The influence of degree of expertise and objective task complexity on perceived task complexity and performance

Research on expertise has shown that nonexperts may sometimes outperform experts. Some researchers have suggested that superior performance by experts depends on the match between the experts' cognition and the demands of the task. The authors explored this issue using a quasi-experiment set in an organization. They examined how 3 sets of similar tasks that differ in their type of complexity can lead to differences in task perceptions and performance among experts, intermediates, and novices. The results suggest that experts and novices pay attention to different aspects of a task and that this affects both their perceptions of task complexity (i.e., task analyzability and variability) and their performance on the task.     

Cognitive advantage in sport: the nature of perceptual structures

To extend and clarify the nature of the perceptual processes used by sport experts to perceive schematic sport information, two experiments used schematic football diagrams that varied in structure (structured vs. unstructured) and complexity (complex vs. easy). The primary objective was to examine and characterize the nature of the perceptual structures (chunks) that are initially encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved. In Experiment 1, compared with nonexperts, experts recalled larger perceptual structures following the initial stimulus presentation of structured stimuli only, replicating the recall findings of previous research in other skill domains. Experiment 2 used a long-term memory recognition task and a sorting task. Experts had superior recall and recognition of structured stimuli only, along with more discriminating sorting criteria of perceptual structures within long-term memory. This suggests that experts possess a highly refined semantic network or organized, structured schematic information. This research extends and clarifies the similarities between the perceptual processes of experts in sport (i.e., football) and experts in skill domains that require obvious cognitive involvement (i.e., chess). The results are discussed with reference to the perceptual and conceptual chunking hypotheses. It is proposed that sport experts' knowledge of a conceptual category enables them to retrieve elements using a "generate-and-test process."     

The relationship between expertise and evaluative extremity: the moderating role of experts' task characteristics

Past research has yielded contradictory results with regard to the relationship between expertise and evaluative extremity. The authors suggest that this apparent contradiction is due to the task characteristics of the expert activity. The primary task of certain experts is to formulate overall (configural) judgments and to generate clear, unambiguous answers. These experts tend to give relatively extreme evaluations. Other experts generally communicate the implications of the different choice alternatives and explain featural aspects of the stimuli. These experts are characterized by relatively moderate evaluations. The research reported in this article shows that experts whose expert activity involves configural judgments tend to make more extreme evaluations than experts who generally provide others with featural explanations. It also demonstrates that experts' task characteristics affect the way they store stimulus-relevant attributes in memory.     

How Experts Adapt Their Gaze Behavior When Modeling a Task to Novices

Domain experts regularly teach novice students how to perform a task. This often requires them to adjust their behavior to the less knowledgeable audience and, hence, to behave in a more didactic manner. Eye movement modeling examples (EMMEs) are a contemporary educational tool for displaying experts’ (natural or didactic) problem-solving behavior as well as their eye movements to learners. While research on expert-novice communication mainly focused on experts’ changes in explicit, verbal communication behavior, it is as yet unclear whether and how exactly experts adjust their nonverbal behavior. This study first investigated whether and how experts change their eye movements and mouse clicks (that are displayed in EMMEs) when they perform a task naturally versus teach a task didactically. Programming experts and novices initially debugged short computer codes in a natural manner. We first characterized experts’ natural problem-solving behavior by contrasting it with that of novices. Then, we explored the changes in experts’ behavior when being subsequently instructed to model their task solution didactically. Experts became more similar to novices on measures associated with experts’ automatized processes (i.e., shorter fixation durations, fewer transitions between code and output per click on the run button when behaving didactically). This adaptation might make it easier for novices to follow or imitate the expert behavior. In contrast, experts became less similar to novices for measures associated with more strategic behavior (i.e., code reading linearity, clicks on run button) when behaving didactically.     

