A cognitive model of insomnia

Insomnia is one of the most prevalent psychological disorders, causing sufferers severe distress as well as social, interpersonal, and occupational impairment. Drawing on well-validated cognitive models of the anxiety disorders as well as on theoretical and empirical work highlighting the contribution of cognitive processes to insomnia, this paper presents a new cognitive model of the maintenance of insomnia. It is suggested that individuals who suffer from insomnia tend to be overly worried about their sleep and about the daytime consequences of not getting enough sleep. This excessive negatively toned cognitive activity triggers both autonomic arousal and emotional distress. It is proposed that this anxious state triggers selective attention towards and monitoring of internal and external sleep-related threat cues. Together, the anxious state and the attentional processes triggered by it tricks the individual into overestimating the extent of the perceived deficit in sleep and daytime performance. It is suggested that the excessive negatively toned cognitive activity will be fuelled if a sleep-related threat is detected or a deficit perceived. Counterproductive safety behaviours (including thought control, imagery control, emotional inhibition, and difficulty problem solving) and erroneous beliefs about sleep and the benefits of worry are highlighted as exacerbating factors. The unfortunate consequence of this sequence of events is that the excessive and escalating anxiety may culminate in a real deficit in sleep and daytime functioning. The literature providing preliminary support for the model is reviewed and the clinical implications and limitations discussed.     

The relationship between joint attention and theory of mind in neurotypical adults

Joint attention (JA) is hypothesized to have a close relationship with developing theory of mind (ToM) capabilities. We tested the co-occurrence of ToM and JA in social interactions between adults with no reported history of psychiatric illness or neurodevelopmental disorders. Participants engaged in an experimental task that encouraged nonverbal communication, including JA, and also ToM activity. We adapted an in-lab variant of experience sampling methods (Bryant et al., 2013) to measure ToM during JA based on participants’ subjective reports of their thoughts while performing the task. This experiment successfully elicited instances of JA in 17/20 dyads. We compared participants’ thought contents during episodes of JA and non-JA. Our results suggest that, in adults, JA and ToM may occur independently.     

Executive and attentional contributions to Theory of Mind deficit in attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)

Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children has been associated with attentional and executive problems, but also with socioemotional difficulties possibly associated with deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM). Socioemotional problems in ADHD are associated with more negative prognoses, notably interpersonal, educational problems, and an increased risk of developing other psychiatric disorders that emphasize the need to clarify the nature of their ToM deficits. In this study, we hypothesized that ToM dysfunction in children with ADHD is largely attributable to their attentional and/or executive deficits. Thirty-one children with ADHD (8–12 years, IQ > 85) and 31 typically developing (TD) children were assessed using executive functions (inhibition, planning, and flexibility) and attentional tasks, as well as two advanced ToM tasks (Reading the Mind in the Eyes and Faux Pas) involving different levels of executive control. Children with ADHD performed more poorly than TD children in attentional, executive function, and ToM tasks. Linear regression analyses conducted in the ADHD group indicated that inhibition scores predicted performance on the “Faux Pas” task the best, while attention scores were the best for predicting performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. When controlled for inhibition and attentional variables, ToM performance in children with ADHD was actually similar to TD children. Contrarily, controlling for ToM scores did not normalize performance for inhibition and attentional tasks in children with ADHD. This unidirectional relationship suggests that deficits in the EF and attentional domains are responsible for ToM deficits in ADHD, which therefore may contribute to their socioemotional difficulties.     

Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention

People commonly interpret others’ behavior in terms of the actors’ underlying beliefs, knowledge, or other mental states, thereby using their “theory of mind.” Two experiments suggest that using one’s theory of mind is a relatively effortful process. In both experiments, people reflexively used their own knowledge and beliefs to follow a speaker’s instruction, but only effortfully used their theory of mind to take into account a speaker’s intention to interpret those instructions. In Experiment 1, people with lower working memory capacity were less effective than people with larger working memory capacity in applying their theory of mind to interpret behavior. In Experiment 2, an attention-demanding secondary task reduced people’s ability to apply their theory of mind. People appear to be reflexively mindblind, interpreting behavior in terms of the actor’s mental states only to the extent that they have the cognitive resources to do so.     

