The ontologicalization of the Confucian concept of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Xin Xing</Emphasis>: Zhou Lianxi’s founding contribution to the Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism

The Confucian concept of “cheng” (integrity) emphasizes logical priority of value realization over “zhen shi” (reality or truth). Through value realization and the completion of being, zhenshi can be achieved. Cheng demonstrates the original unity of value and reality. Taking the concept of cheng as the core, Zhou Lianxi’s philosophy interpreted yi Dao (the Dao of change), and integrated Yi Jing (The Book of Changes) and Zhong Yong (The Doctrine of the Mean). On the one hand, it ontologicalized the Confucian concept of xin xing (mind nature), and proved and established the significance of Dao ti (the ontological Dao) as the principle and origin of the utmost goodness. On the other hand, it also extended the significance of value realization to the process of qi hua (transformation of qi) and transformation of myriad things. He proved li yi (the One Principle) of Dao ti from its many manifestations and established his own metaphysical system. Zhou Lianxi’s philosophy sets up a new theoretical direction for the Song-Ming Confucians to reconstruct Confucian Metaphysics. __________ Translated from Beijing Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Journal of Beijing Normal University)(Social Sciences Edition), Vol. 186, 2004 (6) by Yan Xin     

From life state to ecological consciousness: on Wang Yangming’s “natural principles of order within the realm of liang zhi”

Wang Yangming argues that the life state of a virtuous person is “forming one body with Heaven, Earth and the myriad things.” For instance, in watching a child fall into a well, he cannot help feeling alarmed and commiserate; In observing the pitiful cries and frightened appearance of animals, he cannot help feeling “unable to bear” their suffering; In seeing plants destroyed or tiles shattered, he cannot help but feel pity and regret and so forth. At the same time, he also stresses that there is a natural order of values with the help of which a human being deals with the myriad things, namely the natural principles of order within the realm of liang zhi. From a practical perspective, Yangming integrated these two aspects into a spontaneously psychological self-consciousness and an intuition of judgment and choice. Under its direction and instruction, human beings cannot only generally care for the myriad things, but also make reasonable use of them. Therefore, the significant reference to “the natural principles of order within the realm of liang zhi” involves the harmony between nature and human beings from life state to ecological consciousness. __________ Translated from Tranjin Shehui Kexue 天津社会科学 (Tianjin Social Sciences), 2004 (6) by Wu Min, Proofread by Xu Xiangdong & Wu Fei     

儒家差异思想阐微

Difference is a category of relationship lying between identity and non-identity, and equality and inequality. This concept is both the Confucian reflection of the real relationship between things in the world and the value ideal of Confucianism. The Confucian idea of difference, embodied in the view of human relationships, of world, and of nature, seeks to build a rational order based on difference, so as to reach a harmonious, united and ideal state. Confucians in the past dynasties continually interpreted difference and raised it to the level of ontology, enriching the system of Confucianism. Translated by Yan Xin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2006, (3): 32–37     

"本质"的双重含义:自然科学与人文科学——黑格尔、狄尔泰、胡塞尔之间的一点链接

Early in Aristotle’s terminology, and ever since, “essence” has been conceived as having two meanings, namely “universality” and “individuality”. According to the tradition of thought that has dominated throughout the history of Western philosophy, “essence” unequivocally refers to “universality”. As a matter of fact, however, “universality” cannot cover Aristotle’s definition and formulation of “essence”: Essence is what makes a thing “happen to be this thing.” “Individuality” should be the deep meaning of “essence”. By means of an analysis of some relevant Western thoughts and a review of cultural realities, it can be concluded that the difference between the attitudes toward things of the natural sciences and the humane sciences mainly lies in the fact that the former focus on the pursuit of universal regularity, whereas the latter go after the value and significance of human life. The movement from natural things to cultural things is a process in which essence shifts from universality to individuality. It is the author’s contention that what should be stressed in the fields of human culture and society is the construction of an ideal society that is “harmonious yet not identical”, on the basis of respecting and developing individual peculiarity and otherness. Translated by Zhang Lin from Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大学学报 (Journal of Peking University), 2007, (11): 23–29     

