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1.
Michael Devitt 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(2):251-264
In “Intuitions in Linguistics” (2006a) and Ignorance of Language (2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker’s metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence.
I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses
to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar.
Mark Textor, “Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions” (2009), argues that I have picked the wrong intuitions: I should have picked non-judgmental linguistic “seemings”. These reside
between metalinguistic judgments and linguistic performances and have an epistemic authority that the orthodox view may well
be able to explain. Textor seems to think that the metalinguistic intuitions are not evidence at all. I argue that he is wrong
about that. More importantly, I argue that there are no “in-between” linguistic seemings with epistemic authority. 相似文献
2.
Matthew C. Haug 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(3):313-330
Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation
between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates
why these differences hold. This account of realization incorporates two distinct roles that mechanisms play in the realization
of mental (and other special science) properties which are implicit, but undeveloped, in the literature—what I call “constitutive”
and “integrative” mechanisms. I then use these two notions of mechanism to clarify some debates about the relations between
realization, multiple realizability, and irreducibility. 相似文献
3.
Isidora Stojanovic 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):49-58
It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977; No?s 13: 3–21, 1979, Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for
theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan (1989), has it that if Alma says “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said, is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from
the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has
often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the
same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary
nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying.
I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing. 相似文献
4.
Lisa Weems 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(6):557-568
In this article, I discuss how the space of the classroom is a contested object that is constituted by historical, cultural,
political, social, psychological, and discursive practices (Lefebvre in The production of space, Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1991). I then employ Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “assemblage” to characterize the ways in which educational spaces cohere
“content and affect” quoted in Puar (Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times, Duke University Press, Durham,
2007, 193) into discursive figures of the heteronormative and racialized national “family.” Finally, I argue that in order to
advance contemporary theorizing on safe space we might consider shifting the metaphor of the classroom (and/or schooling)
as a situation of home (in loco parentis) to that of a metaphor of camp. As a discursive practice, “camp” is like “home” in
that it has multiple associations of past histories. However, the advantage of the metaphor of classroom as camp allows for
a more capacious range of past histories of association, from recreation to temporary inhabitation to forced relocation, thus
foregrounding the innate political implications of theorizing space. Moreover, the metaphor of camp implies transience (whether
real or imaginary) while keeping in mind the partial and situated nature of particular places and spaces. Foregrounding the
transient component/feature of safe space allows us to make visible and explore the possibilities and limitations of conceptualizing
relations of power as circuitous, contested and performative through competing claims to particular places as objects of safety. 相似文献
5.
Jacqueline A. Sullivan 《Synthese》2010,177(2):151-164
The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement
that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences,
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous
responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”,
“spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively
to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have
not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question
of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study
using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed
a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes
nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and
molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental
and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze. 相似文献
6.
Steven Daskal 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(2):221-229
In “Desire as Belief” and “Desire as Belief II,” David Lewis (1988, 1996) considers the anti-Humean position that beliefs about the good require corresponding desires, which is his way of understanding
the idea that beliefs about the good are capable of motivating behavior. He translates this anti-Humean claim into decision
theoretic terms and demonstrates that it leads to absurdity and contradiction. As Ruth Weintraub (2007) has shown, Lewis’ argument goes awry at the outset. His decision theoretic formulation of anti-Humeanism is one that no
sensible anti-Humean would endorse. My aim is to demonstrate that Lewis’ infelicitous rendering of anti-Humeanism really does
undermine the force of his arguments. To accomplish this, I begin by developing a more adequate decision theoretic rendering
of the anti-Humean position. After showing that my formulation of anti-Humeanism constitutes a plausible interpretation of
the anti-Humean thesis, I go on to demonstrate that if we adopt this more accurate rendition of anti-Humeanism, the view is
no longer susceptible to arguments like the ones Lewis has devised. I thereby provide a more robust response to Lewis’ arguments
than has yet been offered, and in the process I develop a formulation of anti-Humeanism that creates the possibility for future
decision theoretic arguments that, unlike Lewis’, speak directly to the plausibility of anti-Humeanism. 相似文献
7.