Reaction time, intelligence, and attention

The roles of attention in reaction time and in the relationships among reaction time, intelligence, and achievement were analyzed. The subjects were 105 seventh-grade children. The results were generally consistent with most studies involving the Hick paradigm: both mean reaction time and the standard deviation of reaction time correlated with the intelligence and achievement measures used. Reaction time measures were correlated with attention and perceptual speed as well as with general intelligence, or g. Implications of these results for current theories linking reaction time and intelligence are discussed.     

Extended cognition and the space of social interaction

The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management—the negotiation and management of “we-space”—and that some of the expressive actions involved in the negotiation and management of we-space (gesture, touch, facial and whole-body expressions) drive basic processes of interpersonal understanding and thus do genuine social-cognitive work. Social interaction is a kind of extended social cognition, driven and at least partially constituted by environmental (non-neural) scaffolding. Challenging the Theory of Mind paradigm, I draw upon research from gesture studies, developmental psychology, and work on Moebius Syndrome to support this thesis.     

The relationship between sustained attention,attentional selectivity,and capacity

The Theory of Visual Attention (TVA; Bundesen, 1990) provides a quantitative account of visual attentional selectivity and capacity but does not include a parameter relating to sustained attention. We conducted two studies to examine the relationship between sustained attention and the TVA parameters relating to selectivity and capacity. In the first study (n=46; mean age=41, SD=10), we investigated the effects of self alerting during a combined whole and partial report task (CombiTVA). In the second study, 70 participants (aged 20–69), performed the CombiTVA and the Sustained Attention to Response Task (Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). The results indicated that attentional selectivity and capacity were unaffected by self alerting, unrelated to sustained attention ability and robust to the adverse effects of time-on-task. These findings are in keeping with the idea of independent functions relating to sustained attention and attentional selectivity and capacity.     

A social-cognitive framework for understanding serious lies: Activation-decision-construction-action theory

Little is known about the cognition of deception (Gombos, 2006). We propose a cognitive account of serious lying (i.e., deception involving high stakes) in response to a solicitation of a truth: Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT). Built on the Activation-Decision-Construction Model of answering questions deceptively (Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphrey, 2003), the theory elaborates on the roles of executive processes, theory of mind, emotions, motivation, specifies cognitive processing thoroughly, and considers the rehearsal of lies. ADCAT's four processing components are (a) activation of the truth, the (b) decision whether and how to alter deceptively the information shared, (c) construction of a deception, and (d) action [acting sincere while delivering a lie]. Core constructs are “theory of mind” and “cognitive resources”. Specifically, throughout serious deception, individuals are inferring the current or potential mental states of targets and taking steps to minimize the allocation of cognitive resources during delivery to appear honest and lie well.     

Cognition in moral space: A minimal model

We describe moral cognition as a process occurring in a distinctive cognitive space, wherein moral relationships are defined along several morally relevant dimensions. After identifying candidate dimensions, we show how moral judgments can emerge in this space directly from object perception, without any appeal to moral rules or abstract values. Our reductive “minimal model” (Batterman & Rice, 2014) elaborates Beal’s (2020) claim that moral cognition is determined, at the most basic level, by “ontological frames” defining subjects, objects, and the proper relation between them. We expand this claim into a set of formal hypotheses that predict moral judgments based on how objects are “framed” in the relevant dimensions of “moral space.”     

Mighty metaphors: behavioral and ERP evidence that power shifts attention on a vertical dimension

Thinking about the abstract concept power may automatically activate the spatial up-down image schema (powerful up; powerless down) and consequently direct spatial attention to the image schema-congruent location. Participants indicated whether a word represented a powerful or powerless person (e.g. ‘king’ or ‘servant’). Following each decision, they identified a target at the top or bottom of the visual field. In Experiment 1 participants identified the target faster when their spatial position was congruent with the perceived power of the preceding word than when it was incongruent. In Experiment 2 ERPs showed a higher N1 amplitude for congruent spatial positions. These results support the view that attention is driven to the image schema congruent location of a power word. Thus, power is partially understood in terms of vertical space, which demonstrates that abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor processing.     

