Ambiguity and Undecidability in Fides et Ratio

The article offers a response to the encyclical Fides et Ratio , identifying its ambiguity with respect to two issues: the nature of the relation between faith and reason, and the diagnosis of the relation of modernity and postmodernity. The tension between the different accounts in the encyclical is not a flaw but a positive feature of the encyclical as an exercise in catholicity.     

Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Reflections towards an Explorative Theology1

Abstract: The postmodern critique has rendered traditional justifications of the practice of research incredible. Further, the status of theological research, in which ‘the discovery of new facts’ or the like is at best ambiguous as an aim, must be under question. This article argues that the aim of theological research is to discover what life lived as if theological claims were true might look like.     

奥古斯丁“信仰寻求理解”的哲学诠释学解读

“信仰寻求理解”源自奥古斯丁在解决三位一体的理解问题时提出的“你们要是不信,定然不得理解”。安瑟伦将其表述为“信仰寻求理解”。“信仰寻求理解”不仅指出了寻求宗教真理的途径,而且渗透着深刻的哲学诠释学思想,甚至可以说在一定意义上开始了为后世精神科学的合法性的奠基。     

On Martin Luther's Statement, “Fides Creatrix Divinitatis”

Martin Luther's statement “faith creates divinity” depends upon the antecedent promise of the crucified and triune God. When considered as a theology of gift, this statement illustrates that faith makes divinity by giving God glory.     

Ratio reinforcement of matching behavior

Three pigeons, previously trained to a high level of accuracy on matching-to-sample procedures, were exposed to various schedules of ratio reinforcement for correct matches. Overall accuracy was lower on fixed ratio than on regular reinforcement. There was a high incidence of errors immediately after reinforcement on fixed ratio schedules with accuracy increasing as the ratio progressed. This increase was found to be inversely correlated with the latency of the observing response to the sample. By contrast, accuracy was high throughout the ratio on a variable ratio schedule.     

On Ratio Measures of Confirmation

There are different Bayesian measures to calculate the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis H in respect of a particular piece of evidence E. Zalabardo (Analysis 69:630–635, 2009) is a recent attempt to defend the likelihood-ratio measure (LR) against the probability-ratio measure (PR). The main disagreement between LR and PR concerns their sensitivity to prior probabilities. Zalabardo invokes intuitive plausibility as the appropriate criterion for choosing between them. Furthermore, he claims that it favours the ordering of pairs evidence/hypothesis generated by LR. We will argue, however, that the intuitive non-numerical example provided by Zalabardo does not show that prior probabilities do not affect the degree of confirmation. On account of this, we conclude that there is no compelling reason to endorse LR qua measure of degree of confirmation. On the other side, we should not forget some technicalities which still benefit PR.     

Ratio scales of acid sourness

Experiments were conducted to assess the relation between concentration, or pH, and the perceived sourness of 24 acids. The psychophysical functions for sourness conform to the power relation S = kCⁿ which relates sensory intensity, S, to physical concentration, C. Averaged across the 24 acids, the exponent for sourness was 0.85 for both molar and percentage concentrations, and about ?1.70 for pH concentration. The intercept, k, which is a measure of relative sourness, differed across acids. The particular measure used to designate the concentration of an acid markedly influenced its magnitude and rank order of sourness.     

Ratio scales of sugar sweetness

In a series of 10 experiments, groups of Os judged the sweetness of 16 sugars. The results suggest that, for all sugars except mannose, the intensity of sweetness grows as a power function of concentration, with an exponent of about 1.3. The relative sweetness of sugars was determined using both molarity and per cent by weight. With both measures, sucrose and fructose were the sweetest sugars. The order of the remaining sugars in the sweetness hierarchy was partiy a function of the measure of concentration. The variability of the magnitude estimates of sweetness was roughly proportional to the stimulus concentration, supporting Weber’s law.     

Test of the Ratio Judgment Hypothesis

The hypothesis that we are capable of judging ratios of subjective intensities is widely used in psychology. Here, experimental results are reported that more stringently verify prior findings that people respond to sensory intensity differences while they execute the task of judging sensory intensity ratios. This verification was made on brightness and heaviness and for verbal and matching responses, suggesting that the results may be general for both sensory intensive dimensions and response systems. The results have implications for the comparisons of scores on evaluation scales based on ratio judgment.     

Human Performance Under Progressive Ratio Contingencies

The Psychological Record - Ten human subjects experienced a progressive ratio schedule under three different reinforcement conditions; (a) 20-point increments on a computer screen for each ratio...     

Ratio abstraction by 6-month-old infants

Human infants appear to be capable of the rudimentary mathematical operations of addition, subtraction, and ordering. To determine whether infants are capable of extracting ratios, we presented 6-month-old infants with multiple examples of a single ratio. After repeated presentations of this ratio, the infants were presented with new examples of a new ratio, as well as new examples of the previously habituated ratio. Infants were able to successfully discriminate two ratios that differed by a factor of 2, but failed to detect the difference between two numerical ratios that differed by a factor of 1.5. We conclude that infants can extract a common ratio across test scenes and use this information while examining new displays. The results support an approximate magnitude-estimation system, which has also been found in animals and human adults.     

On the Ratio Challenge for Comparativism

This paper discusses a challenge for comparativists about belief, who hold that numerical degree of belief (in particular, subjective probability) is a useful fiction, unlike comparative belief, which they regard as real. The challenge is to make sense of claims like ‘I am twice as confident in A as in B’ in terms of comparative belief only. After showing that at least some comparativists can meet this challenge, I discuss implications for Zynda's [2000] and Stefánsson's [2017] defences of comparativism.     

Signifique et linguistique

Sans résuméCommunication faite à la seconde Conférence de Linguistique Psychologique (Naarden, Pays-Bas, 1946).