They do what they are told to do: the influence of instruction on (chess) expert perception-commentary on linhares and brum (2007)

Linhares and Brum (2007) argue that they provide evidence for analogy as the main principle behind experts' acquisition of perceptual knowledge. However, the methodology they used—asking players to pair positions using abstract similarity—raises the possibility that the task reflects more the effect of directional instructions than the principles underlying the acquisition of knowledge. Here we replicate and extend Linhares and Brum's experiment and show that the matching task they used is inadequate for drawing any conclusions about the nature of experts' perception. When expert chess players were instructed to match problems based on similarities at the abstract level (analogy), they produced more abstract pairs than pairs based on concrete similarity. However, the same experts produced more concrete pairs than abstract ones when instructed to match the problems based on concrete similarity. Asking experts to match problems using explicit instructions is not an appropriate way to show the importance of either analogy or similarity in the acquisition of expert knowledge. Experts simply do what they are told to do.     

Inflexibility of experts--reality or myth? Quantifying the Einstellung effect in chess masters

How does the knowledge of experts affect their behaviour in situations that require unusual methods of dealing? One possibility, loosely originating in research on creativity and skill acquisition, is that an increase in expertise can lead to inflexibility of thought due to automation of procedures. Yet another possibility, based on expertise research, is that experts' knowledge leads to flexibility of thought. We tested these two possibilities in a series of experiments using the Einstellung (set) effect paradigm. Chess players tried to solve problems that had both a familiar but non-optimal solution and a better but less familiar one. The more familiar solution induced the Einstellung (set) effect even in experts, preventing them from finding the optimal solution. The presence of the non-optimal solution reduced experts' problem solving ability was reduced to about that of players three standard deviations lower in skill level by the presence of the non-optimal solution. Inflexibility of thought induced by prior knowledge (i.e., the blocking effect of the familiar solution) was shown by experts but the more expert they were, the less prone they were to the effect. Inflexibility of experts is both reality and myth. But the greater the level of expertise, the more of a myth it becomes.     

Expertise and the perception of kinematic and situational probability information

Two experiments were conducted on the nature of expert perception in the sport of squash. In the first experiment, ten expert and fifteen novice players attempted to predict the direction and force of squash strokes from either a film display (occluded at variable time periods before and after the opposing player had struck the ball) or a matched point-light display (containing only the basic kinematic features of the opponent's movement pattern). Experts out-performed the novices under both display conditions, and the same basic time windows that characterised expert and novice pick-up of information in the film task also persisted in the point-light task. This suggests that the experts' perceptual advantage is directly related to their superior pick-up of essential kinematic information. In the second experiment, the vision of six expert and six less skilled players was occluded by remotely triggered liquid-crystal spectacles at quasi-random intervals during simulated match play. Players were required to complete their current stroke even when the display was occluded and their prediction performance was assessed with respect to whether they moved to the correct half of the court to match the direction and depth of the opponent's stroke. Consistent with experiment 1, experts were found to be superior in their advance pick-up of both directional and depth information when the display was occluded during the opponent's hitting action. However, experts also remained better than chance, and clearly superior to less skilled players, in their prediction performance under conditions where occlusion occurred before any significant pre-contact preparatory movement by the opposing player was visible. This additional source of expert superiority is attributable to their superior attunement to the information contained in the situational probabilities and sequential dependences within their opponent's pattern of play.     

Forecasting outcomes of the World Cup 2006 in football: Performance and confidence of bettors and laypeople

ObjectivesMotivated by a paucity of research on sports forecasting, this paper examines how well individuals with varying degrees of relevant knowledge predict football (soccer) and how much confidence they have in their predictions.Design and procedureThree groups of participants (110 art students, 81 sports students, and 85 bettors) representing three levels of knowledge (poor, moderate, and expert) performed five forecasting tasks with relation to the outcome of the first round of the World Cup 2006. The tasks were assumed to reflect different degrees of complexity. About half of the participants obtained relevant information (world rankings). The participants stated their confidence in connection to conducting those tasks.ResultsWhereas the groups had roughly similar levels of performance in three tasks (i.e., predicting the teams qualifying for the second round as well as two types of match statistics), the knowledgeable and expert participants were better at predicting scores and percentage of ball possession in the matches than the naïve participants. Relatively few participants performed better than the simple rule that followed world rankings. Regardless of task complexity, the knowledgeable and expert participants were found to be significantly more confident about their forecasts than the naïve participants. Access to information had limited influence on forecasting performance and confidence.ConclusionThe present study shows that the forecasting performance of football experts and laypeople varies dependent on task. For easy tasks, they tend to predict equally well, partly because laypeople might use well-adapted heuristics. Once the prediction tasks become more difficult, the experts may take advantage of their domain-specific skills and produce forecasts that excel those of the laypeople.     