A Longitudinal Investigation of Perceived Control and Cognitive Performance in Young,Midlife and Older Adults

ABSTRACT

Longitudinal associations between generalized control beliefs (one's perceived capacity to influence events) and cognitive test performance were examined in a population-based sample of young, midlife and older adults. Participants provided measures of perceived control, self-assessed health, education and depression and anxiety symptoms, and completed cognitive tests at two assessments, 4 years apart. For each age group, baseline (between-person) control was positively related to performance on tests of memory (immediate recall and digits backwards), speed (Symbol Digit Modalities Test and choice reaction time) and verbal intelligence (Spot-the-Word). Interaction effects indicated stronger associations of between-person control beliefs with indices of speed for the older age group relative to the younger groups. Within-person changes in control were not significantly associated with changes in cognitive test performance over the study interval. Implications of the findings for self-efficacy based interventions designed to promote cognitive functioning are discussed.     

Inhibition in ADHD,aggressive, and anxious children: A biologically based model of child psychopathology

In this study the stop signal task was employed to investigate inhibitory control in 15 children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 18 aggressive and 20 anxious children, and a group of 17 normal controls. The psychopathological groups were recruited from special educational services. Parent, teacher, and child questionnaires were used to select children with pervasive disorders. Controls attended regular classes and scored low on all questionnaires. Based on Quay's model of child psychopathology (Quay, 1988, 1993), we hypothesized a deficit in inhibitory control in children with externalizing disorders, whereas anxious children were predicted to be overinhibited. The ADHD group and the aggressive group showed poor inhibitory control and a slower inhibitory process. No evidence of overinhibition was found in anxious children.     

Effects of acute endurance,strength, and coordination exercise interventions on attention in adolescents: A randomized controlled study

ObjectivesThe aim of this study was to compare three different modes of an acute bout of exercise – endurance, strength, and coordination – in their effects on adolescents' attention.DesignThis was a preregistered, prospective, randomized intervention study with four groups and two distinct measurement occasions.MethodEighty adolescent students aged 15–18 years were randomized to one of three exercise intervention groups (endurance, strength, coordination) or to a non-exercise, control group. The exercise interventions lasted for 25 min. The random assignment to the study groups was stratified according to participants' age and gender. Before and after the exercise intervention, all participants completed the revised d2-test of attention. A 4 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with contrast-coded test was used as the main analysis method.ResultsAttentional test performance increased from before to after the exercise intervention for all exercise groups, as compared with the control group. The three exercise groups improved equally and did not differ in their attentional scores after the intervention.ConclusionsAn acute bout of exercise was in general beneficial for adolescent students' attention, while the mode of the provided exercise training was not decisive. School directors and teachers are encouraged to incorporate exercise-related breaks into their school plan.     

Infants' ability to connect gaze and emotional expression to intentional action

Four studies investigated whether and when infants connect information about an actor's affect and perception to their action. Arguably, this may be a crucial way in which infants come to recognize the intentional behaviors of others. In Study 1 an actor grasped one of two objects in a situation where cues from the actor's gaze and expression could serve to determine which object would be grasped, specifically the actor first looked at and emoted positively about one object but not the other. Twelve-month-olds, but not 8-month-olds, recognized that the actor was likely to grasp the object which she had visually regarded with positive affect. Studies 2, 3, and 4 replicated the main finding from Study 1 with 12- and 14-month-olds and included several contrasting conditions and controls. These studies provide evidence that the ability to use information about an adult's direction of gaze and emotional expression to predict action is both present, and developing at the end of the first year of life.     

Research on intelligent cognitive function enhancement of intelligent robot based on ant colony algorithm

In this paper, ant colony algorithm is studied to improve the visual cognitive function of intelligent robots. Based on the detailed understanding of the research status in this field at home and abroad, and learning from cognitive science and neurobiology research results, a solution is proposed from the perspective of ant colony algorithm based on human brain structure and function. By simulating the process of autonomous learning controlled by human long-term memory and its working memory, a visual strangeness-driven growth long-term memory autonomous learning algorithm is proposed. This method takes incremental self-organizing network as long-term memory structure, and combines with visual strangeness internal motivation Q learning method in working memory. The visual knowledge acquired by self-learning is accumulated into long-term memory continuously, thus realizing the ability of self-learning, memory and intelligence development similar to human beings. The experimental results show that the robot can learn visual knowledge independently, store and update knowledge incrementally, and improve its intelligence development, classification and recognition ability compared with the method without long-term memory. At the same time, the generalization ability and knowledge expansion ability are also improved.     

