The BDNF Val66Met polymorphism impacts victim's moral emotions following interpersonal transgression

Immoral behaviors make individuals abominate and punish transgressors. Inspired by the associations between the Val66Met polymorphism of brain‐derived neurotropic factor (BDNF) gene and emotional responses following negative events, we investigated whether this polymorphism was also associated moral emotions such as punishment and forgiveness following interpersonal transgression. To do so, we categorized 340 individuals according to the BDNF Val66Met and assessed moral emotions by using 12 hypothetic scenarios in different conditions of intention and interpersonal consequence. The results indicated that this polymorphism was significantly associated with moral aversion and punishment towards transgressors. Victims with the Val/Val genotype expressed less aversion and punishment than the Met carriers, regardless of intention and interpersonal consequence. Moreover, this polymorphism was associated with forgiveness. Victims with the Val/Val genotype expressed more forgiveness than the Met carriers. Taken together, these findings highlight the importance of the BDNF Val66Met to moral emotions.     

The Expressivist Account of Punishment, Retribution, and the Emotions

This paper provides a discussion of the role that emotions may play in the justification of punishment. On the expressivist account of punishment, punishment has the purpose of expressing appropriate emotional reactions to wrongdoing, such as indignation, resentment or guilt. I will argue that this expressivist approach fails as these emotions can be expressed other than through the infliction of punishment. Another argument for hard treatment put forward by expressivists states that punitive sanctions are necessary in order for the law to be valid. But this justification of punishment, too, is unconvincing. There are no good reasons to assume that we have to resort to punitive measures in order to vindicate the law. I will then raise the more general worry whether there is any intelligible link at all between moral emotions such as indignation, resentment or guilt and retributive behaviour. I will finally conclude with some sceptical remarks on the moral worth of retribution.     

Punitive emotions and norm violations

The recent literature on social norms has stressed the centrality of emotions in explaining punishment and norm enforcement. This article discusses four negative emotions (righteous anger, indignation, contempt, and disgust) and examines their relationship to punitive behavior. I argue that righteous anger and indignation are both punitive emotions strictly speaking, but induce punishments of different intensity and have distinct elicitors. Contempt and disgust, for their part, cannot be straightforwardly considered punitive emotions, although they often blend with a colder form of indignation to favor low-cost, indirect, and collective forms of punishment such as mockery, exclusion, and ostracism.     

Weight Stigmatization Moderates the Effects of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage-Related PSAs Among U.S. Parents

Research indicates that media campaigns targeting weight-related behaviors can make overweight individuals feel stigmatized and may create backlash effects in weight-related health behavior. Using weight-based identity threat theory as a guiding framework, this study investigates the role of prior weight stigmatization in adults’ reactions to public service advertisements (PSAs) encouraging sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) reduction. In an online survey experiment among 807 U.S. parents, participants were randomly assigned to view anti-SSB PSAs containing one of three persuasive appeals (fear, humor, or nurturance). Emotional responses, evaluation of argument strength, and intention to reduce SSB consumption were measured following PSA exposure. Non-stigmatized parents felt less empowerment and hope and perceived weaker arguments if they viewed humorous PSAs instead of fear-based PSAs. Argument strength and empowerment or hopeful emotions predicted increased intention to reduce SSB consumption, regardless of whether participants had been stigmatized. There was weak support for the moderation of emotional responses on intentions by stigmatization history such that negative emotions were associated with lower SSB-reduction intentions only among stigmatized participants. Experiences of stigmatization can shape audiences’ responses to health-related messages in unintended ways. The findings suggest that campaign designers should choose empowering messages with strong arguments and avoid evoking negative emotions.     

The Evolution of Retribution: Intuitions Undermined

Recent empirical work suggests that emotions are responsible for anti‐consequentialist intuitions. For instance, anger places value on actions of revenge and retribution, value not derived from the consequences of these actions. As a result, it contributes to the development of retributive intuitions. I argue that if anger evolved to produce these retributive intuitions because of their biological consequences, then these intuitions are not a good indicator that punishment has value apart from its consequences. This severs the evidential connection between retributive intuitions and the retributive value of punishment. This argument may generalize to other deontological intuitions and theories.     