Confidence in aggregation of expert opinions

We investigate the case of a single decision maker (DM) who obtains probabilistic forecasts regarding the occurrence of a unique target event from J distinct, symmetric, and equally diagnostic expert advisors (judges). The paper begins with a mathematical model of DM's aggregation process of expert opinions, in which confidence in the final aggregate is shown to be inversely related to its perceived variance. As such, confidence is expected to vary as a function of factors such as the number of experts, the total number of cues, the fraction of cues available to each expert, the level of inter-expert overlap in information, and the range of experts' opinions. In the second part of the paper, we present results from two experiments that support the main (ordinal) predictions of the model.     

Network approaches for expert decisions in sports

This paper focuses on a model comparison to explain choices based on gaze behavior via simulation procedures. We tested two classes of models, a parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) artificial neuronal network model and an accumulator model in a handball decision-making task from a lab experiment. Both models predict action in an option-generation task in which options can be chosen from the perspective of a playmaker in handball (i.e., passing to another player or shooting at the goal). Model simulations are based on a dataset of generated options together with gaze behavior measurements from 74 expert handball players for 22 pieces of video footage. We implemented both classes of models as deterministic vs. probabilistic models including and excluding fitted parameters. Results indicated that both classes of models can fit and predict participants' initially generated options based on gaze behavior data, and that overall, the classes of models performed about equally well. Early fixations were thereby particularly predictive for choices. We conclude that the analyses of complex environments via network approaches can be successfully applied to the field of experts' decision making in sports and provide perspectives for further theoretical developments.     

AUTOMATIC STEREOTYPING

Abstract— Two experiments tested a form of automatic stereotyping Subjects saw primes related to gender (e g, mother, father, nurse, doctor ) or neutral with respect to gender (e g, parent, student, person ) followed by target pronouns (stimulus onset asynchrony = 300 ms) that Mere gender related (e g, she, he ) or neutral ( it, me ) or followed by nonpronouns ( do. alt , Experiment 2 only) In Experiment I, subjects judged whether each pronoun was male or female Automatic gender beliefs (stereotypes) were observed in faster responses to pronouns consistent than inconsistent with the gender component of the prime regardless of subjects' awareness of the prime-target relation, and independently of subjects explicit beliefs about gender stereotypes and language reform In Experiment 2, automatic stereotyping was obtained even though a gender irrelevant judgment task (pronoun/not pronoun) was used Together, these experiments demonstrate that gender information imparted by words can automatically influence judgment, although the strength of such effects may be moderated by judgment task and prime type.     

Modeling drivers' visual attention allocation while interacting with in-vehicle technologies

In 2 experiments, the authors examined how characteristics of a simulated traffic environment and in-vehicle tasks impact driver performance and visual scanning and the extent to which a computational model of visual attention (SEEV model) could predict scanning behavior. In Experiment 1, the authors manipulated task-relevant information bandwidth and task priority. In Experiment 2, the authors examined task bandwidth and complexity, while introducing infrequent traffic hazards. Overall, task priority had a significant impact on scanning; however, the impact of increasing bandwidth was varied, depending on whether the relevant task was supported by focal (e.g., in-vehicle tasks; increased scanning) or ambient vision (e.g., lane keeping; no increase in scanning). The computational model accounted for approximately 95% of the variance in scanning across both experiments.     

