Mikhail Lifshits and the Soviet image of Giambattista Vico

Mikhail Lifshits’ interpretation of the scholarly work of the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico is analysed against the background of other Soviet interpretations. M. Lifshits authored the introductory article for the first complete translation of Vico’s Scienza Nuova in 1940. In the second half of the 1930s, interest in Vico’s ‘historical theory of knowledge’ was important for the struggle against so-called ‘vulgar sociology’ in the field of aesthetics and literary criticism. Besides this, Vico’s theory of the ‘historical cycle’ was close to the interests M. Lifshits and G. Lukács and their circle in Stalin-era Moscow. This interest was connected with discussions about the preservation of the revolutionary impulse under the conditions of state socialism. However, such an interpretation of Vico (considering him only as a predecessor of Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophy of history) restricted a wide spectrum of his scholarly work. In particular, Lifshits, as an opponent of social-constructivism tradition, ignored Vico’s well-known doctrine of verum factum.

     

Lifshits and Ilyenkov on the nature of the ideal

This article compares the concepts of the ideal proposed by two prominent Soviet Marxists: the contemplative concept (Lifshits) and that based on the activity approach (Ilyenkov). The former derives the ideal, along with man himself, from nature and the latter derives the ideal from the dialectics of labour which generates man, his feelings and thoughts and the higher forms of cultural being.     

Mikhail Lifshits and the fate of Hegelianism in the 20th century

In his essay “Das literarische Erbe Hegels” (“The fate of Hegel’s literary legacy”, 1931) Lifshits addressed the fate of Hegelianism in the first third of the 20th century. He observed a struggle surrounding Hegel’s heritage between Marxism on the one hand, and Neo-Hegelianism or ?the Hegel renaissance“ on the other hand and came to the conclusion that the only legitimate Hegel heir is—Marxism. According to Lifshits, Neo-Hegelianism exploits the “Hegelian state” to justify the modern power state by illegitimately shifting the meaning of the Hegelian concept of the state. Thanks to Kojève’s philosophy, a diffuse yet profound Neo-Hegelian influence continues to have an impact on modern thinking, which gives cause in this essay to examine Lifshits’ verdict on the illegitimacy of the Neo-Hegelian Hegel heritage by confronting his argumentation with Kojève’s Neo-Hegelian concept. So, this essay will update Lifshits’ perspective on the fate of Hegelianism and broaden it beyond the horizon that was available to Lifshits.     

道教审美文化的历史、特色及将来

以道教文艺为代表的道教审美文化 ,是中国古代审美文化的一条独特的分支 ,曾经对中国古代审美文化的发展起过重要的推动作用 ,道教文学源远流长 ,道教艺术别具特色 ,道教美学思想富于民族特色。进入新世纪 ,怎样研究和引导道教审美文化与社会主义相适应 ,有利于抵制邪教 ,也应提上文化发展的日程。     

A model of art perception, evaluation and emotion in transformative aesthetic experience

While accounts of “aesthetic” experience inspire art study and drive its cognitive goals the current modeling of art perception, based on the analytic tradition emphasizing successful assimilation of art information, is unable to truly address this phenomenon, leaving us without means of accounting for disruption and fundamental change—either perceptual or self-referential—as well as epiphany and insight, within the experience of art; and no means of addressing ’art’s ability to mark and change lives. To address this, we introduce a five-stage model of art-perception, organized around initial disruption and subsequent meta-cognitive reflection and self-transformation, which allows for this needed discussion of perceptual and conceptual change, and a connection of art-viewing to viewer personality. Based on this, we consider belletristic accounts of aesthetic experience, and discuss the inter-relation of emotional, cognitive and appraisal factors that may be important for objective research.     

Aesthetics as evaluative forms of agency to perceive and design reality: A reply to aesthetic realism

Following a naturalist-realist point of view, this paper attempts to contribute to the metaphysical question of whether or not reality includes aesthetics. During evolution, cognitive agents have constructed (goal-directed) regulatory abilities forming anticipatory contents in the form of feelings regarding opportunities for interaction. These feelings are considered to be the fundamental part of an evaluative or (what in this paper considered as aesthetic) behavior through which agents show a preference to aspects of their external world. Thus, ‘aesthetic’ denotes an agential behavior based on an organization of processes integrated in a form that identifies, evaluates, and compares sources of interaction-success or error in specific aspects of external reality. While agents approach the same aspects of reality as they all interact with the same world, our claim is that aesthetic normativity cannot be an objective feature of this reality. This model overcomes problems of correspondence in the sense that an agent's actions and thoughts ought to react to any pre-given (aesthetic) quality or norm, while at the same time it emphasizes the self-directedness of aesthetic behavior that enables the development of creative forms of cognition.     

