共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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David H. Sanford 《Philosophical Studies》1978,33(2):185-194
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David H. Sanford 《Philosophical Studies》1975,28(2):103-112
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On some arguments for the necessity of necessity 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
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John D. White 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》1979,10(1-3):177-187
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Richard Montague 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(1-4):259-269
Some philosophers, for example Quine, doubt the possibility of jointly using modalities and quantification. Simple model‐theoretic considerations, however, lead to a reconciliation of quantifiers with such modal concepts as logical, physical, and ethical necessity, and suggest a general class of modalities of which these are instances. A simple axiom system, analogous to the Lewis systems S1 —S5, is considered in connection with this class of modalities. The system proves to be complete, and its class of theorems decidable. 相似文献
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John D. White 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》1984,10(1):177-187
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John Hawthorne 《Philosophical Studies》2012,158(3):493-501
Claims of the form ??I know P and it might be that not-P?? tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, ??Might P?? is true in a speaker??s mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath??s recent Knowledge in an Uncertain World. 相似文献
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Scott A. Shalkowski 《Synthese》1992,90(1):55-87
Causal necessity typically receives only oblique attention. Causal relations, laws of nature, counterfactual conditionals, or dispositions are usually the immediate subject(s) of interest. All of these, however, have a common feature. In some way, they involve the causal modality, some form of natural or physical necessity. In this paper, causal necessity is discussed with the purpose of determining whether a completely general empiricist theory can account for the causal in terms of the noncausal. Based on an examination of causal relations, laws of nature, counterfactual conditionals, and dispositions, it is argued that no reductive program devoid of essentialist commitments can account for all the phenomena that involve causal necessity. Hence, neo-Humean empiricism fails to provide a framework adequate for understanding causal necessity.I am grateful to D. M. Armstrong, Ellery Eels, Kit Fine, Philip Quinn, Elliot Sober, Chris Swoyer, Bas van Fraassen, and an anonymous Synthese referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 相似文献
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A. B. Levison 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(1-4):367-373
An attempt is made to show that Wittgenstein's later philosophy of logic is not the kind of conventionalism which is often ascribed to him. On the contrary, Wittgenstein gives expression to a “mixed” theory which is not only interesting but tends to resolve the perplexities usually associated with the question of the a priori character of logical truth. I try to show that Wittgenstein is better understood not as denying that there are such things as “logical rules” nor as denying that the results of applying such rules are “logically necessary,” but as trying to understand what it is to appeal to a logical rule and what it means to say that the results of applying such a rule are “necessary.” He is not so much overthrowing standard accounts of logical necessity as discovering the limits of the concept. 相似文献
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