Spacetime theory as physical geometry

Discussions of the metaphysical status of spacetime assume that a spacetime theory offers a causal explanation of phenomena of relative motion, and that the fundamental philosophical question is whether the inference to that explanation is warranted. I argue that those assumptions are mistaken, because they ignore the essential character of spacetime theory as a kind of physical geometry. As such, a spacetime theory does notcausally explain phenomena of motion, but uses them to construct physicaldefinitions of basic geometrical structures by coordinating them with dynamical laws. I suggest that this view of spacetime theories leads to a clearer view of the philosophical foundations of general relativity and its place in the historical evolution of spacetime theory. I also argue that this view provides a much clearer and more defensible account of what is entailed by realism concerning spacetime.I would like to thank William Demopoulos and Michael Friedman for their comments on earlier drafts. I also thank the anonymous referees forErkenntnis for their suggestions. Work on this paper was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.     

Set theory as modal logic

A logical systemBM ⁺ is proposed, which, is a prepositional calculus enlarged with prepositional quantifiers and with two modal signs, and These modalities are submitted to a finite number of axioms. is the usual sign of necessity, corresponds to transmutation of a property (to be white) into the abstract property (to be the whiteness). An imbedding of the usual theory of classesM intoBM ⁺ is constructed, such that a formulaA is provable inM if and only if(A) is provable inBM ⁺. There is also an inverse imbedding with an analogous property.     

On the adequacy of prototype theory as a theory of concepts

Prototype theory construes membership in a concept's extension as graded, determined by similarity to the concept's “best” exemplar (or by some other measure of central tendency). The present paper is concerned with the compatibility of this view of concept membership with two criteria of adequacy for theories of concepts. The first criterion concerns the relationship between complex concepts and their conceptual constituents. The second concerns the truth conditions for thoughts corresponding to simple inclusions.     

Buber's interpersonal theory as a hermeneutic

Martin Buber is remembered as a philosopher, existentialist, Zionist, and Jewish theologian. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that his theory of interpersonal relations forms a useful tool for categorizing some of the theoretical perspectives and therapeutic techniques within psychiatry. It is neither the intention nor purpose of the authors to judge the relative merits of competing modalities of treatment but to clarify their therapeutic mechanisms in such a way as to identify their purposes more precisely. Additionally, the authors wish to categorize the various schools of psychotherapy and their subdivisions according to the realm in which they are operative. Finally, they hope to demonstrate that Buber's system can be modified or elaborated upon by this connection with some of these approaches to personality theory.T.L. Brink, Ph.D., did his graduate work at the University of Chicago. He taught psychotherapy at Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios Superiores del Occidente in Guadalajara, Mexico. Currently he has a private practice in geriatric counseling in the San Francisco Bay area. He serves as a consultant for Midpeninsula Health Services and San Mateo County Mental Health and is on the faculty at College of Notre Dame and Palo Alto School of Professional Psychology.Connie Janakes leads a dream therapy group for the aged at Little House in Menlo Park, and counsels alcoholics at WRA in San Mateo, California.