What is the Right to Exclude Immigrants?

It is normally taken for granted that states have a right to control immigration into their territory. When immigration is raised as a normative issue two questions become salient, one about what the right to exclude is, and one about whether and how it might be justified. This paper considers the first question. The paper starts by noting that standard debates about immigration have not addressed what the right to exclude is. Standard debates about immigration furthermore tend to result either in fairly strong cases for open borders or in denials that considerations of justice apply to immigration at all, which results in state discretion positions. This state of debate is both theoretically unsatisfactory and normatively implausible. The paper therefore explores an alternative approach to the right to exclude immigrants from the perspective of recent debates about the territorial rights of states. The right to exclude claimed by states is analysed and it is shown to differ both conceptually and normatively from rights to impose political authority within a territory. The paper finally indicates how this analysis might broaden the focus of debates about immigration and suggest alternative regimes of migration regulation the possibility of which is obscured by traditional justice approaches.     

What is the self? A psychobiological perspective

Philosophers have long struggled with questions about the nature of personal identity and of the self, with some viewing the self as a transcendent entity, and others arguing that the self is a constructed fiction. An approach based in cognitive-affective neuroscience emphasizes that self-related structures and processes are based in the brain-mind, and emerge within the social processes of human development. Alterations in such structures and processes are present in a wide range of neurological and psychiatric disorders, and neuropsychiatric lesion and functional brain imaging studies have led to more detailed awareness of the precise neuronal circuitry underlying self-representations. A cognitive-affective neuroscience approach provides a conceptual basis from which clinical research can further explore how best to assess and treat a wide range of disruptions to the self.     

RNA interference: a new mechanism by which FMRP acts in the normal brain? What can Drosophila teach us?

Fragile X syndrome is the most common heritable form of mental retardation caused by loss-of-function mutations in the FMR1 gene. The FMR1 gene encodes an RNA-binding protein that associates with translating ribosomes and acts as a negative translational regulator. Recent work in Drosophila melanogaster has shown that the fly homolog of FMR1 (dFMR1) plays an important role in regulating neuronal morphology, which may underlie the observed deficits in behaviors of dFMR1 mutant flies. Biochemical analysis has revealed that dFMR1 forms a complex that includes ribosomal proteins and, surprisingly, Argonaute2 (AGO2), an essential component of the RNA-induced silencing complex (RISC) that mediates RNA interference (RNAi) in Drosophila. dFMR1 also associates with Dicer, another essential processing enzyme of the RNAi pathway. Moreover, both a micro-RNA (miRNA) and short interfering RNAs (siRNAs) can coimmunoprecipitate with dFMR1. Together these findings suggest that dFMR1 functions in an RNAi-related apparatus to regulate the expression of its target genes at the level of translation. These findings raise the possibility that Fragile X syndrome may be the result of a protein synthesis abnormality caused by a defect in an RNAi-related apparatus. Because the core mechanisms of complex behaviors such as learning and memory and circadian rhythms appear to be conserved, studies of Fragile X syndrome using Drosophila as a model provide an economy-of-scale for identifying biological processes that likely underlie the abnormal morphology of dendritic spines and behavioral disturbances observed in Fragile X patients.     

What is to be done?

The overriding question in contemporary philosophy is as follows: We now have a reasonably well-established conception of the basic structure of the universe. But it is not at all easy to reconcile the basic facts we have come to know with a certain conception we have of ourselves, derived in part from our cultural inheritance but mostly from our own experience. Various aspects of this question are examined, concerning consciousness, intentionality, language, rationality, free will, society and institutions, politics, and ethics.     

What is the best way to promote cycling? A systematic review and meta-analysis

Cycling has the potential to address a number of personal and societal challenges, not least with respect to health and the need for more sustainable modes of transport. However, the best way(s) to promote cycling is still unclear. In an effort to answer this question, we identified 39 interventions designed to promote cycling, with a total sample of 46,102 participants. Random effects meta-analysis estimated a small but statistically significant effect of interventions on cycling behaviour (g₊ = 0.14, 95% CI [0.05, 0.23]). To identify the most effective intervention strategies, we coded the behaviour change techniques used within each of the interventions. Interventions that prompted people to self-monitor their behaviour or added objects to the environment (e.g., provided shared bikes) were more effective than those that did not use these strategies. Interventions that restructured the physical environment (e.g., built new cycle paths) were less effective than the studies that did not do this. We also identified a number of factors that moderated the effect of the interventions on outcomes; specifically, interventions that targeted a specific group, used objective measures of cycling such as accelerometers, and that were tested using independent groups designs typically yielded stronger effects. The findings should help to guide interventions to promote cycling in the future.     

What is the speed to transparent and kinetic-boundary displays?

