Cognitive control outside of conscious awareness

To test whether cognitive control can operate fully unconsciously on conflicts arising between two interfering subliminal stimuli, we designed a priming paradigm in which a subliminal reverse Color-Word Stroop item (a color word written on a congruent/incongruent color rectangle) preceded a supraliminal one in each trial. We found (a) a conflict adaptation effect, with a smaller reverse Stroop effect on the visible probe items after incongruent than after congruent subliminal prime items and (b) a negative priming effect, with longer reaction-times on incongruent visible probe items when the color word corresponded to the color of the rectangle in the preceding subliminal prime item than when it was not. These effects replicate the ones classically reported in studies using visible items and suggest that cognitive control was transferred from the subliminal prime to the visible probe items. Taken together, our results demonstrate that cognitive control can operate on conflicting subliminal information.     

Implicit sequence learning and conscious awareness

This paper uses the Process Dissociation Procedure to explore whether people can acquire unconscious knowledge in the serial reaction time task [Destrebecqz, A., & Cleeremans, A. (2001). Can sequence learning be implicit? New evidence with the Process Dissociation Procedure. Psychonomic Bulletin &Review, 8, 343-350; Wilkinson, L., & Shanks, D. R. (2004). Intentional control and implicit sequence learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 354-369]. Experiment 1 showed that people generated legal sequences above baseline levels under exclusion instructions. Reward moved exclusion performance towards baseline, indicating that the extent of motivation in the test phase influenced the expression of unconscious knowledge. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that even with reward, adding noise to the sequences or shortening training led to above-baseline exclusion performance, suggesting that task difficulty and the amount of training also affected the expression of unconscious knowledge. The results help resolve some current debates about the role of conscious awareness in sequence learning.     

Impaired control of visual attention in schizophrenia

To investigate attentional impairment in schizophrenia, the authors examined the performance of 22 patients with schizophrenia and 16 healthy control subjects in 4 visual search tasks that varied in perceptual requirements and in the need for precise attentional control. The rate of search was slowed in the patients in all tasks. However, the degree of slowing was largest in tasks requiring precise attentional control and smallest in tasks that were perceptually difficult but required less attentional control. This pattern of results indicates that the primary impairment of attention in schizophrenia lies in the control of attention and not in the selection processes that operate once attention has been directed to an object.     

Nonconscious perception, conscious awareness and attention

Because it is unclear how a nonconscious stimulus is cognitively processed, there is uncertainty concerning variables that modulate the processing. In this context recent findings of a set of neuroimaging experiments are important. These findings suggest that conscious and nonconscious stimuli activate same areas of the brain during performance of a similar task. Further, different areas are activated when a task is performed with or without awareness of processing. It appears that the neural network involved in cognitive processing depends on the awareness of processing rather than awareness of perception. Since conscious and nonconscious cognitive processing use separate neural networks, each processing is modulated by different variables. Attention modulates most conscious cognitive processing and most, but not all, nonconscious processing is attention dependent. Nonconscious tasks that require attentional resources, with or without conscious awareness, are processed using the attention dependent system. Further, because attention dependent and attention independent tasks are processed by separate neural networks, the cognitive processing and modulating variables can be understood better if cognitive tasks are defined as attention dependent or attention independent, rather than conscious or nonconscious.     

Detecting conscious awareness from involuntary autonomic responses

Can conscious awareness be ascertained from physiological responses alone? We evaluate a novel learning-based procedure permitting detection of conscious awareness without reliance on language comprehension or behavioural responses. The method exploits a situation whereby only consciously detected violations of an expectation alter skin conductance responses (SCRs). Thirty participants listened to sequences of piano notes that, without their being told, predicted a pleasant fanfare or an aversive noise according to an abstract rule. Stimuli were presented without distraction (attended), or while distracted by a visual task to remove awareness of the rule (unattended). A test phase included occasional violations of the rule. Only participants attending the sounds reported awareness of violations and only they showed significantly greater SCR for noise occurring in violation, vs. accordance, with the rule. Our results establish theoretically significant dissociations between conscious and unconscious processing and furnish new opportunities for clinical assessment of residual consciousness in patient populations.     

Anxiety, conscious awareness and change detection

Attentional scanning was studied in anxious and non-anxious participants, using a modified change detection paradigm. Participants detected changes in pairs of emotional scenes separated by two task irrelevant slides, which contained an emotionally valenced scene (the 'distractor scene') and a visual mask. In agreement with attentional control theory, change detection latencies were slower overall for anxious participants. Change detection in anxious, but not non-anxious, participants was influenced by the emotional valence and exposure duration of distractor scenes. When negative distractor scenes were presented at subliminal exposure durations, anxious participants detected changes more rapidly than when supraliminal negative scenes or subliminal positive scenes were presented. We propose that for anxious participants, subliminal presentation of emotionally negative distractor scenes stimulated attention into a dynamic state in the absence of attentional engagement. Presentation of the same scenes at longer exposure times was accompanied by conscious awareness, attentional engagement, and slower change detection.     

Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness

Higher-order theories of consciousness argue that conscious awareness crucially depends on higher-order mental representations that represent oneself as being in particular mental states. These theories have featured prominently in recent debates on conscious awareness. We provide new leverage on these debates by reviewing the empirical evidence in support of the higher-order view. We focus on evidence that distinguishes the higher-order view from its alternatives, such as the first-order, global workspace and recurrent visual processing theories. We defend the higher-order view against several major criticisms, such as prefrontal activity reflects attention but not awareness, and prefrontal lesion does not abolish awareness. Although the higher-order approach originated in philosophical discussions, we show that it is testable and has received substantial empirical support.     

On the signals underlying conscious awareness of action

To investigate whether conscious judgments of movement onset are based solely on pre-movement signals (i.e., premotor or efference copy signals) or whether sensory feedback (i.e., reafferent) signals also play a role, participants judged the onset of finger and toe movements that were either active (i.e., self initiated) or passive (i.e., initiated by the experimenter). Conscious judgments were made by reporting the position of a rotating clock hand presented on a computer screen and were then compared to the actual measured time of movement onset. In line with previous studies, judgment errors were found to be anticipatory for both finger and toe movements. There was a significant difference between judgment errors for active and passive movements, with judgments of active movements being more anticipatory than judgments of passive movements. This is consistent with a pre-movement (from here on referred to as an “efferent”) account of action awareness because premotor and efference copy signals are only present in active movements, whereas the main source of movement information in passive movements is sensory feedback which is subject to time delays of conduction (and hence predicts later judgment times for passive movements). However, judgments of active toe movement onset time were less anticipatory than judgments of active finger movement onset time. This pattern of results is not consistent with a pure efferent account of conscious awareness of action onset - as this account predicts more anticipatory judgments for toe movements compared to finger movements. Instead, the data support the idea that conscious judgments of movement onset are based on efferent (i.e., premotor, efference copy) and reafferent (i.e., feedback from the movement) components.     

Triggering self-presentation efforts outside of people's conscious awareness

Three studies utilized priming techniques to examine whether self-presentations can be activated without conscious awareness. The results across all experiments consistently demonstrated nonconscious self-presentation effects, in that people were unaware that their self-presentations were triggered automatically and that their self-presentations were comparable to participants who were explicitly instructed to self-present. The findings are novel because they are the first to demonstrate that self-presentations can be triggered without conscious awareness in a manner similar to self-presentations that are strategically selected. In addition, the results help undermine the common misconception that self-presentation typically involves conscious deliberation, pretense, or outright deception.     

The generation of conscious awareness in an incidental learning situation

The purpose of the present experiments was to investigate the generation of conscious awareness (i.e., of verbal report) in an incidental learning situation. While the single-system account assumes that all markers of learning, verbal or nonverbal, index the same underlying knowledge representation, multiple-systems accounts grant verbal report a special status as a marker of learning because they assume that the nonverbal and verbal effects of learning rely on different memory representations. We tested these two accounts in two experiments in which we held the amount of learning in the nonverbal memory system constant while manipulating independent variables aimed at affecting learning in the declarative system. The results of both experiments revealed significant differences in verbal report between experimental conditions, but no significant differences in response times. Overall, these results provide clear evidence in favor of the multiple-systems account.     

Effort awareness and sense of volition in schizophrenia

Contemporary experimental research has emphasised the role of centrally generated signals arising from premotor areas in voluntary muscular force perception. It is therefore generally accepted that judgements of force are based on a central sense, known as the sense of effort, rather than on a sense of intra-muscular tension. Interestingly, the concept of effort is also present in the classical philosophy: to the French philosopher Maine de Biran [Maine de Biran (1805). Mémoire sur la décomposition de la pensée (Tome III), Vrin, Paris (1963)], the sense of effort is the fundamental component of self-experience, the landmark of the exercise of the will. In the present review, after a presentation of the nature and neurophysiological bases of effort sensation, we will examine its possible involvement in the neurocognitive process of agency. We will further focus on delusions of alien control in schizophrenic patients. Experimental data suggest that these patients have an abnormal awareness of effort caused by cerebral anomalies in the frontal and parietal lobes.     

