A P.S. on B.S.: Some Remarks on Humbug and Bullshit

While lies have attracted philosophical attention since antiquity, phenomena in the near area have generated considerably less interest. Lately, however, Max Black and Harry Frankfurt have visited a close relative: humbug or bullshit, as it's either more politely or more rudely called. In this article their views on humbug and bullshit are exposed, explained, critiqued, and, ultimately, rejected. An alternative view is then proposed and defended.     

克利考特伦理整体主义理论研究

文章从克利考特与大地伦理学的理论渊源着手,对克利考特如何捍卫大地伦理学,扩展大地伦理理论,以及提出的伦理整体主义这一理论发展过程做一概说。     

Revolution and the counter-revolution: The conflict over meaning between P. B. Struve and S. L. Frank in 1922

Lecturer in the Lomonossov University, Moscow, specialist in the young Hegel; has also worked quite extensively on Russian prerevolutionary thought. Nikolaj Plotnikov is notably the co-editor of the recently re-published texts,Vekhi, Iz Glubiny in the collection 'Iz istorii oteestvennoj filosofskoj mysli' in conjunction withVoprosy Filosofii.     

Notes for S. P. S. S. I. Members

Summary

It is argued that Levin (1) has answered a question Schneider (3) did not ask. Logically, then Levin's procedure does not question the answer Schneider reported, but is appropriate for answering the question he raises.     

J. S. Mill on Coolie Labour and Voluntary Slavery

This article discusses John Stuart Mill's voluntary slavery argument in On Liberty. The author shows that standard interpretations of the argument rely on the assumption that part of Mill's objection to voluntary slavery is the permanent nature of the decision. However, in correspondence, Mill also objects to voluntary ‘coolie’ labour contracts, which he regards as a form of slavery. This produces difficulties for standard interpretations of the voluntary slavery argument. Finally, the author provides a revised interpretation of Mill's argument to solve this problem.     

The Tacit Concept of Competence in J. S. Mill's On Liberty

Abstract

Mill is often the object of schizophrenic interpretation: he is either interpreted as a fierce proponent of negative freedom, i.e. a prototypical liberal who professes neutrality with regard to different conceptions of the good, or as a concealed moralist whose ultimate goal is to construct society on the basis of a particular and thick conception of the good. In this paper I will argue that Mill employs a tacit concept of competence in On Liberty, which allows us to account for these different interpretations. I will do so by focussing on the role of truth and individuality in On Liberty. Competence is a precondition for individuality, and as such, it is a threshold concept: those above the threshold are sensitive to rational argument and should be free to pursue happiness in their own way (because they are guided by the truth), whereas those who fail to meet this threshold should be educated and paternalistically be kept out of harm's way until they are able to find the truth for and by themselves.