走向整合的智力研究 ——Demetriou的经验结构式认知发展理论述评

基于经验结构式认知发展理论的智力结构包含环境指向系统、超认知系统和加工系统三个层次。环境指向系统用于表征和加工不同领域的信息,加工系统是个体加工信息的操作平台,超认知系统负责监控和调节其他两个系统的认识活动。三个层次的发展既具有各自的特点又相互影响。因此,该理论指出智力结构的发展是一个动态平衡过程,存在三种发展变化模式：自下而上、自上而下和平行变化。智力结构层次内和层次间的发展都要遵循四种变化的机制。该理论作为整合型智力理论有自己的优势,但在概念使用、超认知概念的提出以及执行功能在结构中定位等问题有待商榷     

Moving Beyond Computational Cognitivism: Understanding Intentionality,Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind

The emergence of the Cognitive Sciences, in the middle of the 20th Century, was initially based on an abstract model of the mind: the computer metaphor. The human mind was understood in analogy to the digital computer, as a rule-based, symbol processor. As a consequence, the human being was envisioned as logically-rationally guided, radically disembodied and isolated from culture. Over the last few decades, several disciplines, such as Biology, Mathematics, Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience, have begun to address the study of intentionality, intersubjectivity and natural cognition. Searching for a better understanding of these complex issues, a number of approaches have been developed with the promise of capturing the specific qualities of human cognition, radically omitted from a computationalist view of mind. Nevertheless, since these research programs are rather recent, concrete methodological designs and empirical approaches in the form of experimentally testable hypotheses are still scarce. This special issue brings together several perspectives in order to propose alternative research approaches in the topics of Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecology of Mind. We believe it is necessary to discuss and advance towards explicit empirical frames in the form of actual experiments, specific predictions and formal models. The essays presented here constitute an attempt to move in this direction, with the specific aim of reconsidering the study of some forgotten properties of brain and mind.     

A psychophysiological model of emotion space

Despite a wide variety of emotions that can be subjectively experienced, the emotion space has consistently revealed a low dimensionality. The search for corresponding somato-visceral response patterns has been only moderately successful. The authors suggest a solution based on an assumed parallelism between emotion coding and color coding. According to the color detection model proposed by Sokolov and co-workers, neurons responsible for color detection are triggered by a combination of excitations in a limited number of input cells. Similarly, a limited number of input channels may feed complex emotion detectors being located on a hypersphere in a four-dimensional emotion space, the three angles of which correspond to emotional tone, intensity, and saturation, in parallel to hue, lightness, and saturation in color perception. The existence of such a four-dimensional emotion space in the subjective domain is shown by using schematic facial expressions as stimuli. A neurophysiological model is provided in which reticular, hypothalamic, and limbic structures constitute input channels of an emotion detecting system, thus acting as the first layer of emotion predetectors. Hypothalamic neurons with differential sensitivity for various transmitters may elicit a subsequent selective activation in a second layer of predetectors at the thalamic level. The latter are suggested to trigger emotion detectors located in cortical areas, the action of which should be revealed by measures of central nervous system activity. Preliminary results from evoked potential studies show that switching between schematic faces that express different emotions may be used as an objective measure for establishing a psychophysiological emotion space.     

Testing joint attention, imitation, and play as infancy precursors to language and theory of mind

Various theoretical accounts propose that an important developmental relation exists between joint attention, play, and imitation abilities, and later theory of mind ability. However, very little direct empirical evidence supports these claims for putative “precursor” theory of mind status. A small sample (N=13) of infants, for whom measures of play, joint attention, and imitation had been collected at 20 months of age, was followed-up longitudinally at 44 months and a battery of theory of mind measures was conducted. Language and IQ were measured at both timepoints. Imitation ability at 20 months was longitudinally associated with expressive, but not receptive, language ability at 44 months. In contrast, only the joint attention behaviours of gaze switches between an adult and an active toy and looking to an adult during an ambiguous goal detection task at 20 months were longitudinally associated with theory of mind ability at 44 months. It is argued that joint attention, play, and imitation, and language and theory of mind, might form part of a shared social–communicative representational system in infancy that becomes increasingly specialised and differentiated as development progresses.