On Laozi��s Dao��An attempt to make philosophy speak Chinese

“How is the meaning of the Dao to be understood?” To answer this question, we should not make indiscreet remarks outside of the framework of Laozi’s thought; rather, we should enter the system, helping Laozi to establish a philosophical system on the Dao. Such an establishment is equivalent to that of a logical system of Laozi’s philosophy. We consider the presentation of Laozi’s thought as unverified propositions, and the purpose of this essay is to expound on these propositions and make them philosophy in a strict sense: The Dao that can be talked about is not Dao anymore, and while “the Dao” seems to have its name, it actually does not. Names are also particular things. The Dao is neither a name nor a thing; instead, the Dao implies nonexistence. Nonexistence means the possibility of the being of all things, and all these things are the manifestation of the Dao, thus nonexistence is also existence. Things are discriminated from the Dao, and because all these things are discriminated from each other, there is de 德 (virtues). Where the discrimination is removed, there is the Dao, and adherence to the discrimination means deviation from the Dao. The diversity of things stirs up desires, and the control and utilization of things are a departure from the Dao. Only desires without self are compatible with nature. Desire discriminates with artificial measurements, and thus leads to knowledge. To acquire knowledge is to learn, and learning develops the capability to differentiate between the self and the other, so only a decline in learning can be conducive to human life. One can achieve something, transform external things and withstand nature only after he learns and acquires knowledge. On the other hand, wuwei 无为 (doing nothing) leads to wuwo 无我 (self-denial), avoiding the invention or differentiation of things. So, life is just the movement of the Dao, in which all things are allowed to take their own courses and nothing is left unaccomplished.     

How is the arrival of things possible?

Ancient Chinese thought inquired primarily into how the achievement of things is possible rather than into what a thing as a thing is. It held that man should participate in the achieving or generation of things in order to realize his self-achievement. A thing is understood as an event. Because all things and man are united as one, it is possible for man to enter into things by tasting and feeling rather than by relying on the sense of sight. This may provide a possible new means of rescuing things from the numericalization and phenomenalization that sweep over the world today. Translated by Liu Liangjian from Renwen Zazhi 人文杂志 (The Journal of Humanities), 2007, (2): 14–21     

Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value

Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which Mooreans and Kantians have disagreed, but rather two distinct concepts. I state a number of principles about intrinsic value that have typically (though not universally) been held by Mooreans, all of which are typically denied by Kantians. I show that there are distinct theoretical roles for a concept of intrinsic value to play in a moral framework. When we notice these distinct theoretical roles, we should realize that there is room for two distinct concepts of intrinsic value within a single moral framework: one that accords with some or all of the Moorean principles, and one that does not.     

Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence?

Puzzles about persistence and change through time, i.e., about identity across time, have foundered on confusion about what it is for ‘two things’ to be have ‘the same thing’ at a time. This is most directly seen in the dispute over whether material objects can occupy exactly the same place at the same time. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against several arguments to the contrary. Distinguishing a temporally relative from an absolute sense of ‘the same’, we see that the intuition, ‘this is only one thing’, and the dictum, ‘two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time’, are individuating things at a time rather than absolutely and are therefore compatible with coincidence. Several other objections philosophers have raised ride on this same ambiguity. Burke, originating what has become the most popular objection to coincidence, argues that if coincidence is possible there would be no explanation of how objects that are qualitatively the same at a time could belong to different sorts. But we can explain an object’s sort by appealing to its properties at other times. Burke’s argument to the contrary equivocates on different notions of ‘cross-time identity’ and ‘the statue’. From a largely negative series of arguments emerges a positive picture of what it means to say multiple things coincide and of why an object’s historical properties explain its sort rather than vice versa – in short, of how coincidence is possible.     

Dialectics and practical wisdom

Dialectics is essentially the method or logos in which categories of forms are combined to explain things. Dialectics was developed because reason faces difficulties in grasping the sensible world. Practical wisdom is knowledge about some things or certain person or persons because of its variable objects. But it is not entirely specific or only about a particular thing and without universality in any sense. As one kind of dialectics, it combines various elements to accord with the right logos, similar to the way in which various forms are combined in theory. Therefore practical wisdom as a combination or polymerization of elements can be regarded as another kind of logic, namely practical logic or dialectics. __________ Translated from Zhexue Dongtai 哲学动态 (Philosophical Trends), 2005 (4) by Xie Yongkang     

Analysing Personal Value

It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favour” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis admits that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value, but for everyone else too. We thereby avoid facing two completely different notions of value, viz., one pertaining to impersonal value, and another to personal value. The analysis also elucidates why we are (at least pro tanto) justified in our concern for objects that are valuable for us; if value just is, as it is suggested, the existence of reasons for such a concern, the justification is immediately forthcoming.     

