The depoliticization of Karl Lashley: A response to Dewsbury

In this response to Donald Dewsbury's article, I address Dewsbury's criticisms of my interpretation of Karl Lashley by, first, disputing Dewsbury's characterization of my historiographic stance. I then go on to address Dewsbury's specific points, particularly regarding Lashley's racism and hereditarianism, which I argue are central to an understanding of the context of his science. I conclude by criticizing Dewsbury's proposed personality theory of Lashley on the grounds that it depoliticizes Lashley by psychologizing him.     

Transcendental realisms in the philosophy of science: on Bhaskar and Cartwright

I consider two transcendental arguments for realism in the philosophy of science, which are due to Roy Bhaskar (A realist theory of science, 1975) and Nancy Cartwright (The dappled world, 1999). Bhaskar and Cartwright are both influential figures, however there is little discussion of their use of transcendental arguments in the literature. Here I seek to correct this oversight. I begin by describing the role of the transcendental arguments in question, in the context of the broader philosophical theories in which they are embedded, by Bhaskar and Cartwright respectively. I then consider some specific problems that arise for these particular transcendental arguments, in the context of contemporary philosophy of science. I raise two general problems for transcendental arguments for realism and I finish by spelling out what needs to be done to address the criticisms raised in this paper.     

We Are All Much More Simply Unsettled Than Otherwise: Reply to Commentaries by González,Rozmarin, and Tummala-Narra

In this paper I respond to the commentaries by González, Rozmarin, and Tummala-Narra and address some of the issues they raise. These are the themes of unsettledness, the anxiety of the immigrant as well as of the “native,” the experience of marginalization, and the topic of secrecy and privacy. I appreciate that I am included in this inspiring dialogue and have the opportunity to rethink my paper in the context of the current social and political frame.     

Putnam’s account of apriority and scientific change: its historical and contemporary interest

In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of relativized a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by Michael Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a priori scientific principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or “entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly distinguished, and that only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the relationship between the constitutive function a priori principles and entrenchment.     

Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess

I consider the evolution of our relational ideal—its implications for our therapeutic goals, our patients, and for ourselves. Who do we aim to be in the consulting room? How do we view our patient—her potential and her limitations? What are the clinical goals of a relational analysis? What might those goals occlude? In this context I address the historical excesses of our ideal and the ways we may have gone too far.     

Morally Respectful Listening and its Epistemic Consequences

This paper focuses on the phenomenon of morally respectful listening. I defend a specific requirement for respectful listening in the context of disagreement. According to it, when listening occurs in the context of disagreement, the morally respectful listener must be open to the possibility that the speaker will surprise the listener with her positive epistemic qualities. That is, the listener must be open to what I call “epistemic surprise.” I also argue for a specific interpretation of this openness: to be open to epistemic surprise is to be open to unexpected changes in confidence levels concerning the proposition in question. I close by arguing that respectful listening is incompatible with a listener's being certain, and I apply this conclusion to three recent debates in epistemology to show that the phenomenon of listening has potentially far-reaching consequences for epistemology.     

Educational justice and transnational migration

ABSTRACT

In this paper I address the distributive, inclusive, and relational dimensions of educational justice individually in relation to transnational migration. First, I thematize distributive issues with regard to immigrant students, the central question being whether these students are entitled to more or less educational resources as non-immigrant students. Second, I discuss to which extent and in which sense enabling immigrant students to participate fully in the social and political life of their receiving country is a demand of educational justice. Third, I elaborate on which kinds of educational interactions – in the first place, which types of teaching – could perpetuate unjust treatment of those students in the form of disrespect. I claim that educational justice with regard to immigrated students consists in their enabling to full social and political participation by a mode of teaching that positively addresses students’ biographical experiences with migration, and by constructing school curricula which encourage inter-lingual, inter-cultural, and inter-contextual translations in the classroom. That is to say, that educational justice in context of migration is to be ultimately understood as relational justice, or more specific – as a matter of just pedagogical relations.     

Engaging religious experience in stroke rehabilitation

In this article, I respond to the problem of engaging with religious experience in health care environments. In particular, I illuminate the relational aspects of religious experience in the context of stroke rehabilitation by providing a commentary on data gathered from existing qualitative research and personal narratives in the acute and rehabilitation phases of stroke recovery. In so doing, I address the necessary balance of empathy and alterity in the art of resonant listening. I also provide some critical reflections on interdisciplinary approaches to engaging with religious experience with reference to a largely overlooked group of health care professionals—hospital chaplains.     

