Social comparison and confidence: When thinking you’re better than average predicts overconfidence (and when it does not)

A common social comparison bias—the better-than-average-effect—is frequently described as psychologically equivalent to the individual-level judgment bias known as overconfidence. However, research has found “Hard–easy” effects for each bias that yield a seemingly paradoxical reversal: Hard tasks tend to produce overconfidence but worse-than-average perceptions, whereas easy tasks tend to produce underconfidence and better-than-average effects. We argue that the two biases are in fact positively related because they share a common psychological basis in subjective feelings of competence, but that the “hard–easy” reversal is both empirically possible and logically necessary under specifiable conditions. Two studies are presented to support these arguments. We find little support for personality differences in these biases, and conclude that domain-specific feelings of competence account best for their relationship to each other.     

Overconfidence and underconfidence: When and why people underestimate (and overestimate) the competition

It is commonly held that people believe themselves to be better than others, especially for outcomes under their control. However, such overconfidence is not universal. This paper presents evidence showing that people believe that they are below average on skill-based tasks that are difficult. A simple Bayesian explanation can account for these effects and for their robustness: On skill-based tasks, people generally have better information about themselves than about others, so their beliefs about others’ performances tend to be more regressive (thus less extreme) than their beliefs about their own performances. This explanation is tested in two experiments that examine these effects’ robustness to experience, feedback, and market forces. The discussion explores the implications for strategic planning in general and entrepreneurial entry in particular.     

Testing four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect: Single- and multi-item entities as comparison targets and referents

In six experiments, we tested four explanations for the better/worse-than-average effect (B/WTA) by manipulating the number of items comprising the target or referent of direct comparison. A single-item target tended to be rated more extremely than a single-item or a multi-item referent (Experiments 1–3). No B/WTA was obtained, however, when a multi-item target was compared with either a single- or multi-item referent (Experiments 4 and 5). A bias favoring a multi-item target was found only if cohesiveness among the items was increased through instructions (Experiment 6). The Unique-Attributes Hypothesis generally provided the best explanation the findings; the focalism explanation also demonstrated some empirical viability. The results suggest that important preferential decision-making outcomes can be affected by both the number of items and whether items are strategically manipulated to serve as targets or referents of comparison.     

Defining body deception and its role in peer based social comparison theories of body dissatisfaction

The purpose of the current study was to operationalize the phenomenon of body deception, describe its theoretical importance, and validate its existence in an experimental paradigm. The definition of body deception includes the intentional misrepresentation of information about appearance to others. The present study examined body deception in a controlled experimental study of male and female same-sex peer groups using a series of hierarchical linear models. Ninety male and 90 female undergraduates were randomized to an experimental same-sex peer group or individual control condition. The results suggested that both men and women used body deception among peers, but men's body deception was muscularity driven whereas women's was thinness driven. Body dissatisfaction was significantly predictive of the degree of body deception used by both genders and it was significantly related to peer group membership. An integrated model for the role of body deception in body image disturbance is proposed.     

Not all happy people are lazy or stupid: Evidence of systematic processing in happy moods

Two experiments investigated the effects of mood on the use of global trait information in impression formation tasks. Participants in both experiments formed an impression of a target based on traits and a series of behaviors that were both consistent and inconsistent with the traits. In Experiment 1, participants in happy moods, relative to those in unhappy moods, made impression judgments that reflected the evaluative implications of the trait information to a greater extent than the behaviors, regardless of the order in which they received the information. In Experiment 2, both happy and sad participants engaged in systematic processing, as reflected by the recall data, but only happy participants’ recall of target information was significantly biased by the global trait information they received. These findings are consistent with the affect-as-information model in which affective cues influence the extent to which individuals rely on general knowledge and, importantly, are inconsistent with models that posit that happiness results in reduced motivation or ability to process information carefully.     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

Losing sight of oneself in the above-average effect: When egocentrism, focalism, and group diffuseness collide

Four experiments examined the relative influence of three causal processes in the above-average effect (AAE) and related comparative biases: (a) egocentrism, (b) focalism, and (c) referent group diffuseness. By manipulating the inclusion or exclusion of the self from the referent group (Experiments 1-3) or target group (Experiment 4), the relative contributions of each influence were assessed. In direct comparisons, single peers were systematically judged more favorably relative to groups including the self, suggesting that egocentrism plays a lesser role than focalism or group diffuseness. Thus, in response to the question such as “How friendly is Nancy compared to the rest of us?” the answer tends to be “More friendly.”     

Preferred changes in power differences: Effects of social comparison in equal and unequal power relations

Efforts to change power differences with others who are equal and unequal in power were examined. According to social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954; Rijsman, 1983), people prefer slight superiority in power over comparison others. In Experiment 1, 93 participants imagined working with two others in a group. Group members varied in hierarchical rank and on exact power scores. Participants indicated their preferred changes in power differences. Social comparison theory was supported regarding rank differences, but not regarding power scores. In Experiment 2, 145 participants imagined a similar group setting. Group members were equal, unequal, or very unequal in power. Social comparison theory was supported regarding ranks: power differences with an equally powerful person were increased more often than with a less powerful person. Power scores again yielded no effects. This suggests that social comparisons of power are based on rank and not interval information.