Scientists' Uncertainty and Disagreement about Global Climate Change: A Psychological Perspective

Since there are major gaps in scientific knowledge about the greenhouse effect, policy makers are forced to rely on scientists' judgments about the rate of climate change and its effects. It now appears that significant policy decisions will have to be made despite continuing uncertainty and disagreement among scientists. The best that policy makers can do is look for guidance in the best available expert judgment. But when the best experts express great uncertainty and disagree, as seems to be the case with the greenhouse effect, policy makers are unsure about how to proceed. Despite its importance, scientific judgment about the greenhouse effect has not been systematically studied. Psychological research on expert judgment and decision making provides theory, methods, and empirical results that can be used to study judgments based on uncertain and incomplete data and can help to explain the sources of expert uncertainty and disagreement regarding the greenhouse effect. Possible explanations are discussed.     

The relation between body semantics and spatial body representations

The present study addressed the relation between body semantics (i.e. semantic knowledge about the human body) and spatial body representations, by presenting participants with word pairs, one below the other, referring to body parts. The spatial position of the word pairs could be congruent (e.g. EYE / MOUTH) or incongruent (MOUTH / EYE) with respect to the spatial position of the words’ referents. In addition, the spatial distance between the words’ referents was varied, resulting in word pairs referring to body parts that are close (e.g. EYE / MOUTH) or far in space (e.g. EYE / FOOT). A spatial congruency effect was observed when subjects made an iconicity judgment (Experiments 2 and 3) but not when making a semantic relatedness judgment (Experiment 1). In addition, when making a semantic relatedness judgment (Experiment 1) reaction times increased with increased distance between the body parts but when making an iconicity judgment (Experiments 2 and 3) reaction times decreased with increased distance. These findings suggest that the processing of body-semantics results in the activation of a detailed visuo-spatial body representation that is modulated by the specific task requirements. We discuss these new data with respect to theories of embodied cognition and body semantics.     

Expertise and hierarchical knowledge representation in chess

Summary In two experiments the structure of knowledge representation in chess experts and average players was examined. Pattern-recognition theory explains expertise through the existence of many small, unrelated knowledge units. Recent research stresses the structure of knowledge representations. However, the standard paradigm does not allow for the detection of relations between chunks; the theoretical shift has to be accompanied by a methodological shift. In Experiment 1, by means of a partitioning task, evidence was provided for a hierarchical representation of chess positions. Chess masters formed larger and more complex knowledge units than average players. In Experiment 2, the typicality of the positions was varied. The more typical the positions were, the larger and more coherent the constructed knowledge units were. The greatest differences between both groups occurred in more typical positions. This reflects the experts' ability to relate several knowledge units with one another.     

The role of temporal unpredictability for process interference and code overlap in perception-action dual tasks

Two experiments explore interference in dual tasks. The first task required perceptual judgment of the movement direction (left vs right) of a briefly presented stimulus; the second task was a tone-discrimination reaction-time (RT) task. Participants reported their judgment at leisure. In 50% of the trials they were told to ignore the stimulus (no report). The directions of stimulus movement and response in the RT task could either be the same or different, establishing cross-task compatibility (CTC) relations. We varied the degree of temporal unpredictability by using two stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOA, 100 ms vs 1200 ms) for the task stimuli. In Experiment 1, SOA was varied randomly within blocks of trials in one group and between blocks in another group. In Experiment 2, only the short SOA was used in one group and only the long SOA in another group. In both experiments, we observed substantially longer RTs with the short compared with the long SOA, regardless of whether there was temporal certainty (blocked or constant SOA) or uncertainty (random SOA) about stimulus onset. We assume that the process of encoding into short-term memory in one task interferes with concurrent retrieval processes (i.e., response selection) in the other task. This process interference effect was strongly reduced in no-report trials. Furthermore, we found shorter RT in compatible than in incompatible trials. This CTC effect diminished with long SOA but occurred even in no-report trials, implying that it refers to an automatically activated and then decaying code that primes response selection in the RT task.     

Diagnostic classification by experts and novices.