"气"概念几个层次意义的分殊

In Chinese philosophy, although the concept of “qi” has numerous meanings, it is not completely without order or chaotic. Generally speaking, “qi” has several different levels of meanings, such as in philosophy, physics, physiology, psychology, ethics, and so on. On the philosophical level, “qi” is similar to “air,” and it is essentially similar to the “matter-energy” or “field” in physics, which refers to the origin or an element of all things in the world. It is from this point that the meanings of “qi” in physiology, psychology, ethics as well as aesthetics are derived. This paper analyzes the meanings of “qi” on five levels and seeks to clarify misunderstandings about “qi,” such as its alleged pan-vitalistic, conscious and pan-ethical characters. Translated by Yan Xin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2006, (9): 34–41     

Zhuangzi’s philosophy of thing

It is usually believed that the concept of ‘qiwu 齊物’ in the Zhuangzi means ‘equalizing things’. This reading of the Zhuangzi, however, presupposes that things are originally separated and exist independently. The equality of things is just a mental construct in a specific state of mind. In this paper, we will argue that this reading does not stand; what Zhuangzi does in the ‘Qiwulun 齊物論’is to examine how myriad things are created from the original oneness. According to Zhuangzi’s philosophy of thing, things are created by objectification through fact and value imposing. Oneness is therefore not a mere perspective but the condition for things being objectified. This understanding of the things’ being is comparable to Heidegger’s classification of thing and equipment, but it differs from Heidegger by its special implication on the Daoist liberation.     

“Intrinsically” or just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge

Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, I pave a path throughthe (terminological) thicket of structural types of values. Our initial simple opposition is shown to conflate thedistinctions intrinsic/extrinsic and instrumental (or justuseful)/final. Next, I consider the value(s) of knowledgeand knowing in general and their possible value components(like the values of truth and justifiedness). After havingdiscussed the types of value of everyday knowledge,especially its functional and constitutive value (notionsintroduced earlier), I argue that these can or should alsobe attributed to scientific knowledge, thus departing fromboth objectivist and sociological views of science. One could say that I offer a certain defense of theintrinsic value of scientific knowing (and the inherentvalue of scientific knowledge) and some importantdifferentiations of its “instrumental values”. I alsocaution (in relation with my puzzle) against drawing hastymoral conclusions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Aufbau to Animism: A sketch of the alternate methodology and major discovery in Dorion Cairns's revision of Edmund Husserl's “Fifth Cartesian Meditation”

After a review of his revisions of Husserl's methodology, Cairns's new version of the procedure of Abbauor unbuilding is followed from the Objective world down to the primordial world and then from there down to the phantom world within which sensa fields can be analyzed. Then the abstractive epochēs by which lower strata were reached are successively relaxed in the Aufbau or upbuilding procedure and, most interestingly, the sense “psychophysical thing” originally constituted within primordial automaticity is found to be transferred automatically and with presumptive certainty to everything in the Objective world. Any differences between “animate” and “inanimate” things are only constituted at a higher level and pertain then to culture and not nature.     

A reconstruction of contemporary Confucianism as a form of knowledge

Traditional Confucianism might be likened to a great tree, with various branches and trends of thought emerging from common roots. Continuing with this metaphor, Confucianism as a form of knowledge might be regarded as a main branch, and the resulting form of Confucianism constitutes the main body of Chinese learning. Due to modern society’s transformation, Confucianism as a form of knowledge has begun to disappear and the form of Confucianism which has its own discourse system and problem consciousness has become a disconnected tradition and an object of study of all the branches of learning in modern times. It is important for the present-day development of Confucianism that we break the rigescent modern academic system, propagate Confucianism as a form of knowledge, and rebuild the Confucian form of knowledge. __________ Translated from Hebei Xuekan 河北学刊 (Hebei Academic Journal), 2005(4) by Yan Xin     

