Interpreting our emotions

This essay looks at the important, but often neglected, contribution that self-interpretation makes to emotional self-knowledge. We engage in acts of self-interpretation when (A) we try to understand what it is that we are feeling, or, relatedly, what it is that we ought to be feeling. On such occasions, we draw upon social and personal narratives as well as on the emotional conceptual repertoires at our disposal. We also engage in acts of self-interpretation when (B) we try to ascertain the meaning or significance of an emotion, treating it as a datum, or piece of evidence, upon which to make inferences or further Interpretations. Although we often seem to have first-person privileged access to our mental states, the third-person strategy of self-interpretation can be a valuable source of self-knowledge. I focus here upon the role that self-interpretation plays in providing us with knowledge about our emotional experiences.     

Confabulation and rational obligations for self-knowledge

This paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why we have our attitudes.     

The Middle-Class Nature of Identity and its Implications for Education: A Genealogical Analysis and Reevaluation of a Culturally and Historically Bounded Concept

We consider identity as a historically emerging discourse that requires genealogical analysis ― not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit [ourselves] to its dissipation (Foucault 1977, p. 162). We suggest analyzing identity through the history of socio-economic classes, their life struggles, ambitions, development, and reproduction. We see learning not as a project of transformation of identity, but rather as developing access to socially valuable practices and developing one‘s own voice within these practices (through addressing and responding to other voices). The access and voice projects free agents from unnecessary finalization and objectivization by oneself and others (Bakhtin 1999; Bakhtin 1990). In education, we should develop indigenous discourses of learning and develop a conceptual framework that makes analysis of diverse discourses possible. We argue that learning, as transformation of participation in a sociocultural practice to gain more access, is a better conceptual framework than learning as transformation of identity.     

The externalist challenge to conceptual engineering

Unlike conceptual analysis, conceptual engineering does not aim to identify the content that our current concepts do have, but the content which these concepts should have. For this method to show the results that its practitioners typically aim for, being able to change meanings seems to be a crucial presupposition. However, certain branches of semantic externalism raise doubts about whether this presupposition can be met. To the extent that meanings are determined by external factors such as causal histories or microphysical structures, it seems that they cannot be changed intentionally. This paper gives an extended discussion of this ‘externalist challenge’. Pace Herman Cappelen’s recent take on this issue, it argues that the viability of conceptual engineering crucially depends on our ability to bring about meaning change. Furthermore, it argues that, contrary to first appearance, causal theories of reference do allow for a sufficient degree of meaning control. To this purpose, it argues that there is a sense of what is called ‘collective long-range control’, and that popular versions of the causal theory of reference imply that people have this kind of control over meanings.

     

Conceptual engineering as concept preservation

In the burgeoning philosophical literature on conceptual engineering improving our concepts is typically portrayed as the hallmark activity of the field. However, Herman Cappelen has challenged the idea that we can know how and why conceptual changes occur well enough to actively intervene in revising our concepts; the mechanisms of conceptual change are typically inscrutable to us. If the ‘inscrutability challenge’ is correct, the practical aspect of conceptual engineering may seem to be undermined, but I argue that endorsing such pessimism would be a mistake. Even if the inscrutability challenge is correct, conceptual engineers often have good reasons to try to preserve existing concepts. I examine several cases where concept preservation is important and draw lessons about this activity for conceptual engineers.     

Analyticity and Incorrigibility

The traditional point of view on analyticity implies that truth in virtue only of meaning entails a priori acceptability and vice versa. The argument for this claim is based on the idea that meaning as it concerns truth and meaning as it concerns competence are one and the same thing. In this paper I argue that the extensions of these notions do not coincide. I hold that truth in virtue of meaning — truth for semantic reasons—doesn't imply a priori acceptability, and that a priori reflection based only on knowledge of meaning—in the sense of competence—doesn't necessitate true conclusions.The main consequence of this view concerns conceptual analysis, as it presupposes we have a privileged—incorrigible in the face of empirical evidence—access to non-trivial truths about the world on the basis of mere a priori reflection founded on meaning. If, as I argue, such access is not incorrigible the project of conceptual analysis loses its special epistemological status.     

