Moral virtue and practical wisdom: theme comprehension in children, youth, and adults

The authors tested 3 hypotheses about the relation of moral comprehension to prudential comprehension by contrasting comprehension of themes in moral stories with comprehension of themes in prudential stories among third-grade, fifth-grade, and college students (n = 168) in Study 1, and among college students, young and middle-aged adults, and older adults (n = 96) in Study 2. In both studies, all groups were statistically significantly better at moral theme comprehension than prudential theme comprehension, suggesting that moral comprehension may develop prior to prudential comprehension. In Study 2, all groups performed equally on moral theme generation whereas both adult groups were significantly better than college students on prudential theme generation. Overall, the findings of these studies provide modest evidence that moral and prudential comprehension each develop separately, and that the latter may develop more slowly.     

Shu and zhong as the virtue of the Golden Rule: a Confucian contribution to contemporary virtue ethics

I aim to show how Confucian philosophy can contribute to the contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics education by arguing that it has the resource to address a lacuna in Aristotelian ethics. Aristotelian ethics, which is arguably the main resource of contemporary virtue ethics, lacks a virtue that corresponds to the notion of loving each person as one’s self or the Golden Rule. To be more precise, Aristotelian ethics has no virtue about loving all people as one’s self, although philia comes close but is precisely limited because it lacks universality. However, I believe that Dai Zhen’s interpretation of the Confucian virtues of shu and zhong does have this universal scope which philia lacks. For Dai, the ground for loving another is not any characteristic that a particular group of people have in common, such as, in the case of philia, being virtuous. Rather, the ground is universal human nature itself.     

Three sources of wisdom of Chinese traditional virtue and a contemporary examination

There are three explanations of the sources of virtue in the history of Chinese traditional ethical thoughts. The first source is tian Dao (the Dao of Heaven) (natural), the second is xing Dao (the Dao of nature) (mind-nature), and the third is ren Dao (the Dao of human) (social). These explanations not only demonstrate the unique wisdom of ancient Chinese thinkers in constructing mortality, but also have special revelations for us to comprehend more accurately the Chinese traditional morality, to clear up the wrong ideas about morality that have formed since modern times, to make virtue ‘present’ instead of ‘latent’, and to construct a moral society. __________ Translated from Fujian Luntan 福建论坛 (Fujian Forum) (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), 2005 (2) by Xi Liuqin & Peng Hua     

Confucianism and its Modern Values: Confucian moral,educational and spiritual heritages revisited

This article argues that what makes Confucianism a living tradition in the modem world cannot be any fixed pattern of familial, social and political life. The modem relevance of Confucianism is in its moral and spiritual values. Among these values, its concern about moral responsibilities, its emphasis on the importance of transmission of values, and its humanistic understanding of life, are the key elements for the Confucian relevance to the future, and will make a contribution to an ethic of responsibility, give a new momentum to the establishment of a comprehensive education system, and help people in their search for the ultimate meaning of life in the age of the global village.     

Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account

According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters.     

Bolzanian knowing: infallibility,virtue and foundational truth

The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do so by searching for the objective grounds of the truths asserted lies at the heart of Bolzano’s notion of knowledge. However, the explanatory task of searching for grounds requires methods that cannot warrant infallibility. Hence, its constitutive role in a conception of knowledge seems to imply the fallibility of such knowledge. I argue that the explanatory task contained in Bolzanian knowing involves a high degree of epistemic virtues, and that it is only through some salient virtue that the credit of infallibility can distinguish Bolzanian knowing from a high degree of Bolzanian believing.     

Moral paternalism,virtue, and autonomy

According to colour irrealism, material objects do not have colour; they only appear to have colour. The appeal of this view, prominent among philosophers and scientists alike, stems in large part from the conviction that scientific explanations of colour facts do not ascribe colour to material objects. To explain why objects appear to have colour, for instance, we need only appeal to surface reflectance properties, properties of light, the neurophysiology of observers, etc.

Typically attending colour irrealism is the error theory of ordinary colour judgement: ordinary judgements in which colour is ascribed to a material object are, strictly speaking, false. In this paper, I claim that colour irrealists who endorse the error theory cannot explain how we acquire colour concepts (yellow, green, etc.), concepts they must acknowledge we do possess. Our basic colour concepts, I argue, could not be phenomenal concepts that we acquire by attending to the colour properties of our experience. And, I explain, all other plausible explanations render colour concepts such that our ordinary colour judgements involving them are often true. Given the explanatory considerations upon which the irrealist's position is based, this is a severe problem for colour irrealism.     

