Logical Foundations for Belief Representation

This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems far natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because—unlike pure indicators—they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning of the embedding sentence. Therefore, the referent of the quasi-indicator must be represented in such a way that no invalid coreferential claims are entailed. The importance of quasi-indicators is discussed, and it is shown that all four of the above categories of belief reports can be handled by a single representational technique using belief spaces containing intensional entities. Inference rules and belief-revision techniques for the system ore also examined.     

Representation for reciprocal agent–environment interaction

Declarative modelling approaches in principle assume a notion of representation or representational content for the modelling concepts. The notion of representational content as discussed in literature in cognitive science and philosophy of mind shows complications as soon as agent and environment have an intense reciprocal interaction. In such cases an internal agent state is affected by the way in which internal and external aspects are interwoven during (ongoing) interaction. In this paper it is shown that the classical correlational approach to representational content is not applicable, but the temporal-interactivist approach is. As this approach involves more complex temporal relationships, formalisation was used to define specifications of the representational content more precisely. These specifications have been validated by automatically checking them on traces generated by a simulation model. Moreover, by mathematical proof it was shown how these specifications are entailed by the basic local properties.     

Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event-Types

According to act theories, propositions are structured cognitive act-types. Act theories appear to make propositions inherently representational and truth-evaluable, and to provide solutions to familiar problems with alternative theories, including Frege’s and Russell’s problems, and the third-realm and unity problems. Act theories have critical problems of their own, though: acts as opposed to their objects are not truth evaluable, not structured in the right way, not expressed by sentences, and not the objects of propositional attitudes. I show how identifying propositions with other cognitive event-types, namely thoughts, has the perceived virtues of act theories without the defects.     

Representation recovers information

Early agreement within cognitive science on the topic of representation has now given way to a combination of positions. Some question the significance of representation in cognition. Others continue to argue in favor, but the case has not been demonstrated in any formal way. The present paper sets out a framework in which the value of representation use can be mathematically measured, albeit in a broadly sensory context rather than a specifically cognitive one. Key to the approach is the use of Bayesian networks for modeling the distal dimension of sensory processes. More relevant to cognitive science is the theoretical result obtained, which is that a certain type of representational architecture is necessary for achievement of sensory efficiency. While exhibiting few of the characteristics of traditional, symbolic encoding, this architecture corresponds quite closely to the forms of embedded representation now being explored in some embedded/embodied approaches. It becomes meaningful to view that type of representation use as a form of information recovery. A formal basis then exists for viewing representation not so much as the substrate of reasoning and thought, but rather as a general medium for efficient, interpretive processing.     

Cross-cognitive Aspects of Discourse Comprehension: Semantic Post-representation

Four related sciences, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics and neurobiology, are compared in a cross-cognitive way with respect to their approaches in the study of discourse comprehension, in particular its final product, semantic post-representations. The nature and structure of these, as they are built in a human mind after processing a short piece of discourse (one or a few sentences), seem to be best described in the framework of activation models, a family in which the basic processes of comprehension are considered to be activation of semantic units from long-term memory, predication and construction of higher-level propositional constituents. The notion of “activation level”, applied to such representational units in working memory, is particularly fruitful in this framework. Besides, a satisfying neural interpretation of this psychological type of model can be proposed. The paper shortly presents a series of experiments, involving a semantic probing technique and three main categories of factors, with results that support the semantic post-representation view, in addition to others. A critical comparison of this analysis with neurofunctional imagery data confirms the necessity of cross-cognitive exchanges.     

Cognitive approaches to posttraumatic stress disorder: the evolution of multirepresentational theorizing

The evolution of multirepresentational cognitive theorizing in psychopathology is illustrated by detailed discussion and analysis of a number of prototypical models of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Network and schema theories, which focus on a single, explicit aspect/format of mental representation, are compared with theories that focus on 2 or more explicit representational elements. The author argues that the latter theories provide a more complete account of PTSD data, though are not without their problems. Specifically, it is proposed that at least 3 separate representational elements-associative networks, verbal/propositional representations, and schemas-are required to generate a comprehensive cognitive theory of PTSD. The argument that the development of multirepresentational cognitive theory in PTSD is a paradigm case for the development of similar theories in other forms of psychopathology is elaborated, and a brief agenda is proposed promoting 2 levels of theorizing-deep, formal theory alongside more localized, applied theory.     

Representation and cognitive science

‘Representation’ is a concept which occurs both in cognitive science and philosophy. It has common features in both settings in that it concerns the explanation of behaviour in terms of the way the subject categorizes and systematizes responses to its environment. The prevailing model sees representations as causally structured entities correlated on the one hand with elements in a natural language and on the other with clearly identifiable items in the world. This leads to an analysis of representation and cognition in terms of formal symbols and their relations. But human perception and cognition use multiple informational constraints and deal with unsystematic and messy input in a way best explained by Parallel Distributed Processing models. This undermines the claim that a formal representational theory of mind is ‘the only game in town’. In particular it suggests a radically different model of brain function and its relation to epistemology from that found in current representational theories.     

