Demystifying Intuition: What It Is,What It Does,and How It Does It

Definitions of intuition are discussed and two working definitions are proposed. This is followed by a list of eight unresolved problems concerning intuition. It is suggested that all of these problems can be resolved by cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), a dual-process theory of personality according to which people process information with two systems, an experiential/intuitive system that is an associative learning system that humans share with other animals and a uniquely human verbal reasoning system. Intuition is considered to be a subsystem of the experiential/ intuitive system that operates by exactly the same principles and attributes but has narrower boundary conditions. The next section includes a presentation of the most relevant aspects of CEST with an emphasis on the operating rules and attributes of the experiential/intuitive system. This is followed by demonstrating how the operation of the experiential/intuitive system can resolve each of the unresolved problems concerning intuition. The article closes with a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the experiential/intuitive and rational/analytic systems. It is concluded that neither system is generally superior to the other, as each has important advantages and disadvantages.     

Dependency,Imitation Learning,and the Process of Identification

Social learning theory posits a relationship between dependency and imitation learning. Since the previous findings regarding this postulate were inconclusive, a study to clarify the relationship between dependency and imitation learning was implemented with use of 73 preschool children. Instrumental dependency and emotional dependency were measured by a naturalistic behavioral observation technique. Purposive and incidental imitation learning were taught by modeling procedures. The children's degree of emotional dependency was found related to their propensity to imitate the model's irrelevant behavior (i.e., incidental learning). While the nature of the postulated relationship remained unclear, the results suggested that sex and age were influential factors.     

20世纪中国哲学的历史分期:学着讲、照着讲、接着讲

冯友兰先生在《新理学》开头就说 :此书“是‘接着’宋明以来底理学讲底 ,而不是‘照着’宋明以来底理学讲底”。冯先生在《中国现代哲学史》中又说 :“新的现代化的中国哲学 ,只能是用近代逻辑学的成就 ,分析中国传统哲学中的概念 ,使那些似乎是含混不清的概念明确起来 ,这就是‘接着讲’与‘照着讲’的分别。” (冯友兰 :《中国现代哲学史》 ,广东人民出版社 1 999年版 ,第 2 0 0页 )张立文教授也在《中国人民大学学报》 2 0 0 0年第 2期上发表了题为《中国哲学 :从“照着讲”、“接着讲”、到“自己讲”》的文章。笔者受冯、张两先生的启…     

Defining Elemental Imitation Mechanisms: A Comparison of Cognitive and Motor-Spatial Imitation Learning Across Object- and Computer-Based Tasks

During the first 5 years of life, the versatility, breadth, and fidelity with which children imitate change dramatically. Currently, there is no model to explain what underlies such significant changes. To that end, the present study examined whether task-independent but domain-specific—elemental—imitation mechanism explains performance across imitation tasks or domains. Preschool-age children (n = 156) were tested on 4 imitation tasks, 2 object-based (animal, puzzle box) and 2 computer-based (cognitive, motor-spatial). All tasks involved 3 serial actions. The animal task involved making an animal face, and the puzzle box task involved manipulating a box to retrieve a reward. The cognitive task involved responding to 3 different pictures in a specific picture order, and the motor-spatial task involved responding to 3 identical pictures in a specific spatial order. A principal component analysis including performance on all 4 tasks produced 2 components: “cognitive imitation” (cognitive and animal tasks) and “motor-spatial imitation” (motor-spatial and puzzle box tasks). Regression analyses replicated these results. These findings provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that underlying performance across these different tasks involves multiple—elemental—imitation mechanisms for learning and copying domain-specific information across tasks.     

Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask

Many studies have reported that the confidence people have in their judgments exceeds their accuracy and that overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the task. However, some common analyses confound systematic psychological effects with statistical effects that are inevitable if judgments are imperfect. We present three experiments using new methods to separate systematic effects from the statistically inevitable. We still find systematic differences between confidence and accuracy, including an overall bias toward overconfidence. However, these effects vary greatly with the type of judgment. There is little general overconfidence with two-choice questions and pronounced overconfidence with subjective confidence intervals. Over- and underconfidence also vary systematically with the domain of questions asked, but not as a function of difficulty. We also find stable individual differences. Determining why some people, some domains, and some types of judgments are more prone to overconfidence will be important to understanding how confidence judgments are made.     

Seeing love, or seeing lust: How people interpret ambiguous romantic situations

Interpreting ambiguous situations is a task individuals face on a daily basis. In romantic contexts the accurate interpretation of these situations is of particular importance. In the present set of studies we investigated how level of construal guides individual perception in these cases. When a high level of construal was induced participants likely interpreted a given interpersonal situation as the start or the continuation of a long lasting relationship. When a low level of construal was induced the same situations were more likely interpreted as leading to a one-night stand (in a dating situation) or involving little chance of a common future for both actors (in a break-up situation). In sum, the present studies demonstrate construal level to be a crucial determinant of the interpretation of ambiguous romantic situations. We discuss these findings in relation to the functional independence of love and sex, level of construal, and social perception.     