The present study examines differences between experts and novices in classifying symptoms and the effect of the nature of the task on classifying. The study involved three groups of subjects, two expert groups (n = 12, n = 10) and one novice group (n = 12). Thinking-aloud protocols were collected for two classification tasks: sorting of behavioural symptoms into predefined categories and intuitive clustering of behavioural symptoms. In a third task, experts and novices were asked to make typicality ratings of behavioural symptoms. The protocols were analyzed with respect to seven cognitive operations: (a) asking or giving information, (b) associating, (c) abstracting or labelling, (d) explaining, (e) neutral matching, (f) identifying, and (g) differentiating. Results showed an effect of experience and an effect of the task on the relative frequencies of these operations. No differences were found in typicality rating of experts versus novices. These contradictory findings are discussed in relation to Kolodner's model about the evolution of expertise.     

Evidential diversity and premise probability in young children's inductive judgment

A familiar adage in the philosophy of science is that general hypotheses are better supported by varied evidence than by uniform evidence. Several studies suggest that young children do not respect this principle, and thus suffer from a defect in their inductive methodology. We argue that the diversity principle does not have the normative status that psychologists attribute to it, and should be replaced by a simple rule of probability. We then report experiments designed to detect conformity to the latter rule in children's inductive judgment. The results suggest that young children in both the United States and Taiwan are sensitive to the constraints imposed by the rule on judgments of probability and evidential strength. We conclude with a suggested reinterpretation of the thesis that children's inductive methodology qualifies them as “little scientists.”     

The effect of expertise on collaborative problem solving

Why do some groups succeed where others fail? We hypothesise that collaborative success is achieved when the relationship between the dyad's prior expertise and the complexity of the task creates a situation that affords constructive and interactive processes between group members. We call this state the zone of proximal facilitation in which the dyad's prior knowledge and experience enables them to benefit from both knowledge-based problem-solving processes (e.g., elaboration, explanation, and error correction) andcollaborative skills (e.g., creating common ground, maintaining joint attention to the task). To test this hypothesis we conducted an experiment in which participants with different levels of aviation expertise, experts (flight instructors), novices (student pilots), and non-pilots, read flight problem scenarios of varying complexity and had to identify the problem and generate a solution with either another participant of the same level of expertise or alone. The non-pilots showed collaborative inhibition on problem identification in which dyads performed worse than their predicted potential for both simple and complex scenarios, whereas the novices and experts did not. On solution generation the non-pilot and novice dyads performed at their predicted potential with no collaborative inhibition on either simple or complex scenarios. In contrast, expert dyads showed collaborative gains, withdyads performing above their predicted potential, but only for the complex scenarios. On simple scenarios the expert dyads showed collaborative inhibition and performed worse than their predicted potential. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of collaborative problem solving.     

Relative mislocalization of briefly presented stimuli in the retinal periphery

We studied the ability to localize flashed stimuli, using a relative judgment task. When observers are asked to localize the peripheral position of a probe with respect to the midposition of a spatially extended comparison stimulus, they tend to judge the probe as being more toward the periphery than is the midposition of the comparison stimulus. We report seven experiments in which this novel phenomenon was explored. They reveal that the mislocalization occurs only when the probe and the comparison stimulus are presented in succession, independent of whether the probe or the comparison stimulus comes first (Experiment 1). The size of the mislocalization is dependent on the stimulus onset asynchrony (Experiment 2) and on the eccentricity of presentation (Experiment 3). In addition, the illusion also occurs in an absolute judgment task, which links mislocalization with the general tendency to judge peripherally presented stimuli as being more foveal than they actually are (Experiment 4). The last three experiments reveal that relative mislocalization is affected by the amount of spatial extension of the comparison stimulus (Experiment 5) and by its structure (Experiments 6 and 7). This pattern of results allows us to evaluate possible explanations of the illusion and to relate it to comparable tendencies observed in eye movement behavior. It is concluded that the system in charge of the guidance of saccadic eye movements is also the system that provides the metric in perceived visual space.