The dynamics of moral progress

Assuming that there is moral progress, and assuming that the abolition of slavery is an example of it, how does moral progress occur? Is it mainly driven by specific individuals who have gained new moral insights, or by changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions in which agents morally judge the norms and practices of their society, and act upon these judgements? In this paper, I argue that moral progress is a complex process in which changes at the level of belief and changes at the level of institutions and social practices are deeply intertwined, and that changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions of moral agency constitute the main motor of moral progress. I develop my view of moral progress by way of grappling with Michelle Moody‐Adams’ prominent philosophical account of it. My view is less intellectualistic and individualistic than hers, does not presuppose meta‐ethical moral realism, and blurs her distinction between moral progress in beliefs and moral progress in social practices. I point out the limits of humans to progress morally, which are partly grounded in our evolutionary history, and argue that moral progress is always of a ‘local’ nature.     

Theorizing inquiry in the moral space of practice

Moral realism has been advanced as a central theme in contemporary hermeneutic thought. From this standpoint, participation in cultural practices is made possible and meaningful by ontologically real moral goods and reference points. Cultural practices thus constitute a moral referential totality for human action. This article suggests that these and related hermeneutic insights offer a unique perspective for taking account of practical involvement in the world and can form the basis of an interpretive frame for research that foregrounds this practice-based moral realism. An emphasis on moral realist concepts such as participation in practice, distinctions of worth, strong evaluations, and moral reference points can allow interrelated phenomena to show up as aspects of a moral ecology and reveal something about their moral significance within a form of practice. Moreover, inquiry of this sort can reveal something about that form of practice as a space of moral possibilities for action.     

Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.     

论道德相对性及其道德实践意义——兼析道德相对主义

道德相对性表现为道德准则规范具有具体性、差异性和不确定性.道德相对性中渗透了道德绝对性即存在普遍的、共同的、不变的道德价值.道德相对主义的错误在于夸大相对性而否定了绝对性.但道德相对主义基于道德相对性的某些主张有一定的合理性.正确理解道德相对性在道德实践中有重要意义.个体道德自主性的提高,既要把握绝对的道德价值观念,同时需要把握道德的相对性以提高具体情境中道德判断和选择能力.     

Morally we Roll Along: (Optimistic Reflections) on Moral Progress

Changes over time in many large scale human practices such as science and technology seem best understood in terms of progress. Further, regarding such practices as slavery, we seem to have moved on and for the better, that is, to have progressed morally. But moral progress seems something different from other forms of progress. If possible at all, in what can it consist? Progress is understood as falling into three distinguishable categories; namely, progress as mere change, as change culminating in some end-state, and as change involving improvement or betterment. While scientific or economic progress seem of the last sort, moral progress is best understood as a hybrid of culminative change and improvement, a variety of progress labelled millenarian. Though there is an end towards which moral progress must tend, we do not know what it is. Further, moral progress must occupy a special superordinate and regulatory role regarding other progressive practices; that is, for moral progress to be possible, other progressive practices must come under the aegis of increasingly stringent moral regulation. This paper elaborates a model of moral progress, speculates upon signs of its presence, considers various relativist objections, and makes an exhortative plea for the need to have such a notion as a condition of the very possibility of moral progress.     

Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology.     

Moral Courage and Facing Others

Abstract

Moral courage involves acting in the service of one’s convictions, in spite of the risk of retaliation or punishment. I suggest that moral courage also involves a capacity to face others as moral agents, and thus in a manner that does not objectify them. A moral stand can only be taken toward another moral agent. Often, we find ourselves unable to face others in this way, because to do so is frightening, or because we are consumed by blinding anger. But without facing others as moral subjects, we risk moral cowardice on the one hand and moral fanaticism on the other.     

Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers: Limits of Moral Philosophy and a Pragmatist Alternative

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law‐like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question (a) whether this is possible and (b) what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life.     

