Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition

We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question regarding the intentional and representational nature of cognition found in organisms simpler than human beings, because enactivists do not deny that more sophisticated cognitive phenomena are representational and involve content. After introducing the debate on the naturalization of intentionality (Sect. 2), we briefly review different varieties of enactivism and introduce their central claims (Sect. 3). In Sect. 4 we turn to radical enactivism in order to focus on the arguments for a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of perception and basic cognition. In particular, we discuss three major issues: First, what is supposed to replace the representational analysis of perception in a radical-enactive explanation of perception? How does the enactive explanation of perception compare to the best scientific work on the neuroscience of perception? Second, what is—on an enactive account—the function of neural processing in the brain for the generation of perception if not to produce representations? This question is especially pressing since one implication of autopoietic enactivism (accepted by radical enactivists) is that even the simplest organisms, i.e. single-celled organisms, have cognitive capacities (Sect. 5). Since they lack brains and nervous systems, enactivists must specify the (possibly) unique contribution of the brain and nervous system in those animals who have them. In Sect. 5, we evaluate the advantages of an autopoietic–enactive approach to the naturalization of intentionality and end with a suggestion how cognition may relate to intentionality and representation.

     

生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。     

Radicalizing numerical cognition

In recent decades, non-representational approaches to mental phenomena and cognition have been gaining traction in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. In these alternative approach, mental representations either lose their central status or, in its most radical form, are banned completely. While there is growing agreement that non-representational accounts may succeed in explaining some cognitive capacities (e.g. perception), there is widespread skepticism about the possibility of giving non-representational accounts of cognitive capacities such as memory, imagination or abstract thought. In this paper, I will critically examine the view that there are fundamental limitations to non-representational explanations of cognition. Rather than challenging these arguments on general grounds, I will examine a set of human cognitive capacities that are generally thought to fall outside the scope of non-representational accounts, i.e. numerical cognition. After criticizing standard representational accounts of numerical cognition for their lack of explanatory power, I will argue that a non-representational approach that is inspired by radical enactivism offers the best hope for developing a genuine naturalistic explanatory account for these cognitive capacities.

     

Cognitive approaches to posttraumatic stress disorder: the evolution of multirepresentational theorizing

The evolution of multirepresentational cognitive theorizing in psychopathology is illustrated by detailed discussion and analysis of a number of prototypical models of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Network and schema theories, which focus on a single, explicit aspect/format of mental representation, are compared with theories that focus on 2 or more explicit representational elements. The author argues that the latter theories provide a more complete account of PTSD data, though are not without their problems. Specifically, it is proposed that at least 3 separate representational elements-associative networks, verbal/propositional representations, and schemas-are required to generate a comprehensive cognitive theory of PTSD. The argument that the development of multirepresentational cognitive theory in PTSD is a paradigm case for the development of similar theories in other forms of psychopathology is elaborated, and a brief agenda is proposed promoting 2 levels of theorizing-deep, formal theory alongside more localized, applied theory.     

Representations in Distributed Cognitive Tasks

In this article we propose a theoretical framework of distributed representations and a methodology of representational analysis for the study of distributed cognitive tasks—tasks that require the processing of information distributed across the internal mind and the external environment. The basic principle of distributed representations Is that the representational system of a distributed cognitive task is a set of internal and external representations, which together represent the abstract structure of the task. The basic strategy of representational analysis is to decompose the representation of a hierarchical task into its component levels so that the representational properties at each level can be independently examined. The theoretical framework and the methodology are used to analyze the hierarchical structure of the Tower of Hanoi problem. Based on this analysis, four experiments are designed to examine the representational properties of the Tower of Hanoi. Finally, the nature of external representations is discussed.     

