Kantian Constructivism,the Issue of Scope,and Perfectionism: O'Neill on Ethical Standing

Abstract: Kantian constructivists accord a constitutive, justificatory role to the issue of scope: they typically claim that first‐order practical thought depends for its authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope, or by all relevant others, and some Kantian constructivists, notably Onora O'Neill, hold that our views of the nature and criteria of practical reasoning also depend for their authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope. The paper considers whether O'Neill‐type Kantian constructivism can coherently accord this key role to the issue of scope while adhering to the universalist, ‘cosmopolitan’ commitments at its core. The paper argues that this is not so. On the one hand, it shows that O'Neill's attempt to ‘fix’ the scope of practical reasoning supposes, rather than establishes, a view of ethical standing and the scope of practical reasoning. On the other hand, the paper argues that Kantian constructivism should endorse a non‐constructivist, perfectionist view of the good to determine that scope. The paper thereby supports the perfectionist conjecture that Kantian constructivism, in order to defend its universalist commitments, should take refuge in non‐constructivist, perfectionist considerations, and that Kantian constructivism should therefore construe perfectionism as a partial, though uneasy, ally.     

Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem

According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate by defending a robust conception of construction, which names a distinctive view of practical reasoning as transformative.     

Constructivism and the Limits of Reason: Revisiting the Kantian Problematic

The main focus of this paper ison ways in which Kantian philosophy can informproponents and opponents of constructivismalike. Kant was primarily concerned withreconciling natural and moral law. His approachto this general problematic was to limit andseparate what we can know about things(phenomena) from things as they are inthemselves (noumena), and to identify moralagency with the latter. Revisiting the Kantianproblematic helps to address and resolve longstanding epistemological concerns regardingconstructivism as an educational philosophy inrelation to issues of objectivity andsubjectivity, the limits of theoretical andpractical reason, and the relation betweenhuman experience and the world. It also servesto address ethical concerns regardingliberation from limited self-interests andcontexts conditioned by localised beliefs andinclinations. In light of revisiting theKantian problematic, both Glasersfeld's radicalview of constructivism and Jardine's socialcritique of constructivism are found wanting.Beyond constructivism, Kant's distinctionbetween phenomena and noumena and the limits ofreason that follow from it are brieflyconsidered in terms of Merleau-Ponty's noveldouble-embodied notion of flesh as anontological primitive – as a matter of beingboth in, and of, the world – with an aim tomore intimate connections between epistemologyand ethics.     

论元伦理学中的康德式建构主义

康德主义伦理学被怀疑论者看作一种心灵-独立的实在论,并因此遭到它的批评。实在论者则把康德主义伦理学作为一种心灵-独立的实在论加以辩护。科斯嘉承继并推进了罗尔斯所实现的康德主义的元伦理学转向,在回应对康德主义外在实在论批评和辩护的同时,提出了一种建构主义的程序实在论,并把它作为一种内在的实在论加以辩护,完成了道德实在论的内在转变。但是这种康德式建构主义却面临着这样一个困难,即它作为一种内在的实在论同时是一种非认知主义。从理论的融贯性来看,与这种康德式内在实在论相适合的应是一种康德式内在认知主义。     

Constitutivism and Inescapability: A Diagnosis

A central element of constitutivist accounts of categorical normativity is the claim that the ultimate foundation of the relevant kind of practical authority is sourced in certain tasks, features, and aims that every person inevitably possesses and inescapably has to deal with. We have no choice but to be agents and this fact is responsible for the norms and principles that condition our agency-related activities to have anunconditional normative grip on us. Critics of constitutivism argue that it is exactly because of itsinescapability that agency is a powerless source of normative authority. I investigate why our intuitionsconcerning the appeal to inescapability point into such contrary directions. Why do we feel the attraction ofgrounding categorical normativity in phenomena that not even the skeptic can ignore, on the one hand, butseem to hold dear the principle that “ought implies need not,” on the other? Instead of fully developing thethird, neutral, way of conceptualizing the relationship between inescapability and normativity that theimpasse between constitutivists and their critics suggests, this paper diagnoses the disagreement at hand.That agency is inescapable does neither guarantee nor rule out its status qua source of categoricalnormativity. Both camps of the debate overlook this option and depict their opponents as adhering to animplausible perspective of how appeals to inescapability and unconditional normativity are related. Sincethe debate relies on a false dichotomy it is not surprising that its participants so often talk past each other.     

A Law of One's Own: Self‐Legislation and Radical Kantian Constructivism

Radical constructivists appeal to self‐legislation in arguing that rational agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian proponents are unable to defend an account of self‐legislation as the fundamental source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox that arises when self‐legislation is unable to appeal to external normative standards. Onora O'Neill anchors self‐legislation more firmly to the self‐disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self‐legislation prompt a reconstruction of a neglected realist self‐legislative tradition which is exemplified by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self‐legislation, I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can make them our own.     

Introduction: Constructivism and social constructionism in the career field

The impact of constructivism and social constructionism upon vocational psychology has often been through the use of the more generic “constructivism.” In this article constructivism is distinguished by its focus on how the individual cognitively engages in the construction of knowledge from social construction which claims that knowledge and meaning are historically and culturally constructed through social processes and action. The considerable ambiguity in the use of these terms is also discussed. Their contributions, challenges, and opportunities to the career field’s dominant discourses are examined: the dispositions discourse, the contextualizing discourse, the subjectivity and narrative discourse, and the process discourse. Broader challenges and opportunities for the field are also noted. The historical construction of knowledge, concern with language, action, and process problematize traditional understandings of career. They raise opportunities to question fundamental assumptions, focus on context, culture, the person-environment interaction, and practice.     

A Social Constructivism Model of Ethical Decision Making in Counseling

Social constructivism is defined as an intellectual movement in the mental health field that directs a social consensual interpretation of reality. A social constructivism approach redefines the ethical decision‐making process as an interactive rather than an individual or intrapsychic process. The process involves negotiating, consensualizing, and, when necessary, arbitrating. Counselors are guided by social and cultural factors in defining what is acceptable ethical practice.     

Editor's Introduction: Theory and Engagement in Bioethics

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics -     

Editorial: Shaping Ethical Futures in Brain-Based and Artificial Intelligence Research

Science and Engineering Ethics -     

A Kantian Hybrid Theory of Art Criticism: A Particularist Appeal to the Generalists

Noël Carroll proposes a generalist theory of art criticism, which essentially involves evaluations of artworks on the basis of their success value, at the cost of rendering evaluations of reception value irrelevant to criticism. In this article, I argue for a hybrid account of art criticism, which incorporates Carroll's objective model but puts Carroll‐type evaluations in the service of evaluations of reception value. I argue that this hybrid model is supported by Kant's theory of taste. Hence, I not only present an alternative theory of metacriticism, which has the merit of reinstating the centrality of reception value in art critics’ evaluations, but also show that, contrary to a common conception, Kant's aesthetic theory can house a fruitful account of art criticism. The benefit of this hybrid account is that, despite being essentially particularist, it should be appealing even to generalists, including Carroll.     

康德哲学与广松涉"交互主体的共同主观性"理论

广松涉认为,对近代认识论基础的问题式及其构成机制和局限进行反思,首先需要将着眼点放在康德哲学的问题式及其构成机制上。康德哲学的总的问题式就是在以先验逻辑学为基础的逻辑学、认识论和本体论“三位一体”的哲学构架中,探讨人的认识以及纯粹理性的先天综合判断及其能力何以可能。这一问题式潜含着一个意义非常重大的认识论问题——即“主体际共同主观性”问题．需要我们认真地加以研究。