Peter B. M. Vranas 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):115-121
Kadri Vihvelin, in “What time travelers cannot do” (Philos Stud 81:315–330, 1996), argued that “no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self”, because (V1) “if someone would fail to
do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it”, and (V2) if a time traveler tried to
kill her baby self, she would always fail. Theodore Sider (Philos Stud 110:115–138, 2002) criticized Vihvelin’s argument, and Ira Kiourti (Philos Stud 139:343–352, 2008) criticized both Vihvelin’s argument and Sider’s critique. I present a critique of Vihvelin’s argument different from both
Sider’s and Kiourti’s critiques: I argue in a novel way that both V1 and V2 are false. Since Vihvelin’s argument might be
understood as providing a challenge to the possibility of time travel, if my critique succeeds then time travel survives such
a challenge unscathed. 相似文献
8.
Carol L. Schnabl Schweitzer 《Pastoral Psychology》2010,59(6):829-842
This article examines some of the basic psychodynamic understandings of forgiveness including forgiveness as aesthetic, ahistorical,
tact, or the ability to for-give that Julia Kristeva (1995, 1989, 1987a, b) presents in her writings on depression and melancholia, analytic process and technique, and love and faith. These are supplemented
by more recent examinations of forgiveness in the therapeutic community (Worthington 1998; Watts and Gulliford 2004; McCullough et al. 2000) as they relate to Christian belief, Christian practice and pastoral care. I argue that it is in the context of a caring
relationship where and when individuals experience “for-giving” that they develop the ability to accept forgiveness (especially
of the self) and thus become individuals who can extend forgiveness to others. Even those entering pastoral ministry who have
no desire or little ability to engage in pastoral counseling will be served well if their own abilities to be “for-giving”
are cultivated during their theological education. Thus, the application of “for-giving” extends far beyond the analytic process
or technique that Kristeva envisions to include pastoral identity formation and pastoral ministry. 相似文献
9.
Liu Qingping 《Dao》2007,6(1):1-19
Confucianism advocates the lofty moral ideal of “humane love” (ren ai 仁愛) and condemns immoral actions. Strangely enough, however, Mencius, a “paradigmatic Confucian intellectual” who believed
that “a true man cannot be corrupted by wealth, subdued by power, or affected by poverty” (Tu 1989a: 15), highly commended such typically corrupt actions as bending the law for the benefit of relatives or appointing people
by mere nepotism when he talked about Shun 舜 in the text of the Mencius. In the first four sections of this article, I will address the issue of how Confucianism encourages a special kind of corruption
through its fundamentally consanguineous affection. Then, in the remaining sections, I will try to respond to some criticisms
of my views by a few Chinese scholars. 相似文献
10.
Emmanuelle Danblon 《Argumentation》2009,23(3):351-359
According to Perelman (Rhétoriques, Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1989: 80), a pseudo-argument is an argument that is supposed to be convincing from a given audience viewpoint, while it is not
from another audience viewpoint. Such a claim raises the traditional problem of the boundaries between the well known “convince
versus persuade” dichotomy. This paper aims at investigating it from a contemporary rhetorical and argumentative perspective
which will take into account the fictional dimension of persuasion. In this perspective, it will be claimed that the notion
of an “as if” argument better fits to some rhetorical phenomena.
相似文献
Emmanuelle DanblonEmail: |
11.
Nicholas Silins 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(2):243-261
This paper evaluates the prospects of harnessing “anti-individualism” about the contents of perceptual states to give an account
of the epistemology of perception, making special reference to Tyler Burge’s (2003) paper, “Perceptual Entitlement”. I start by clarifying what kind of warrant is provided by perceptual experience, and I
go on to survey different ways one might explain the warrant provided by perceptual experience in terms of anti-individualist
views about the individuation of perceptual states. I close by motivating accounts which instead give a more prominent role
to consciousness. 相似文献
12.
