应用伦理学、伦理知识与生活之道

应用伦理学的程序共识论者根本否认应用伦理学提供伦理专门知识的可能性,但西方伦理学家认为,应用伦理学可提供关于道德推理的专门知识,应用伦理学家可通过伦理委员会等制度化的机构而发挥专家的作用.但应用伦理学更重要的作用在于通过哲学反思和社会批判而昭示一种正当的生活方式.     

Expertise as Argument: Authority,Democracy, and Problem-Solving

This article addresses the problem of expertise in a democratic political system: the tension between the authority of expertise and the democratic values that guide political life. We argue that for certain problems, expertise needs to be understood as a dialogical process, and we conceptualize an understanding of expertise through and as argument that positions expertise as constituted by and a function of democratic values and practices, rather than in the possession of, acquisition of, or relationship to epistemic materials. Conceptualizing expertise through argument leads us to see expertise as a kind of phronetic practice, oriented toward judgments and problems, characterized by its ability to provide inventional capacities for selecting the best possible resolution of a particular problem vis-à-vis particular expectations regarding the resolution of a problem. At its core, expertise thus comes to exist in reference not to epistemic but to dialogical, deliberative, democratic practice.     

Virtue Ethics,Applied Ethics and Rationality twenty-three years after After Virtue

Abstract

In evaluating the merits and shortcomings of virtue ethics I focus on some central differences between virtue ethics and rival theories such as deontology and utilitarianism. Virtue ethics does not prescribe strict rules of conduct. Instead, the virtue ethical approach can be understood as an invitation to search for standards, as opposed to strict rules, that ought to guide the conduct of our individual lives. This requires a particular method. The importance of this approach in present times will become clear when we investigate the relation between virtue ethics and postmodernity. In our postmodem age moral concepts are no longer perceived as deriving their meaning from larger frameworks. Instead, their meanings are perceived as being derived from the contingencies that define our particular existences. Thus ongoing grassroots moral engagement is required, and virtue ethics is the appropriate moral framework for doing this. This results in a broadening of rationality insofar as the full richness of our situated lives are factored into our accounts of rationality. At the same time virtue ethics prevents relativism, mainly because it does justice to the social embeddedness of human activities. In order to illustrate the virtue ethical approach I will discuss two key concepts in our moral vocabulary: responsibility and integrity. We will see how these basic concepts can be properly understood only if one takes into consideration the contingencies, inherent paradoxes and tensions in human life.     

Navigators and Captains: Expertise in Clinical Ethics Consultation

The debate about what constitutes the discipline of ethics and who qualifies as an ethics consultant is linked unavoidably to a debate that is potentiated by the reality of a rapidly changing and high-stakes health care consultation marketplace. Who we are and what we can offer to the moral gesture that is medicine is shaped by our fundamental understanding of the place of expert knowledge in the transformation of social reality. The struggle for self-definition is particularly freighted since clinical ethics consultation aspires to be more than academic contemplation. Two recent books (Ethics Consultation by John La Puma and David Schiedermayer and The Health Care Ethics Consultant: A Practical Guide, edited by Francoise Baylis) exemplify the two most popular but most widely divergent positions on these issues. We argue that while useful, neither book addresses fully the particular and distinct role of the professional ethicist.     

Hydrogen Fuel‐Cell Vehicles,Energy Policy,and the Ethics of Expertise

Relatively few thinkers have attempted to develop a systematic ‘ethics of expertise’ (EOE) that can guide scientists and other technical experts in providing information to the public. This paper argues that the prima facie duty to disseminate information in a manner that does not damage the self‐determination of decision makers could fruitfully serve as one of the core principles of an EOE. Moreover, this duty can be fleshed out in promising ways by drawing on the concept of informed consent, which guides medical clinicians in preserving the self‐determination of their patients. The paper applies the resulting ethical framework to recent policy discussions about hydrogen fuel‐cell (HFC) vehicles, both because they have received a good deal of research funding and because their merits have been hotly debated. It concludes that technical experts providing information about HFC vehicles should be especially cognizant of three issues: (1) important alternatives to hydrogen technology that need to be addressed, (2) major false beliefs that should be prevented or corrected, and (3) significant framing effects that could influence the recipients of information.     

Applied Philosophy and Business Ethics

Given the socio-economic incentives for academic relevance, the sceptic may well challenge the academic integrity of the evolving discipline of business ethics. For, the question is, how could such an emerging field of enquiry constitute applied philosophy? I critically examine certain arguments, principally advanced by Michael Oakeshott and Stephen Clark, which might be thought to underwrite such scepticism, via a wholesale suspicion of applied ethics. Yet, I argue, philosophy can be and is properly concerned with our practical experience and actions. The significance of more general, abstract ethical questions derives, in great part, from their bearing upon our practical deliberations and actions. Moreover, reflection about the nature and role of ethical principles need not deny a role for moral judgement. Although for contingent reasons we may be right to be worried, I present an argument to show that, as a matter of principle, the sceptical challenge regarding business ethics can be refuted.     

