三段论推理中信念偏差效应的研究

采用结论评估范式,通过考察不同类型三段论推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式,比较了选择性检查模型、必然性误解模型和心理模型理论对三段论推理中信念偏差效应的预测,对各种理论的解释力进行了验证.研究结果表明,心理模型理论能够包容较多的实验现象,并对信念影响推理的信息加工过程进行了较为具体的说明,因而较其它理论而言显示出一定的优越性.     

范畴三段论推理中信念偏差效应的实验研究

本研究利用三段论评价任务,分析了已有信念与三段论逻辑状态间的交互影响,探讨了三段论推理判断中信念偏差的存在与作用机制,同时从信念偏差角度对心理模型理论进行了初步验证。结果发现：1．范畴三段论推理的逻辑判断过程中存在信念偏差效应;2．信念偏差效应以逻辑状态与结论可信性交互作用的方式存在;3当逻辑结果与信念相一致时,信念会促进逻辑反应,反之则妨碍逻辑反应;4．信念偏差效应对逻辑有效、结论不可信的单模型三段论问题影响最大,而对逻辑有效、结论不可信的多模型三段论问题相对影响最小。     

基于双加工理论解释下信念偏差效应的神经机制

信念偏差效应是指人们已有的知识信念对逻辑推理的影响现象.对此,双加工理论认为这是由于信念偏向系统和逻辑分析系统之间的冲突所导致的.近年来,该理论得到来自认知神经科学证据的有力支持:一方面,基于功能磁共振成像(fMRI)、近红外光谱(NIRS)以及重复性经颅磁刺激(rTMS)等技术的研究从不同角度证实右侧前额皮层与信念偏差抑制有关;另一方面,基于脑电(ERP)的研究表明,晚期正成分和晚期负成分可能参与了不同推理类型下信念偏差效应的认知加工.未来的研究可以从工作记忆、不同加工阶段、推理前提本身可信度、实验分析、实验材料生态学效度以及思维训练等方面对信念偏差效应作进一步探索.     

演绎推理是基于规则还是模型?——来自空间推理的证据

对空间推理的研究有助于探明其加工机制以及验证心理逻辑理论和心理模型理论。行为研究通过考察多种影响空间推理的因素(如心理模型数量、前提的对象顺序等)证实了心理模型理论的预测。脑成像的研究表明,空间推理活动主要激活枕-顶-额脑区网络,顶区可能是推理的特异性脑区。研究的结果同样支持心理模型理论。未来的研究应该整合演绎推理的不同理论,加强对不同演绎推理任务的研究,并将脑成像技术与EEG或ERP结合起来,进一步探明人类空间推理的机制。     

儿童理解误信念的理论观点:认知过程的新视角

近年来,心理理论的研究领域中侧重从认知过程角度解释儿童理解误信念心理机制的理论起到越来越重要的作用。此文着重阐述:(1)事实掩盖假设及其认知抑制机制观点;(2)强调儿童在信念推理中经历反事实推理过程的适应性模型假设;(3)强调并分离出儿童愿望抑制和信念抑制的愿望-信念推理假设。它们从认知加工的不同角度进行了理论建构,将黑箱式的误信念理解过程外显化,为相关研究提供了有益启示。     

条件推理中否定前件下信念偏差发生阶段的ERP研究

以日常生活中的条件推理语句为实验材料,采用大、小前提和结论依次呈现的“推断-判断”范式,利用事件相关电位(event-related brain potential, ERP)技术探讨了条件推理中否定前件下信念偏差效应的脑内时程动态变化。结果发现：在行为反应上,较信念促进,信念阻碍下的正确率更低反应时更长;在脑电上,两条件(信念阻碍和信念促进)诱发的ERP波形仅在大前提加工阶段出现明显的分离。这表明该推理下的信念偏差效应可能早在对大前提的语义表征阶段就已发生。     

3～5岁儿童信念状态推理中的偏差

以判断正误的得分和原因解释的得分作为测量指标,以90名儿童为被试,采用信念状态推理任务来考察3～5岁儿童对信念状态推理的偏差状况.结果表明在信念状态推理任务中,儿童对他人信念的推理都受到自身信念状态的影响,表现出自我中心倾向,当儿童与他人信念状态相同时推理成绩更高.此结果在一定程度上说明了儿童心理理论的发展支持表征不可通达假设.     