Seeing what we know and understand: How knowledge shapes perception

Expertise in object recognition, as in bird watching or X-ray specialization, is based on extensive perceptual experience and in-depth semantic knowledge. Although it has been shown that rich perceptual experience shapes elementary perception and higher level discrimination and identification, little is known about the influence of in-depth semantic knowledge on object perception and identification. By means of recording event-related brain potentials (ERPs), we show that the amount of knowledge acquired about initially unfamiliar objects modulates visual ERP components already 120 msec after object presentation, and causes gradual variations of activity in similar brain systems within a later timeframe commonly associated with meaning access. When perceptual analysis is made more difficult by blurring object pictures, knowledge has an even stronger effect on perceptual analysis and facilitates recognition. These findings demonstrate that in-depth knowledge not only affects involuntary semantic memory access, but also shapes perception by penetrating early visual processes traditionally held to be immune to such influences.     

Two Critical Issues in Primary Prevention: What It Is and How To Do It

Definition of primary prevention and of end-state and stressful life variable models are presented to guide the design and conduct of primary prevention activities.     

Imitation: definitions, evidence, and mechanisms

Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.     

Use It or Lose It: Post-workshop Reflection Enhances Learning and Utilization of CBT Skills

Many therapists attend 1- or 2-day workshops as part of their continuing professional development. Recent literature has suggested that workshops are largely ineffective unless followed up by consultation or supervision. However, not all therapists have this option, and the question remains whether there are ways to potentiate workshop learning in the absence of follow-up consultation. This study tested the hypothesis that creating opportunities to reflect in the weeks following a workshop would enhance learning and utilization of skills. Two groups of practitioners, who attended the same 2-day CBT skills workshop in successive years, were compared: a training-as-usual group and a reflection group. The reflection group completed reflection worksheets at the end of each workshop day and were instructed to complete follow-up reflection worksheets at 1, 4 and 8 weeks post-workshop. Ten weeks after the workshop, the reflection group reported enhanced use of new skills with clients and a trend towards increased awareness of workshop learning. Further analysis revealed that group differences were almost entirely linked to use of follow-up reflection worksheets. Those participants in the reflection group who used follow-up reflection worksheets reported far greater awareness and use of skills than those who did not. Reminder emails had the predicted effect of increasing the use of the reflection worksheets; twice as many participants in the email reminder group used the reflection sheets compared with the nonreminder group. The results suggest that the relatively simple strategy of introducing reflection worksheets to workshop handouts, and sending reminder emails may significantly enhanced learning and utilization of workshop skills.     

Imitation in language development: If,when, and why

In order to explore the function of imitation for first language learning, imitative and spontaneous utterances were compared in the naturalistic speech of six children in the course of their development from single-word utterances (when mean length of utterance was essentially 1.0) to the emergence of grammar (when mean length of utterance approached 2.0). The relative extent of imitation, and lexical and grammatical variation in imitative and spontaneous speech were determined. There were inter-subject differences in the extent of imitation, but each child was consistent in the tendency to imitate or not to imitate across time. For those children who imitated, there were both lexical and grammatical differences in imitative and spontaneous speech, and a developmental shift from imitative to spontaneous use of particular words and semantic-syntactic relations between words. The results are discussed as evidence of an active processing of model utterances relative to the contexts in which they occur for information for language learning.     

Bias in the Counseling Process: How to Recognize and Avoid It

Counselors' vulnerability to inferential bias during the counseling process may result in misdiagnosis and improper interventions. This article provides readers with information regarding inferential bias. The inferential biases discussed include (a) availability and representativeness heuristics; (b) fundamental attribution error; (c) anchoring, prior knowledge, and labeling; (d) confirmatory hypothesis testing; and (e) reconstructive memory. Each bias is described and illustrated through fictitious case vignettes, and suggestions concerning what precautions counselors may do to avoid each type of bias are presented.     

Religion and Psychology in Transition: How It Came to Be Written

Pastoral Psychology -     

Seeing connections: reason,faith, and education

The article explores some of the congruencies of thought and resonances in phrasing in the work of Janet Erskine Stuart, John Henry Newman and Ludwig Wittgenstein. These three writers have in common their resistance to philosophers of religion who are preoccupied with proposing arguments for the existence of God and grounds for believing in God. They also share a belief in the importance of assent and that reason and faith cannot be easily separated; that faith is always there in the background. The article is concerned primarily with the interrelationship between reason and faith across human practices and the relevance to education and how we live our lives.     

Calibrating Study and Learning as Hermeneutic Principles Through Greco-Christian Seeing,Rabbinic Hearing,and Chinese Yijing Observing

Study is recently re-invoked as an alternative educational formation to disrupt the learning trap and trope. This paper calibrates study and learning as two hermeneutic principles and correlates them with seeing, hearing, and observing as three onto-epistemic modes that respectively underpin Greco-Christian, Rabbinic, and ancient Chinese exegetical traditions. Linking study and learning with the hermeneutic issues of language, text, meaning, and reality, my calibration unfolds in four steps. First, I introduce an epistemic aporia encountered in interpreting some Chinese educational “wind” texts, exposing our naturalized reasoning of learning along a representational enclosure. Second, turning to Susan Handelman’s writing, I trace this learning-as-representation enclosure as being conditioned upon the Greco-Christian exegetical mode of seeing, meanwhile correlating study back with the Rabbinic hearing hermeneutic. Third, I move on to explicate an onto-cosmological Yijing observing, proffering a study hermeneutic as a movement of observing, following, and attuning to wendao, literally put, “a crisscrossing pattern that (re-)turns with dao.” Finally, I re-observe and study the crisscrossing Chinese educational “wind” texts, evoking a Chinese “wind-teaching” sensibility so far rarely discerned through representational thinking and learning.