认知神经心理学简介

认知神经心理学是认知心理学的一个分支。它的目的是探讨当人们执行认知活动的时候,心理信息加工过程是怎样的,所采用的手段是研究这些认知功能受损的病人。它与认知神经科学的不同在于：认知神经心理学关注的是心理（mind）,而认知神经科学关注的是大脑（特别是关注与认知有关的大脑机制）。研究认知神经心理学的方法也可以用于研究发展性认知障碍,如阅读障碍,或者特殊的语言损伤,这就是发展性认知神经心理学。这些方法还可以用于高级认知发面的研究,如信念形成和心理理论。这些高级认知方面的障碍是精神病学的范畴,因此这类研究错觉、幻想或虚构等的认知神经心理学叫做认知神经精神病学。认知神经心理学的典型特征有：1）研究症状,而不是并发症;2）采用个案研究,而不是群体研究;3）主要数据来源是症状间的双分离;4）致力于模块化认知模型的建立。     

发展认知神经科学研究述评

发展认知神经科学是发展心理学与认知神经科学相结合而形成的跨学科研究领域,旨在从神经、行为和情境三个水平,对认知发展的方方面面进行整合性研究。本文从发展认知神经科学的研究内容、研究方法及其对发展心理学的贡献进行了梳理,并对该学科未来发展的趋势进行了展望。     

进化发展心理学：发展中的人类本性

进化发展心理学研究社会能力与认知能力发展背后的基因与环境机制,以及基因与环境机制在特定社会文化中的表现。进化发展心理学探讨的主要问题与设计到的主要概念包括：（1）自然选择在毕生发展的早期阶段发挥作用;（2）进化发展心理学特别重视适应在婴儿期及儿童期发展中的作用;（3）儿童期的延长有助于儿童学习人类社会的复杂性;（4）发展背景的方法可以用来理解成人外显行为的进化起源;（5）基因与环境因素相互影响约束个体发展;（6）认知能力与行为活动敏感于早期环境,但二者发展也具有可塑性     

视错觉产生的神经机制

传统认知心理学对视觉错觉的解释存在局限性。认知神经科学在移动错觉、轮廓错觉、颜色错觉研究中的一批新发现,可以综合并概括为一种视错觉发生的神经关联重叠机制。该重叠性表现为错觉与相应的真实知觉具有本质上相同的神经活动,即错觉与真实知觉享有共同的神经关联,没有只对错觉反应而不对真实知觉反应的特定神经关联物,而错觉神经活动的特别之处是在真实知觉发生的相同脑区有更强烈的激活     

生理心理学前沿研究概述

1引言 生理心理学是心理科学体系中的重要基础学科,它除用人为研究对象外还用各种实验动物为对象,研究心理行为活动的生理学机制.随着心理科学、生物学、神经科学和新技术的发展,生理心理学超越了传统生理心理学的视野和方法,越来越明显地表现出自身多学科交叉的发展特点和趋势.     

认知神经科学中注意研究的新进展

注意的研究历来是心理学研究中的一个热点问题。文中指出了认知心理学中注意研究取得的成果以及存在的主要问题，接着重点描述了认知神经科学对于注意研究中几个基本问题的最新研究成果。文章最后列出了认知神经科学中注意研究存在的不足。并指出了今后努力的方向。     

社会认知神经科学——一个很有前途的交叉学科

该文介绍了近年兴起的一门交叉学科——社会认知神经科学,着重阐述了它强调在社会、认知与脑神经等三个层面的交互作用上去理解心理现象。作者指出,东方亚洲人与西方人在知觉、注意、认知和人格上的差别都是十分成熟的,可以立即开展社会认知神经科学探索的问题。     