Samuel Todes's Account of Non–conceptual Perceptual Knowledge and its Relation to Thought

Samuel Todes's book, Body and World , makes an important contribution to the current debate among analytic philosophers concerning non–conceptual intentional content and its relation to thought. Todes's relevant theses are: (1) Our unified, active body, in moving to meet our needs, generates a unified, spatio–temporal field. (2) In that field we use our perceptual skills to make the determinable perceptual objects that show up relatively determinate. (3) Once we have made the objects of practical perception determinate, we can make 'practical perceptual judgements' about them. Such 'judgements' have conditions of satisfaction, but they are non–conceptual in that they are a way of coping with an actual object in this situation, from this point of view, in this light, in this orientation, and so forth. (4) By withholding our activity, however, we can transform our practical perception into a detached, spectatorial perception of qualities that are experienced as independent of the object they qualify. (5) Thanks to our conceptual imagination, we can then treat these qualities as reidentifiable properties of reidentifiable objects that can be entertained by thought.     

From concepts to lexical items.

In this paper we address the question how in language production conceptual structures are mapped onto lexical items. First we describe the lexical system in a fairly abstract way. Such a system consists of, among other things, a fixed set of basic lexical entries characterized by four groups of information: phonetic form, grammatical features, argument structure, and semantic form. A crucial assumption of the paper is that the meaning in a lexical entry has a complex internal structure composed of more primitive elements (decomposition). Some aspects of argument structure and semantic form and their interaction are discussed with respect to the issue of synonymy. We propose two different mappings involved in lexical access. One maps conceptual structures to semantic forms, and the other maps semantic forms to conceptual structures. Both mappings are context dependent and are many-to-many mappings. We present an elaboration of Levelt's (1989) model in which these processes interact with the grammatical encoder and the mental lexicon. Then we address the consequences of decomposition for processing models, especially the nature of the input of lexical access and the time course. Processing models that use the activation metaphor may have difficulties accounting for certain phenomena where a certain lemma triggers not one, but two or more word forms that have to be produced with other word forms in between.     

Predication in Conceptual Realism

Conceptual realism begins with a conceptualist theory of the nexus of predication in our speech and mental acts, a theory that explains the unity of those acts in terms of their referential and predicable aspects. This theory also contains as an integral part an intensional realism based on predicate nominalization and a reflexive abstraction in which the intensional contents of our concepts are “object”-ified, and by which an analysis of predication with intensional verbs can be given. Through a second nominalization of the common names that are part of conceptual realism’s theory of reference (via quantifier phrases), the theory also accounts for both plural reference and predication and mass noun reference and predication. Finally, a separate nexus of predication based on natural kinds and the natural properties and relations nomologically related to those natural kinds, is also an integral part of the framework of conceptual realism.     

Returning the tables: language affects spatial reasoning

Li and Gleitman (Turning the tables: language and spatial reasoning. Cognition, in press) seek to undermine a large-scale cross-cultural comparison of spatial language and cognition which claims to have demonstrated that language and conceptual coding in the spatial domain covary (see, for example, Space in language and cognition: explorations in linguistic diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press; Language 74 (1998) 557): the most plausible interpretation is that different languages induce distinct conceptual codings. Arguing against this, Li and Gleitman attempt to show that in an American student population they can obtain any of the relevant conceptual codings just by varying spatial cues, holding language constant. They then argue that our findings are better interpreted in terms of ecologically-induced distinct cognitive styles reflected in language. Linguistic coding, they argue, has no causal effects on non-linguistic thinking--it simply reflects antecedently existing conceptual distinctions. We here show that Li and Gleitman did not make a crucial distinction between frames of spatial reference relevant to our line of research. We report a series of experiments designed to show that they have, as a consequence, misinterpreted the results of their own experiments, which are in fact in line with our hypothesis. Their attempts to reinterpret the large cross-cultural study, and to enlist support from animal and infant studies, fail for the same reasons. We further try to discern exactly what theory drives their presumption that language can have no cognitive efficacy, and conclude that their position is undermined by a wide range of considerations.     

Evidence and armchair access

In this paper, I shall discuss a problem that arises when you try to combine an attractive account of what constitutes evidence with an independently plausible account of the kind of access we have to our evidence. According to E = K, our evidence consists of what we know. According to the principle of armchair access, we can know from the armchair what our evidence is. Combined, these claims entail that we can have armchair knowledge of the external world. Because it seems that the principle of armchair access is supported by widely shared intuitions about epistemic rationality, it seems we ought to embrace an internalist conception of evidence. I shall argue that this response is mistaken. Because externalism about evidence can accommodate the relevant intuitions about epistemic rationality, the principle of armchair access is unmotivated. We also have independent reasons for preferring externalism about evidence to the principle of armchair access.     

Indian cognitivism and the phenomenology of conceptualization

We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological as well as formal richness. This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift from the usual dichotomies of cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/empiricist divides—to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of “valid cognition”. Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.     

Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery

When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we represent the occluded parts of perceived objects by means of mental imagery. This conclusion could be thought of as a (weak) version of the Strawsonian dictum, according to which “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself”.     

Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility

This article re-examines Ned Block??s (1997, 2007) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block??s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness.     

The bodily complexity of truth‐telling in qualitative research: Some implications of Gendlin's theory

Abstract

Gendlin's philosophy of the body is used as an approach to the “truth values” of qualitative research. In this view, our bodily participation in life provides a grounded quality to understanding, a shared reference point for an experientially‐grounded language that can “'work.” This understanding is a bodily‐informed practice and involves the body's access to “more than words can say.” As such, the body is intimate to understanding and such bodily‐informed sense‐making adds a dimension to the ways we have access to and present truth. Implications of this approach for qualitative methodology will be discussed, in particular the implications for the informant's task, the interviewer's task, the task of analysis and the task of the reader.     

The Relationship of Promotion Focus,Need for Cognitive Closure,and Categorical Accessibility in American and Hong Kong Chinese University Students

Categorical accessibility is a cognitive factor that limits the extent of creative conceptual expansion. In the present study, we sought to establish the categorical accessibility norms in five conceptual domains among American and Hong Kong Chinese university students. In addition, we predicted that the tendency to access normatively inaccessible exemplars in a conceptual domain is positively related to the motivation to maximize the likelihood of attaining positive outcomes (promotion focus) and negatively related to the need for cognitive closure. We obtained the predicted relationships among both American and Hong Kong Chinese university students. These findings were discussed in terms of their implications for promoting creativity across cultures.     

Semantic significance: a new measure of feature salience

According to the feature-based model of semantic memory, concepts are described by a set of semantic features that contribute, with different weights, to the meaning of a concept. Interestingly, this theoretical framework has introduced numerous dimensions to describe semantic features. Recently, we proposed a new parameter to measure the importance of a semantic feature for the conceptual representation—that is, semantic significance. Here, with speeded verification tasks, we tested the predictive value of our index and investigated the relative roles of conceptual and featural dimensions on the participants’ performance. The results showed that semantic significance is a good predictor of participants’ verification latencies and suggested that it efficiently captures the salience of a feature for the computation of the meaning of a given concept. Therefore, we suggest that semantic significance can be considered an effective index of the importance of a feature in a given conceptual representation. Moreover, we propose that it may have straightforward implications for feature-based models of semantic memory, as an important additional factor for understanding conceptual representation.     

A uniform model of computational conceptual blending

We present a mathematical model for the cognitive operation of conceptual blending that aims at being uniform across different representation formalisms, while capturing the relevant structure of this operation. The model takes its inspiration from amalgams as applied in case-based reasoning, but lifts them into category theory so as to follow Joseph Goguen’s intuition for a mathematically precise characterisation of conceptual blending at a representation-independent level of abstraction. We prove that our amalgam-based category-theoretical model of conceptual blending is essentially equivalent to the pushout model in the ordered category of partial maps as put forward by Goguen. But unlike Goguen’s approach, our model is more suitable to capture computational realisations of conceptual blending, and we exemplify this by concretising our model to computational conceptual blends for various representation formalisms and application domains.     

The mind considered as a system of meaning structures II. Concepts and representations

The theory of the mind considered as a system of meaning structures, which was sketched in an earlier paper (Lundh, 1981), is developed further in this paper. Whereas the earlier paper remained at a prelinguistic, sensorimotor level of functioning, the present paper extends the theory to conceptual thinking. Three main distinctions are drawn: between 1) mental representations and symbols, 2) sensorimotor intelligence and conceptual intelligence, and 3) habitual inferences and cognitive operations. Sensorimotor development consists in the development of mental representations, which the child, however, does not yet have any conscious access to. It is argued that sensorimotor structures are transformed into conceptual and propositional structures to the extent that the child becomes able not only to act, but also to think in terms of these structures—the latter is equated with the development of a kind of conscious access to already existent mental representations.     

Analysis of the conceptual structure of natural and artifactual categories in Alzheimer's disease patients

This work has two goals, the first one is to study in detail the conceptual structure of some natural and artifactual categories, by using multidimensional scaling (MDS). According to our theoretical approximation, conceptual structure is composed of semantic features, and these features have different entities and nature. As an index of relevance in mental representation of semantic categories, we took the frequency of production of semantic features on a free verbal production task. Our second goal was to compare the structure of conceptual representations in two populations, healthy elderly and Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients, assuming that conceptual representation is impaired in this last population. We assume that the impairment in the conceptual representations of AD patients will show, when the disease reaches a determined level, loosing specific features. This impairment will have serious consequences in the whole conceptual structure.