The attitudinal view and the integration of the particular object of emotions

In recent years, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed to understand emotions as embodied evaluative attitudes we take towards objects that figure in nonevaluative representational states. Although their account nicely explains some of the key features that emotions are widely taken to have, it runs into a version of what I call the problem of integration. In the case of the attitudinal view, the integration problem takes the form of explaining how, from the point of view of the subject, the bodily responses that make up the attitude part of the emotion and the representational states that provide the particular object of the emotion come to form an intentionally structured unitary experience, that is, one in which the bodily responses are intentionally directed towards the object. I argue that what explains this integration is the way in which the experience of bodily responses and the experience of the representational states interact. This, I propose, produces what I call an experience of convergence. I also suggest that understanding emotional experience in this way not only solves the problem of the integration but also provides a more solid ground for the claim that emotions qua embodied attitudes are evaluative.     

Extending the classical view of representation

Representation has always been a central part of models in cognitive science, but this idea has come under attack. Researchers advocating the alternative approaches of perceptual symbol systems, situated action, embodied cognition, and dynamical systems have argued against central assumptions of the classical representational approach to mind. We review the core assumptions of the representational view and these four suggested alternatives. We argue that representation should remain a core part of cognitive science, but that the insights from these alternative approaches must be incorporated into models of cognitive processing.     

Knowledge Representation: Two Kinds Of Emergence

Two different but closely related issues in current cognitive science will be considered in this essay. One is the controversial and extensively discussed question of how connectionist and symbolic representations of knowledge are related to each other. The other concerns the notion of connectionist learning and its relevance for the understanding of the distinction between propositional and nonpropositional knowledge. More specifically, I shall give an overview of a result in Rantala and Vadén (1994) establishing a limiting case correspondence between symbolic and connectionist representations and, on the other hand, study the problem, preliminarily investigated in Rantala (1998), of how propositional knowledge may arise from nonpropositional knowledge. I shall also try to point out that on some more or less plausible assumptions, often made by cognitive scientists, these results may have some significance when we try to comprehend the nature of human knowledge representation. Some of these assumptions are rather hypothethical and debatable for the time being and they will become justified in the future only if there will be more progress in the empirical and theoretical research on the brain and on artificial networks. The assumptions concern, besides some questions of the behavior of neural networks, such things as the relevance of pattern recognition for modelling human cognition, in particular, knowledge acquisition, and the relation between emergence and reduction.     

Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism)

In this paper I argue that, by combining eliminativist and fictionalist approaches toward the sub-personal representational posits of predictive processing, we arrive at an empirically robust and yet metaphysically innocuous cognitive scientific framework. I begin the paper by providing a non-representational account of the five key posits of predictive processing (“prediction-signal”, “error-signal”, “prior”, “likelihood”, and “posterior probability”). Then, I motivate a fictionalist approach toward the remaining indispensable representational posits of predictive processing, and explain how representation can play an epistemologically indispensable role within predictive processing explanations without thereby requiring that representation metaphysically exists. Finally, I outline four consequences of accepting this approach and explain why they are beneficial: (1) we arrive at a victory for metaphysical eliminativism in the ‘representation wars’; (2) my account fits with extant empirical practice; (3) my account provides guidance for future research; and, (4) my account provides the beginnings of a response to Mark Sprevak’s IBE problem for fictionalist approaches toward sub-personal representation.     

质量表征和眼动过度追踪对表征动量的影响

人们对运动目标最终位置的记忆常常会向运动方向发生偏移, 这种偏移被称为“表征动量”。现有研究对表征动量的解释涉及从低水平的知觉加工到高水平的认知加工等多个方面。本研究采用不同材质和滚动声音的球体作为刺激材料, 考察高水平的质量表征对表征动量的影响以及知觉水平的眼动信息在其中的作用。实验1探讨了对目标质量的主观表征对眼动追踪和表征动量的影响。结果显示, 质量表征会同时影响眼动追踪和表征动量。实验2通过不同的提示线索控制眼动追踪, 进一步探讨眼动过度追踪对表征动量的影响。我们发现, 非自然追踪的条件下, 表征动量会减小, 且质量表征对表征动量的影响不再显著。本研究结果表明, 高水平的质量表征对表征动量的影响会通过知觉水平的眼动过度追踪起作用; 然而, 表征动量还受其它因素影响, 眼动信息并非决定表征动量的唯一因素。     

Phantasies, Neurotic-Beliefs, and Beliefs-Proper

This paper presents a philosophical analysis of three cognitive states familiar and important to psychoanalysts—phantasy, neurotic-belief, and belief-proper. It explores the differences among these three propositional attitudes and finds that the development of secondary process capacities of reality testing and truth directness out of earlier primary process operations (themselves prior to considerations of truth or falsity) plays a crucial role. Difficulties in the proper typing of cognitive states are discussed, as are the consequences of such confounds. This use of a philosophical method serves to sharpen the familiar psychoanalytic clinical concepts of phantasy and neurotic-belief. In addition, these same clinical concepts, once properly specified, have much to offer the philosophy of mind, where current understanding of representational cognitive states is restricted to those that are largely conscious and rational. When psychoanalytic concepts such as phantasy and neurotic-belief can be better integrated within the discipline of philosophy of mind, both philosophers and psychoanalysts will have a more complete and adequate theory of mind.     