Representation-hunger reconsidered

According to a standard representationalist view cognitive capacities depend on internal content-carrying states. Recent alternatives to this view have been met with the reaction that they have, at best, limited scope, because a large range of cognitive phenomena—those involving absent and abstract features—require representational explanations. Here we challenge the idea that the consideration of cognition regarding the absent and the abstract can move the debate about representationalism along. Whether or not cognition involving the absent and the abstract requires the positing of representations depends upon whether more basic forms of cognition require the positing of representations.     

Stepping off the pendulum: Why only an action-based approach can transcend the nativist–empiricist debate

We argue that the nativist–empiricist debate in developmental psychology is distorted, both theoretically and methodologically, by a shared framework of assumptions concerning the nature of representation. In particular, both sides of the debate assume models of representation that make the emergence of representation impossible. This, in turn, distorts conceptions of cognitive development by forcing developmentally new representation to be constructed out of some already available (innate) foundation of atomistic representations – it forces a foundationalism. Contemporary nativists and empiricists differ with respect to the size and scope of such foundations, but are equally committed to some form of foundationalism. In further consequence, this foundationalism distorts methodologies by rendering any form of developmental emergence of representation impossible, and, thus, renders control conditions in experiments for such kinds of development (and their precursors) crucially irrelevant. We end by outlining an approach to modeling representation that is not committed to foundationalism because it explicitly models representational emergence. This is an action-based approach, with similarities to Piaget's model.     

The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A developmental hypothesis

In this paper we shall argue that mentalistic action explanations, which form an essential component of a mature theory of mind, are conceptually and developmentally derived from an earlier and purely teleological interpretational system present in infancy. First we summarize our evidence demonstrating teleological action explanations in one-year-olds. Then we shall briefly contrast the structure of teleological vs. causal mentalistic action explanations and outline four logical possibilities concerning the nature of the developmental relationship between them. We shall argue for the view that causal mentalistic action explanations are constructed as useful theoretical extensions of the earlier, purely teleological, nonmentalistic interpretational stance.     

Exemplars, prototypes, similarities, and rules in category representation: an example of hierarchical bayesian analysis

This article demonstrates the potential of using hierarchical Bayesian methods to relate models and data in the cognitive sciences. This is done using a worked example that considers an existing model of category representation, the Varying Abstraction Model (VAM), which attempts to infer the representations people use from their behavior in category learning tasks. The VAM allows for a wide variety of category representations to be inferred, but this article shows how a hierarchical Bayesian analysis can provide a unifying explanation of the representational possibilities using 2 parameters. One parameter controls the emphasis on abstraction in category representations, and the other controls the emphasis on similarity. Using 30 previously published data sets, this work shows how inferences about these parameters, and about the category representations they generate, can be used to evaluate data in terms of the ongoing exemplar versus prototype and similarity versus rules debates in the literature. Using this concrete example, this article emphasizes the advantages of hierarchical Bayesian models in converting model selection problems to parameter estimation problems, and providing one way of specifying theoretically based priors for competing models.     

A behavior-analytic account of cognitive bias in clinical populations

Cognitive bias refers to a well-established finding that individuals who suffer from certain clinical problems (e.g., depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, etc.) selectively attend to, remember, and interpret events relevant to their condition. Although a body of literature exists that has tried to examine this phenomenon, most existing explanations are mentalistic and mediational. In this paper we offer a behavior-analytic account of cognitive bias, its development, and how it may contribute to maintenance of clinical problems. This account is based on establishing operations or motivating events, verbal processes, and relational responding. Clinical and future research implications are also discussed.     

Situational features influencing young children's mentalistic explanations of action

This research assessed whether variable self-initiated movement and perceptual access to goals influence children to regard an action as mentalistically caused. In Study 1, preschoolers, first graders, and adults chose whether the actions of artifacts, insects, mammals, or humans were caused by mental or physical states. At all ages mental explanations were generally preferred in the presence (but not the absence) of the three situational cues (ps < .001). Also, the proportion of mental explanations by adults, and to a lesser extent by first graders, significantly increased depending upon the biological sophistication of the actor. In Study 2, preschoolers and first graders witnessed scenarios in which the presence of perceptual access or variable self-initiated movement was varied. Spontaneous mentalistic explanations of action were more common in both age groups when the feature of interest was present than when it was absent, ps < .001. Taken together, these studies suggest that children abstract specific features of action when construing its cause across disparate situations and actors and that doing so plays a vital role in learning when to generalize mentalistic explanations to new situations.     