Do We Need a Psychology of Women in the Islamic World?

In these brief remarks I use the present collection of papers to this special issue on women in the Muslim World to address broader questions about a psychology of women in Islam. I discuss what might constitute Muslim culture, arguing that the combination of the themes of religiosity, collectivism, tightness, conservatism, gender differentiation and patriarchy, and honor offer a good starting point as a taxonomy for a distinct Islamic culture. Next, I discuss the present contributions to this special issue in the broader context of challenges faced by women in Muslim cultures, which are often among the most gender unequal in the world. Finally, I offer some suggestions for advancing cultural research on women in the Islamic World.     

To Be Is to Betray: On the Place of Collective History and Freedom in Psychoanalysis

This paper explores an open frontier between psychoanalysis and critical theory, the relations between subjective experience and collective history. Its drive is a concern with the question of freedom: How might contemporary psychoanalysis help us think about freedom? How could it, as a practice, help us to be free? On the theoretical level, the paper follows the critique of psychoanalysis offered by Foucault and Adorno, particularly the latter's close reading Ferenczi in Negative Dialectics and his notion of “the spell.” I employ their critique in order to articulate the dilemma psychoanalysis faces vis-à-vis the notion of freedom in social context. I argue that, unlike traditional psychoanalytic discourse, relational psychoanalysis can address this dilemma in a generative way. I find this prospect in the readiness of relational psychoanalysis to realize the potential inherent in the psychoanalytic setting: the creation of a mutually constituted intersubjective space. I tell the story of a young woman for whom love seems impossible, and of a psychoanalytic expedition that finds her ability to love being held hostage. I suggest that what appears in one register as gender and sexual trouble appears in another as a dilemma of attachments and loyalties: my patient's ability to love is spellbound, trapped in a subjective-collective no man's land between her desire to be for herself and the unconscious demands of collective heritage. I argue that for psychoanalysis to be a practice of freedom, it must address the ways in which subjective experience answers to social forces and collective history. I question in this context the relations between freedom, guilt, and responsibility. Re-engaging Adorno, I agree that selfhood may always involve a guilty betrayal of others but argue against him that we must allow this guilt to be reconciled with living. I suggest, in conclusion, that theory is the bearer of collective responsibility.     

To Be Saved and Not Saved: The Ongoing Challenge of Working in the Depressive Position: Reply to Commentaries

In this response to the generative commentaries by Stefanie Solow Glennon and Steven Cooper, I address issues taken up by the two discussants, including the analyst’s challenges to both work in and help her patient work in the depressive position, and to envision a sense of psychic future. I also explore questions related to Relational notions of therapeutic action, in the context of a recent panel in Psychoanalytic Dialogues that considers whether Relational psychoanalysis has gone too far in the direction of relationality and away from privacy, contemplation, and reverie.     

The De of Levinas: Cultivating the Heart-Mind of Radical Passivity

This essay explores the early Chinese text Guanzi to address the question of ethical responsibility in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. We begin with the premise that being responsive to the other, feeling the impossibility of renouncing ethical obligation, and experiencing the basic moral asymmetry at the heart of Levinas’s project all rely on the welcome openness of the subject that Levinas describes as the subject’s “radical passivity.” However, his emphasis on infinite responsibility, coupled with the theme of radical passivity, gives the problematic impression that ethics amounts to a never-ending to-do list for the other, and certainly this is not what Levinas means. We turn to the Guanzi, which recommends that the ethically efficacious sage-prince must cultivate a state of passive stillness and inner vacuity. Only because the sage-prince maintains this deferential heart-mind is he freely open and responsive to others. Here the sage-prince looks strikingly like a good Levinasian: He is deferential, sensitive to context, and hyper-aware of the limits of his own knowledge. The Guanzi goes on to describe specific practices the sage-prince can employ to cultivate his ethical prowess, including practices of meditation and gentle physical exercises. Taking this insight into Levinas’s context, we suggest that such practices of self-regulation are necessary to enable effective responsiveness to the other. From this perspective, responsibility is “infinite” not because I am perpetually beholden to the other’s whims, but because I am perpetually accountable for calming and clearing my own mind of the unstable emotions, selfish desires, and intellectual machinations that prevent the welcome openness of radical passivity.     

