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1.
Bernard Flynn 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):125-138
This article follows the development of Merleau-Ponty’s political philosophy from his 1947 text, Humanism and Terror, through a number of essays in the Adventures of the Dialectic, to the Preface to Signs published in 1959. It shows the process by which Merleau-Ponty escaped the “grip of marxism” as a philosophy of history.
It notes the link between his philosophy of history and the concrete historical events of his times, particularly the Russian
Revolution and its degeneration into Stalinism. It suggests a certain analogy between Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on the October
Revolution and Kant’s reflection on the French Revolution. The notion of the universal class of the proletariat is the guiding thread in the analyses of both Merleau-Ponty’s proximity to marxism and the process by which he frees himself
from its grip. We observe the role that this concept plays in Humanism and Terror and in the essays on Weber and Lukacs in the Adventure of the Dialectic where we eventually see its dissolution. It is argued that Merleau-Ponty arrives at a new conception of historical meaning
which is neither totalizing or empiricist. The paper concludes by presenting an outline of the direction that his philosophy
of history took after he extricated himself from marxism. This new philosophy took the form of a critical reflection on the
role of the “notion of the hero” in 20th century political philosophy in general, particularly in Heidegger and Sartre.
相似文献
Bernard FlynnEmail: |
2.
Rasmus Thybo Jensen 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):371-388
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational
motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous
preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest
we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance
both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
相似文献
Rasmus Thybo JensenEmail: |
3.
Whereas Phenomenology of Perception concludes with a puzzling turn to “heroism,” this article examines the short essay “Man, the Hero” as a source of insight
into Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the early postwar period. In this essay, Merleau-Ponty presented a conception of heroism through
which he expressed the attitude toward post-Hegelian philosophy of history that underwrote his efforts to reform Marxism along
existential lines. Analyzing this conception of heroism by unpacking the implicit contrasts with Kojève, Aron, Caillois, and
Bataille, I show that its philosophical rationale was to supply experiential evidence attesting to the latent presence of
human universality. It is a mythic device intended to animate the faith necessary for Marxist politics by showing that universal
sociality is possible, and that the historically transformative praxis needed to realize it does not imply sacrifice. This
sheds considerable light on Merleau-Ponty’s early postwar political thought. But inasmuch as the latter cannot be severed from his broader philosophical concerns, the prospect is raised that
his entire phenomenological project in the early postwar period rested on a myth. Not necessarily a bad myth, but a myth nonetheless. 相似文献
4.
Silvia Stoller 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(1):97-110
Until now post-structuralism and phenomenology are widely regarded as opposites. Contrary to this opinion, I am arguing that
they have a lot in common. In order to make my argument, I concentrate on Judith Butler’s poststructuralist concept of performativity
to confront it with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological concept of expressivity. While Butler claims that phenomenological
theories of expression are in danger of essentialism and thus must be replaced by non-essentialist theories of performativity,
I hold that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expressivity must strictly be understood in anti-essentialist terms. Following this
line of interpretation, “expressivity” and “performativity”—as well as phenomenology and post-structuralism—are not opposites
but partners in the search for an anti-essentialist gender concept. Consequently, feminist phenomenology turns out to be a
non-essentialist approach that combines phenomenological and post-structural insights. 相似文献
5.
Dorothea Olkowski 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(4):525-544
The chapter on temporality in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, is situated in a section titled, “Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World.” As such, Merleau-Ponty’s task in the chapter
on temporality is to bring these two positions together, in other words, to articulate the manner in which time links the
cogito (Being-for-Itself) with freedom (Being-in-the-World). To accomplish this, Merleau-Ponty proposes a subject located at the
junction of the for-itself and the in-itself, a subject which has an exterior that makes it possible for others to have an
interior. This analysis will take Merleau-Ponty to an impasse where, on the one hand, there appears to be an objective world
and the time of objects in that world, and on the other, there is the subject’s notion of events and the passing of time.
Referring to Bergson’s notion of time, this essay proposes that there must be a temporal interval between perception, feeling
and action in order for the subject to be “temporal by means of an inner necessity,” as Merleau-Ponty prescribes. 相似文献
6.