Synthetic Neuroethology

Computation and philosophy intersect three times in this essay. Computation is considered as an object, as a method, and as a model used in a certain line of philosophical inquiry concerning the relation of mind to matter. As object, the question considered is whether computation and related notions of mental representation constitute the best ways to conceive of how physical systems give rise to mental properties. As method and model, the computational techniques of artificial life and embodied evolutionary connectionism are used to conduct prosthetically enhanced thought experiments concerning the evolvability of mental representations. Central to this essay is a discussion of the computer simulation and evolution of three-dimensional synthetic animals with neural network controllers. The minimally cognitive behavior of finding food by exhibiting positive chemotaxis is simulated with swimming and walking creatures. These simulations form the basis of a discussion of the evolutionary and neurocomputational bases of the incremental emergence of more complex forms of cognition. Other related work has been used to attack computational and representational theories of cognition. In contrast, I argue that the proper understanding of the evolutionary emergence of minimally cognitive behaviors is computational and representational through and through.     

Critical periods and catastrophic interference effects in the development of self-organizing feature maps

The use of self-organizing feature maps (SOFM) in models of cognitive development has frequently been associated with explanations of critical or sensitive periods. By contrast, error-driven connectionist models of development have been linked with catastrophic interference between new knowledge and old knowledge. We introduce a set of simulations that systematically evaluate the conditions under which SOFMs demonstrate critical/sensitive periods in development versus those under which they display interference effects. We explored the relative contribution of network parameters (for example, whether learning rate and neighbourhood reduce across training), the representational resources available to the network, and the similarity between old and new knowledge in determining the functional plasticity of the maps. The SOFMs that achieved the best discrimination and topographic organization also exhibited sensitive periods in development while showing lower plasticity and hence limited interference. However, fast developing, coarser SOFMs also produced topologically organized representations, while permanently retaining their plasticity. We argue that the impact of map organization on behaviour must be interpreted in terms of the cognitive processes that the map is driving.     

Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist's Challenge in Cognitive Science

Advocates of dynamical systems theory (DST) sometimes employ revolutionary rhetoric. In an attempt to clarify how DST models differ from others in cognitive science, I focus on two issues raised by DST: the role for representations in mental models and the conception of explanation invoked. Two features of representations are their role in standing-in for features external to the system and their format. DST advocates sometimes claim to have repudiated the need for stand-ins in DST models, but I argue that they are mistaken. Nonetheless, DST does offer new ideas as to the format of representations employed in cognitive systems. With respect to explanation, I argue that some DST models are better seen as conforming to the covering-law conception of explanation than to the mechanistic conception of explanation implicit in most cognitive science research. But even here, I argue, DST models are a valuable complement to more mechanistic cognitive explanations.     

The effect of external representations on numeric tasks

This article explores the effect of external representations on numeric tasks. Through several minor modifications on the previously reported two-digit number comparison task, we obtained different results. Rather than holistic comparison, we found parallel comparison. We argue that this difference was a reflection of different representational forms: The comparison was based on internal representations in previous studies but on external representations in our present study. This representational effect is discussed under a framework of distributed number representations. We propose that in numerical tasks involving external representations, numbers should be considered as distributed representations, and the behaviour in these tasks should be considered as the interactive processing of internal and external information through the interplay of perceptual and cognitive processes. We suggest that theories of number representations and process models of numerical cognition should consider external representations as an essential component.     

The perception/cognition distincton: Challenging the representational account

A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented —just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.