共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Jordi Fernández 《Synthese》2008,160(1):103-121
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features
of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is
inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’
feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next,
I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories
that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories
that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different
theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory
that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence. 相似文献
2.
Elinor Mason 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2002,5(3):287-303
I argue against the standard view that it is possible to describe extensionally different consequentialist theories by describing different evaluative focal points. I argue that for consequentialist purposes, the important sense of the word act must include all motives and side effects, and thus these things cannot be separated. 相似文献
3.
Joel Kenton Press 《Synthese》2008,161(1):119-139
Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific
application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable,
we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity.
Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current
theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids
explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection
fatal to that theory.
My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific
explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’
by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion
of function.
However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant
contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’
must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to
determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function
may in many cases assist them in this task. 相似文献
4.
Nicolas Espinoza 《Synthese》2008,165(1):127-139
It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively
comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means
of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense.
The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to
the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally as good as.’ 相似文献
5.
Jennie Louise 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(4):345-364
The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually
prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object
does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or intending to
have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike
awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons.
I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response.
I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration
or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’
phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of
such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.
相似文献
Jennie LouiseEmail: |
6.
Corey J. Maley 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(1):117-131
Representation is central to contemporary theories regarding the mind/brain. But the nature of representation—both in the
mind/brain and more generally—is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish
between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations
vary in a step-wise manner. In other words, ‘digital’ is synonymous with ‘discrete’, while ‘analog’ is synonymous with ‘continuous’.
I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is (and should be) used in
cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis’s account of analog
and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation.
I will argue that the distinctions available in this fourfold account better accord with representational features of interest
in cognitive science than the received analog/digital dichotomy. 相似文献
7.
Dorothée Legrand 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):67-87
The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that
one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other
hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness
of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree,
however about which modes of givenness are involved.
相似文献
Dorothée LegrandEmail: URL: http://dorotheelegrand.googlepages.com |
8.
N. N. Trakakis 《Sophia》2010,49(1):129-140
In responding to Peter Forrest’s defence of ‘tough-minded theodicy’, I point to some problematic features of theodicies of
this sort, in particular their commitment to an anthropomorphic conception of God which tends to assimilate the Creator to
the creaturely and so diminishes the otherness and mystery of God. This remains the case, I argue, even granted Forrest’s
view that God may have a very different kind of morality from the one we mortals are subject to. 相似文献
9.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
10.
Tamar Schapiro 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(3):147-167
In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims
if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having
a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the
world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction
between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to
which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction
between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation
Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation. 相似文献
11.
Bryan Pickel 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(2):193-211
I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue
that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as ‘this statue is a molded piece of clay’. This suggests that speakers believe
propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore
pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word ‘is’,
such that ‘is’ in these sentences means the same as ‘constitutes or is constituted by’. I will use standard tests for ambiguity
to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument. 相似文献
12.
Michael McDermott 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2009,38(4):465-470
Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories
generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory
of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability;
but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way. 相似文献
13.
A Communicative Conception of Moral Appraisal 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Jules Holroyd 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):267-278
I argue that our acts of moral appraisal should be communicative. Praise and blame should communicate, to the appraised, information
about their status and competences as moral agents; that they are recognised by the appraiser as a competent moral agent,
and thus a legitimate candidate for appraisal. I argue for this thesis by drawing on empirical data about factors that can
affect motivation. On the basis of such data, I formulate a constraint, and argue that two prominent models of moral appraisal
– a consequentialist model and Wallace’s ‘evaluative response’ model – violate this constraint. The model that I propose –
the communicative conception of appraisal – does not violate this constraint. This conception, I argue, can provide a fuller
picture of the role of appraisals in deepening agents’ commitment to moral norms. On this model, praise and blame has not
only an evaluative component, but also communicates to the agent competence affirming information.
相似文献
Jules HolroydEmail: |
14.
Steven French 《Synthese》2011,180(2):205-221
Various forms of underdetermination that might threaten the realist stance are examined. That which holds between different
‘formulations’ of a theory (such as the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics) is considered in some
detail, as is the ‘metaphysical’ underdetermination invoked to support ‘ontic structural realism’. The problematic roles of
heuristic fruitfulness and surplus structure in attempts to break these forms of underdetermination are discussed and an approach
emphasizing the relevant structural commonalities is defended. 相似文献
15.