The cost of closure: logical realism,anti-exceptionalism,and theoretical equivalence

Philosophers of science often assume that logically equivalent theories are theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not a priori, that it is revisable, and that it is not special or set apart from other human inquiry) and logical realism (which says, roughly, that differences in logic reflect genuine metaphysical differences in the world) make trouble for this commitment, as well as a closely related commitment to theories being closed under logical consequence. I provide three arguments. The first two show that anti-exceptionalism about logic provides an epistemic challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims; the third shows that logical realism provides a metaphysical challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims. Along the way, I show that there are important methodological upshots for metaphysicians and philosophers of logic, in particular, lessons about certain conceptions of naturalism as constraining the possibilities for metaphysics and the philosophy of logic.

     

An essay in the history of a medieval ideal

John Bugge. Virginitas. The Hague: International Archives of the History of Ideas, Series Minor 17: The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 168. Guilders 47.50

Geoffrey Ashe. The virgin, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976, pp. 262. £5.25

Marina Warner. Alone of all her sex. The myth and cult of the virgin Mary, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976, pp. 400 + xix. £6.50     

The spirited, the observant, and the disheartened: social concepts of optimism, realism, and pessimism

The social concepts of optimism, pessimism, and realism were investigated by assessing the prototypical acts (thoughts, feelings, goals, and actions) that laypersons assign to optimists, pessimists, and realists responding to a controllable and an uncontrollable situation. Optimists and realists, but not pessimists, were seen as adjusting their behavior to the situation. However, whereas optimists were characterized by flexibility in thoughts and feelings but invariance in goals and actions (i.e., they pursued their goals in both controllable and uncontrollable situations), the act profiles assigned to realists varied on all of these dimensions. The profile assigned to pessimists was characterized by cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioral invariance, encompassing negative construals of the situation, giving up, and a focus on distress.     

The Rabbit and The Duck: Antinomic unity in Dostoevskij, the Russian religious tradition, and Mikhail Bakhtin

At the core of Dostoevskij’s philosophy and theology lies a concept according to which the Truth (Istina) is antinomical: it contains both a thesis and its antithesis without expectation of synthesis. This concept can be traced to Eastern Patristics. After Dostoevskij, the theory of antinomies was elaborated by 20th century Russian religious thinkers such as Pavel Florenskij, Sergej Bulgakov, Nikolaj Berdjaev, Semën Frank, and Vladimir Losskij. Their ideas help us to understand that Dostoevskij’s dialogism, made famous in its secular guise by Bakhtin, has a theological underpinning. Dostoevskij’s exposition of conflicting truths should therefore be seen not as a case of irresolvable contradiction or paradox but as an organic wholeness.     

Structural realism versus standard scientific realism: the case of phlogiston and dephlogisticated air

The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulating the appropriate form of scientific realism in response to arguments from theory change, and that the case of phlogiston theory is shown to be readily accommodated by ontic structural realism.     

The poet,the child and the blackbird: aesthetic reading and spiritual development

This article explores the potential and limitations of Louise Rosenblatt's account of aesthetic reading as a basis for understanding the relationship between literary experience and spiritual development. It does so by examining a particular act of reading involving a poem by Ernst Jandl in the light of Rosenblatt's account of ‘aesthetic reading’ and Kierkegaard's categories of the poet and the child. It is argued that an account of the relationship of spirituality to the reading of literature needs to go beyond the immediate experience of the act of reading and take into account the way that literary meanings are responded to in later living and the way in which attentiveness to textual detail can be rooted in spiritual attitudes.     

Putnam on realism,reference and truth: The problem with quantum mechanics

In this essay, I offer a critical evaluation of Hilary Putnam's writings on epistemology and philosophy of science, in particular his engagement with interpretative problems in quantum mechanics. I trace the development of his thinking from the late 1960s when he adopted a strong causal-realist position on issues of meaning, reference, and truth, via the "internal realist" approach of his middle-period writings, to the various forms of pragmatist, naturalized, or "commonsense" epistemology proposed in his latest books. My contention is that Putnam's retreat from a full-fledged realist outlook has been prompted in large part by his belief that it cannot possibly be reconciled with the implications of quantum mechanics for our understanding of processes and events in the subatomic domain. However, I suggest, this response should be seen as premature given the range of as-yet unresolved problems with quantum mechanics on the orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretation and also the existence of an alternative account - David Bohm's hidden-variables theory - which perfectly matches the established predictive-observational results while providing a credible realist ontology. I also examine Putnam's case for adopting a nonstandard (three-valued) "quantum logic" in relation to the thinking of other philosophers - Michael Dummett among them - who have espoused a more global or doctrinaire version of anti-realism. I conclude that Putnam's early (causal-realist) position is by no means untenable in light of the various arguments that he now takes as counting decisively against it.