The ad hominem argument of Berkeley’s Analyst

This paper responds to two issues in interpreting George Berkeley’s Analyst. First, it explains why the text contains no discussion of religious mysteries or points of faith, despite the claims of the text's subtitle; I argue that the subtitle must be understood, and its success assessed, in conjunction with material external to the text. Second, it’s unclear how naturally the arguments of the Analyst sit with Berkeley’s broader views. He criticizes the methodology of calculus and conceptually problematic entities, and the extent to which they require one to bend the rules of classical mathematics. Yet, elsewhere, Berkeley’s opinion of classical mathematics and its intelligibility is low, and he defends a pragmatic approach to word meaning that should not find fault with so functionally successful a theory. The ad hominem intention of the text makes it difficult to discern to what extent Berkeley is committed to the sincerity of these criticisms. This component of the text is rarely discussed, but I argue that when trying to decide what Berkeley’s true position is in the Analyst, we should treat its ad hominem component as its primary intention.     

Sumner On Desires and Well-Being

Berkeley holds that objects in the world are constituted of ideas. Some commentators argue that for Berkeley, ideas are identical to acts of perception; this is taken to proceed from his view that ideas are like pains. In this paper, I evaluate the identity claim. I argue that although it does not follow from the pain analogy, nonetheless the texts suggest that Berkeley does think ideas and acts are identical. I show how Berkeley can account for objects persisting over time and being perceivable by multiple observers, even if the ideas that constitute them are intermittent and dependent on particular actors.     

The management of science and the mismanagement of the world

The truth of a scientific proposition, finding, or an abstract ethical principle is not a static property inherent in it. Truth happens as the result of the management of human affairs. It becomes true, is discovered and made true by actions. Its verity is in fact a series of actions, a process: the process of its implementation. Its validity is gained through what may generally be called “the management of truth: (C. West Churchman and Ian I. Mitroff). ... The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation. William James This paper will also appear in the volumeThe Experimenting Society: Policy Essays in Honor of Donald T. Campbell. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Publishers, 1994 (in press).     

The Effects of Time Delays on Consumers' Use of Different Criteria for Product Purchase Decisions

Recent research has suggested that time delays might result in consumers' reliance on different sets of criteria in making product purchase decisions. A critical criterion among these factors is consumers' product category knowledge. The present study suggests that category knowledge mediates temporally distanced purchase decisions. When product category knowledge is retrieved, it has no or marginal immediate influence on consumers' decisions. However, retrieved product category knowledge has a substantial influence on consumers' decisions if these are delayed, that is, when decisions are made only after some time had elapsed since the exposure to product information. The function of product category knowledge within the decision predictors is conceptualized and demonstrated empirically. Its significance in the marketing reality which involves numerous decisions that are obtained in delay, is discussed.     

Locke's theory of classification

In §155 of his New Theory of Vision Berkeley explains that a hypothetical ‘unbodied spirit’ ‘cannot comprehend the manner wherein geometers describe a right line or circle’.1 ¹All references to Berkeley are from, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds.), The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1948) The following abbreviations are used: An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision, section x = New Theory x; Philosophical Commentaries, entry x = Commentaries x; Part I of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Knowledge, section x = Principles x. All other references to Berkeley's works are of the form The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, volume x, page y = Works, x, y. The reason for this, Berkeley continues, is that ‘the rule and compass with their use being things of which it is impossible he should have any notion.’ This reference to geometrical tools has led virtually all commentators to conclude that at least one reason why the unbodied spirit cannot have knowledge of plane geometry is because it cannot manipulate a ruler or a compass. In this article I will show that such an interpretation is flawed. I will instead argue that Berkeley's understanding of Euclidian geometry was based on Isaac Barrow's account of the foundations of geometry. On this view geometrical objects are conceived in terms of the idealized motion that generates the objects of geometry. Consequently, that what the unbodied spirit cannot do in this context is to form an idea of motion rather than being unable to handle geometrical tools.     