“认知科学”与“第二代认知科学”刍议

以计算隐喻为核心假设的传统认知心理学以及联结主义心理学均不能克服离身心智（disembodied mind）的根本缺陷,当代认知心理学正面临着新的范型转换。以具身性和情境性为重要特征的第二代认知科学将日受重视,并促使认知神经科学进入新的发展阶段。作者认为在身心关系上应该坚持生理只是心理的必要条件,而非充分条件的立场,克服生理还原论的危险;应该重新审视基于二元论的生理机制这种说法;心理学传统中的科学主义和人文主义有可能在第二代认知科学强调认知情境性的基础上达成某种融合;第一代认知科学对意识的研究是不成功的,因为对知觉、注意、记忆、思维等心理过程的研究不能代替意识的研究,同时还应避免以意识内容的研究取代心理学研究的倾向。第二代认知科学中的动力系统理论关于变量（因素）之间的偶合（coupling）关系完全不同于变差分析中的变量之间的交互作用关系”,其动力系统模式可能更有助于破解意识的产生（涌现）之谜,并引发心理学研究的方法论的变革新潮。第二代认知科学的兴起将启发人们对身心关系、生理还原论、意识研究在心理学中的地位、人工智能对心智完全模拟的可能性等重大问题重新思考     

演绎推理的认知和脑机制研究述评

演绎推理是指假设在某些前提成立的条件下推测必然会出现的结论,它是人类重要的思维形式.不同的认知理论对人在推理过程中表现出的逻辑和非逻辑特性作出了相应的解释和预测,而来自认知神经科学的研究也进一步揭示了推理行为的脑机制,对演绎推理的认知理论进行了验证和发展.本文通过对国内外有关演绎推理认知与脑机制研究现状的回顾,以期能促进该领域研究的不断深入.     

评《认知神经科学基础》

自上世纪末以来,伴随着新的脑高级功能成像技术在心理学中的成功应用,心理学已逐渐脱离了认知心理学时期而进入了认知神经科学时期.这是心理学继构造主义、机能主义、行为主义和认知心理学时期以后所达到的一个新的历史时期.     

From Intentions to Neurons: Social and Neural Consequences of Disbelieving in Free Will

The problem of free will is among the most fascinating and disputed questions throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. Traditionally limited to philosophical and theological debate, in the last decades it has become a matter of scientific investigation. The theoretical and methodological advances in neuroscience allowed very complex psychological functions related to free will (conscious intentions, decision-making, and agency) to be investigated. In parallel, neuroscience is gaining momentum in the media, and various scientific findings are claimed to provide evidence that free will is nothing more than an illusion. Why do neuroscientific findings have such a strong impact on our notion of free will? Does it really matter what neuroscience tells us about free will? Here we critically examine studies in experimental philosophy, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience that attempt to provide an empirical answer to these questions. This overview of the literature demonstrates that inducing disbelief in free will has an impact on folk psychology, social behavior and intentional action.     

Is Psychology a Cognitive Science?

ABSTRACT Since the 1970s there has been a significant paradigm shift in psychology away from behaviourism and towards cognitive psychology. Indeed a recent survey discovered that by 1983 more than half American psychologists were describing their approaches as cognitive. However, while behaviourism has had an identifiable philosophical 'line' in positivism, reductionism and the hypothetico-deductive model, such a framework has been noticeably lacking from cognitive psychology. A view of cognitive psychology based on functionalism and ideas from systems analysis is put forward.     

Just because you're imaging the brain doesn't mean you can stop using your head: a primer and set of first principles

Developments within the neurosciences, cognitive sciences, and social sciences have contributed to the emergence of social neuroscience. Among the most obvious contemporary developments are brain-imaging procedures such as functional magnetic resonance imaging. The authors outline a set of first principles designed to help make sense of brain-imaging research within the fields of cognitive and social neuroscience. They begin with a principle few would debate--that social cognition, emotion, and behavior involve the brain--but whose implications might not be entirely obvious to those new to the field. The authors conclude that (a). complex aspects of the mind and behavior will benefit from yet a broader collaboration of neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and social scientists, and (b). social psychologists bring important theoretical, methodological, and statistical expertise to this interdisciplinary enterprise.     