Entrapment,temptation and virtue testing

Philosophical Studies - We address the ethics of scenarios in which one party (the ‘agent’) entraps, intentionally tempts or intentionally tests the virtue of another (the...     

Oriental wisdom for interpersonal life: Confucian ideal personality traits (Junzi personality) predict positive interpersonal relationships

Junzi personality refers to traits of ideal persons in Confucian philosophy and is a key to East-Asian indigenous personality studies. We proposed that Junzi personality predicts positive interpersonal relationships, mediated by internal and external attributions in affiliation goal areas. Participants from China (N = 337) completed self- and peer-rated questionnaires in three stages over a 4-month period. Results showed that Junzi personality significantly and positively predicted self-rated interpersonal competence and satisfaction and peer ratings of interpersonal performance. These effects were significantly mediated by internal and external attributions for affiliation. This research provides personality and interpersonal psychology insights by culturally compatible measures and frameworks rooted in East-Asian philosophy and also contributes to the literature on antecedents and consequences of affiliation attribution.     

Cognitive bias,situationism, and virtue reliabilism

Synthese - Mark Alfano claims that the heuristics and biases literature supports inferential cognitive situationism, i.e., the view that most of our inferential beliefs are arrived at and retained...     

Hylomorphic virtue: cosmology,embryology, and moral development in Aristotle

Aristotle is traditionally read as dividing animal souls into three parts (nutritive, perceptive, and thinking), while dividing human souls into four parts (a rational part, with theoretical and practical subparts, and non-rational part, with nutritive and desiderative subparts). But careful reading of Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 suggests that he divides the human soul into three parts – the nutritive, the theoretical, and the “practical” – but allows that the “practical” part is sometimes divided, as in akratic and other non-virtuous agents. In a fully virtuous agent, practical reason is the proper form of – and so in the hylomorphic sense one with – the desiring part of soul. It is thus contingent how many parts a given soul has, three being the norm, but four being common. Reading Aristotle this way is supported by appeal to his cosmology, where the superlunary world provides the unitary norm, and his embryology, where male offspring are the norm (in which menstrual fluid is fully mastered by the male principle) but female offspring commonly occur when the menstrual fluid (analogous to desire) is only partially mastered by the male principle (analogous to practical reason).     

Whitehead,Confucius, and the aesthetics of virtue

The most constructive response to the crisis in moral theory has been the revival of virtue ethics, an ethics that has the advantages of being personal, contextual, and, as this paper will argue, normative as well. The first section offers a general comparative analysis of Confucian and Whiteheadian philosophies, showing their common process orientation and their views of a somatic self united in reason and passion. The second section contrasts rational with aesthetic order, demonstrating a parallel with analytic and synthetic reason, and showing that rule‐based ethics comes under the former and virtue ethics under the latter. The third and final section discusses a Confucian–Whiteheadian aesthetics of virtue, focusing on love as the comprehensive virtue. The principal goal of the paper is to propose that an appropriation of Confucian virtue ethics will enhance the otherwise slow development of a Euro–American process ethics.     

The notion of the moral: the relation between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology

In this paper I argue that virtue ethics should be understood as a form of ethics which integrates various domains of the practical in relation to which virtues are excellences. To argue this it is necessary to distinguish two senses of the “moral”: the broad sense which integrates the domains of the practical and a narrow classificatory sense. Virtue ethics, understood as above, believes that all genuine virtue should be understood as what I call virtues proper. To possess a virtue proper (such as an excellent disposition of open-mindedness, an epistemic virtue) is to possess a disposition of overall excellence in relation to the sphere or field of the virtue (being open to the opinions of others). Overall excellence in turn involves excellence in integrating to a sufficient degree, standards of excellence in all relevant practical domains. Epistemic virtues, sporting virtues, moral virtues, and so on are all virtues proper. In particular it is impossible for an epistemic virtue to be a moral (narrow sense) vice.     

Science,reason, knowledge,and wisdom: A critique of Specialism

In this paper I argue for a kind of intellectual inquiry which has, as its basic aim, to help all of us to resolve rationally the most important problems that we encounter in our lives, problems that arise as we seek to discover and achieve that which is of value in life. Rational problem‐solving involves articulating our problems, proposing and criticizing possible solutions. It also involves breaking problems up into subordinate problems, creating a tradition of specialized problem‐solving ‐ specialized scientific, academic inquiry, in other words. It is vital, however, that specialized academic problem‐solving be subordinated to discussion of our more fundamental problems of living. At present specialized academic inquiry is dissociated from problems of living ‐ the sin of specialism, which I criticize.