Sven Dupré 《Synthese》2012,185(3):501-525
This paper argues that Kepler considered his work in optics as part of natural philosophy and that, consequently, he aimed
at change within natural philosophy. Back-to-back with John Schuster’s claim that Descartes’ optics should be considered as
a natural philosophical appropriation of innovative results in the tradition of practical and mixed mathematics the central
claim of my paper is that Kepler’s theory of optical imagery, developed in his Paralipomena ad Vitellionem (1604), was the result of a move similar to Descartes’ by Kepler. My argument consists of three parts. First, Kepler borrowed
a geometrical model and experiment of optical imagery from the mélange of mixed and practical mathematics provided in the
works of the sixteenth-century mathematicians Ettore Ausonio and Giovanni Battista Della Porta. Second, Kepler criticized
the Aristotelian theory of light and he developed his own alternative metaphysics. Third, Kepler used his natural philosophical
assumptions about the nature of light to re-interpret the model of image formation taken from Della Porta’s work. Taken together,
I portray Kepler’s theory of optical imagery as a natural philosophical appropriation of an innovative model of image formation
developed in a sixteenth-century practical and mixed mathematical tradition which was not interested in questioning philosophical
assumptions on the nature of light. 相似文献
7.
Luce Irigaray 《Continental Philosophy Review》2004,37(4):389-405
In this essay, which is preceded by an interview with the translator, the author revisits her earlier critique of Merleau-Ponty’s
privileging of the visible, but also takes further her own thinking by drawing specifically on the issues raised within the
context of painting. The focal point of her discussion is Merleau-Ponty’s essay, “Eye and Mind.”
This paper was first published in Italian as “Dipingere l’invisible,” Segni e Comprensione 44 (December 2001): 10–16. This
English translation is from the French version. 相似文献
8.
Diane Antonio 《Sophia》2001,40(2):47-65
Julian of Norwich (b. 1342) anticipated the ontological and epistemological work on sexed embodiment pioneered in the work
of Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray in the 20th century. Her epistemology of sensual ‘showings’ helped reconfigure women’s embodiment
and speech acts (‘bodytalk’): by recognizing cognitive emotions and the knowledge-producing body; and by envisioning the intertwining
of human flesh with All That Is. The paper next examines Merleau-Ponty’s somatic discourse on the chiasmic flesh, which leads
to a discussion of Irigaray’s work on poetic mimesis. 相似文献
9.
Thomas Mormann 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):127-146
Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well
known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930,
however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict
emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive attitude concerning
values. It is argued that his non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension
between conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap’s non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between logical empiricists and American
pragmatists. Carnap’s persisting adherence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason
why he could not accept Morris’s and Kaplan’s pragmatist theses that cognitivism might well be compatible with a logical and
empiricist scientific philosophy. 相似文献
10.
Daniel Stoljar 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(3):609-618
I discuss Soames’s proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method
he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore’s moral philosophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be
self-evident. The method in Moore’s epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In review of the distance between something’s
being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames’s proposal is mistaken. 相似文献
11.
Kirsten Jacobson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(3):355-373
Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home”
is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar
notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity
that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially
an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for
our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way
of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature
of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving. 相似文献
12.
How to Define a Number? A General Epistemological Account of Simon Stevin’s Art of Defining 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jurgen Naets 《Topoi》2010,29(1):77-86
This paper explores Simon Stevin’s l’Arithmétique of 1585, where we find a novel understanding of the concept of number. I will discuss the dynamics between his practice and
philosophy of mathematics, and put it in the context of his general epistemological attitude. Subsequently, I will take a
close look at his justificational concerns, and at how these are reflected in his inductive, a postiori and structuralist
approach to investigating the numerical field. I will argue that Stevin’s renewed conceptualisation of the notion of number
is a sort of “existential closure” of the numerical domain, founded upon the practice of his predecessors and contemporaries.
Accordingly, I want to make clear that l’Aritmetique have to be read not as an ontological analysis or exploration of the numerical field, but as an explication of a mathematical
ethos. In this sense, this article also intends to make a specific contribution to the broader issue of the “ethics of geometry.” 相似文献
13.
David Morris 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(2):141-165
This article clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s enigmatic, later concept of reversibility by showing how it is connected to the theme
of the genesis of sense. The article first traces reversibility through “Eye and Mind” and The Visible and the Invisible, in ways that link reversibility to a theme of the earlier philosophy, namely an interrelation in which activity and passivity
reverse to one another. This linkage is deepened through a detailed study of a passage on touch in the Phenomenology’s chapter on “Sensing,” which shows how reversibility is important to the genesis of sense, not from some already given origin,
but through a creative operation within being, beyond the perceiver, wherein the field of perception internally diverges into
active and passive moments. The article connects this point about the genesis of sense to themes in Merleau-Ponty’s lectures
on institution and passivity. Altogether the article shows how reversibility is a sign of a divergence and thence of a sort
of gap or excess in being that allows for a genesis of sense within being itself. 相似文献
14.
Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan 《Human Studies》2007,30(4):395-409
In this paper I address some related aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished texts, The Visible and the Invisible and The Prose of the World. The point of departure for my reading of these works is the sense of philosophical disillusionment which underlies and motivates
them, and which, I argue, leads Merleau-Ponty towards an engagement with art in general and with literature in particular.
