Is Moral Theory Harmful in Practice?—Relocating Anti-theory in Contemporary Ethics

In this paper I discuss the viability of the claim that at least some forms of moral theory are harmful for sound moral thought and practice. This claim was put forward by e.g. Elisabeth Anscombe (1981(1958)) and by Annette Baier, Peter Winch, D.Z Phillips and Bernard Williams in the 1970’s–1980’s. To this day aspects of it have found resonance in both post-Wittgensteinian and virtue ethical quarters. The criticism has on one hand contributed to a substantial change and broadening of the scope of analytic moral philosophy. On the other hand it is, at least in its most strongly anti-theoretical formulations, now broadly considered outdated and—to the extent that it is still defended—insensitive to the changes that have occurred within the field in the last 20–30 years. The task of this paper is to relocate the anti-theoretical critique into the field of analytic ethics today.     

A limited defense of moral perception

One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a necessary condition for coming to know that X is F by perception is the ability to have a perceptual experience that represents something as being F. Call this the ‘Representation Objection’ to moral perception. In this paper I argue that the Representation Objection to moral perception fails. Thus I offer a limited defense of moral perception.     

Toward a Hermeneutic Turn in Chinese Philosophy: Western Theory,Confucian Tradition,and C<Emphasis Type="SmallCaps">HENG</Emphasis> Chung-ying’s Onto-hermeneutics

The present essay thinks along the comparative, philosophical lines that Cheng Chung-ying’s project of “onto-hermeneutics” draws in order to shed light on the relations between ontology and epistemology in the hermeneutic act. In the process, not only will we be thinking with Cheng and some Western hermeneutic theorists, but we will also be thinking through history by examining the Confucian act of reading. To the extent that any hermeneutic exercise, in accordance with Cheng’s construal, cannot merely be a disembodied act of theoretical knowing but is also moral effort that entails personal cultivation—or, in Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s terms, Bildung—its espousal and its practice necessarily embody a larger conception of culture. In fact, precisely in terms of the intimate engagement with culture, Confucian insights, filtered through Cheng’s onto-hermeneutic lenses, may have much to offer contemporary hermeneutics.     

Saving Strawson: Evil and Strawsonian Accounts of Moral Responsibility

Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson denies that the truth of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at least appear to have difficulty incorporating evil persons into their accounts of moral responsibility. In what follows, I argue that Strawson is not committed to supposing that being evil is an exempting condition—at least, that he can allow that evil persons are morally responsible agents.     

The Great Apes and the Severely Disabled: Moral Status and Thick Evaluative Concepts

The literature of bioethics suffers from two serious problems. (1) Most authors are unable to take seriously both the rights of the great apes and of severely disabled human infants. Rationalism—moral status rests on rational capacities—wrongly assigns a higher moral status to the great apes than to all severely disabled human infants with less rational capacities than the great apes. Anthropocentrism—moral status depends on membership in the human species—falsely grants all humans a higher moral status than the great apes. Animalism—moral status is dependent on the ability to suffer—mistakenly equates the moral status of humans and most animals. (2) The concept person is widely used for justificatory purposes, but it seems that it cannot play such a role. It seems that it is either redundant or unable to play any justificatory role. I argue that we can solve the second problem by understanding person as a thick evaluative concept. This then enables us to justify assigning a higher moral status to the great apes than to simple animals: the great apes are persons. To solve the first problem, I argue that certain severely disabled infants have a higher moral status than the great apes because they are dependent upon human relationships for their well-being. Only very limited abilities are required for such relationships, and the question who is capable of them must be based on thick evaluative concepts. Thus, it turns out that to make progress in bioethics we must assign thick evaluative concepts a central role.

Charged experiences of natural environments

Natural environments often generate experiences that combine great emotional and moral power—“charged” experiences. Their characteristics are explored through writings that capture them convincingly. They appear to have a perceptual character. Perception of the scene is invested with a sense of something beyond it, and much bigger. It may be God, or immensity in time or space, or the essence of a nation. This encounter is often connected with moral authority. A recurring theme is the sense that environment and the things in it—including the observer—are a self-similar pattern. People are not passive recipients of these experiences. They seek them out. Evoking the environment in words can often evoke the charged experience too—at least in part. The material suggests tasks for psychologists—most simply, finding systematic ways to describe these experiences. That may help other environmental disciplines, which face difficulty characterising the dimension of response. Theoretically, the material raises questions about the representations generated by perceptual processes. The observation that powerful moral imperatives seem to be given in the act of perceiving is also suggestive for the psychology of morality. Culture certainly plays a part in charged responses, but landscapes have the power to be invested with an emotional and moral charge where other stimuli may not. I am indebted to Helen Ross for provoking this article; to Bert Hodges, Eamonn Hughes, David Hale and most particularly to Edna Longley for ideas and examples; and to Noel Sheehy for encouragement. They cannot be blamed for my misunderstandings.     

