共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Ted Poston 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(2):331-346
This paper responds to Ernest Sosa’s recent criticism of Richard Fumerton’s acquaintance theory. Sosa argues that Fumerton’s
account of non-inferential justification falls prey to the problem of the speckled hen. I argue that Sosa’s criticisms are
both illuminating and interesting but that Fumerton’s theory can escape the problem of the speckled hen. More generally, the
paper shows that an internalist account of non-inferential justification can survive the powerful objections of the Sellarsian
dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen. 相似文献
2.
Fred Dallmayr 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(3):189-204
During the last few years two major volumes have been published, both greatly revised versions of earlier Gifford Lectures: Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) and Raimon Panikkar’s The Rhythm of Being (2010). The two volumes are similar in some respects and very dissimilar in others. Both thinkers complain about the glaring blemishes of the modern, especially the contemporary age; both deplore above all a certain deficit of religiosity. The two authors differ, however, both in the details of their diagnosis and in their proposed remedies. Taylor views the modern age—styled as “secular age”—as marked by a slide into secular agnosticism, into “exclusive humanism”, and above all into an “immanent frame” excluding theistic “transcendence”. Although sharing the concern about “loss of meaning”, Panikkar does not find its source in the abandonment of (mono)theistic transcendence; on the contrary, both radical transcendence and agnostic immanence are responsible for the deficit of genuine faith. For him, recovery of faith requires an acknowledgment of our being in the world, as part of the “rhythm of being” happening in a holistic or “cosmotheandric” mode. In classical Indian terminology, while Taylor’s emphasis on the transcendence-immanence tension reflects ultimately a dualistic perspective (dvaita), Panikkar’s holistic notion of the rhythm of being captures the core of Advaita Vendanta. 相似文献
3.
David Bittner 《Journal of religion and health》2010,49(4):603-619
In this article, David Bittner explodes the myth, restated in Brideshead
Revisited (1945), that Polynesians are “happy and harmless.” He does so for the same reason that Evelyn Waugh does: “the grim invasion of
trader, administrator, missionary, and tourist” has changed all that (p. 174). Touring Hawaii in July of ’09, Bittner was
interested to discover some unusual bits of American heritage, but saddened to see how “civilization” and “Americanization”
actually seem to have eroded the Hawaiian people’s rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Bittner’s dual religious
heritage—Judaism by birth and upbringing and Catholicism by choice in mid-life—has given him the perspective to apply the
lessons of Hawaiian history to his own personal issues, particularly forgiveness. 相似文献
4.
Michael E. Levin 《Synthese》2007,155(1):35-64
It is argued that the intuition driving Kripke’s famous version of Wittgenstein’s meaning skepticism is precisely the one
that prompted Hume to despair of his bundle theory of the self: there are no necessary connections between distinct mental
states. This interpretation is shown to throw light on Wittgenstein’s notorious idea that all proofs “create concepts.”
Wittgenstein has invented a new form of skepticism. Personally I am inclined to regard it as the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date[.] – Saul Kripke相似文献
5.
Tyrus Fisher 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):51-59
Some of Quine’s critics charge that he arrives at a behavioristic account of linguistic meaning by starting from inappropriately
behavioristic assumptions (Kripke 1982, 14; Searle 1987, 123). Quine has even written that this account of linguistic meaning is a consequence of his behaviorism (Quine 1992, 37). I take it that the above charges amount to the assertion that Quine assumes the denial of one or more of the following
claims: (1) Language-users associate mental ideas with their linguistic expressions. (2) A language-user can have a private
theory of linguistic meaning which guides his or her use of language. (3) Language learning relies on innate mechanisms. Call
an antecedent denial of one or more of these claims illicit behaviorism. In this paper I show that Quine is prepared to grant, if only for the sake of argument, all three of the above claims. I
argue that his claim that “there is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behavior in observable
circumstances” is unscathed by these allowances (Quine 1992, 38). And I show that the behaviorism which Quine does assume should be viewed as a largely uncontroversial aspect of his
evidential empiricism. I conclude that if one sets out to dismiss Quine’s arguments for internal-meaning skepticism, this dismissal should not
be motivated by the charge that his conclusions rely on the illicitly behavioristic assumptions that some have suggested that
they do. 相似文献
6.
