Computer simulation through an error-statistical lens

After showing how Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical philosophy of science might be applied to address important questions about the evidential status of computer simulation results, I argue that an error-statistical perspective offers an interesting new way of thinking about computer simulation models and has the potential to significantly improve the practice of simulation model evaluation. Though intended primarily as a contribution to the epistemology of simulation, the analysis also serves to fill in details of Mayo’s epistemology of experiment.     

Self-Defense against Verbal Assault: Shame, Anger, and the Social Bond

With many years of experience and refinement, the arts of self-defense against physical assault are highly developed. Without an effective theory and a useful practice, there is little in the way of self-defense against verbal assault. For THEORY, I draw upon ideas from aikido, family systems theory, and the sociology of emotions. Since unacknowledged shame seems to generate rage and damage social bonds, I emphasize the management of shame, anger, and bonds. To illustrate the meaning of these principles, I offer several episodes as examples, using the METHOD of discourse analysis. I apply this theory and method to the PRACTICE of psychotherapy by describing some rudimentary principles of defense of self against verbal aggression, especially the subtle aggression of innuendo. Psychotherapy is often an arena of verbal aggression by both therapist and client, even though it is usually unintentional and outside of awareness.     

Bayesian decision theory,subjective and objective probabilities,and acceptance of empirical hypotheses

It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and the simplicity ranking of alternative hypotheses.     

Anthropomorphism and anthropectomy as friendly competitors

Principles help comparative psychologists select from among multiple hypotheses that account for the data. Anthropomorphic principles select hypotheses that have the most human–animal similarities while anthropectic principles select hypotheses that have the most human–animal differences. I argue that there is no way for the comparative psychologist on their own to justify their selection of one principle over the other. However, the comparative psychologist can justify their selection of one principle over the other in virtue of being members of comparative psychology as a community. As it turns out, though, this justifies both competing principles: the community benefits most from competition between the two principles so comparative psychologists are justified in implementing the principles by which they can best contribute to the competition. Thus, I argue that common arguments to unify principle implementation in comparative psychology are defeated by the conservative arguments to preserve and foster competition.     

Internalist and externalist aspects of justification in scientific inquiry

While epistemic justification is a central concern for both contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, debates in contemporary epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification have not been discussed extensively by philosophers of science. As a step toward a coherent account of scientific justification that is informed by, and sheds light on, justificatory practices in the sciences, this paper examines one of these debates—the internalist–externalist debate—from the perspective of objective accounts of scientific evidence. In particular, we focus on Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical theory of evidence because it is a paradigmatically objective theory of evidence that is strongly informed by methodological practice. We contend that from the standpoint of such an objective theory of evidence, justification in science has both externalist and internalist characteristics. In reaching this conclusion, however, we find that the terms of the contemporary debate between internalists and externalists have to be redefined to be applicable to scientific contexts.     

Weinberg on QFT: Demonstrative Induction and Underdetermination

In this essay I examine a recent argument by Steven Weinberg that seeks to establish local quantum field theory as the only type of quantum theory in accord with the relevent evidence and satisfying two basic physical principles. I reconstruct the argument as a demonstrative induction and indicate it's role as a foil to the underdetermination argument in the debate over scientific realism. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Constructor theory

Constructor theory seeks to express all fundamental scientific theories in terms of a dichotomy between possible and impossible physical transformations–those that can be caused to happen and those that cannot. This is a departure from the prevailing conception of fundamental physics which is to predict what will happen from initial conditions and laws of motion. Several converging motivations for expecting constructor theory to be a fundamental branch of physics are discussed. Some principles of the theory are suggested and its potential for solving various problems and achieving various unifications is explored. These include providing a theory of information underlying classical and quantum information; generalising the theory of computation to include all physical transformations; unifying formal statements of conservation laws with the stronger operational ones (such as the ruling-out of perpetual motion machines); expressing the principles of testability and of the computability of nature (currently deemed methodological and metaphysical respectively) as laws of physics; allowing exact statements of emergent laws (such as the second law of thermodynamics); and expressing certain apparently anthropocentric attributes such as knowledge in physical terms.     