Michael S. Brady 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):413-430
A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of
flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important
problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In
this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality
of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational
insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected.
相似文献
Michael S. BradyEmail: |
16.
Scott Hill 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2009,10(2):215-228
Daniel Haybron has made an original contribution to philosophical discussions of happiness. He has put forward a theory that
identifies happiness with moods and the propensity to experience moods. Haybron’s contribution deserves a critical examination.
The first section of my paper is interpretive. I show how Haybron uses the concepts of ‘central affective states’ and ‘mood
propensity’ to define happiness. The second and third sections of the paper are critical. They focus on the inclusion of mood
propensity in Haybron’s theory. In the second section I argue that his theory fails because there is an example that shows
a subject can be happy even when that subject does not have a positive mood propensity. In the third section of the paper,
I consider Haybron’s objection that the case in question is ‘object-specific’ and that it is not ‘emotionally-based’. I discuss
both of these technical terms in detail. Moreover, I argue that a modified version of the counter example accommodates these
technical terms while retaining the persuasiveness of the original example.
相似文献
Scott HillEmail: |
17.
N. Ángel Pinillos 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(2):301-324
Sometimes two expressions in a discourse can be about the same thing in a way that makes that very fact evident to the participants.
Consider, for example, ‘he’ and ‘John’ in ‘John went to the store and he bought some milk’. Let us call this ‘de jure’ coreference.
Other times, coreference is ‘de facto’ as with ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ in a sincere use of ‘Mark Twain is not Samuel
Clemens’. Here, agents can understand the speech without knowing that the names refer to the same person. After surveying
many available linguistic and pragmatic tools (intentions to corefer, presuppositions, meanings, indexing, discourse referents,
binding etc.) I conclude that we must posit a new semantic primitive to account for de jure coreference. 相似文献
18.
Sean Crawford 《Synthese》2008,160(1):75-96
Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The
distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’
(or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account
of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system
is also supposed to suffer from the problem of ‘suspended judgement with continued belief’. I argue that this criticism fails
to take account of a crucial presupposition of Quine’s about the connection between thought and language. The aim of the paper
is to defend the spirit of Quine’s account of attitudes by offering solutions to these two problems.
See also chapters four and five of Word and Object (Quine, 1960) and ‘Intensions Revisited’ (Quine, 1977). 相似文献
19.
Elaine Landry 《Synthese》2007,158(1):1-17
Recent semantic approaches to scientific structuralism, aiming to make precise the concept of shared structure between models,
formally frame a model as a type of set-structure. This framework is then used to provide a semantic account of (a) the structure
of a scientific theory, (b) the applicability of a mathematical theory to a physical theory, and (c) the structural realist’s
appeal to the structural continuity between successive physical theories. In this paper, I challenge the idea that, to be
so used, the concept of a model and so the concept of shared structure between models must be formally framed within a single
unified framework, set-theoretic or other. I first investigate the Bourbaki-inspired assumption that structures are types
of set-structured systems and next consider the extent to which this problematic assumption underpins both Suppes’ and recent
semantic views of the structure of a scientific theory. I then use this investigation to show that, when it comes to using
the concept of shared structure, there is no need to agree with French that “without a formal framework for explicating this
concept of ‘structure-similarity’ it remains vague, just as Giere’s concept of similarity between models does ...” (French,
2000, Synthese, 125, pp. 103–120, p. 114). Neither concept is vague; either can be made precise by appealing to the concept of a morphism, but it is the context (and not any set-theoretic type) that determines the appropriate kind of morphism. I make use of French’s
(1999, From physics to philosophy (pp. 187–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) own example from the development of quantum theory to show that, for
both Weyl and Wigner’s programmes, it was the context of considering the ‘relevant symmetries’ that determined that the appropriate
kind of morphism was the one that preserved the shared Lie-group structure of both the theoretical and phenomenological models.
I wish to thank Katherine Brading, Anjan Chakravartty, Steven French, Martin Thomson-Jones, Antigone Nounou, Stathis Psillos,
Dean Rickles, Mauricio Suarez and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and criticisms, and Gregory Janzen for editorial
suggestions. Research for this paper was funded by a generous SSHRC grant for which I am grateful 相似文献
20.
Patrick McGivern 《Synthese》2008,165(1):53-75
I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale
analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience
argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based”
properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts
such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be
revised. 相似文献