THE “AS‐YET SITUATION” IN WINNICOTT'S “FRAGMENT OF AN ANALYSIS”: YOUR FATHER “NEVER DID YOU THE HONOR OF”… YET

The author proposes a new hypothesis in relation to Winnicott's “Fragment of an Analysis”: that as early as 1955, in the case described in this text, Winnicott is creating the paternal function in his patient's psychic functioning by implicitly linking his interpretations regarding the father to the Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit. The author introduces an original clinical concept, the as‐yet situation, which she has observed in her own clinical work, as well as in Winnicott's analysis of the patient described in “Fragment of an Analysis” (1955).     

KNOWING WHEN TO “SECOND-GUESS”

Studies on social information gathering typically investigate how an interactant actively elicits needed information from another source. An alternative approach would focus on how a hearer gathers selected bits of information from the message(s) at hand. The process of second-guessing is proposed as one such interpretive approach to information gathering. Previous research confirmed that social actors do use this strategy and use it reasonably effectively. This article extends our knowledge of second-guessing by looking at the conditions or “cues” that provoke the process, and by showing that participants in an experimental study second-guess when confronted with those cues.     

ALTERNATIVES TO COUNSELING “MINORITIES”

Since it is impossible for a counselor to have first hand knowledge of all minority/cultural groups with which he deals, it is suggested that he develop skills in the “here and now” models of counseling to be able to assist the counselee from minority group.     

ECONOMY OF “INVISIBLE DEBT” AND ETHICS OF “RADICAL HOSPITALITY”: Toward a Paradigm Change of Hospitality from “Gift” to “Forgiveness”

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct a Christian theology of “hospitality” through a critical reading of Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche as well as through an in‐depth biblical and theological reflection on the ethics of hospitality. Out of this reconstructive investigation, I propose a new Christian ethics of hospitality as a radical kind. As a new paradigm, this radical hospitality is distinguished from other types in that it is no longer conceived on the model of “gift”. The new Christian ethics of hospitality is rather reconstructed on the model of “forgiveness” by critically appropriating the concept of “invisible debt” that lies between the hosting citizens and the migrants in the senses of “you owe us your presence” and “I owe you my security and success.” While the hospitality of the gift defines the relationship between the hosting citizens and the migrants as givers and givees, the new paradigm of hospitality identifies this relationship as between creditors and debtors. In this regard, a new Christian hospitality called for unto citizens of the hosting society is a radical kind that challenges them to transcend the creditor‐debtor consciousness.     

THE “NEGATIVE” AND “POSITIVE” ARGUMENTS OF MORAL MODERATES

According to Shelly Kagan, “ordinary” or “moderate” moralists must establish the existence of “options.” Kagan considers a “negative” and a “positive” argument, which he regards as the most promising means by which moral moderates might establish their position. He offers objections to both, and he concludes that the moderate position is indefensible. I argue that Kagan fails in his attempt to discredit the negative argument. I also argue that the positive argument is so implausible that Kagan's elaborate criticism of it is unnecessary. The positive argument is interesting nevertheless, because of why it cannot serve the moderate's purposes.     

“Be careful what you wish for…”: A quantitative and qualitative investigation of “fata1 attractions”

This study uses questionnaire data from 301 terminated romantic relationships to investigate hypotheses concerning the conditions under which a quality that is initially appealing in a partner is later disliked (i.e., a “fatal attraction”). Individuals are expected to be prone to fatal attractions when they are attracted to a quality in a romantic partner that is “different” in any of three ways: (1) different from the individual's own qualities (i.e., dissimilar); (2) different from average (i.e., extreme, or unique); or (3) different from normative expectations (i.e., gender atypical). Such attractions are less likely, however, when individuals are drawn to similarity in another. Findings from a logistic regression analysis provide support for four of the five hypotheses. Fatal attractions are significantly more likely when an individual is drawn to partner characteristics seen either as “dissimilar” from her or his own, as “unique,” or as “extreme” in nature. When these characteristics are viewed as “similar,” disenchantment is less likely. Fatal attractions are neither more, nor less, probable, however, when partner qualities contradict gender stereotypes. A qualitative analysis of open-ended questionnaire responses provides further support for these attraction patterns. The findings have implications for diverse theories, including those of mate selection and dialectics.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.