Socialization of Emotion and Offspring Internalizing Symptoms in Mothers with Childhood-Onset Depression

This study examines how mothers with and without a history of childhood-onset depression respond to their 3-9 year-old children's emotions. Mother-child dyads included 55 offspring of mothers with a history of childhood-onset depressive disorders and 57 offspring of never-depressed mothers. Mothers with a history of childhood depression were less likely than control mothers to respond in supportive ways to their children's negative emotions and were more likely to magnify, punish, or neglect their children's negative emotions. Magnification, neglect, and punishment of children's negative emotions were concurrently associated with children's internalizing symptoms, and neglect and punishment were associated with internalizing over a one year follow-up. Maternal neglect of children's negative emotion was positively associated with later internalizing symptoms for children who already had higher internalizing symptoms at the initial assessment. Findings suggest that atypical socialization of emotion may be one mechanism in the development of internalizing disorders.     

Emotional Justification

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non‐basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties.     

Locke's Essay, Book I: The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments

In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) "the Awareness Principle", viz. , the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments' dependence on this principle is question begging on two counts. Unless this principle is defended, Locke's arguments beg the question against Descartes and Leibniz because their nativism implies the denial of the Awareness Principle. And even when Locke defended the principle, his arguments remain question begging because they presuppose the empiricism they aim to prove. The disclosure of the question-begging status of these arguments debunks a seemingly powerful way of attacking nativism.     

前瞻性情绪作为社会风险的信息源假说：公共场景下风险决策的情绪及文化机制探讨

本研究从梳理决策的情绪理论入手, 在综合几种主要理论的基础上提出了“前瞻性情绪作为社会风险信息源”的假说。前瞻性情绪是在决策过程中产生的, 由于对决策选择的预期而感受到的, 进而影响决策行为的情绪。社会环境下的风险事件具有突发和稍纵即逝的特征, 如果一个公民对这类风险事件做出反应, 其结果的概率难于量化。在这种情况下, 前瞻性情绪能够为决策者快速提供有关信息, 并形成对决策预期结果严重性和可能性的综合表征, 从而成为公众场景下风险决策的有效线索。不同前瞻性情绪的组合在面对社会性风险事件时具有针对性的作用。近年来在文化比较中对于面子、荣誉和尊严文化的划分, 也为我们研究文化的情绪特征和行为效应提供了理论框架。本研究拟通过四项研究和多个实验探讨前瞻性情绪如何影响公众场景下人们的风险应对行为, 并对三种文化的情绪特征进行比较, 探索情绪性决策中个人因素、群体因素、及文化因素如何共同决定公共场景下风险决策(如亲社会行为或反社会行为)的发生与发展, 同时也期望为公共政策的制定及风险管理提供科学依据。     

Dispelling a few false-positives: A reply to MacGregor and McNamee on doping

McGregor and MacNamee recently, in this journal, offered several criticisms of an earlier article in which I attempted to refute a number of arguments for the claim that doping in sports is morally wrong. Their criticisms are numerous, but focus on four domains. First, they sketch a view on which the risk profiles of different sports may make doping permissible in some and impermissible in others. Second, they suggest that my criticisms of safety-based arguments assume that doping opponents are bent on harm elimination, rather than harm management. Finally, they offer two methodological criticisms, the first pertaining to my use of analogical arguments, and the second pertaining to the general difficulties of making revisionist arguments in ethics. I defend my criticisms of safety-based arguments by showing that these do not rest on the assumptions McGregor and MacNamee attribute to me and by noting that their own view about the variable relevance of safety considerations is underdeveloped. As for their methodological arguments, I endeavor to show that these are misplaced, in that they either rest on misinterpretations of my earlier article or on an excessively high standard for ethical argumentation.     