Charged experiences of natural environments

Natural environments often generate experiences that combine great emotional and moral power—“charged” experiences. Their characteristics are explored through writings that capture them convincingly. They appear to have a perceptual character. Perception of the scene is invested with a sense of something beyond it, and much bigger. It may be God, or immensity in time or space, or the essence of a nation. This encounter is often connected with moral authority. A recurring theme is the sense that environment and the things in it—including the observer—are a self-similar pattern. People are not passive recipients of these experiences. They seek them out. Evoking the environment in words can often evoke the charged experience too—at least in part. The material suggests tasks for psychologists—most simply, finding systematic ways to describe these experiences. That may help other environmental disciplines, which face difficulty characterising the dimension of response. Theoretically, the material raises questions about the representations generated by perceptual processes. The observation that powerful moral imperatives seem to be given in the act of perceiving is also suggestive for the psychology of morality. Culture certainly plays a part in charged responses, but landscapes have the power to be invested with an emotional and moral charge where other stimuli may not. I am indebted to Helen Ross for provoking this article; to Bert Hodges, Eamonn Hughes, David Hale and most particularly to Edna Longley for ideas and examples; and to Noel Sheehy for encouragement. They cannot be blamed for my misunderstandings.     

Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability

The inference from determinism to predictability, though intuitively plausible, needs to be qualified in an important respect. We need to distinguish between two different kinds of predictability. On the one hand, determinism implies external predictability, that is, the possibility for an external observer, not part of the universe, to predict, in principle, all future states of the universe. Yet, on the other hand, embedded predictability as the possibility for an embedded subsystem in the universe to make such predictions, does not obtain in a deterministic universe. By revitalizing an older result—the paradox of predictability—we demonstrate that, even in a deterministic universe, there are fundamental, non-epistemic limitations on the ability of one subsystem embedded in the universe to predict the future behaviour of other subsystems embedded in the same universe. As an explanation, we put forward the hypothesis that these limitations arise because the predictions themselves are physical events which are part of the law-like causal chain of events in the deterministic universe. While the limitations on embedded predictability cannot in any direct way show evidence of free human agency, we conjecture that, even in a deterministic universe, human agents have a take-it-or-leave-it control over revealed predictions of their future behaviour.     

Sorai and the will oftian

Conclusion My purpose has been more negative than positive. That is, I have challenged the view that Sorai understoodtian as an intentional agent. At minimum, Sorai’s philosophical views do not depend upon such a conception oftian, and he refrains from characterizingtian in such terms when he discusses the concept oftian directly. However, I do not claim to have proven that Sorai’s view oftian was completely naturalistic, or even that Sorai did not—at some level—believe thattian had intentions. I have, I hope, shown thatthe case that Sorai viewedtian as intentional has not been convincingly made. Further, something closer to a dynamic and indeterminate naturalistic view is a reasonable alternative. On my reading, Sorai steers a course between the Song Confucian view oftian as static and knowable (a view that he explicitly rejects) and a view oftian as intentional (a view he never unequivocally expresses)—indeed, he rejects the idea of personifyingtian. When Sorai speaks of thexin or “mind”of tian, he is best understood as employing a metaphor that implies complexity, mystery, activity, and perhaps moral structure, but not intentionality in the normal sense. The complexity, indeterminacy, and dynamism oftian, as these are expressed in Sorai’s writings, do not necessarily imply willful intent on the part oftian, for they are all consistent with the Xunzian interpretation oftian as a natural process, even iftian’s regularities have a moral character.     

Kamm on Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restrictions

Agent-relative restrictions prohibit minimizing violations: that is, they require us not to minimize the total number of their violations by violating them ourselves. Frances Kamm has explained this prohibition in terms of the moral worth of persons, which, in turn, she explains in terms of persons’ high moral status as inviolable beings. I press the following criticism of this account: even if minimizing violations are permissible, we need not have a lower moral status provided other determinants thereof boost it. Thus, Kamm’s account is incomplete at best. And when, to address this incompleteness, it is insisted that our moral worth derives from specific moral statuses, the inviolability account comes to seem deficient because it begs the question against those who are not initially persuaded that minimizing violations are impermissible.