青少年网络不道德行为与父母教养方式的关系——道德脱离、责任心、道德同一性的中介作用

研究采用问卷法,对764名青少年进行测试,用结构方程模型检验了教养方式、责任心、道德同一性、道德脱离和网络不道德行为之间的关系模型。结果表明,拒绝型教养方式通过责任心、道德同一性和道德脱离的中介来间接影响网络不道德行为。责任心可以直接作用于网络不道德行为,也可以通过道德脱离的中介来影响网络不道德行为。道德同一性只能通过道德脱离来影响不道德行为。     

道德概念的黑白隐喻表征及其对道德认知的影响

采用不同的研究方法在不同水平上考察道德概念的黑白隐喻表征, 探讨了黑白视知觉对道德认知的影响。实验1a发现, 在词汇选择任务中被试倾向于判断白色希腊文词汇具有道德意义, 判断黑色希腊文词汇具有不道德意义。实验1b通过词性判断任务表明, 当道德词以白色呈现、不道德词以黑色呈现时被试的判断反应更快。实验2显示, 当将道德两难故事呈现在黑色背景上时, 相比于呈现在白色背景上, 被试会在道德评判任务中将故事中人物的行为判断为更加不道德。实验3通过情境实验发现, 相比明亮环境, 在黑暗环境中完成实验的被试会更倾向于认为他人会不公正地对待自己。研究证明, 黑白颜色概念与道德概念的隐喻联结存在心理现实性, 黑白颜色刺激知觉会对道德判断产生影响作用, 且环境的亮度也会影响到人们对道德相关问题的认知判断。     

两种道德自我调节机制下的道德行为

道德自我调节指个体根据道德自我, 从事(不从事)道德行为和不道德行为。道德自我分为状态道德自我(道德自我知觉)和特质道德自我(道德认同)。道德自我调节的负反馈机制, 指个体依据道德自我知觉, 保持道德行为的波动性, 它包含道德许可效应和道德清洁效应; 正反馈机制, 指个体依据道德认同, 保持道德行为的一致性。解释水平理论整合了正负反馈机制, 两种道德行为。未来研究需探讨公我、个体差异对道德自我调节机制的影响。     

道德直觉分析：内涵、形成机制与加工判断机制

自Haidt 提出道德判断的社会直觉模型后,道德直觉便成为道德心理研究中的重要课题。本文围绕这三方面的问题就最近10多年来道德直觉的相关理论与实证研究进行了评述,得到如下结论：（1）道德直觉作为社会直觉的一种,它既有一般社会直觉的一些共性特点,又有其特殊性。从目前道德的神经认知研究结果来看,与一般社会直觉的神经机制相比,道德直觉过程还涉及到眶额皮层、颞顶联合区以及前额叶的更多脑区。相关研究表明这些脑区涉及到情绪刺激的再评价、以及对行为动机、意图、心理理论等认知成分的联合处理。（2）对于道德直觉的起源与形成问题,尽管道德直觉表现出跨文化的普遍性,但是目前还没有充分的证据支持道德直觉的先天论;同时,本研究认为基于“进化-文化-个人”的具身隐喻过程可能是道德直觉形成的重要机制。（3）目前道德判断研究的有关理论与实证研究仍然难以回答道德直觉加工的情理之争问题,但有几点发现值得注意：一是从加工的水平差异角度来看,道德直觉可能存在不同的亚类形式,且不同类型的道德直觉可能有着不同的学习获得机制与加工机制;二是道德直觉判断不完全是情绪直接作用的结果,而与道德情境中的情绪认知以及情绪背后的道德规则（信念）之间有着重要联系。     

道德推脱与大学生亲社会行为：道德认同的调节效应

运用问卷调查的方法,以550名大学生为研究对象,探讨了道德认同在道德推脱影响大学生亲社会行为过程中的调节效应。采用潜变量调节效应模型的无约束估计方法研究发现：(1)道德推脱会对大学生的亲社会行为产生显著的负向影响,道德认同会对大学生的亲社会行为产生显著的正向影响,并且道德认同会对道德推脱与亲社会行为之间的关系产生显著的调节作用;(2)在高道德认同水平下,大学生的亲社会行为会随着道德推脱水平的升高而显著地减少,而在低道德认同水平下,大学生的亲社会行为并无明显的变化。     

Educated intuitions. Automaticity and rationality in moral judgement

Moral judgements are based on automatic processes. Moral judgements are based on reason. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are true, and show how they can be reconciled. Neither the automaticity of moral judgement nor the post hoc nature of conscious moral reasoning pose a threat to rationalist models of moral cognition. The relation moral reasoning bears to our moral judgements is not primarily mediated by episodes of conscious reasoning, but by the acquisition, formation and maintenance – in short: education – of our moral intuitions.     