Social Emotions and Intertemporal Choice: "Hot" Mechanisms for Building Social and Economic Capital

ABSTRACT— Individuals regularly confront situations in which acceptance of short-term costs may lead to long-term gains. Given that individuals frequently discount the utility of future benefits with respect to more immediate ones, successfully solving such intertemporal choice dilemmas has been theorized to involve self-regulation aimed at controlling emotional responses that are sensitive to immediate rewards. In this article, I argue for a more multifaceted view of the role played by emotions in intertemporal choice. In support of this view, I review emerging evidence demonstrating the ability of specific, socially oriented emotions to facilitate behaviors designed to build social and economic capital in the long run.     

Are there basic emotions?

Ortony and Turner's (1990) arguments against those who adopt the view that there are basic emotions are challenged. The evidence on universals in expression and in physiology strongly suggests that there is a biological basis to the emotions that have been studied. Ortony and Turner's reviews of this literature are faulted, and their alternative theoretical explanations do not fit the evidence. The utility of the basic emotions approach is also shown in terms of the research it has generated.     

Intergenerational Transmission of Emotion Dysregulation Through Parental Invalidation of Emotions: Implications for Adolescent Internalizing and Externalizing Behaviors

We examined parent emotion dysregulation as part of a model of family emotion-related processes and adolescent psychopathology. Participants were 80 parent–adolescent dyads (mean age = 13.6; 79 % African-American and 17 % Caucasian) with diverse family composition and socioeconomic status. Parent and adolescent dyads self-reported on their emotion regulation difficulties and adolescents reported on their perceptions of parent invalidation (i.e., punishment and neglect) of emotions and their own internalizing and externalizing behaviors. Results showed that parents who reported higher levels of emotion dysregulation tended to invalidate their adolescent’s emotional expressions more often, which in turn related to higher levels of adolescent emotion dysregulation. Additionally, adolescent-reported emotion dysregulation mediated the relation between parent invalidation of emotions and adolescent internalizing and externalizing behaviors. Potential applied implications are discussed.     

母亲情绪调节与幼儿情绪理解能力:母亲应对方式的中介作用

对258名幼儿进行情绪理解能力任务测查,其母亲完成情绪调节方式问卷和应对幼儿消极情绪问卷,探讨母亲情绪调节方式、母亲对幼儿消极情绪的反应方式和幼儿情绪理解能力之间的关系。结果表明,幼儿情绪理解能力随年龄增长而提高,女孩情绪理解能力高于男孩。母亲对幼儿消极情绪更多采用情感关注和问题解决,惩罚反应最少,母亲对男孩的消极情绪表现出更多的惩罚反应,对女孩表现出更多的情感关注。母亲鼓励表达在其情绪调节方式和幼儿情绪理解能力之间有中介作用。     

Why emotion recognition is not simulational

According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the current body of empirical evidence suggests that emotion recognition is processed in an integrative system involving multiple cross-regional interactions in the brain, a view which squares with understanding emotion recognition as an information-rich, rather than simulational, process. In the final section, I discuss possible objections.     

On the Risks of Recycling Because of Guilt: An Examination of the Consequences of Introjection1

The present study sought to examine the influence of introjected beliefs on individuals’ vulnerability to counterattitudinal arguments. University students’ reasons for engaging in proenvironmental behaviors were assessed prior to their reading excerpts from a counterattitudinal article. The excerpts were written by a personally attractive or unattractive author and contained either weak or strong arguments against recycling. Our results show that individuals who were highly introjected about recycling (e.g., “I recycle because I would feel guilty if I didn't”) were influenced by the personal attractiveness of the source but not by the strength of the specific arguments. Specifically, a thought‐listing procedure revealed that introjection was associated with generating more favorable thoughts and fewer counterarguments about the anti‐recycling message when the author was personally attractive than when he was unattractive.     