范畴三段论推理中信念偏差效应的ERP研究

以具体范畴三段论作为实验材料,探讨了推理过程中信念偏差效应的脑内时程动态变化。结果发现:有效式下,信念抑制和信念促进诱发的ERP波形趋于一致。无效式下,与基线任务相比,信念抑制和信念促进在300-500ms和1000-1600ms诱发了更正的ERP成分,可能反映了该推理不同的加工阶段,同时,300-600ms内,在大脑额中部信念抑制比信念促进诱发一个更正的ERP成分(P480),可能反映了关系整合阶段对自动激活的知识信念的抑制。     

道德推理与道德行为关系的元分析

目前道德心理学中存在对道德推理作用的质疑, 这一质疑源自哲学领域的著名争论。从经典道德心理学理论来说, 道德推理应该是道德行为的重要决定因素, 但新近的观点则否定这一重要作用。本研究采用元分析技术探讨道德推理与道德行为的关系。通过文献搜索与检查, 获得了50项研究和83个独立效应量, 共包含16738名被试。检验表明发表偏差不会影响元分析的结果, 选择随机效应模型是准确的。通过随机效应模型的元分析表明, 道德推理与道德的行为有显著的正相关, 与不道德的行为有显著的负相关。调节效应分析表明, 道德推理测量工具的类型会影响道德推理与道德行为的关系, 被试年龄阶段会影响道德推理与不道德行为的关系。这些结果肯定了道德推理的作用, 也强调了研究过程中要关注测量工具的类型, 指出了需要开发更全面的道德推理测量工具。     

平行竞争还是序列加工?——来自空间关系推理的脑电证据

本研究应用事件相关电位技术探讨推理的双重加工理论中两个系统T1与T2之间的相互作用关系。研究假设逻辑推理者(LR)的推理过程启动T2系统,而非逻辑推理者(IR)在推理过程中会启动T1系统,工作记忆的参与与否作为区分T1与T2系统的指标。研究结果显示空间关系三段论推理可分为识别-对比-推导-保持四个阶段,两类推理者在推导阶段与结果保持阶段存在明显差异。LR的推导与保持阶段需要工作记忆广泛参与,而IR的推导过程主要进行视觉操作,在保持阶段抑制信念冲突,这个过程不依赖工作记忆。这表明LR的推理过程主要启动T2系统,IR的推理过程有T1系统参与,对信念与逻辑冲突的探测不需要T2参与,符合混合模型。     

The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning

A novel explanation of belief bias in relational reasoning is presented based on the role of working memory and retrieval in deductive reasoning, and the influence of prior knowledge on this process. It is proposed that belief bias is caused by the believability of a conclusion in working memory which influences its activation level, determining its likelihood of retrieval and therefore its effect on the reasoning process. This theory explores two main influences of belief on the activation levels of these conclusions. First, believable conclusions have higher activation levels and so are more likely to be recalled during the evaluation of reasoning problems than unbelievable conclusions, and therefore, they have a greater influence on the reasoning process. Secondly, prior beliefs about the conclusion have a base level of activation and may be retrieved when logically irrelevant, influencing the evaluation of the problem. The theory of activation and memory is derived from the Atomic Components of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture and so this account is formalized in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Two experiments were conducted to test predictions of this model. Experiment 1 tested strength of belief and Experiment 2 tested the impact of a concurrent working memory load. Both of these manipulations increased the main effect of belief overall and in particular raised belief‐based responding in indeterminately invalid problems. These effects support the idea that the activation level of conclusions formed during reasoning influences belief bias. This theory adds to current explanations of belief bias by providing a detailed specification of the role of working memory and how it is influenced by prior knowledge.     

On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

A multinomial model is used to disentangle the respective contributions of reasoning processes and response bias in conclusion-acceptance data that exhibit belief bias. A model-based meta-analysis of 22 studies reveals that such data are structurally too sparse to allow discrimination of different accounts of belief bias. Four experiments are conducted to obtain richer data, allowing deeper tests through the use of the multinomial model. None of the current accounts of belief bias is consistent with the complex pattern of results. A new theory of belief bias is proposed that assumes that most reasoners construct only one mental model representing the premises as well as the conclusion or, in the case of an unbelievable conclusion, its logical negation. New predictions derived from the theory are confirmed in 4 additional studies.     

Traditional difference-score analyses of reasoning are flawed

Studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning have relied on three traditional difference score measures: the logic index, belief index, and interaction index. Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010, 2011) argued that the interaction index incorrectly assumes a linear receiver operating characteristic (ROC). Here, all three measures are addressed. Simulations indicated that traditional analyses of reasoning experiments are likely to lead to incorrect conclusions. Two new experiments examined the role of instructional manipulations on the belief bias effect. The form of the ROCs violated assumptions of traditional measures. In comparison, signal detection theory (SDT) model-based analyses were a better match for the form of the ROCs, and implied that belief bias and instructional manipulations are predominantly response bias effects. Finally, reanalyses of previous studies of conditional reasoning also showed non-linear ROCs, violating assumptions of traditional analyses. Overall, reasoning research using traditional measures is at risk of drawing incorrect conclusions.     