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2011,50(2):313-320
When asked in a questionnaire to describe a spiritual person, William James named one instead: Phillips Brooks. This article
focuses on Brooks—his life, his sermons, and his poem “O Little Town of Bethlehem”—to make the case that he exemplified James’
view of spirituality as “a susceptibility to ideals, but with a certain freedom to indulge in imagination about them.” It
also supports Belzen’s (Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 12:205–222, 2009) view that there is no spirituality in general but only individual manifestations of it, a point that James’ nomination of
Brooks implicitly supports. 相似文献
7.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2008,164(3):385-400
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem
of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between
Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools
of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed
by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine. 相似文献
8.
Clare Palmer 《Nanoethics》2011,5(1):43-48
In his paper “The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem” (Nanoethics 2:305–316, 2008) Paul Thompson argues that the possibility of “disenhancing” animals in order to improve animal welfare poses a philosophical
conundrum. Although many people intuitively think such disenhancement would be morally impermissible, it’s difficult to find
good arguments to support such intuitions. In this brief response to Thompson, I accept that there’s a conundrum here. But
I argue that if we seriously consider whether creating beings can harm or benefit them, and introduce the non-identity problem to discussions of animal disehancement, the conundrum is even
deeper than Thompson suggests. 相似文献
9.
In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional
fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles
of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive
effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), despite containing ‘equivalent’
content. This poses a potential problem, because people might be unduly (and unsuspectingly) influenced by mere presentational
differences. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms,
however, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent—and hence, whether there is any normative
requirement for them to be equally persuasive—is a difficult task. Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be
information equivalent. The normative implications of this for both speakers and listeners are discussed. 相似文献
10.
Isidora Stojanovic 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):49-58
It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977; No?s 13: 3–21, 1979, Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for
theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan (1989), has it that if Alma says “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said, is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from
the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has
often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the
same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary
nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying.
I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing. 相似文献
11.
12.
We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason
to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains
an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort
of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p” and “p but it there’s a chance that not p.” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims.
First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not-p, it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not-p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p, then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief.
相似文献
Matthew McGrathEmail: |
13.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2007,55(3):253-270
In Men, Religion, and Melancholia: James, Otto, Jung, and Erikson (D. Capps, 1997) and Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor (D. Capps, 2002), I argued that men are no less religious than women, but their religiousness is different from that of women because it
has its psychological origins in the emotional separation between a boy and his mother around the ages of three to five. Employing
Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” (S. Freud, 1917/1963) essay, I suggested that their religiousness is rooted in an ontological state of melancholy (which
is different from the psychological state of depression). In Men and Their Religion I identified the religions of honor and of hope as the primary forms of male melancholic religion, and suggested that humor
is a third form that may come to one’s assistance when one experiences the limitations of the other two religions. In this
article, I focus on my own early adolescent years (age 11–14) and explain how one boy became reliably religious, that is, how he embraced or internalized the religions of honor and of hope. In the companion article, I will
explain how these two religions were relativized—and thereby preserved—by the religion of humor. 相似文献
14.
We look into the transformation of meanings in psychotherapy and suggest a clinical application for Wittgenstein’s intuitions
concerning the role of linguistic practices in generating significance. In post-modern theory, therapy does not necessarily
change reality as much as it does our way of experiencing it by intervening in the linguistic-representational rules responsible
for constructing the text which expresses the problem. Since “states of mind assume the truths and forms of the language devices
that we use to represent them” (Foucault, 1963, p. 57), therapy may be intended as a narrative path toward a new naming of one’s reified experiences. The clinical problem
we consider here, the pervasive feeling of inadequacy due to one’s excessive height (dysmorphophobia), is an excellent example
of “language game” by which a “perspicuous representation” (the “therapy” proposed by Wittgenstein in the 1953) may bring out alternatives to linguistically-built “traps”, putting the blocked semiotic mechanism back into motion. 相似文献
15.