Cognitive psychology in sport: Progress and prospects

ProblemThere has been a recent upsurge of research interest in cognitive sport psychology or the scientific study of mental processes (e.g., mental imagery) in athletes. Despite this interest, an important question has been neglected. Specifically, is research on cognitive processes in athletes influential outside sport psychology, in the “parent” field of cognitive psychology or in the newer discipline of cognitive neuroscience?ObjectivesThe purpose of this paper is to explore the theoretical significance of research on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes from the perspective of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience.MethodFollowing analysis of recent paradigm shifts in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, a narrative review is provided of key studies on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes.Results and conclusionsThis paper shows that cognitive sport psychology has contributed significantly to theoretical understanding of certain mental processes studied in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It also shows that neuroscientific research on motor imagery can benefit from increased collaboration with cognitive sport psychology. Overall, I conclude that the domain of sport offers cognitive researchers a rich and dynamic natural laboratory in which to study how the mind works.     

Reducing mind to molecular pathways: explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience

As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot explain cognition and complex behavior directly. These experimental practices involve intervening directly with molecular components of sub-cellular and gene expression pathways in neurons and then measuring specific behaviors. These behaviors are tracked using tests that are widely accepted by experimental psychologists to study the psychological phenomenon at issue (e.g., memory, attention, and perception). Here I illustrate these practices and their importance for explanation and reduction in current mainstream neuroscience by describing recent work on social recognition memory in mammals.     

Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.     

论心理学中的还原论

心理学中的还原论主要指方法论意义上的“理论的还原论”,可分为心理学理论向物理学、生理学与生物学理论还原等三种还原论类型。它并不像其攻击者所误解的那样,就是本体论的还原论、必然导致决定论、与整体论截然对立或者仅仅就是还原方法。相反地,还原论是研究心理现象的重要途径,与方法论的多元主义并行不悖,符合人类进行认识的规律。只要使用者注意其适用的边界条件,还原论还是不失为心理学研究的一种不错的“没有选择的选择”。     

Les représentations philosophiques de la relation entre l’« esprit » et le cerveau des enseignants-chercheurs de psychologie : quelques implications

The history of psychology has been marked by strong methodological, theoretical and epistemological controversies. In this paper, we evaluate the hypothesis that these well-known controversies are often implicitly supported by philosophical, metaphysical and probably religious oppositions. The focus of our investigation concerns the classical opposition in philosophy between dualism and physicalism, more specifically the complex relationship between the brain and the mind. One hundred and sixty-six teachers and researchers (30 in clinical psychology, 37 in cognitive psychology, 31 in development psychology, 38 in social psychology and 30 in neurosciences) from 8 French universities have accepted to participate in this survey by responding to a questionnaire made of 17 questions. Data were analyzed using factor analysis technique and the results of the principal component analysis (PCA) revealed four main factors that are more likely to define accurately the philosophical profile of each sub-discipline. The main result of this survey is that philosophical and metaphysical positions, at the foundations of psychology, clearly distinguish and oppose the five studied sub-disciplines. At one extreme, there are cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists who are strongly physicalist. To the contrary, clinical and social psychologists exhibit more dualistic representation. Developmental psychologists occupy an intermediate position between these two extremes. Finally, we analyzed the implications of the participants’ philosophical representation differences, from an epistemological and clinical/practical point of view. The important point is that these philosophical and metaphysical oppositions are largely implicit. Indeed, inside our community, it is very rare, if not exceptional, that they are explicitly involved in the theoretical or epistemological conflicts, which exist inside our discipline. However, it is probable that they play a massive role in our debates, a role all the more important, as we are largely unconscious of them. The current study is the first to tackle such an important topic by describing more accurately the philosophical representation of scholars in major sub-fields of psychology. By revealing such deep metaphysical oppositions, we hope to shed a new light on the origins of these persisting conflicts in psychology.