The theory of incubation: a reply to Bersh

Bersh's critique of Eysenck's theory of incubation is summarized, and some arguments are presented to indicate that while some criticisms are pertinent, they do not invalidate the theory.     

The theory behind Psychoticism: a reply to Eysenck

In this reply to Eysenck, we attempt to clarify why we have criticized Eysenck's Psychoticism model and have found it necessary to introduce our own alternative model. It is concluded that the validity of the P scale as a measure of Psychoticism has not been demonstrated and that the P construct itself is untenable.     

Comment on internal feedback as a theory of judgment: a reply to Levin

Levin's suggestion that internal feedback strategies be employed in judgmental and learning tasks is discussed. The predictions of an internal feedback notion are seen as inconsistent with Veit's ratio and difference task data. Scale-free frameworks and scale-convergence criteria used in previous research are described as useful techniques for separating integration from judgmental processes in information-integration as well as learning-task situations.     

Necessary considerations for a theory of form perception: a theoretical and empirical reply to Boselie and Leeuwenberg (1986)

Boselie and Leeuwenberg (1986) recently defended their version of the minimum principle, called structural information theory or SIT, against a varied set of criticisms. Two of the most notable of these criticisms are (i) that perceptual organization can proceed as a piecemeal, rather than as a global, process (as demonstrated by partially-biased Necker cubes and 'impossible' figures), and (ii) that perceptual organization is influenced by subjective variables as well as by stimulus variables (Peterson and Hochberg 1983). The second criticism was acknowledged by Boselie and Leeuwenberg but not addressed. The first criticism was addressed by the introduction of two new variables into SIT in order to argue that the perceived organization of partially-biased Necker cubes and impossible figures can be predicted by a global coding scheme, thereby supporting rather than refuting global minimum principles. It is argued here that the criticisms cannot be dismissed by this rebuttal, which is focused narrowly on single examples rather than on the general principles embodied by the demonstrations. The implications of piecemeal perception and subjective mediation are spelled out, and both old and new data showing that the applicability of global minimum principles must be reexamined, not merely defended, are discussed. Finally, the argument for a richer, more interacting, theory of form perception is presented.     

On the dual-mechanism theory of recognition failure: A reply to Begg

Experimental results recently reported by Begg (1979) have been interpreted as inconsistent with the predictions of the dual-mechanism theory of recognition failure proposed by Jones 1978a). The detailed data are reanalyzed here, and it is shown that, on the contrary, they provide strong support for the theory.