The Maizena Argument: A Reaction

Everyday listening is the experience of hearing events in the world rather than sounds per se. In this article, I explore the acoustic basis of everyday listening as a start toward understanding how sounds near the ear can indicate remote physical events. Information for sound-producing events and their dimensions is investi- gated using physical analyses of events to inform acoustic analyses of the sounds they produce. The result is a variety of algorithms which enable the synthesis of sounds made by basic-level events such as impacts, scraping, and dripping, as well as by more complex events such as bouncing, breaking, spilling, and machinery. These algorithms may serve as instantiated hypotheses about the acoustic infor- mation for events. Analysis and synthesis work together in their development: Just as analyses of the physics and acoustics of sound-producing events may inform synthesis, so listening to the results of synthesis may inform analysis. This raises several issues concerning evaluation, specification, and the tension between formal and informal physical analyses. In the end, however, the fundamental test of these algorithms is in the sounds they produce: I describe them in enough detail here that readers may implement, test, and extend them.     

Comment on “Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology”

A serious problem with Popperian falsificationism in the presence of auxiliary hypotheses and experimental conditions, in addition to a theory under test, is raised by Meehl. In brief, a negative result endangers both the theory in question, and the auxiliary hypotheses; which should we reject? I discuss how considering series of studies, rather than a single study, helps make this problem somewhat more tractable. I treat situations where negative results are in hand, as well as situations where positive results may be discounted by skeptics who question auxiliary hypotheses.     

Explanation is a Genus: An Essay on the Varieties of Scientific Explanation

I shall endeavor to show that every physical theory since Newton explainswithout drawing attention to causes–that, in other words, physical theories as physical theories aspire to explain under an ideal quite distinctfrom that of causal explanation. If I am right, then even if sometimes theexplanations achieved by a physical theory are not in violation ofthe standard of causal explanation, this is purely an accident. For physicaltheories, as I will show, do not, as such, aim at accommodating the goals oraspirations of causal explanation. This will serve as the founding insightfor a new theory of explanation, which will itself serve as the cornerstoneof a new theory of scientific method.     

Psychodynamic and systemic paradigms: An attempted integration in the light of personal experience with groups

Conclusion Our purpose is not to confuse psychoanalysis with systems theory: Karen Horney defined herself as a psychoanalyst, while the theory of autopoietic systems remains a systems theory. With the exception of the basic matrices that determine the identity of each current of thought, it seems possible to point out interesting points of contact among different anthropological views. They appear to converge on some points that are not to be overlooked, though they may take off from premises that are very different from each other. These are recent working hypotheses, which I have presented as a theme of research that needs to be verified scientifically. If these hypotheses can be rigorously verified in such a way as to avoid superimpositions, the theories would be enriched reciprocally, opening up interesting prospectives of scientific research. This is our wish.     

The logic of social exchange: has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task

In order to successfully engage in social exchange--cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit--humans must be able to solve a number of complex computational problems, and do so with special efficiency. Following Marr (1982), Cosmides (1985) and Cosmides and Tooby (1989) used evolutionary principles to develop a computational theory of these adaptive problems. Specific hypotheses concerning the structure of the algorithms that govern how humans reason about social exchange were derived from this computational theory. This article presents a series of experiments designed to test these hypotheses, using the Wason selection task, a test of logical reasoning. Part I reports experiments testing social exchange theory against the availability theories of reasoning; Part II reports experiments testing it against Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) permission schema theory. The experimental design included eight critical tests designed to choose between social exchange theory and these other two families of theories; the results of all eight tests support social exchange theory. The hypothesis that the human mind includes cognitive processes specialized for reasoning about social exchange predicts the content effects found in these experiments, and parsimoniously explains those that have already been reported in the literature. The implications of this line of research for a modular view of human reasoning are discussed, as well as the utility of evolutionary biology in the development of computational theories.     

Models of data and theoretical hypotheses: a case-study in classical genetics

Linkage (or genetic) maps are graphs, which are intended to represent the linear ordering of genes on the chromosomes. They are constructed on the basis of statistical data concerning the transmission of genes. The invention of this technique in 1913 was driven by Morgan’s group’s adoption of a set of hypotheses concerning the physical mechanism of heredity. These hypotheses were themselves grounded in Morgan’s defense of the chromosome theory of heredity, according to which chromosomes are the physical basis of genes. In this paper, I analyze the 1919 debate between William Castle and Morgan’s group, about the construction of genetic maps. The official issue of the debate concerns the arrangement of genes on chromosomes. However, the disputants tend to carry out the discussions about how one should model the data in order to draw predictions concerning the transmission of genes; the debate does not bear on the data themselves, nor does it focus on the hypotheses explaining these data. The main criteria that are appealed to by the protagonists are simplicity and predictive efficacy. However, I show that both parties’ assessments of the simplicity and predictive efficacy of different ways of modeling the data themselves depend on background theoretical positions. I aim at clarifying how preference for a given model and theoretical commitments articulate.     

Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?

Hilary Putnam has argued that computational functionalism cannot serve as a foundation for the study of the mind, as every ordinary open physical system implements every finite-state automaton. I argue that Putnam's argument fails, but that it points out the need for a better understanding of the bridge between the theory of computation and the theory of physical systems: the relation of implementation. It also raises questions about the class of automata that can serve as a basis for understanding the mind. I develop an account of implementation, linked to an appropriate class of automata, such that the requirement that a system implement a given automaton places a very strong constraint on the system. This clears the way for computation to play a central role in the analysis of mind.     

The Physical: Empirical, not Metaphysical

Intuitively, physicalism is the thesis that there’s nothing ‘over and above’ the physical. Going beyond this intuitive formulation requires an account of what it is for a property, kind, relation, or object to be a physical one. Here I defend an unfamiliar implementation of the familiar strategy of defining physical properties, etc. as those posited by the complete and ideal physical theory. That implementation ties being a physical theory to being a theory with the hallmarks of scientific theories and then identifies physical theories among the scientific ones by their characteristic subject matter, roughly, the world’s relatively fundamental elements. I then argue that, fully fleshed out, such an account is able to satisfy an array of constraints on any account of the physical, as well as avoid a number of prima facie objections, without imposing Wilson’s No Fundamental Mentality Constraint.     

Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity

The notion of a severe test has played an important methodological role in the history of science. But it has not until recently been analyzed in any detail. We develop a generally Bayesian analysis of the notion, compare it with Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach by way of sample diagnostic tests in the medical sciences, and consider various objections to both. At the core of our analysis is a distinction between evidence and confirmation or belief. These notions must be kept separate if mistakes are to be avoided; combined in the right way, they provide an adequate understanding of severity. Those who think that the weight of the evidence always enables you to choose between hypotheses “ignore one of the factors (the prior probability) altogether, and treat the other (the likelihood) as though it ...meant something other than it actually does. This is the same mistake as is made by someone who has scruples about measuring the arms of a balance (having only a tape measure at his disposal ...), but is willing to assert that the heavier load will always tilt the balance (thereby implicitly assuming, although without admitting it, that the arms are of equal length!). (Bruno de Finetti, Theory of Probability)²     

Pay Equity Evaluations of Occupations and Their Bases

Recent research indicates that type of occupation is a major basis for evaluating the fairness of earnings. The present paper reports the results of a research investigating which of the characteristics of occupations serve as bases of pay-equity evaluations, and whether there is a measure of consensus in regard to these bases. Major prevalent theoretical perspectives, such as equity theory and status value theory, served as bases for formulating and testing a series of hypotheses. The findings, based on a cross-sectional city sample of 222 employed individuals in Israel, show that pay-equity evaluations of occupations are based on a consensual frame of reference. The major bases of such evaluations were found to be occupational prestige and certain contributive inputs such as the amount of vocational training and the physical demands required of the incumbents' occupations.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Recursive Ontology</Emphasis>: A Systemic Theory of Reality

The article introduces recursive ontology, a general ontology which aims to describe how being is organized and what are the processes that drive it. In order to answer those questions, I use a multidisciplinary approach that combines the theory of levels, philosophy and systems theory. The main claim of recursive ontology is that being is the product of a single recursive process of generation that builds up all of reality in a hierarchical fashion from fundamental physical particles to human societies. To support this assumption, I provide the general laws and the basic principles of recursive ontology as well as a semi-formalised model of the theory based on a recursive generative grammar. Recursive ontology not only actively promotes a multidisciplinary investigation of reality, but also can be used as a general framework to develop future domain-specific theories.     

The utility of transactional and transformational leadership for predicting performance and satisfaction within a path‐goal theory framework

In a test of hypotheses derived from the integration of principles of path‐goal theory ( House, 1996 ) and transformational leadership theory ( Bass, 1985 ), data collected from 179 high school teachers and their principals were examined with hierarchical regression analysis. Augmentation analysis indicated that transactional leadership had a stronger role in explaining unique criterion variance beyond the contribution of transformational leadership, than did transformational leadership relative to transactional leadership. In addition, both the transactional and transformational leadership had a negative interactive relationship for predicting the outcome of performance, such that leader vision and leader intellectual stimulation were more positively correlated with employee performance when leader use of contingent reward was low. These augmentation effects, in conjunction with the findings of negative moderation, suggest that transactional leadership may have greater potential predictive value than previously assumed.