I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s emerging conception of ethics—premised on the paradox of a “universal singularity” and concerned
with the concrete experience of the individual subject, rather than with abstractions and formal categories—can best be articulated
through the formalist concept of “defamiliarization,” the fundamental performativity of all literature, and the dialogic relations
which, though inherent in all discourse, become most powerfully evident in the dynamics of reading.
相似文献
Daphna Erdinast-VulcanEmail: |
15.
Jack Reynolds 《Sophia》2008,47(3):311-325
This essay raises some critical questions about the interpretation that Derrida offers of Merleau-Ponty in his recent book,
On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy, where Derrida implies that the latter’s work remains mired in theological prejudices. As well as defending Merleau-Ponty’s
analyses of the senses and inter-subjectivity against such claims, this essay is also concerned to examine Derrida’s transcendental
philosophy of time (or philosophy of the contretemps that breaks open time but nonetheless pertains to it) that undergirds
and motivates his engagement with various philosophies of touch. In this latter respect, I will argue that Derrida’s philosophy
is itself ‘touched’ by time, in the peculiar sense of ‘touched’ that connotes affected and wounded. His work instantiates
an ethics of non-presentist time (which is also the transcendental condition for any event of touch) and I ask whether there
is reason to look for a different understanding of both time and the transcendental to Derrida’s.
相似文献
Jack ReynoldsEmail: |
16.
Ira M. Schnall 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(2):271-283
David Widerker, long an opponent of Harry Frankfurt’s attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), has recently
come up with his own Frankfurt-style scenario which he claims might well be a counterexample to PAP. Carlos Moya has argued
that this new scenario is not a counterexample to PAP, because in it the agent is not really blameworthy, since he lacks weak
reasons-responsiveness (WRR), a property that John Fischer has argued is a necessary condition of practical rationality, and
hence of moral responsibility. I argue that in Widerker’s scenario the agent is indeed blameworthy, even though he lacks WRR;
and that therefore this scenario is a counterexample not only to PAP, but also to Fischer’s claim that WRR is necessary for
blameworthiness. 相似文献
17.
Jenny Slatman 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):321-342
This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while
referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these
two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite
their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition,
however, Husserl’s account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition
involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing self-recognition as the result
of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one’s “hereness” and “thereness”.
The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.
相似文献
Jenny SlatmanEmail: |
18.
William H. Hanson 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(3):437-459
The traditional view that all logical truths are metaphysically necessary has come under attack in recent years. The contrary
claim is prominent in David Kaplan’s work on demonstratives, and Edward Zalta has argued that logical truths that are not
necessary appear in modal languages supplemented only with some device for making reference to the actual world (and thus
independently of whether demonstratives like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ are present). If this latter claim can be sustained, it
strikes close to the heart of the traditional view. I begin this paper by discussing and refuting Zalta’s argument in the
context of a language for propositional modal logic with an actuality connective (section 1). This involves showing that his
argument in favor of real world validity his preferred explication of logical truth, is fallacious. Next (section 2) I argue
for an alternative explication of logical truth called general validity. Since the rule of necessitation preserves general
validity, the argument of section 2 provides a reason for affirming the traditional view. Finally (section 3) I show that
the intuitive idea behind the discredited notion of real world validity finds legitimate expression in an object language
connective for deep necessity.
Earlier versions of this paper were read at the universities of Graz,
Maribor, and Salzburg, and at a workshop on the philosophy of logic at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City. My
thanks to those present at these events for many helpful suggestions. Thanks
are also due to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies. 相似文献
19.
Joel Kenton Press 《Synthese》2008,161(1):119-139
Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific
application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable,
we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity.
Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current
theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids
explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection
fatal to that theory.
My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific
explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’
by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion
of function.
However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant
contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’
must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to
determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function
may in many cases assist them in this task. 相似文献
20.
Setargew Kenaw 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):315-332
The paper shows how Karl Popper’s critique of ‘historicism’ is permeated by psychoanalytic discourse regardless of his critique
that psychoanalysis is one of the exemplars of pseudoscience. Early on, when he was formulating his philosophy of science,
Popper had an apparently stringent criterion, viz. falsifiablity, and painstaking analysis. The central argument of this paper is that despite his
representation of psychoanalysis as the principal illustration of the category he dubs as ‘pseudoscience’, Popper’s analysis
has been infused with psychoanalysis when it comes to his social and political philosophy. Besides, not only was his interpretation
of the proponents of ‘historicism’ and the ‘closed’ society mediated by the very concepts of a field which he indicted as
pseudoscientific but also he frequently slipped into vacuous and unverifiable accusations forgetting the jurisdiction he formerly
accorded to empirical adequacy and logical consistency when examining and assessing theories. 相似文献