Towards structural systematicity in distributed,statically bound visual representations

The problem of representing the spatial structure of images, which arises in visual object processing, is commonly described using terminology borrowed from propositional theories of cognition, notably, the concept of compositionality. The classical propositional stance mandates representations composed of symbols, which stand for atomic or composite entities and enter into arbitrarily nested relationships. We argue that the main desiderata of a representational system—productivity and systematicity—can (indeed, for a number of reasons, should) be achieved without recourse to the classical, proposition‐like compositionality. We show how this can be done, by describing a systematic and productive model of the representation of visual structure, which relies on static rather than dynamic binding and uses coarsely coded rather than atomic shape primitives.     

Against Slagle’s Reading of Eliminative Materialism on Self-Defeating

Jim Slagle claims that eliminative materialism (EM) denies some of the mind’s self-evident properties, such as intentionality, qualia and the view that beliefs are real or veridical. I, herein, will argue that what EM denies is actually the folk psychological notion of belief, not belief as such. The Churchlands construe propositional belief as merely one kind of representation in the larger representational scheme. The point here is not to deny belief, but to construe it as one of the, and possibly a very recent, sorts of representations that the brain uses, not the general or fundamental form thereof.     

Representations in Distributed Cognitive Tasks

In this article we propose a theoretical framework of distributed representations and a methodology of representational analysis for the study of distributed cognitive tasks—tasks that require the processing of information distributed across the internal mind and the external environment. The basic principle of distributed representations Is that the representational system of a distributed cognitive task is a set of internal and external representations, which together represent the abstract structure of the task. The basic strategy of representational analysis is to decompose the representation of a hierarchical task into its component levels so that the representational properties at each level can be independently examined. The theoretical framework and the methodology are used to analyze the hierarchical structure of the Tower of Hanoi problem. Based on this analysis, four experiments are designed to examine the representational properties of the Tower of Hanoi. Finally, the nature of external representations is discussed.     

顿悟:是进程监控还是表征转换

当前解释顿悟问题解决机制的理论主要有表征转换理论和进程监控理论。进程监控理论主要解释了顿悟问题为什么困难,但事实上它并没有说明顿悟问题为什么会解决,只回答了在什么情况下被试才会寻求其他的方法,而且它把顿悟问题解决的一般过程看成是同常规问题解决方法相同的过程。而表征转换理论主要解释了顿悟是如何获得的——顿悟的获得是由于问题解决者对问题的表征实现了正确的转变,但它并没有解释表征什么时候、怎么样才能转变?顿悟问题的解决经历了三个认知加工阶段,顿悟问题的解决需要在消除定势情况下激活正确的启发信息(线索),并验证了顿悟问题的原型激活和关键启发信息理论假说。     

On the object relational texture of affects

Marty Mayman will be remembered as a uniquely gifted clinician, diagnostician, supervisor, and teacher. In this article, I link his distinctive capacity for empathic understanding to his reliance on self-representational and object representational concepts as a vehicle for accessing the inner life of his participant. Mayman's special brand of empathy was remarkable for its sensitivity to nuance as well as its ability to strike a chord with vivid resonance. His understanding of ego development included the notion that self-representation and object representation make up part of the internalized structure of all ego functions. Self- and object representations can be thought of as embedded in the individual's subjective experience of the very performing of those ego functions. Self- and object representations can also be thought of as embedded in the individual's attitudes toward the exercising of particular ego functions, for example, where the individual struggles with whether or not he or she feels a sense of permission to "own" or exercise specific ego capacities. In this article, I apply the use of self- and object representation as a way of "texturizing" the ego to the way object relations are embedded within affects. I use some Early Memory Test (Mayman, 1968) material to elucidate the role of object relational themes in the specific way in which affects are experienced.     

Symbolic representation of probabilistic worlds

Symbolic representation of environmental variables is a ubiquitous and often debated component of cognitive science. Yet notwithstanding centuries of philosophical discussion, the efficacy, scope, and validity of such representation has rarely been given direct consideration from a mathematical point of view. This paper introduces a quantitative measure of the effectiveness of symbolic representation, and develops formal constraints under which such representation is in fact warranted. The effectiveness of symbolic representation hinges on the probabilistic structure of the environment that is to be represented. For arbitrary probability distributions (i.e., environments), symbolic representation is generally not warranted. But in modal environments, defined here as those that consist of mixtures of component distributions that are narrow ("spiky") relative to their spreads, symbolic representation can be shown to represent the environment with a relatively negligible loss of information. Modal environments support propositional forms, logical relations, and other familiar features of symbolic representation. Hence the assumption that our environment is, in fact, modal is a key tacit assumption underlying the use of symbols in cognitive science.