What do decision models tell us about information use?

This paper develops hypotheses about the implications of different types of decision for the utilization of different types of systematically produced information: data, research, and analysis. The engineering and enlightenment models found in the knowledge utilization literature prove inadequate for this purpose. We turn to three decision models—routine, incremental, and fundamental–and determine their implied demands for information. We also examine how information might be used in scanning procedures in anticipation of decision regime shifts. The results suggest that patterns of information should differ markedly in each decision context and indicate that there may be an inherent bias against the use of research in decision. Evert A. Lindquist, a doctoral candidate at the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Calfornia at Berkeley, is completing a dissertation onPolicy Institutes in Canada: The Organization and Relevance of Public Inquiry and will join the faculty of the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto this fall. Organizations, public policy, and the role of information in decision making are among his primary research interests.     

Action,knowledge and embodiment in Berkeley and Locke

Embodiment is a fact of human existence which philosophers should not ignore. They may differ to a great extent in what they have to say about our bodies, but they have to take into account that for each of us our body has a special status, it is not merely one amongst the physical objects, but a physical object to which we have a unique relation. While Descartes approached the issue of embodiment through consideration of sensation and imagination, it is more directly reached by consideration of action and agency: whenever we act upon the world, we act by moving our bodies. So if we can understand what an immaterialist such as Berkeley thinks about agency, we will have gone a fair way to understanding what he thinks about embodiment. §1 discusses a recent flurry of articles on the subject of Berkeley’s account of action. I choose to present Berkeley as a causal-volitional theorist (realist) not because I think it is the uniquely correct interpretation of the texts, but because I find it more philosophically interesting as a version of immaterialism. In particular, it raises the possibility of a substantive account of human embodiment which is completely unavailable to the occasionalist. §2 articulates an apparent philosophical problem for Berkeley qua causal-volitional theorist and show that Locke was aware of a related problem and had a solution of which Berkeley would have known. §3 distinguishes two interpretations of Berkeley’s famous denial of blind agency – as the assertion of a weak representational condition or a strong epistemic one – and provide evidence that there was a well-established debate about blind powers in the seventeenth century which took the metaphor of blindness as indicating an epistemic rather than merely representational failing. What remains to do in §4 is to consider whether Berkeley, with his own peculiar commitments, could in fact accept this account of agency.     

Assessment and reflexivity in family therapy training

Educational contexts can be both enriched and impoverished by our relationship with learning and our ‘identity stories’ as learners influence how we construct contexts for learning. Keenoy et al. (2007) describe identity as a ‘transient bridging concept’ between the individual and society which is constructed through ‘reflexive processes of naming, labelling, classifying and associating symbolic artefacts and social actors in a dialogical process of social definition and redefinition’. Can methods of assessment be constructed to afford reflexive, dialogical learning opportunities? This paper outlines the design and methodology of a reflexive framework for the summative assessment of abilities used on the Intermediate Level course at Northumbria University.     

Something-We-Know-Not-What,Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley,Meaning and Minds