Charles B. Cross 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(2):101-120
In “Backward Causation and the Stalnaker–Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals,” Analysis 62:191–7, (2002), Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker–Lewis comparative world
similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. In “Tooley on Backward Causation,” Analysis 63:157–62, (2003), Paul Noordhof argues that Tooley’s example can be reconciled with a Stalnaker–Lewis account of counterfactuals if the comparative
world similarity relation on which the Stalnaker–Lewis account relies is allowed to be antecedent-relative. In this paper
I show that taking comparative world similarity to be antecedent-relative results in a formal semantics which is a comparative
world similarity semantics in name only. 相似文献
13.
14.
We look into the transformation of meanings in psychotherapy and suggest a clinical application for Wittgenstein’s intuitions
concerning the role of linguistic practices in generating significance. In post-modern theory, therapy does not necessarily
change reality as much as it does our way of experiencing it by intervening in the linguistic-representational rules responsible
for constructing the text which expresses the problem. Since “states of mind assume the truths and forms of the language devices
that we use to represent them” (Foucault, 1963, p. 57), therapy may be intended as a narrative path toward a new naming of one’s reified experiences. The clinical problem
we consider here, the pervasive feeling of inadequacy due to one’s excessive height (dysmorphophobia), is an excellent example
of “language game” by which a “perspicuous representation” (the “therapy” proposed by Wittgenstein in the 1953) may bring out alternatives to linguistically-built “traps”, putting the blocked semiotic mechanism back into motion. 相似文献
15.
Clare Palmer 《Nanoethics》2011,5(1):43-48
In his paper “The Opposite of Human Enhancement: Nanotechnology and the Blind Chicken problem” (Nanoethics 2:305–316, 2008) Paul Thompson argues that the possibility of “disenhancing” animals in order to improve animal welfare poses a philosophical
conundrum. Although many people intuitively think such disenhancement would be morally impermissible, it’s difficult to find
good arguments to support such intuitions. In this brief response to Thompson, I accept that there’s a conundrum here. But
I argue that if we seriously consider whether creating beings can harm or benefit them, and introduce the non-identity problem to discussions of animal disehancement, the conundrum is even
deeper than Thompson suggests. 相似文献
16.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(1):45-60
Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution
falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in
this case, “if x, then I am awake,” x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we
can know that the antecedent holds, and as such can infer the consequent, i.e., “I am awake.” Sosa’s second solution, in terms
of so-called reflective knowledge, is shown to land him in the dilemma of either facing yet another conditionality problem,
or violating an internalist constraint that he explicitly grants the skeptic with respect to what kind of factors can be legitimately
invoked in our account of how we may know the relevant antecedent. For these reasons, I conclude that Sosa has not solved
the problem of dream skepticism. 相似文献
17.
Karen L. Kuchan 《Journal of religion and health》2011,50(1):120-131
This article will expand previous conceptualizations (Kuchan, Presence Int J Spiritual Dir 12(4):22–34, 2006; J Religion Health 47(2):263–275, 2008; J Pastoral Care Counsel, forthcoming) of what might be occurring during a prayer practice that creates space within a spiritual
direction relationship for the creation of inner images that reveal a person’s unconscious relational longings and co-created
representations of God that seem to facilitate therapeutic process toward aliveness. In previous articles, I suggest one way
to understand the prayer experience is through a lens of Winnicottian notions of transitional space, illusion, and co-creation
of God images. This article expands on these ideas to include an understanding of God as Objective Other (Lewis, The four
loves, 1960) interacting with a part of a person’s self (Jung, in: The structure and dynamics of the psyche, collected works 8, 1934; Symington, Narcissism, a new theory, 1993) that has capacity for subjectivity (Benjamin, Like subjects, love objects: Essays on recognition and sexual difference,
1995) and co-creation (Winnicott, Home is where we start from: Essays by a psychoanalyst, 1990), of inner representations of God (Ulanov, Winnicott, god and psychic reality, 2001). I also expand on a notion of God as “Source of aliveness” by integrating an aspect of how Symington (Narcissism, a new
theory, 1993) thinks about “the lifegiver,” which he understands to be a mental object. After offering this theoretical expansion of the
prayer practice/experience, one woman’s inner representations of self and God are reflected upon in terms of a therapeutic
process toward transforming destructiveness, utilizing ideas from Winnicott, Kohut, and Benjamin. 相似文献
18.
