The Moral Oracle’s Test

When presented with a situation involving an agent’s choice between alternative actions, a moral oracle says what the agent is allowed to do. The oracle bases her advice on some moral theory, but the nature of that theory is not known by us. The moral oracle’s test consists in determining whether a series of questions to the oracle can be so constructed that her answers will reveal which of two given types of theories she adheres to. The test can be applied to moral theories in order to determine if they differ in their recommendations for action. Based on this test, a terminology is developed to specify different forms and degrees of distinguishability between moral theories, or types of theories, in terms of their recommendations for action. In conclusion, the test is applied to consequentialism and utilitarianism.     

Crime and the elderly: a review of British and American research

Research into the victims of crime is of fairly recent origin and has been centred in America. However, a review of research into the experience of the elderly as the victims of crime, and their anxiety about crime, reveals a paradox. Numerous studies show that while the elderly are less likely to be the victims of crime than are the other age groups, they are among those who exhibit most anxiety over crime. The research is discussed in the context of theories of why the elderly appear as a low-risk group and in terms of an attempt to explain the paradox.     

Crime and the elderly: a review of British and American research

Research into the victims of crime is of fairly recent origin and has been centred in America. However, a review of research into the experience of the elderly as the victims of crime, and their anxiety about crime, reveals a paradox. Numerous studies show that while the elderly are less likely to be the victims of crime than are the other age groups, they are among those who exhibit most anxiety over crime. The research is discussed in the context of theories of why the elderly appear as a low-risk group and in terms of an attempt to explain the paradox.     

Victim Blaming in Young, Middle-Aged, and Older Adults: Variations on the Severity Effect

It has been long known that people blame victims for the bad things that happen to them, and that people blame victims more when the victims experience severe difficulties than when they experience minor difficulties, even if the victims were not particularly irresponsible. Little previous research has examined victim blaming in middle-age and older adults. One hundred and forty-five adults in 3 age groups (18–34, 35–59, and 60–84) read 4 scenarios (2 accidents, 1 crime, and 1 fire) imbedded in other scenarios. The scenarios were varied so that the victim is either very irresponsible or not very irresponsible, and the outcome is mild or severe. The oldest group of participants blamed the victims more than the other groups. However, in contrast to the typical severity effect, the oldest group blamed the very irresponsible victim more when the outcome was mild than they did when the outcome was severe.     

Diamonds are a Philosopher's Best Friends

The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the unwanted disappearance of the diamond may be escaped. The emphasis is not laid on a discussion of the contentious premise of the knowability paradox, namely that all truths are possibly known, but on how from this assumption the conclusion is derived that all truths are, in fact, known. Nevertheless, the solution offered is in the spirit of the constructivist attitude usually maintained by defenders of the anti-realist premise. In order to avoid the paradoxical reasoning, a paraconsistent constructive relevant modal epistemic logic with strong negation is defined semantically. The system is axiomatized and shown to be complete.     

MISUNDERSTOOD IN THE DIASPORA: THE EXPERIENCE OF ORTHODOX SIKHS IN VANCOUVER

Heroism and martyrdom are central values in contemporary Sikh historiography and primary symbols in their collective memory. Both are replete with the stories of numerous heroes and martyrs who faced death, unflinchingly fighting in defense of the Sikh faith and its believers (constituting the Panth or community) against overwhelming odds. Conversely, it is considered shameful for Sikhs to become mere victims, succumbing to attacks against faith and community without fighting to the death. It is also insisted that true Sikhs do not themselves attack those who are weak or harmless; on the contrary true Sikhs come to the defense of such persons even if they are not of the same faith. However, during the last half century, Sikhs have many times become victims, as well as perpetrators of violence, being unable to act in a way consistent with their central values. The consequence has been an inability to integrate their modern history successfully into a narrative consistent with those values and to find appropriate ways of memorializing what has been done to many Sikhs and what many Sikhs have done to others.     

Intentions vs. resemblance: Understanding pictures in typical development and autism

Research has debated whether children reflect on artists’ intentions when comprehending pictures, or instead derive meaning entirely from resemblance. We explore these hypotheses by comparing how typically developing toddlers and low-functioning children with autism (a population impaired in intentional reasoning) interpret abstract pictures. In Experiment 1, both groups mapped familiar object names onto abstract pictures, however, they related the same representations to different 3-D referents. Toddlers linked abstract pictures with intended referents they did not resemble, while children with autism mapped picture-referent relations based on resemblance. Experiment 2 showed that toddlers do not rely upon linguistic cues to determine intended referential relations. Experiment 3 confirmed that the responding of children with autism was not due to perseveration or associative word learning, and also provided independent evidence of their intention-reading difficulties. We argue that typically developing children derive meaning from the social-communicative intentions underlying pictures when resemblance is an inadequate cue to meaning. By contrast, children with autism do not reflect on artists’ intentions and simply relate pictures to whatever they happen to resemble.     

Theism and Dialetheism

The divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence have faced objections to their very consistency. Such objections rely on reasoning parallel to semantic paradoxes such as the Liar or to set-theoretic paradoxes like Russell's paradox. With the advent of paraconsistent logics, dialetheism—the view that some contradictions are true—became a major player in the search for a solution to such paradoxes. This paper explores whether dialetheism, armed with the tools of paraconsistent logics, has the resources to respond to the objections levelled against the divine attributes.     

