed to elicit scanpath pairs with commonalities known to be problematic for algorithms (e.g., when one scanpath is shifted in locus or when fixations fall on either side of an AOI boundary). The results illustrate the advantages of a multidimensional approach, revealing how two scanpaths differ. For instance, if one scanpath is the reverse copy of another, the difference is in the direction but not the positions of fixations; or if a scanpath is scaled down, the difference is in the length of the saccadic vectors but not in the overall shape. As well as having enormous potential for any task in which consistency in eye movements is important (e.g., learning), MultiMatch is particularly relevant for ??eye movements to nothing?? in mental imagery and embodiment-of-cognition research, where satisfactory scanpath comparison algorithms are lacking.