The revelation effect for autobiographical memory: A mixture-model analysis

Participants provided information about their childhood by rating their confidence about whether they had experienced various events (e.g., “broke a window playing ball”). On some trials, participants unscrambled a key word from the event phrase (e.g., wdinwo—window) or an unrelated word (e.g., gnutge—nugget) before seeing the event and giving their confidence ratings. The act of unscrambling led participants to increase their confidence that the event occurred in their childhood, but only when the confidence rating immediately followed the act of unscrambling. This increase in confidence mirrors the “revelation effect” observed in word recognition experiments. In the present article, we analyzed our data using a new signal detection mixture distribution model that does not require the researcher to know the veracity of memory judgments a priori. Our analysis reveals that unscrambling a key word or an unrelated word affects response bias and discriminability in autobiographical memory tests in ways that are very similar to those that have been previously found for word recognition tasks.     

Was I Entitled or Should I Apologize? Affirmative Action Going Forward

As a U.S. civil rights policy, affirmative action commonly denotes race-conscious and result-oriented efforts by private and public officials to correct the unequal distribution of economic opportunity and education attributed to slavery, segregation, poverty and racism. Opponents argue that affirmative action (1) violates ideals of color-blind public policies, offending moral principles of fairness and constitutional principles of equality and due process; (2) has proven to be socially and politically divisive; (3) has not made things better; (4) mainly benefits middle-class, wealthy and foreign-born blacks; (4) stigmatizes its beneficiaries; and (5) compromises the self-esteem and self-respect of beneficiaries who know that they have been awarded preferential treatment. By way of a thought experiment, imagine that after decades of public policy and experimentation, the United States public finally came to agree: affirmative action is morally and legally wrong. Employing such a thought experiment, this essay by a beneficiary of affirmative action—written in response to James Sterba’s Affirmative Action for the Future (2009)—examines duties of moral repair and the possibility that the past beneficiaries of affirmative action owe apologies, compensation or some other highly personal form of corrective accountability. Beneficiaries of affirmative action have experienced woundedness and moral insecurity. Indeed, the practice of affirmative action comes with a psychology, a set of psychological benefits and burdens whose moral logic those of us who believe in our own fallibility—as much as we believe in the justice of what we have received and conferred on others—should address.     

Accidental Rightness

In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’ One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not—yet needs to—present an account of moral obligation.

Defending a possibilist insight in consequentialist thought

There is a heated dispute among consequentialists concerning the following deontic principle:

Ethical challenges in a technological environment: The perspective of engineers versus managers

In his article ‘Better Communication Between Engineers and Managers: Some Ways to Prevent Many Ethically Hard Choices’¹ Michael Davis analyzes the causes of the disaster in terms of a communications gap between management and engineers. When the communication between (representatives of) both groups breaks down, the organization is in (moral) trouble. Crucial information gets stuck somewhere in the organization prohibiting a careful discussion and weighing of all (moral) arguments. The resulting judgment has therefore little (moral) quality. In this paper I would like to comment on some of Michael Davis’s interesting and thought-provoking insights and ideas. A company which implements Davis’s recommendations at least shows some sensitivity to organizational moral issues. But it might miss the point that moral trouble can also result from a common understanding between managers and engineers. Organizational members sometimes tend to be myopic with regard to safety issues. This paper:

Poor Little Ritz Boy David “Does” Hawaii or: Lucky Davy Salutes Lucky Lindy

In this article, David Bittner explodes the myth, restated in Brideshead Revisited (1945), that Polynesians are “happy and harmless.” He does so for the same reason that Evelyn Waugh does: “the grim invasion of trader, administrator, missionary, and tourist” has changed all that (p. 174). Touring Hawaii in July of ’09, Bittner was interested to discover some unusual bits of American heritage, but saddened to see how “civilization” and “Americanization” actually seem to have eroded the Hawaiian people’s rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Bittner’s dual religious heritage—Judaism by birth and upbringing and Catholicism by choice in mid-life—has given him the perspective to apply the lessons of Hawaiian history to his own personal issues, particularly forgiveness.     

Why science cannot stand alone

In an era in which certain arenas of scientific research have become increasingly controversial, this article critically evaluates what it means to “believe in science.” Many scientists today seem to claim a sovereign right to no political interference under the rubric of freedom. This article questions such a notion, and explores the dominance of science and the silencing of moral voices by undertaking two brief investigations—the first into National Socialist Germany, which insisted that it was defined by “applied biology,” and the second into the world of contemporary American biomedicine. When all ethical barriers are eradicated, it seems that a will to power takes over—manifested in Nazi Germany’s vaunted scientific autonomy. In light of these sobering historical examples, this article reminds the reader that members of the public, including physicians, rightly deliberate about how to conscientiously order their lives together, and that part of that instrinsically political deliberation is to set limits to the ways medical science is applied and what scientists may do in pursuit of their goals.

The (near) necessity of alternate possibilities for moral responsibility

Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.