It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea of it, then one cannot speak meaningfully of it. But if this is Berkeley’s position, then there is a puzzle, because Berkeley also explicitly claims that it is impossible to perceive/have ideas of minds. So if he is relying on a criterion on which terms get their meaning by referring to ideas, then, just as Berkeley rejects talk of material substance, so, too, must he reject talk of mental substance. Famously, however, Berkeley insists that there is no parity between the cases of material and mental substance. It is typically suggested that the disparity between matter and minds rests on the fact that although one cannot strictly speaking perceive minds, nonetheless Berkeley thinks that one can have experiential access to minds via reflection, and that this access allows for meaningful talk of minds. Of course, one can only have reflective experience of one’s own mind. But what of other minds, which one cannot reflectively experience? Here the usual tactic is to suppose that, although one cannot have direct reflective experience of other minds, nonetheless one can indirectly experience such minds via analogy to our own minds, and that this indirect experience grounds the meaningfulness of talk of other minds. In this paper, I argue that the reasoning behind Berkeley’s ‘likeness principle,’ that an idea can only be like another idea, can be generalized to argue against this experience-based account of our access to other minds. I claim instead that Berkeley allows for the meaningfulness of talk of other minds by expanding the criterion of meaning in a different way. I argue that Berkeley holds a criterion of meaning on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies either an object of experience or an object that one has reason to posit on the basis of experience, i.e., an object that is necessary to explain our experiences. When an object is neither experienced nor explains our experiences, then and only then is Berkeley willing to reject it as meaningless. Thus he writes of “the word matter,” that “it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us: and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about we know not what, and we know not why” (Principles, §77.) The word is not meaningless merely because we do not know what matter might be; it is meaningless because we also do not know why it should be. Correspondingly, I argue that the term ‘mind’ is meaningful because although we have no experience of minds, nonetheless they play an important role in explaining our experiences.     

Phenomenology and philosophy of science

This article examines human systemic condition and its evolved cultural organization from the perspective of information. The aim is to discuss general, tentative hypotheses on the nature and role of information in human systems. As a framework, the article considers information as the underlying parameter of growth on the general evolutionary trajectory. Information growth experienced an unprecedented increase at the appearance of Homo Sapiens Sapiens, which, as is well known, implies the trajectory's close relation to our species. This has led to the notion of post-organic evolutionary era in which humankind, through cultural evolutionary means, is in the process of supplanting biological determinants. Development, understood generally as victory over nature, has always been the measure by which our species has defined its success; humankind persists in faith in technical solutions to all problems.     

Extending SME to Handle Large‐Scale Cognitive Modeling

Analogy and similarity are central phenomena in human cognition, involved in processes ranging from visual perception to conceptual change. To capture this centrality requires that a model of comparison must be able to integrate with other processes and handle the size and complexity of the representations required by the tasks being modeled. This paper describes extensions to Structure‐Mapping Engine (SME) since its inception in 1986 that have increased its scope of operation. We first review the basic SME algorithm, describe psychological evidence for SME as a process model, and summarize its role in simulating similarity‐based retrieval and generalization. Then we describe five techniques now incorporated into the SME that have enabled it to tackle large‐scale modeling tasks: (a) Greedy merging rapidly constructs one or more best interpretations of a match in polynomial time: O(n²log(n)); (b) Incremental operation enables mappings to be extended as new information is retrieved or derived about the base or target, to model situations where information in a task is updated over time; (c) Ubiquitous predicates model the varying degrees to which items may suggest alignment; (d) Structural evaluation of analogical inferences models aspects of plausibility judgments; (e) Match filters enable large‐scale task models to communicate constraints to SME to influence the mapping process. We illustrate via examples from published studies how these enable it to capture a broader range of psychological phenomena than before.     

Assessing Creative Persons*

ABSTRACT Personality assessment, in contrast to psychodiagnosis, psychological testing, and the measurement of individual differences, attempts to delineate the person as a whole through the use of a multiplicity of procedures and emphasizes the more favorable and positive aspects of personality and its potentialities for effective functioning. Developed during World War II, the method has been most extensively used by the Institute of Personality Assessment and Research, University of California. Berkeley, in its studies of highly creative persons. In these researches the characteristics of such persons have been effectively revealed, e.g., through the use of life history interviews, personality trait ratings, an adjective check list, and the Q-sort method, and their level of creativeness predicted by multiple regression analyses.     

Religious Studies at Berkeley

The University of California at Berkeley has had a Group Major in Religious Studies since 1970, but there is no core faculty for the program. Efforts on the part of distinguished Berkeley faculty members over the years to create a viable department have met with no success. Now (in 1999), as a result of actions taken by the administration, the group major is in serious jeopardy.     