Putting Justice at the Heart of Faith: Reflecting on Ecumenism from an Asian Perspective

As we celebrate 60 years of the Christian Conference of Asia, it becomes incumbent on us to reflect on what it means to speak of ecumenism from an Asian perspective. What is uniquely Asian about ecumenism in Asia? And how have Asians imagined ecumenism and contributed to the larger ecumenical discourse? In this article, I shall first consider what is specific to the Asian context and specifically map both Asian continental uniqueness and the Asian context itself; secondly, I will look at specific issues in Asian ecumenism; and lastly, I will attempt to chart trajectories for Asian ecumenism by seeking an alternative interpretation of the marks of the church as expounded in the Nicene Creed.     

Husserl’s Phenomenology of Animality and the Paradoxes of Normality

In this article, I will discuss the Husserlian phenomenology of animality, by focusing on several texts of the 1920s in which the animal is determined as an abnormal variation of the human being. My aim is to address the question of the abnormality of the animal by reintegrating it in its original context, which is Husserl’s theory of normality. I will sketch the general framework of this theory, its articulations and strata, in order to eventually raise some paradoxical issues, specifically in relation to how the question of animality is interpreted through the couple normality/abnormality.     

The uneasy (and changing) relationship of health care and religion in our legal system

This article provides a brief introduction to the interplay between law and religion in the health care context. First, I address the extent to which the commitments of a faith tradition may be written into laws that bind all citizens, including those who do not share those commitments. Second, I discuss the law’s accommodation of the faith commitments of individual health care providers—hardly a static inquiry, as the degree of accommodation is increasingly contested. Third, I expand the discussion to include institutional health care providers, arguing that the legal system’s resistance to accommodating the morally distinct identities of institutional providers reflects a short-sighted view of the liberty of conscience. Finally, I offer some tentative thoughts about why these dynamics become even more complicated in the context of Islamic health care providers.     

Psychotherapy with compulsively striving professional women 2: Clinical issues

In a previous paper I described the common characteristics of seventeen women between the ages of 22 and 42 with whom I had worked over the past few years in private psychotherapy practice, and who, I suggest, constitute a specific patient group, which I call ‘compulsively striving professional women’. I went on to explore the developmental, theoretical, cultural and systemic context of this group. In this paper I consider the challenging clinical issues raised in working with them.     

Feminist Epistemology, Contextualism, and Philosophical Skepticism

Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems.     

Legal rulings on suicide in India and implications for the right to die

In this paper I am concerned to address the question of voluntary or self‐willed death from two distinct positions—a particular community's socio‐religious practice (viz. Jaina sallekhanā) and as the matter stands in law (penal code, constitution, judicial wisdom, etc.) in India—in the light of the recent move by a bench of its apex court striking down the penal code section proscribing suicide. I also wish to draw out some implications of these deliberations for the beneficence of medical practice and related bio‐ethical ramifications in the Indian context.     

Female Adolescents, Sexual Empowerment and Desire: A Missing Discourse of Gender Inequity

In this commentary, I offer a response to Lamb & Peterson (2011). I base these comments on the feminist scholarship on adolescent girls’ healthy sexuality that Lamb (2010a) critiqued in the first of this series. I address and redress several of her concerns by providing the context and history of my own research and recovering the meanings of desire, pleasure and subjectivity as they appeared in this body of work. I then engage Lamb and Peterson’s points of consensus about the role of sexual empowerment in adolescent girls’ healthy sexuality by 1) positioning sexualization as more than a context; 2) identifying a missing discourse of gender inequity as a central issue in their discussion; and 3) explaining how the use of theory and interpretation in feminist research methods is necessary for and distinct from a surface reading of narratives of lived experience. Finally, I will provide examples of some alternative paths for supporting healthy adolescent women’s sexuality that extend beyond school-based sex education and media literacy into alternative engagements with girls through technology, media activism and participatory practices.     

RELEASING THE FEMININE VOICE: A CAVELLIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

How can we imagine anew the discipline of philosophy of religion, given the feminist critiques that it privileges thinking driven by the needs of male subject formation? I address this question first by arguing with Cavell that a specific masculine aversion of erotic reciprocity produces a particular skeptical epistemology. Overcoming this phallocentric thinking requires therefore a new eros. Secondly, I will argue that the fluidly gendered subjectivities I detect in Cavell's work on film enable such a new erotic and epistemic orientation. I conclude by outlining the consequences of this orientation for the pursuits of philosophy of religion.