DARWIN AND CHRISTIANITY: TRUTH AND MYTH

In recent years many historical myths about the relations between science and religion have been corrected but not always with sensitivity to different types and functions of “myth.” Correcting caricatures of Darwin's religious views and of the religious reaction to his theory have featured prominently in this myth‐busting. With the appearance in 2017 of A. N. Wilson's depiction of Darwin himself as a “mythmaker,” it is appropriate to reconsider where the myths lie in discourse concerning Darwin and Christianity. Problems with Wilson's account are identified and his provocative demeaning of Darwin is contrasted with an image gleaned from Darwin's friend and colleague George Romanes. The article concludes with a brief reference to the problem of suffering and to the work of Christopher Southgate.     

TRUTH AND DISQUOTATION

Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: [W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions ... are needed. I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More pre-cisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational truth-predicate; that the word true, in ordinary language, is not a disquotational truth-predicate; and that it is not at all clear that it is even possible to introduce a disquotational truth-predicate into ordinary language. If so, then we have no clear sense how it is even possible to be a methodological deflationist. My goal here is not to convince a committed deflationist to abandon his or her position. My goal, rather, is to argue, contrary to what many seem to think, that reflection on the apparently trivial character of T-sentences should not incline us to deflationism.     

SOCIAL-COGNITIVE MECHANISMS AND PERSONALITY COHERENCE:

Abstract— This article presents a social-cognitive analysts of cross-situational coherence in personality functioning. Social-cognitive analyses are contrasted with those of trait approaches in personality psychology. Rather than attributing coherence to high-level constructs that correspond directly to observed patterns of social behavior, social-cognitive theory pursues a "bottom-up" analytic strategy in which coherence derives from interactions among multiple underlying causal mechanisms, no one of which corresponds directly to a broad set of responses. Research investigating social and self-knowledge underlying cross-situational coherence in a central social-cognitive mechanism, perceived self-efficacy, is presented. Idiographic analyses revealed that individuals' schematic self-knowledge and situational beliefs give rise to patterns of high and low self-efficacy appraisal across diverse, idiosyncratic sets of situations that do not, in general, correspond to traditional high-level trait categories Bottom-up analyses in personality psychology are related to other disciplines' analyses of organization in complex, adaptive systems.     

DISCIPLINING RELATIVISM AND TRUTH

Abstract. Imre Lakatos's philosophy of science can provide helpful leads for theological methodology, but only when mediated by the disciplines that lie between the natural sciences and theology. The questions of relativism and truth are used as indices for comparing disciplines, and Lakatos's theory of natural science is taken as the starting point. Major modifications of Lakatos's work are demanded as one moves from the natural sciences, through economics, the interpretive social sciences, literary theory, and into theology. Although theology may consist of Lakatosian research programs, it also includes programs of interpretation and programs for living. This conclusion must influence our definition of theological truth and our assessment of theological relativism.     

KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH: A SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE

It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the skeptical challenge, this view also coheres with several previous theoretical proposals in epistemology.     

NON-COGNITIVISM,TRUTH AND LOGIC

Philosophical Studies -     

PRESENTISM,TRUTH AND SUPERVENIENCE

Truthmaker theory is commonly thought to pose a challenge for presentism. Presentism seems to lack the ontological and ideological resources required to adequately underwrite the truth of propositions concerning the past. That is because if presentism is true, then the past does not exist. According to the standard response to this challenge, the truth of propositions concerning the past supervenes on surrogate entities that ‘stand proxy’ for past things. I argue that in order for the standard response to the truthmaker challenge to succeed these surrogate entities must stand in necessary connections to the past. I go on to argue that because the standard response is already committed to denying the existence of cross‐temporal modal connections of this kind, by its own lights that response is in error. 1     

TRUTH AND METATHEORY IN FREGE

In this paper it is contended, against a challenging recent interpretation of Frege, that Frege should be credited with the first semi-rigorous formulation of semantic theory. It is argued that the considerations advanced against this contention suffer from two kinds of error. The first involves the attribution to Frege of a sceptical attitude towards the truth-predicate. The second involves the sort of justification which these arguments assume a classical semantic theory attempts to provide. Finally, it is shown that Frege was in fact mindful of the need for the relevant sort of justification.     

THEOLOGY'S TRUTH AND SCIENTIFIC FORMULATION

Abstract. One of the basic intentions of theology is to extend the explanatory function of the community's faith beyond the community to the realm of wider human experience. In this sense, theology may be called "scientific,'and it will benefit from conforming as much as possible to the characteristics of scientific theory formation. Using the work of Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos as a guide, the following theological theory is proposed: Homo sapiens is God's created co-creator, whose purpose is the stretching/enabling of the systems of nature so that they can participate in Gods purposes in the mode of freedom. It is argued that this research program produces new knowledge in relating the Christian faith to scientific views of human being as comprised of both genes and cultures to a theory of technological civilization; to freedom, determinism, and natural selection; and to credible notions of human purpose. Traditional Christian doctrines are related to this research program.