Religious Studies at Berkeley

The University of California at Berkeley has had a Group Major in Religious Studies since 1970, but there is no core faculty for the program. Efforts on the part of distinguished Berkeley faculty members over the years to create a viable department have met with no success. Now (in 1999), as a result of actions taken by the administration, the group major is in serious jeopardy.     

Patterns: Basic Units of Emotional Memory

In psychoanalysis, we attempt to engage with one another in ways that enhance understanding. We tend to valorize the verbal domains, yet much of the information we seek may be relatively inaccessible to conscious awareness, obscured by trauma or by the early age at which the information was encoded. These types of information are stored within the body as sensory memories, in which it is through the patterns of the communications that meanings are derived. Affect, most particularly, is known through its patterns of prosody and intensity. Greater appreciation of the patterned forms that underlie emotional memory can help us to better locate ourselves within this infinitely complex and fertile realm of nonverbal understandings, and to learn to communicate these understandings in constructive ways.     

Henri Bergson: Evolution,time and philosophy

Evolutionary theory is hindered by the conflict between the apparently antagonistic principles of its two founding figures, Darwin and Lamarck. Bergson's Creative Evolution outlines the means of transcending this impasse. If the evolutionary process is conceived as enduring then the atomistic model of static genetic states is never fully realisable. In the light of this, Bergson considers the germ‐plasm to be essentially “fluid.” If there is to be influence on the germ‐line it will be primarily in terms of the manner in which the genetic data is unfolded. In order to designate this influence Bergson introduces the concept of the “tendency.” The tendency will be explicated in relation to contemporary evolutionary biology. However, as the concept signifies that which is given only in the duration in which information is elaborated, it is precluded from representation. Bergson demonstrates that it is the evolutionary principle of continuous transformation which constitutes the limit to any scientific of view. For this reason, science needs to be complemented by a philosophical account of the duration of process.     

Broadening behavioral decision research: Multiple levels of cognitive processing

The area of behavioral decision research—specifically, the work on heuristics and biases—has had a tremendous influence on basic research, applied research, and application over the last 25 years. Its unique juxtaposition against economics has provided important benefits, but at the cost of leaving it disconnected from too much of psychology. This paper explores an expanded definition of behavioral decision research through the consideration of multiple levels of cognitive processing. Rather than being limited to how decision makers depart from optimality, we offer a broader analysis of how decision makers define the decision problem and link decisions to goals, as well as a more detailed focus on processes associated with implementing decisions.     

Does habit weaken the relationship between intention and behaviour? Revisiting the habit‐intention interaction hypothesis

Habitual behaviours are elicited when a familiar context activates cue‐behaviour associations that have been learned through previous performance. A core hypothesis within habit theory is that, by virtue of its automaticity, habit weakens the impact of intention on action, such that in facilitating conditions, action will be guided more by habit than momentary intentions. This has led to recommendations that habit formation be harnessed as a mechanism for sustaining desirable behaviour over time, when people would otherwise relapse due to loss of motivation. This article reviews theory and evidence around the hypothesized interaction between habit and intention as determinants of behaviour. We first qualify the hypothesis by clarifying that it pertains only to determinants of the instigation of action, rather than execution. Next, drawing on a systematic review of 52 behaviour‐prediction studies, we highlight mixed empirical support for the interaction. We argue that ostensibly inconsistent findings can be reconciled by recognizing the distinction between the direction and strength of intention, and identifying the “facilitating conditions” that may determine the relative influence of habit and intention on behaviour. Evidence demonstrates that when self‐control is diminished, people act habitually regardless of intention direction or strength. When people possess self‐control, habits can help people to act on favourable but weakened intentions, but intentions that oppose habitual tendencies can override habitual influence. This has important implications for behaviour change: even if habit has formed, a minimal level of favourable conscious motivation may be required to sustain behaviours over time. Social psychology might fruitfully move beyond asking whether habit moderates the intention‐behaviour relationship, and instead probe how and in which conditions habits and intentions interact.