精神分裂症患者的情绪调节

日常生活中, 个体通常有不同的理想与目标, 当个体被特定的目标驱动, 试图去影响自身将要体验到的情绪类别、将要体验到的情绪感受发生的时间, 以及如何体验、表达此种情绪时, 情绪调节就发生了。精神分裂症是一种复杂的精神疾病, 该类疾病患者普遍存在情绪方面的缺陷, 通过操控各种内外因素, 可以帮助精神分裂症患者进行有效的情绪调节, 有利于帮助他们构建健全的情绪体验, 对促进其身心健康发展具有现实临床意义。     

Impaired awareness of movement disorders in Parkinson’s disease

Background

This study analyzed the presence of awareness of movement disorders (dyskinesias and hypokinesias) in 25 patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) and motor fluctuations (dyskinesias, wearing off, on–off fluctuations). Of the few studies that have dealt with this topic, none have analyzed the differences in the awareness of motor deficits by comparing the on and off states using motor scales and an extensive battery of tests to assess cognitive and behavioral functioning.

Methods

PD patients were compared on three different scales that we have devised to measure awareness of movement disorders: Global Awareness of Movement (GAM) Disorders, dyskinesia/hypo-bradykinesia rating scales.

Results

Data showed that PD patients had greater awareness and psychological suffering in the off state than in the on state. In particular, they were troubled by motor disabilities related to hypokinesias and had mood-related symptoms and a perception of disability in activities of daily living. Interestingly, patients only showed a selective reduction of awareness of movement disorders associated with executive functions and related to dyskinesias in the on state, compared to a preserved awareness of hypokinesias in the off state. On the contrary, no association with executive functions was found in the off state.

Conclusion

Our findings suggest that the dopaminergic overstimulation of mesocorticolimbic pathways may cause a dysfunction of prefrontal–subcortical connections related to the impaired insight.     

Anesthesia, neural information processing, and conscious awareness

Possible systemic effects of general anesthetic agents on neural information processing are discussed in the context of the thalamocortical suppression hypothesis presented by Drs. Alkire, Haier, and Fallon (this issue) in their PET study of the anesthetized state. Accounts of the neural requisites of consciousness fall into two broad categories. Neuronal-specificity theories postulate that activity in particular neural populations is sufficient for conscious awareness, while process-coherence theories postulate that particular organizations of neural activity are sufficient. Accounts of anesthetic narcosis, on the other hand, explain losses of consciousness in terms of neural signal-suppressions, transmission blocks, and the disruptions of signal interpretation. While signal-suppression may account for the actions of some anesthetic agents, the existence of anesthetics, such as choralose, that cause both loss of consciousness and elevated discharge rates, is problematic for a general theory of narcosis that is based purely on signal suppression and transmission-block. However, anesthetic agents also alter relative firing rates and temporal discharge patterns that may disrupt the coherence of neural signals and the functioning of the neural networks that interpret them. It is difficult at present, solely on the basis of regional brain metabolic rates, to test process-coherence hypotheses regarding organizational requisites for conscious awareness. While these pioneering PET studies have great merit as panoramic windows of mind-brain correlates, wider ranges of theory and empirical evidence need to be brought into the formulation of truly comprehensive theories of consciousness and anesthesia.     

Arousal, working memory, and conscious awareness in contingency learning

There are wide individual differences in the ability to detect a stimulus contingency embedded in a complex paradigm. The present study used a cognitive masking paradigm to better understand individual differences related to contingency learning. Participants were assessed on measures of electrodermal arousal and on working memory capacity before engaging in the contingency learning task. Contingency awareness was assessed both by trial-by-trial verbal reports obtained during the task and by a short post-task recognition questionnaire. Participants who became aware had fewer non-specific skin conductance responses and tended to score higher on a digit span assessment. Skin conductance level was not significantly lower in the aware group than in the unaware group. These findings are consistent with studies showing that lower arousal and greater cognitive processing capacity facilitate conscious perception of a greater breadth of information within a scene or a task.     

Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures

A brief self-report scale was developed to assess everyday performance failures arising directly or primarily from brief failures of sustained attention (attention-related cognitive errors-ARCES). The ARCES was found to be associated with a more direct measure of propensity to attention lapses (Mindful Attention Awareness Scale--MAAS) and to errors on an existing behavioral measure of sustained attention (Sustained Attention to Response Task--SART). Although the ARCES and MAAS were highly correlated, structural modelling revealed the ARCES was more directly related to SART errors and the MAAS to SART RTs, which have been hypothesized to directly reflect the lapses of attention that lead to SART errors. Thus, the MAAS and SART RTs appear to directly reflect attention lapses, whereas the ARCES and SART errors reflect the mistakes these lapses are thought to cause. Boredom proneness was also assessed by the BPS, as a separate consequence of a propensity to attention lapses. Although the ARCES was significantly associated with the BPS, this association was entirely accounted for by the MAAS, suggesting that performance errors and boredom are separate consequences of lapses in attention. A tendency to even extraordinarily brief attention lapses on the order of milliseconds may have far-reaching consequences not only for safe and efficient task performance but also for sustaining the motivation to persist in and enjoy these tasks.