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Ethics and Liberal Democracy

Book Information Charles Taylor: Meaning Morals and Modernity. Charles Taylor: Meaning Morals and Modernity Nicholas H. Smith, Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2002, ix + 285, US$24.95 (paperback) By Nicholas H. Smith. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press. Pp. ix + 285. US$24.95 (paperback:),     

Applied Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public Policy

abstract   Normative argument is supposed to guide ways in which we might change the world, rather than to fit the world as it is. This poses certain difficulties for the notion of applied ethics. Taken literally the phrase 'applied ethics' suggests that principles or standards with substantial philosophical justification, in particular ethical and political principles with such justification, are applied to particular cases and guide action. However, the 'cases' which applied ethics discusses are themselves indeterminate, and the relation of principles to these 'cases' differs from the relation of principles to cases in naturalistic, truth-oriented inquiry. Writing in 'applied ethics', I shall argue, does not need elaborate case histories or scenarios, since the testing points for normative principles are other normative principles rather than particular cases. Normative principles and contexts to which they are applicable are indeed needed for any reasoning that is practical, but they are not sufficient. Practical ethics needs principles that can not merely be applied in certain cases or situations, but also enacted in certain ways, and requires an account of practical judgement and of the public policies that support that judgement .     

应用伦理:当代伦理学研究的热点--第三次全国应用伦理学讨论会综述

20世纪60年代兴起的应用伦理学已日益成为伦理学的"显学".近20余年来,改革开放给我国的政治、经济和社会生活带来了深刻的变化,大量的现实道德问题促使伦理学家为之进行严肃认真的思考并做出积极的反应.     

商讨理论视野中的伦理、民主、人权和民族国家

本文根据哈贝马斯的访华演讲和相关著述,对商讨理论视野中的伦理、民主、人权和民族国家概念进行了考察,并在此基础上提出了某些基本的判断和论点。     

应用伦理学和当代社会道德结构--再论应用伦理学的基本特性

针对<中国人民大学学报>2003年第1期的专题研究"应用伦理学:伦理学的新视野"中的三篇论文,[1]笔者在<中国人民大学学报>2003年第5期发表了题为<基本价值观还是程序方法论--论应用伦理学的基本特性>的论文,提出了应用伦理学"作为基本价值观和程序方法论相统一"的观点,并对甘绍平教授等三位学者的观点提出了自己的看法.令人高兴的是,笔者的商榷得到了甘教授的积极回应.     

无本质的应用伦理学--对当前应用伦理学本质特征争论的质疑

近年来,国内<哲学动态>、<哲学研究>、<中国哲学年鉴>、<光明日报>、<中国人民大学学报>、<自然辩证法研究>、<道德与文明>等报刊开辟了专门园地,讨论"应用伦理学的本质特征".毋庸置疑,这一讨论直接推动了应用伦理学在我国的发展,增进了学界对应用伦理学特征的更为准确的理解和把握.     

Applied Ethics. A Defence

Given a reasonable coherentist view of justification in ethics, applied ethics, as here conceived of, cannot only guide us, in our practical decisions, but also provide moral understanding through explanation of our moral obligations. Furthermore, applied ethics can contribute to the growth of knowledge in ethics as such. We put moral hypotheses to crucial test in individual cases. This claim is defended against the challenges from moral intuitionism and particularism.     

正名:以"部门伦理学"替代"应用伦理学"

无论国内还是国外,都对"什么是应用伦理学"的问题有多种不同界说.但每种界说都存在困窘.究其原因,均是"应用伦理学"之"名不正则言不顺"所致.这就需要正名,以"部门伦理学"之谓取而代之.这个称谓符合学科划分标准,有充分的学理依据.这个新称谓能澄清不少用"应用伦理学"之谓所解释不清的理论问题.     

略论应用伦理学的对象、任务和方法

应用伦理学以道德与实践的关系为对象。其任务主要有：1．为提高人的道德素质服务;2．为促进社会明发展服务;3．为协调人与自然的关系服务;4．为培育人的理想信念服务。其研究方法有：依托实践,归演理念;一无为主,综合创新;以人为本,德福并举。     

应用伦理学运用伦理学理论的方式

伦理学理论在泛义上的“被应用”有两种意义 ,即被直接地或间接地作为理解或解释而诉诸。有三种直接诉诸伦理学理论的方式。将一种体系作为解释系统应用于全部领域的方式目标过高。部分地应用伦理学理论的方式具有灵活性 ,但牺牲解释的系统性。将一种理论应用于某一领域的方式较为合理 ,但也容易受到不同推理和不同结论的挑战。更好的选择也许是解除应用伦理学提供理解或解释系统的工作 ,使它专心从事它能最好地从事的工作。     

Mother Knows Best: Pregnancy,Applied Ethics,and Epistemically Transformative Experiences

L.A. Paul argues that interesting issues for rational choice theory are raised by epistemically transformative experiences: experiences which provide access to knowledge that could not be known without the experience. Consideration of the epistemic effects of pregnancy has important implications for our understanding of epistemically transformative experiences and for debate about the ethics of abortion and applied ethics more generally. Pregnancy is epistemically transformative both in Paul’s narrow sense and in a wider sense: those who have not been pregnant face significant barriers to acquiring the knowledge made accessible through pregnancy. This knowledge is crucial for engaging with the ethics of abortion. The epistemically transformative_WIDE nature of pregnancy may require us to use new methods to try to partially grasp what pregnancy is like, such as, for example, significant engagement with narrative literature. Because pregnancy is also epistemically transformative in a narrow sense, we need to work out how to engage in ethical reasoning when relevant knowledge is not fully accessible to all. This argument has implications beyond the debate about abortion. Philosophers in many areas of applied ethics will need to work out how to respond appropriately to epistemically transformative experiences.