A Daily Diary Investigation of the Defective Self Model Among College Students With Recent Self-Injury

The Defective Self Model of self-injury (Hooley, Ho, Slater, & Lockshin, 2010) asserts that individuals choose to self-injure to gratify the desire for self-punishment associated with a self-critical cognitive style. Specifically, self-injury is used to regulate negative self-directed thoughts and emotions and is made accessible via the belief that the individual deserves punishment. This study sought to test primary assumptions of the Defective Self Model using a 2-week daily diary protocol. It was hypothesized that trait self-criticism would predict daily self-injury urge intensity and behaviors directly, as well as indirectly, through daily thoughts about deserving punishment. We also posited that guilt would predict self-injury urge intensity and behaviors beyond sadness, hostility, and fear. Support for primary hypotheses was mixed. Self-criticism did not directly predict self-injury outcomes, but did indirectly predict urge intensity through daily thoughts about punishment. Daily guilt predicted self-injury urge intensity beyond daily sadness, hostility and fear and was the only type of negative affect associated with self-injury behavior. Results are primarily contextualized through a social cognitive lens in which self-injury urge is precipitated by the activation of a self-critical schema in daily life. Alternatively, self-criticism may serve as a gateway to initial self-injury but lack the sensitivity to predict individual self-injury episodes. Treatments designed to reduce self-critical thoughts and bolster self-compassion may decrease self-injury urge intensity, thereby affecting the frequency of self-injury episodes.     

The Non‐Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves

According to the ‘One Object’ reading of Kant's transcendental idealism, the distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself is not a distinction between two objects, but between two ways of considering one and the same object. On the ‘Metaphysical’ version of the One Object reading, it is a distinction between two kinds of properties possessed by one and the same object. Consequently, the Metaphysical One Object view holds that a given appearance, an empirical object, is numerically identical to the thing in itself that appears as that object. I raise various indiscernibility arguments against that view; because an appearance has different spatiotemporal and modal properties than a thing in itself, no appearance can be identical to a thing in itself. I point out that these arguments are similar to arguments against Monism, the view that material objects are numerically identical to the matter of which they are made. I outline some strategies Monists have developed to respond to these indiscernibility arguments and then develop parallel responses on behalf of the Metaphysical One Object view. However, I then raise another indiscernibility argument, to which, I argue, the Metaphysical One Object view cannot respond, even using the resources I have developed thus far. I develop a modified version of the Metaphysical One Object view that can respond to this new indiscernibility argument, but, I argue, this modified version of the One Object view is only a terminological variant of the Two Object view. When the Metaphysical One Object view is fully thought through it becomes the Two Object view. I conclude that Kantian appearances are not numerically identical to the things in themselves that appear to us.     

Schopenhauer's Pessimism

My purpose in this essay is to clarify and evaluate Arthur Schopenhauer's grounds for the view that happiness is impossible. I shall distinguish two of his arguments for that view and argue that both of them are unsound. Both arguments involve premises grounded on a problematic view, namely, that desires have no objects. What makes this view problematic is that, in each of the two arguments, it conflicts with Schopenhauer's grounds for other premises in the argument. I shall then propose a way of fixing both arguments. The solution involves substituting the view that desires have no objects with the view that we have a desire to have desires. The latter view, I shall argue, can do the grounding work that the former does in Schopenhauer's arguments but, unlike it, the view that we desire to desire is consistent with Schopenhauer's grounds for the rest of premises in those arguments.     

The effect of vicarious punishment on prosocial behavior in children

Two experiments are reported dealing with the effects of vicarious punishment on prosocial behavior. In Experiment I, first and second grade females who witnessed a peer model being punished for a refusal to share (“nonsharing, punished”), shared more than an appropriate control group. Sharing was similarly heightened, however, in a group who witnessed punishment to the model which was not contingent upon any specific behavior (“punishment only”). Experiment II tested and confirmed the hypothesis derived from Experiment I that noncontingent vicarious punishment has a generalized inhibitory effect on antisocial behaviors. First, second, and third grade females were shown either the “nonsharing, punished,” “punishment only,” or baseline videotapes used in Experiment I. Subsequent to viewing the tapes, subjects in the “punishment only” condition helped the experimenter significantly more than did subjects in the “nonsharing, punished” and baseline conditions. The ability of existing theoretical treatments of vicarious punishment to account for these results is questioned.