To compare transparent motion and kinetic boundaries with unidirectional motion, in many studies the relative motion is generated by superimposing or adjoining unidirectional motions oriented in opposite directions. The presumption, tacitly underlying this comparison, is that the two oppositely directed velocities are independent of one another as far as their speed is concerned, i.e. the speed of the relative motion is presumed to be equivalent to the speed of the unidirectional components. Here we report that the relative motion between dots moving in opposite directions augments perceived speed. A constant-stimuli procedure was used to pair transparent-motion or kinetic-boundary displays with unidirectional motion, and human observers were asked to match the speed of the relative and unidirectional motions. The results show that transparency and kinetic boundaries increase the perceived visual speed by about 50%, compared with the speed of the individual components.     

What is A Philosophical Question?

There are many ways of understanding the nature of philosophical questions. One may consider their morphology, semantics, relevance, or scope. This article introduces a different approach, based on the kind of informational resources required to answer them. The result is a definition of philosophical questions as questions whose answers are in principle open to informed, rational, and honest disagreement, ultimate but not absolute, closed under further questioning, possibly constrained by empirical and logico‐mathematical resources, but requiring noetic resources to be answered. The article concludes with a discussion of some of the consequences of this definition for a conception of philosophy as the study (or “science”) of open questions, which uses conceptual design to analyse and answer them.     

What is enumerated by subitization mechanisms?

Subitization, the rapid enumeration of small numbers of objects, is often held to reflect a general ability to process three or four items simultaneously. However, questions as to which types of visual representations count as items for subitization have, thus far, received relatively little attention. In several new experiments, we instructed participants to enumerate three or four colored regions in a display. In some trials, all of these regions belonged to separate visual objects, whereas in others, two or more belonged to the same object(s). We found far slower enumeration in the latter case than in the former case, a result that cannot be attributed to Stroop interference from the number of attended objects in a display. We conclude that subitization mechanisms cannot operate on small fragments of shape and color alone, even when such fragments are easily individuated from one another. Rather, such mechanisms are compelled to operate on object representations.     

What is the diplopia threshold?

The magnitude and nature of the diplopia threshold, that is, the value of the retinal disparity at which binocular single vision ends, were studied in four experiments. The results show that the magnitude of the diplopia threshold is highly dependent on the subject tested (differences up to a factor of 6), the amount of training the subject has received (differences up to a factor of 2.5), the criterion used for diplopia (limits for unequivocal singleness of vision were up to a factor of 3 lower than those for unequivocal doubleness of vision), and the conspicuousness of disparity that can be influenced both by the surrounding stimuli (differences up to a factor of 3.5) and stereoscopic depth (differences up to a factor of 4.5). Our data do not confirm previous findings of interference effects associated with the initial appearance of binocular disparity when test stimuli are presented tachistoscopically. A remarkable finding was that the magnitude of the diplopia threshold seems to be determined by the amount of intrinsic noise in the disparity domain, as revealed by the standard deviations of the thresholds for tachistoscopically presented test stimuli. The overall results suggest that the diplopia threshold is, in essence, not the rigid boundary of a dead zone, but, rather, a disparity level corresponding to a lenient criterion for singleness of vision which leads touseful interpretation of the percept of the stimulus without disparity, given the variability of this percept due to intrinsic noise in the disparity domain.     

What is the Grounding Problem?

A philosophical standard in the debates concerning material constitution is the case of a statue and a lump of clay, Lumpl and Goliath respectively. According to the story, Lumpl and Goliath are coincident throughout their respective careers. Monists hold that they are identical; pluralists that they are distinct. This paper is concerned with a particular objection to pluralism, the Grounding Problem. The objection is roughly that the pluralist faces a legitimate explanatory demand to explain various differences she alleges between Lumpl and Goliath, but that the pluralist’s theory lacks the resources to give any such explanation. In this paper, I explore the question of whether there really is any problem of this sort. I argue (i) that explanatory demands that are clearly legitimate are easy for the pluralist to meet; (ii) that even in cases of explanatory demands whose legitimacy is questionable the pluralist has some overlooked resources; and (iii) there is some reason for optimism about the pluralist’s prospects for meeting every legitimate explanatory demand. In short, no clearly adequate statement of a Grounding Problem is extant, and there is some reason to believe that the pluralist can overcome any Grounding Problem that we haven’t thought of yet.     

What is the axiomatic method?

The modern notion of the axiomatic method developed as a part of the conceptualization of mathematics starting in the nineteenth century. The basic idea of the method is the capture of a class of structures as the models of an axiomatic system. The mathematical study of such classes of structures is not exhausted by the derivation of theorems from the axioms but includes normally the metatheory of the axiom system. This conception of axiomatization satisfies the crucial requirement that the derivation of theorems from axioms does not produce new information in the usual sense of the term called depth information. It can produce new information in a different sense of information called surface information. It is argued in this paper that the derivation should be based on a model-theoretical relation of logical consequence rather than derivability by means of mechanical (recursive) rules. Likewise completeness must be understood by reference to a model-theoretical consequence relation. A correctly understood notion of axiomatization does not apply to purely logical theories. In the latter the only relevant kind of axiomatization amounts to recursive enumeration of logical truths. First-order “axiomatic” set theories are not genuine axiomatizations. The main reason is that their models are structures of particulars, not of sets. Axiomatization cannot usually be motivated epistemologically, but it is related to the idea of explanation.