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: reply to Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010)

Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) argued (a) that the so-called receiver operating characteristic is nonlinear for data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning; (b) that their data are inconsistent with Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (see record 2000-02818-008) model of belief bias; (c) that their data are inconsistent with any of the existing accounts of belief bias and only consistent with a theory provided by signal detection theory; and (d) that in fact, belief bias is a response bias effect. In this reply, we present reanalyses of Dube et al.'s data and of old data suggesting (a) that the receiver operating characteristic is linear for binary "valid" versus "invalid" responses, as employed by the bulk of research in this field; (b) that Klauer et al.'s model describes the old data significantly better than does Dube et al.'s model and that it describes Dube et al.'s data somewhat better than does Dube et al.'s model; (c) that Dube et al.'s data are consistent with the account of belief bias by misinterpreted necessity, whereas Dube et al.'s signal detection model does not fit their data; and (d) that belief bias is more than a response bias effect.     

Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000)

K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000; see record 2000-02818-008) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & A. Garnham, 1989; see record 1989-38845-001)) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data presented by Klauer et al. (Experiments 1-4). The authors further argue that additional data Klauer et al. presented in support of a new model of their own (Experiments 5-8) are explained by this mental model account. The mental model account is, therefore, refuted neither by Klauer et al.'s theoretical analysis nor by any of the results they presented. Furthermore, the account can accommodate more recent findings on belief bias in a more satisfactory way than can alternative models that have been proposed.     

Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

Studies of syllogistic reasoning have shown that the size of the belief bias effect varies with manipulations of logical validity and problem form. This paper presents a mental models-based account, which explains these findings in terms of variations in the working-memory demands of different problem types. We propose that belief bias may reflect the use of a heuristic that is applied when a threshold of uncertainty in one's processing-attributable to working-memory overload-is exceeded during reasoning. Three experiments are reported, which tested predictions deriving from this account. In Experiment 1, conclusions of neutral believability were presented for evaluation, and a predicted dissociation was observed in confidence ratings for responses to valid and invalid arguments, with participants being more confident in the former. In Experiment 2, an attempt to manipulate working-memory loads indirectly by varying syllogistic figure failed to produce predicted effects upon the size of the belief bias effect. It is argued that the employment of a conclusion evaluation methodology minimized the effect of the figural manipulation in this experiment. In Experiment 3, participants' articulatory and spatial recall capacities were calibrated as a direct test of working-memory involvement in belief bias. Predicted differences in the pattern of belief bias observed between highand lowspatial recall groups supported the view that limited working memory plays a key role in belief bias.     

Mental model construction in linear reasoning: Evidence for the construction of initial annotated models

According to the mental model theory, reasoners build an initial model representing the information given in the premises. In the context of relational reasoning, the question arises as to which kind of representation is used to cope with indeterminate or multimodel problems. The present article presents an array of possible answers arising from the initial construction of complete explicit models, partial explicit models, partial implicit models, a single "isomeric" model, or a single annotated model. Predictions generated from these views are tested in two experiments that vary the problem structure and the number of models consistent with the premises. Analyses of the premise processing times, answering times and accuracy show that the annotated model yields the best fit of the data. Implications of these findings for the mental model theory as developed for relational reasoning are discussed.     

Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty

Three experiments investigated belief-based versus analytic processing in transitive inference. Belief-based and analytic processing were inferred from conclusion acceptance rates for problems with conclusions that were either valid or invalid and believable or unbelievable. Premise integration difficulty was manipulated by varying premise integration time (Experiment 1), premise presentation order (Experiment 2), and the markedness of the relational terms in the premises (Experiment 3). In all the conditions, reasoning accuracy and rated confidence were lower on conflict problems, where belief-based and analytic processes yielded different responses. Participants relied more on analytic processing and less on belief-based processing in conditions in which premise integration was easier. Fluid intelligence and premise integration ability predicted analytical reasoning on conflict problems after reasoning on the no-conflict problems was controlled for. The findings were related to three dual-process models of belief bias. They provide the first evidence of belief bias in transitive inference.     

Negative valence can evoke a liberal response bias in syllogistic reasoning

Recently, studies have demonstrated that negative valence reduces the magnitude of the belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning. This effect has been localized in the reasoning stage, in the form of increased deliberation on trials where validity and conclusion believability are incongruent. Here, using signal detection theory, we show that the attenuation of belief bias observed when valence was negative can also be evoked by a liberal response bias at the decision stage. Indeed, when valence was negative participants adopted a more liberal criterion for judging syllogisms as “valid,” and were overconfident in their judgments. They also displayed less sensitivity in distinguishing between valid and invalid syllogisms. Our findings dovetail with recent evidence from memory research suggesting that negative valence can evoke a liberal response bias without improving performance. Our novel contribution is the demonstration that the attenuating effect of negative valence on belief bias can take multiples routes—by influencing the decision stage as was the case here, the reasoning stage as has been demonstrated elsewhere, and potentially both stages.