The imagination effect increases with an increased intrinsic cognitive load

The imagination effect occurs when learners imagining a procedure or concept perform better on a subsequent test than learners studying rather than imagining. Cognitive load theory explains this result by postulating that information is more likely to be transferred from working to long‐term memory under imagination conditions. In an experiment using elementary school students, it was hypothesised that the imagination effect would be larger using more complex, high intrinsic cognitive load information rather than less complex, low intrinsic cognitive load information because assistance in transferring information to long‐term memory provided by the imagination procedure is less important using simpler materials. Experimental results supported this hypothesis. It was concluded that imagination instructions are more likely to enhance learning when associated with complex information. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral Imagination, Disability and Embodiment

abstract    In this paper we question the basis on which judgements are made about the 'quality' of the lives of people whose embodied experience is anomalous, specifically in cases of impairments. In moral and political philosophy it is often assumed that, suitably informed, we can overcome epistemic gaps through the exercise of moral imagination: 'putting ourselves in the place of others', we can share their points of view. Drawing on phenomenology and theories of embodied cognition, and on empirical studies, we suggest that there are barriers to imagining oneself differently situated, or imagining being another person, arising in part from the way imagination is constrained by embodied experience. We argue that the role of imagination in moral engagement with others is to expand the scope of our sympathies rather than to enable us to put ourselves in the other's place. We argue for explicit acknowledgement that our assessments of others' QOL are likely to be shaped by the specifics of our own embodiment, and by the assumptions we make as a consequence about what is necessary for a good quality of life.     

Cognitive load and the imagination effect

When presented with a procedure or concept to learn, imagining the procedure or concept may be an effective instructional technique compared to conventional studying, thus generating an imagination effect. However, it was hypothesized that the importance of learning through imagining as an instructional technique depends on modes of presentation. Experiment 1 tested adults studying or imagining contour maps as participants and was designed to verify the generality of the imagination effect. Imagination instructions were superior to study instructions on subsequent test questions. Experiment 2 further investigated the effect by comparing much younger students (Grade 4), studying or imagining temperature/time graphs presented in either a split‐attention (spatially separated diagram and text) or an integrated (spatially combined diagram and text) format. Results on a subsequent test indicated that the Grade 4 students found imagining beneficial to their learning, compared with studying the material but the effect was only obtained using an integrated rather than a split‐attention format. Experiment 3 was conducted to obtain verbal protocols from Grade 4 imagination and study groups using the same instructional materials to throw light on the cognitive mechanisms behind the imagination effect. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imagination inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred

Counterfactual imaginings are known to have far-reaching implications. In the present experiment, we ask if imagining events from one’s past can affect memory for childhood events. We draw on the social psychology literature showing that imagining a future event increases the subjective likelihood that the event will occur. The concepts of cognitive availability and the source-monitoring framework provide reasons to expect that imagination may inflate confidence that a childhood event occurred. However, people routinely produce myriad counterfactual imaginings (i.e., daydreams and fantasies) but usually do not confuse them with past experiences. To determine the effects of imagining a childhood event, we pretested subjects on how confident they were that a number of childhood events had happened, asked them to imagine some of those events, and then gathered new confidence measures. For each of the target items, imagination inflated confidence that the event had occurred in childhood. We discuss implications for situations in which imagination is used as an aid in searching for presumably lost memories.     

Imagination and Memory

A growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth experiences can change memory. Recent experiments are reviewed to show that when people think about or imagine a false event, entire false memories can be implanted. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. Overall, studies of imagination inflation show that imagining a counter-factual event can make subjects more confident that it actually occurred. We discuss possible mechanisms for imagination inflation and find that, with evidence supporting the involvement of both source confusion and familiarity in creating inflation, the primary mechanism is still to be determined. We briefly review evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to inflation. Finally, the widespread use of imagination-based techniques in self-help and clinical contexts suggests that there may be practical implications when imagination is used as a therapeutic tool.     