The concept of nature and historicism in Marx

Scholars of Marx often spend much effort to emphasize the socio-historical characteristics of Marx’s concept of nature. At the same time, from this concept of nature, one seems to be able to deduce a strong sense of historical anthropocentricism and relativism. But through an exploration of the results of Rorty’s discarding the distinction between “natural” and “man-made” and Strauss’ clearing up value relativism in terms of the concept of nature, people will find that historicism is a world outlook that brought its historical circumstances on itself. It neglects the fundamental role of nature in the structure of the relationships between nature and history. A modern result of it is that it fails to offer any universal norms. __________ Translated from Renwen Zazhi 人文杂志 (Journal of Humanities), 2005 (1)     

Beyond Descartes: Panpsychism Revisited

For some two millennia, Western civilization has predominantly viewed mind and consciousness as the private domain of the human species. Some have been willing to extend these qualities to certain animals. And there has been a small but very significant minority of philosophers who have argued that the processes of mind are universal in extent, and resident in all material things – the concept of panpsychism. The traditional ‘man-alone’, or ‘man-and-higher-animals’, views of mind have come under increasing criticism of late, and their philosophical weaknesses seem increasingly insurmountable. This has caused some thinkers to reexamine the ancient and venerable concept of panpsychism, and to apply it anew in contemporary theories of mind. The present essay reintroduces panpsychism, and demonstrates something of its legacy in Western thought.     

"谦"的德性传统及其当代命运

The virtue of qian, one of the traditional Chinese virtues, usually refers to humbleness, humility and modesty. Ancient thinkers in China not only expounded on the meaning and basis of qian, but also argued for its value. It was usually thought that the value of qian rested in its ability to cultivate virtue, promote scholarship, get along with people, and maintain enterprises. Ancient thinkers in China placed so much emphasis on the virtue of qian that there was a tendency to overemphasize qian. There is also a tradition of qian in the West, which is less likely to become excessive compared to that in the East. Presently, Chinese society is transitioning into a modern society, but the virtue of qian still has value. While continuing to embrace its traditional essence, we should adopt useful aspects from the Western concept of qian to reshape the virtue of qian so that it conforms to modern Chinese society. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Daode Yu Wenming 뗀뗂폫컄쏷 (Morality and Civilization), 2007, (3): 18–24     

郭象"独化"范畴释义

Seemingly, “independent genesis” refers to the independent existence and changes of each thing, but it is clear that there cannot be any truly “independent” things at all. Each thing in the world has to stay in connection or relationship with other things outside itself if it wants to represent its own “independence” and “genesis” in terms of form; and inevitably such connection or relationship itself has to be embodied in the internal nature of each thing. In the metaphysical thought of Guo Xiang, the former was known as the quality of “interdependence”; and the latter the characteristics of “quality” or “quality image.” Such characteristics of “quality” or “quality image” were interdependent, which constituted the essence of each thing itself as “beingness” and “beinglessness,” and thus resulted in the independent manifestation and change of things in terms of their external forms. The grasping of essence of things as “beingness” and “beinglessness” depended upon comprehension or rational intuition, and that was the realm of “profundity” in Guo Xiang’s terms. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲哲哲哲 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (11): 37–43     

Demonstrative Concepts Without Re-Identification

Conceptualism in the philosophy of perception is the doctrine that perceptual experiences have a fully conceptualized content. Conceptualists have laid particular emphasis on the role demonstrative concepts play in experience, in order to deal with the objection that experiences are fine-grained. Normal perceivers, they point out, are able to form fine-grained demonstrative color concepts for the specific shades they perceptually discriminate. Recently, however, Sean Kelly (2001b: ‘Demonstrative concepts and Experience’, The Philosophical Review 110 (3), 397–420.) has argued that, in order to possess a particular demonstrative concept, a perceiver must be able to re-identify things which fall under that concept. Since normal perceivers typically fail at such re-identification, he concludes, they do not in fact possess demonstrative concepts for the specific shades of color they experience. In response to Kelly’s attempt to resurrect the objection from the fineness of grain of experience, I argue that his defense of this Re-identification constraint (i) is not as intuitive as it might seem, (ii) is ill-motivated, and (iii) appears to rest on a conflation between different kinds of concepts.