Don't fear the social relations model: reply to Piper, Ogrodniczuk, Lamarche, and Joyce

By studying actual therapy groups and using a sophisticated design to determine that clients who are held in higher esteem by their fellow group members show greater improvement over the course of therapy, Piper, Ogrodniczuk, Lamarche, and Joyce (this issue) have made a significant contribution to the group psychotherapy literature. Unfortunately, Piper et al. focused much of their discussion on the difficulties they faced using the social relations model (SRM) and the statistical program SOREMO. Although the SRM is not simple and it takes practice to run SOREMO, the analytic alternative proposed by Piper et al. has a number of serious limitations that prevents it from being a viable alternative. There is much to be gained from learning the SRM; for those group therapists and researchers who do not want to learn the SRM, they can always consult or collaborate with SRM researchers.     

Reasoning serves argumentation in children

The argumentative theory of reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, in press-c) claims that reasoning evolved for argumentation: to find and evaluate arguments in dialogic contexts. The theory has drawn most of its supportive evidence from work with adults, leaving open the possibility that argumentive features of reasoning are in fact entirely learned. Evidence is reviewed here suggesting that the special relation between reasoning and argumentation holds at all ages. More specifically, it is argued that (a) children possess at least rudimentary argument skills, (b) they are able to reap the benefits of social reasoning from very early on, (c) confirmation bias is present as soon as they start to argue, and (d) children can be victims of the same biases that affect adults when they use reasoning in the wrong contexts. These claims strengthen the argumentative theory of reasoning and support a call for more research on the interactive features of reasoning in both adults and children.     

Relationship of Long Term Effects of Childhood Sexual Abuse to Identity of the Offender

Sexual abuse is defined as the involvement of children and adolescents in sexual activities they do not fully comprehend and to which they do not freely consent. The long term effects of these violations of children have been described clinically. This study was initiated to demonstrate differences in emotional distress experienced by childhood victims of sexual abuse and their non-abused counterparts. Clinical records of 311 women were reviewed following termination from psychotherapy. Fifteen (15%) percent of the women indicated that they had been abused by a father, brother, grandfather, stepfather, friend, or stranger.     

Moore's Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief

Propositions such as are paradoxical, in that even though they can be true, they cannot be truly asserted or believed. This is Moore's paradox. Sydney Shoemaker has recently argued that the paradox arises from a constitutive relation that holds between first- and second-order beliefs. This paper explores this approach to the paradox. Although Shoemaker's own account of the paradox is rejected, a different account along similar lines is endorsed. At the core of the endorsed account is the claim that conscious beliefs are always partly about themselves; it will be shown to follow from this that conscious beliefs in Moorean propositions are self-contradictory.     

Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle

An important suggestion of objective Bayesians is that the maximum entropy principle can replace a principle which is known to get into paradoxical difficulties: the principle of indifference. No one has previously determined whether the maximum entropy principle is better able to solve Bertrand's chord paradox than the principle of indifference. In this paper I show that it is not. Additionally, the course of the analysis brings to light a new paradox, a revenge paradox of the chords, that is unique to the maximum entropy principle.     

在推理加工能力上学困生与学优生的比较研究

本研究采用模糊集论和信息论的方法,探讨了中小学学困生与学优生在不同记忆负荷条件下的推理加工。结果表明,学优生与学困生在高低两种记忆负荷条件下,已知信息的利用率和推理加工的效率都受到了影响。其中学困生的已知信息的利用率不如学优生,学困生的推理加工效率也不如学优生。     

People are more likely to be insincere when they are more likely to accidentally tell the truth

Although people lie often, and mostly for self-serving reasons, they do not lie as much as they could. The “fudge factor” hypothesis suggests that one reason for people not to lie is that they do not wish to self-identify as liars. Accordingly, self-serving lies should be more likely when they are less obvious to the liars themselves. Here we show that the likelihood of self-serving lies increases with the probability of accidentally telling the truth. Players in our game could transmit sincere or insincere recommendations to their competitors. In line with the fudge factor hypothesis, players lied when their beliefs were based on flimsy evidence and did not lie when their beliefs were based on solid evidence. This is the first demonstration of a new moral hypocrisy paradox: People are more likely to be insincere when they are more likely to accidentally tell the truth.     

艾勒悖论(Allais Paradox)另释

艾勒悖论违背了期望效用(Expected Utility)理论的独立性(independence)原则,成为欲推翻期望效用理论的杠杆。“齐当别”抉择模型不将风险决策行为看成是追求某种“最大期望值”的抉择反应,而将其看成是“最好可能结果之间的取舍”或者“最坏可能结果之间的取舍”。此项研究设计了一“判断”技术,并用此对艾勒设计的选择问题加以检验。实验表明,判断结果所示的“齐当别”策略能满意地对艾勒选择题作出解释。     

When Experts Argue: Explaining the Best and the Worst of Reasoning

Expert reasoning is responsible for some of the most stunning human achievements, but also for some of the most disastrous decisions ever made. The argumentative theory of reasoning has proven very effective at explaining the pattern of reasoning’s successes and failures. In the present article, it is expanded to account for expert reasoning. The argumentative theory predicts that reasoning should display a strong confirmation bias. If argument quality is not sufficiently high in a domain, the confirmation bias will make experts tap into their vast knowledge to defend whatever opinion they hold, with polarization and overconfidence as expected results. By contrast, experts should benefit even more from the power of group discussion to make the best of the confirmation bias—when they genuinely disagree that is, otherwise polarization is again likely to ensue. When experts interact with laymen other mechanisms can take the lead, in particular trust calibration and consistency checking. They can yield poor outcomes if experts do not have a sustained interaction with laymen, or if the laymen have strong opinions when they witness a debate between experts. Seeing reasoning as a mechanism of epistemic vigilance aimed at finding and evaluating arguments helps make better sense of expert reasoning performance, be it in individual ratiocination, in debates with other experts, or in interactions with laymen.