道德敏感性：概念理解与辨析

道德敏感性是新科尔伯格取向的重要概念,是道德行为发生之前逻辑上的心理初始成分,是对情境的道德领悟与解释,典型地反映了道德认知和道德情感的相互作用。对这个概念的性质和内涵理解存在能力观和经验观等不同观点;该概念也常操作化地为道德觉察、道德意识、后果意识、确认道德问题等;它与伦理敏感性、道德直觉等相近概念有着不同程度的区别和联系。     

Recontextualising moral injury among military veterans: An integrative theoretical review

Moral injury was originally conceived as a socially-inflicted wound of betrayal experienced by military veterans (Shay, 1994). However, moral injury has since been redefined by psychological researchers as an individualised, predominantly perpetration-driven, and psychopathological phenomenon (e.g., Currier et al., 2015; Jinkerson, 2016). However, social scientific researchers (e.g., Hodgson & Carey, 2017; Molendijk, 2019; Wiinikka-Lydon, 2017) have contested mainstream psychology's medicalisation and decontextualisation of moral injury. This theoretical review integrates insights from across these discourses, and brings them into dialogue with ideas from moral psychology, evolutionary science, and community psychology. The aim of this cross-disciplinary review is to promote a more holistic understanding of moral injury that does justice to its individual and social dimensions. Drawing on these different theoretical strands, this paper proposes that moral injury can be best understood as a psychological wound to basic human needs for social belonging and cohesion. The implications of this integrative understanding of moral injury for applied psychologists and other societal actors are explored. While the relevance of moral injury to civilian populations such as health and social care professionals is clear (e.g., Dombo et al., 2013; French et al., 2021), this paper focuses on military veterans, whose experiences originally prompted the coinage of the term. Please refer to the Supplementary Material section to find this article's Community and Social Impact Statement.     

The unity of moral attitudes: recipe semantics and credal exaptation*

Abstract

This paper offers a noncognitivist characterization of moral attitudes, according to which moral attitudes count as such because of their inclusion of moral concepts. Moral concepts are distinguished by their contribution to the functional roles of some of the attitudes in which they can occur. They have no particular functional role in other attitudes, and should instead be viewed as evolutionary spandrels. In order to make the counter-intuitive implications of the view more palatable, the paper ends with an account of the evolution of normative judgments as exaptations of the cognitive structures that underlie beliefs.     

道德“沾光”效应：道德评价对道德自我知觉及道德行为的影响

人们喜欢关注道德事件并表达自己的立场。以往研究发现回忆自己(而非他人)的道德行为能影响个体的道德自我知觉和道德行为。本研究关注参与道德评价是否会对个体的道德自我和道德行为产生影响。2个研究共同发现：(1)存在道德“沾光”效应：评价支持他人的道德事件,或反对他人的不道德事件,能提升个体的道德自我知觉;(2)道德评价通过提升道德自我知觉,进一步增加个体的道德行为。     

Patterns and evolution of moral behaviour: moral dynamics in everyday life

Recent research on moral dynamics (the processes and phenomena – collective or individual – by which moral behaviour and moral attitudes emerge, evolve, spread, erode or disappear) shows that an individual's ethical mind-set (i.e. outcome-based vs. rule-based) moderates the impact of an initial ethical or unethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethically on a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mind-set facilitates Moral Balancing (behaving ethically or unethically decreases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behaviour again later), whereas a rule-based mind-set facilitates Moral Consistency (engaging in an ethical or unethical behaviour increases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behaviour later on). The objective was to look at the evolution of moral choice across a series of scenarios, that is, to explore if these moral patterns (Balancing vs. Consistency) are maintained over time. The results of three studies showed that Moral Balancing is not maintained over time. On the other hand, Moral Consistency could be maintained over time, if the mind-set was reinforced before making a new moral judgment (but not otherwise).     

Reason explanation a first-order rationalizing account

In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a concept of moral intuition as a seeming whose seemingness resides in special, phenomenological features such as a felt veridicality, appropriateness, familiarity, or confidence, and whose justificatory force is influenced by the reliability of the belief-producing procedures and by a subject's competence in applying moral concepts. I argue that subjects can come to realise that the beliefs expressed in their intuitive judgements evoke a sense of non-inferential credibility. In section 5, I first discuss the contribution of moral expertise to the non-inferential credibility of a person's intuitions. Subsequently, I discuss whether Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is right in saying that we can never claim non-inferential justification for our intuitions because they are subject to all kinds of distorting influences.