Tomasini F 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(6):497-507
This article critically evaluates bettering human life. Because this involves lives that do not exist yet, the article investigates
human eugenics and enhancement through the social prism of ‘the imaginary’ (defined ‘as a set of assumptions and concepts
for thinking and speaking about human enhancement and its future direction’) [1]. “Exploring basic assumptions underlying the idea of human enhancement” investigates underlying assumptions and claims for
human enhancement. Firstly, human eugenics and enhancement entangles a factual as well as a normative claim about what improvement/betterment
maybe constitutive of. Secondly, claims about what a better life is, is often a future orientated claim about whether certain
kinds of life that do not exist yet should ever exist. Moral images of thought are introduced and how they work to make normative judgments about lives that do not
exist. This implicates the moral problem of difference, where an image of a ‘better’ life—classically expressed in eugenics
as a ‘superior’ and/or ‘normal’ life—necessarily entails inferiority and/or deviance from a norm. “Moral imagination in contemporary fiction and the history of old eugenics”,
introduces moral images in history of eugenics and demonstrates how examples fall foul of the problem. “The new (liberal)
eugenics and the moral image of therapy” examines progress in contemporary debates, the move from authoritarian to non-authoritarian
eugenics (human enhancement), and how, to some extent, this has solved the problem of difference, through liberal defence
of personal choice. “The heart of the eugenic issue” suggests that personal choice in liberal non-authoritarian eugenics is
not immune to basic drive behind all eugenic arguments; desire as lack which is expressed as the continual dissatisfaction
of not having our future expectations met.
相似文献
Floris TomasiniEmail: |
16.
Kirsten Jacobson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(3):355-373
Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home”
is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar
notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity
that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially
an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for
our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way
of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature
of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving. 相似文献
17.
Silvia Stoller 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(1):97-110
Until now post-structuralism and phenomenology are widely regarded as opposites. Contrary to this opinion, I am arguing that
they have a lot in common. In order to make my argument, I concentrate on Judith Butler’s poststructuralist concept of performativity
to confront it with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological concept of expressivity. While Butler claims that phenomenological
theories of expression are in danger of essentialism and thus must be replaced by non-essentialist theories of performativity,
I hold that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expressivity must strictly be understood in anti-essentialist terms. Following this
line of interpretation, “expressivity” and “performativity”—as well as phenomenology and post-structuralism—are not opposites
but partners in the search for an anti-essentialist gender concept. Consequently, feminist phenomenology turns out to be a
non-essentialist approach that combines phenomenological and post-structural insights. 相似文献
18.
Franz Huber 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(5):511-538
This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel,
1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming
at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of
confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper consists in working out the claim that one can have
Hempel’s cake and eat it too — in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the
two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, α is an acceptable theory for evidence β if and only if α is both sufficiently plausible given β and sufficiently informative about β. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability
relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990). It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap’s positive relevance account, thereby shedding
new light on Carnap’s analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory.
A precursor of this paper has appeared as “The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment” in L. Běhounek & M. Bílková (eds.),
The Logica Yearbook 2004, Prague: Filosofia, 2005, 161–176. 相似文献
19.
Carol L. Schnabl Schweitzer 《Pastoral Psychology》2011,60(3):311-321
This article examines the power of music to help transform suffering. It draws on insights from the work of music theorist
David Schwarz (1997) that bridges psychoanalysis, music, and culture; and from Daniel Levitin’s (2008) work on music and human nature, especially as it pertains to religion, ritual and songs. Schwarz describes listening to
music as a process of retrospective fantasy and as a type of transference experience. If how we listen to music is shaped
by traces of past experiences, then music as a resource in pastoral care has the potential to assist ministers in the process
of guiding their parishioners to re-trace painful experiences in ways that “re-sound” with thoughts and feelings which have
become an impediment to healing. A “case study” in which the author was a “player” (or more accurately performer) is briefly
examined, and the role of music in the lives of Steve Lopez and Nathaniel Ayers (Lopez 2008) is explored to demonstrate how music—specifically religious music or song associated with religious ritual—is an overlooked
resource for pastoral care. The article concludes with an illustration of how individuals’ personal associations with a hymn
may have implications for pastoral care. 相似文献
20.
Michael Devitt 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):251-264
In “Intuitions in Linguistics” (2006a) and Ignorance of Language (2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker’s metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence.
I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses
to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar.
Mark Textor, “Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions” (2009), argues that I have picked the wrong intuitions: I should have picked non-judgmental linguistic “seemings”. These reside
between metalinguistic judgments and linguistic performances and have an epistemic authority that the orthodox view may well
be able to explain. Textor seems to think that the metalinguistic intuitions are not evidence at all. I argue that he is wrong
about that. More importantly, I argue that there are no “in-between” linguistic seemings with epistemic authority. 相似文献