Dmitry Kurakin 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2010,44(3):227-234
Meaningful life is emotionally marked off. That’s the general point that Johansen (IPBS: Integrative Psychological & Behavioral
Science 44, 2010) makes which is of great importance. Fictional abstractions use to make the point even more salient. As an example I’ve examined
Borges’ famous fiction story. Along with the examples of Johansen it provides an informative case of exploring symbolic mechanisms
which bind meaning with emotions. This particular mode of analysis draws forth poetry and literature in general to be treated
as a “meaningful life laboratory”. Ways of explanation of emotional effect the art exercises on people, which had been disclosed
within this laboratory, however, constitute a significant distinction in terms that I have designated as “referential” and
“substantive”. The former appeals to something that has already been charged with emotional power, whereas the latter comes
to effect by means of special symbolic mechanisms creating the emotional experience within the situation. Johansen, who tends
to explain emotions exerted by the art without leaving the semiotic perspective, is drawn towards the “referential” type of
explanation. Based upon discussions in theory of metaphor and Robert Witkin’s sociological theory of arts it is demonstrated
an insufficient of “referential” explanation. To overcome a monopoly of “referential” explanation of emotional engagement,
in particular, in literature, means to break away from the way of reasoning, stating endless references to “something else”,
presupposing the existence of something already significant and therefore sharing its effects. 相似文献
19.
Peter Mittelstaedt 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(1):45-53
In modern physics, the constant “c” plays a twofold role. On the one hand, “c” is the well known velocity of light in an empty
Minkowskian space–time, on the other hand “c” is a characteristic number of Special Relativity that governs the Lorentz transformation
and its consequences for the measurements of space–time intervals. We ask for the interrelations between these two, at first
sight different meanings of “c”. The conjecture that the value of “c” has any influence on the structure of space–time is
based on the operational interpretation of Special Relativity, which uses light rays for measurements of space–time intervals.
We do not follow this way of reasoning but replace it by a more realistic approach that allows to show that the structure
of the Minkowskian space–time can be reconstructed already on the basis of a restricted classical ontology (Mittelstaedt,
Philosophie der Physik und der Raum-Zeit, Mannheim: BI-Wissenschaftsverlag, 1988 and Mittelstaedt, Kaltblütig: Philosophie von einem rationalen Standpunkt, Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, pp. 221–240, 2003), and that without any reference to the propagation of light. However, the space–time obtained in this way contains still
an unknown constant. We show that this constant agrees numerically with “c” but that it must conceptually clearly be distinguished
from the velocity of light. Hence, we argue for a clear distinction between the two faces of “c” and for a dualism of space–time
and matter. 相似文献
20.
Hypothesis-testing performance on Wason’s (Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 12:129–140, 1960) 2–4–6 task is typically poor, with only around 20% of participants announcing the to-be-discovered “ascending numbers” rule
on their first attempt. Enhanced solution rates can, however, readily be observed with dual-goal (DG) task variants requiring
the discovery of two complementary rules, one labeled “DAX” (the standard “ascending numbers” rule) and the other labeled
“MED” (“any other number triples”). Two DG experiments are reported in which we manipulated the usefulness of a presented MED exemplar, where usefulness denotes cues that can establish a helpful “contrast class” that can stand in opposition to the presented 2–4–6 DAX exemplar.
The usefulness of MED exemplars had a striking facilitatory effect on DAX rule discovery, which supports the importance of
contrast-class information in hypothesis testing. A third experiment ruled out the possibility that the useful MED triple
seeded the correct rule from the outset and obviated any need for hypothesis testing. We propose that an extension of Oaksford
and Chater’s (European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 6:149–169, 1994) iterative counterfactual model can neatly capture the mechanisms by which DG facilitation arises. 相似文献