The imagination: cognitive, pre-cognitive, and meta-cognitive aspects

This article is an attempt to situate imagination within consciousness complete with its own pre-cognitive, cognitive, and meta-cognitive domains. In the first sections we briefly review traditional philosophical and psychological conceptions of the imagination. The majority have viewed perception and imagination as separate faculties, performing distinct functions. A return to a phenomenological account of the imagination suggests that divisions between perception and imagination are transcended by precognitive factors of sense of reality and non-reality where perception and imagination play an indivisible role. In fact, both imagination and perception define sense of reality jointly according to what is possible and not possible. Absorption in a possible world depends on the strengths of alternative possibilities, and the relationship between core and marginal consciousness. The model may offer a parsimonious account of different states and levels of imaginal consciousness, and of how "believed-in imaginings" develop and become under some circumstances "lived-in experiences."     

Warnings reduce the magnitude of the imagination inflation effect

Imagination inflation occurs when people increase their confidence that an event actually happened after imagining the details of the event. The purpose of this study was to determine whether warning people about the imagination inflation effect would reduce their tendency to inflate their ratings of the imagined events. In one condition, we warned participants about the deleterious effects of imagining distant events. Compared with a control group that did not receive a warning, this group produced a significantly smaller imagination inflation effect. We discuss these results and the imagination inflation effect in the context of 2 theories designed to explain the cognitive processes that produce this effect.     

Tool characteristics in imagery of tool actions

Are tool characteristics represented in imagined tool actions? In two experiments participants imagined and executed coloring rectangles with a thick and a thin pen. In Experiment 2, an additional execution condition without visual feedback of coloring allowed us to dissociate between the relevance of kinesthetic and visual feedback. Pen thickness influenced coloring durations in all conditions, indicating that characteristics of a simple tool are represented during imagery. Imagination was shorter than execution, indicating that imagination may be less detailed than execution. Execution without visual feedback was even shorter than imagination, indicating that vision is more important than kinesthesis for differences between imagination and execution, and that either imagining the movement, inhibiting movement execution or imagining the progress of the action is effortful during imagery. In conclusion, characteristics of simple tools are represented in imagined tool actions but the representation of tools’ effects may not always be adequate.     

Jesus and the Play of Imagination: The Role of His Stories and Parables in Faith Formation

Jesus’ stories and parables—the products of his own imagination—are at the core of Christian religious education. Christian religious educators are to encourage their audience to engage their imagination to let Jesus’ stories retain their power to form and transform them. Although imagination operates imperceptibly, it is essential to faith formation. Religious educators are to befriend imagination and employ it as an efficacious means to form their audiences in the faith. This article aims to describe the “obvious” dynamics involved in the act of imagining. The first part of this essay examines the multifaceted nature of imagination. The second part suggests ways how religious educators may develop the imagining skills of their audience.     

IMAGINATIVE CONTAGION

Abstract: The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional emotions, and social priming. It is suggested that imaginative contagion is a more prevalent phenomenon than has typically been recognized.     

IMAGINATION AND THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTION

Many writers offer accounts of our grasp of the expressive gestures of others, or of the expressive content of works of art, in terms of our imagining the experiences of another, or ourselves having certain experiences, or, in the case of works of art, a persona to have experiences. This invocation of what Kant would term, the reproductive imagination, in the perception of expressive content, is contested in this paper. In its place it is suggested that the detection of expressive content is a form of direct, but reason constituting perception. In such perception it is the Kantian productive, rather than the reproductive, imagination which plays a central role.     

The Power of Analogies for Imagining and Governing Emerging Technologies

The emergence of new technologies regularly involves comparisons with previous innovations. For instance, analogies with asbestos and genetically modified organisms have played a crucial role in the early societal debate about nanotechnology. This article explores the power of analogies in such debates and how they could be effectively and responsibly employed for imagining and governing emerging technologies in general and nanotechnology in particular. First, the concept of analogical imagination is developed to capture the explorative and anticipatory potential of analogies. Yet analogies do not simply stimulate imagination, they also restrict it by framing emerging technologies in specific ways. Thus, second, the article argues that tracing the rhetorical and persuasive power of analogical arguments is essential for understanding how analogies are constructed to legitimise assessments, funding policies, and governance approaches. Third, the article addresses factors that account for the persuasiveness of analogies in debates about emerging technologies. The article concludes with reflections on how analogical imagination and an enhanced analogical sensibility for framing and persuasive effects can foster responsible research and innovation (RRI).     

Memory of imagined actions: Imagining oneself or another person

Summary In two experiments, three modes of action encoding were compared: overt enactment, self-imagination, and imagination of another person performing the actions. Overt enactment and imagining self-performance of an action are mainly assumed to involve motor-kinesthetic representations, whereas imagining another person is thought to place more demands on the visual representational system. Previous paired-associate learning data on memory of action verbs showed that motor-kinesthetic imagery hinders pair integration, but that pair integration is facilitated by visual imagery. The comparison of free and cued recall of actions learned from lists of concrete nouns supports the assumption that the representational properties of overt enactment and self-imagination differ from those involved in the imagining of another person.     

Pretense, imagination, and belief: the Single Attitude theory

A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are ??belief-like?? in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a ??DCA??) called ??imagination?? that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating normal belief and desire. On the present ??Single Attitude?? account of imagination, propositional imagining just is a form of believing. The Single Attitude account is also distinguished from ??metarepresentational?? accounts of pretense, which hold that both pretending and recognizing pretense in others require one to have concepts of mental states. It is argued, to the contrary, that pretending and recognizing pretense require neither a DCA nor possession of mental state concepts.     

A Controversy Over the Existence of Fictional Objects: Husserl and Ingarden on Imagination and Fiction

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the structure and elements of the intentional experiences of imagining fictional objects. The author critically examines the argument that whereas Husserl’s theory of imagination cannot do justice to fictional objects, Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects provides a basis for the theory of intentionality that explains the status of fictional objects. The paper discusses this argument to show that it is justified only in regard to Husserl’s early account of imagination, and on the condition of understanding contents as the phantasmas. Moreover, the author sketches Ingarden’s theory of imagination, and compares it to Husserl’s later account of imagination in terms of noetic-noematic structures. Finally, the author questions the sharp distinction between Husserl and Ingarden with respect to their theories of imagination and fictional objects by showing that it is hard to classify clearly their theories as content or object theories respectively.     

The power of the imagination to affect peripersonal space representations

It is known that visual processing is altered for objects near the hands as well as for objects near the imagined position of the hands, indicating that the imagination can be used to remap peri-hand space. Little is known, however, about the physical conditions that allow for this remapping. In the present study, participants in one experiment performed visual searches through displays that were beyond reach while imagining that their hands were near the display. This imagined impossible posture slowed visual search rates, showing that imagination effectively remapped peri-hand space to be near the display. In another experiment, participants searched displays they were holding, but sometimes imagined their hands to be far away. This produced faster search rates, revealing a remapping of peri-hand space away from the monitor. The results provide new insights into the mechanisms involved in the representation of peri-hand space and about the power of imagined actions to influence body representations.     

Imagination and memory: Does imagining implausible events lead to false autobiographical memories?

Previous studies have reported that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories. This finding has been used to suggest that psychotherapists who have clients imagine suspected repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may, in fact, be inducing false memories for the imagined events. In this study, at Time 1 and then, 2 weeks later, at Time 2, 145 subjects rated each of 20 events on the Life Events Inventory as to whether each had occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, the subjects were told that 2 target events were plausible and 2 were implausible. They were then asked to imagine 1 plausible and 1 implausible target event. Plausibility and imagining interacted to affect occurrence ratings; whereas imagining plausible events increased the change in occurrence ratings, imagining implausible events had no effect on occurrence ratings.