Joint-space analysis of “pick-any” data: Analysis of choices from an unconstrained set of alternatives

Social and naturally occurring choice phenomena are often of the pick-any type in which the number of choices made by a subject as well as the set of alternatives from which they are chosen is unconstrained. These data present a special analytical problem because the meaning of non-choice among pick-any choice data is always ambiguous: A non-chosen alternative may be either unacceptable, or acceptable but not considered, or acceptable and considered but not chosen. A model and scaling method for these data are introduced, allowing for this ambiguity of non-choice. Subjects are represented as points whose coordinates are proportional to the centroids of the points representing their choices. Alternatives are represented at points whose coordinates are proportional to the centroids of the points representing subjects who have chosen them. This centroid scaling technique estimates multidimensional joint spaces from the pick-any data.I am indebted to John Baird, Clyde Coombs, David Eames, John Hunter, Michael J. Levine, Elliot Noma, Robert Z. Norman, William S. Roy, Joseph Schwartz, Daniel Velleman, the editor, and anonymous reviewers for ideas and suggestions that have been incorporated into this work. Conferences organized by Hans J. Hummel for the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (1977) and by Samuel Leinhardt for the National Science Foundation (1975) were instrumental in the development of this work.     

Upper bounds for Kruskal's stress

In this paper the relationships between the two formulas for stress proposed by Kruskal in 1964 are studied. It is shown that stress formula one has a system of nontrivial upper bounds. It seems likely that minimization of this loss function will be liable to produce solutions for which this upper bound is small. These are regularly shaped configurations. Even though stress formula two yields less equivocal results, it seems to be expected that minimization of this loss function will tend to produce configurations in which the points are clumped. These results give no clue as to which of the two loss functions is to be preferred.This study has been supported by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Zuiver-Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research), under grant 56-146.Comments by Willem Heiser and Frank Critichley have been very helpful.The second author presently is employed by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics, Voorburg.     

Component analysis with different sets of constraints on different dimensions

Many of the classical multivariate data analysis and multidimensional scaling techniques call for approximations by lower dimensional configurations. A model is proposed, in which different sets of linear constraints are imposed on different dimensions in component analysis and classical multidimensional scaling frameworks. A simple, efficient, and monotonically convergent algorithm is presented for fitting the model to the data by least squares. The basic algorithm is extended to cover across-dimension constraints imposed in addition to the dimensionwise constraints, and to the case of a symmetric data matrix. Examples are given to demonstrate the use of the method.The work reported in this paper has been supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, grant number A6394, and by the McGill-IBM Cooperative Grant, both granted to the first author. The research of H. A. L. Kiers has been made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. We thank Michael Hunter for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Basic Final Value and Zimmerman’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Nature of Intrinsic Value</Emphasis>

This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its pitfalls.     

Michael K. Scullin: Psi Chi/APA Edwin B. Newman Graduate Research Award

Presents Michael K. Scullin as the 2011 winner of the American Psychological Association Psi Chi/APA Edwin B. Newman Graduate Research Award. "For an outstanding research paper that examines the relationship between prospective memory in executing a goal and various lapses of time from 20 minutes up to a 12- hour wake delay and a 12-hour sleep delay. The results suggest that consolidation processes active during sleep increase the probability of goal execution. The paper, titled 'Remembering to Execute a Goal: Sleep On It!' was published in Psychological Science in 2010 and was the basis for Michael K. Scullin's selection as the recipient of the 2011 Psi Chi/APA Edwin B. Newman Graduate Research Award. Mark A. McDaniel, PhD, served as faculty research advisor." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).     

An analysis and synthesis of multiple correspondence analysis,optimal scaling,dual scaling,homogeneity analysis and other methods for quantifying categorical multivariate data

We discuss a variety of methods for quantifying categorical multivariate data. These methods have been proposed in many different countries, by many different authors, under many different names. In the first major section of the paper we analyze the many different methods and show that they all lead to the same equations for analyzing the same data. In the second major section of the paper we introduce the notion of a duality diagram, and use this diagram to synthesize the many superficially different methods into a single method.The ideas in this paper were worked out by the first author, with some suggestions provided by the second. The current version of this paper has evolved from three previous versions, the first two written by the first author.     

Action of structures,structure of actions

This paper was throught of as a form of silent dialogue with my friend Michael Wright. As such, it has the merits, if any, and the defects of a flowing course of thoughts that entersin medias res with less feignings than in standard philosophical literature.     

Hearing the roar

In this paper I will discuss the case of an older male patient, Michael, and that of a little boy, Daniel. In both cases the archetypal image of a roaring lion has interesting clinical implications. However, the symbol of the lion had a totally different meaning for each patient as the case material will demonstrate.     

MULTIPLE UNIVERSES AND THE FINE-TUNING ARGUMENT: A RESPONSE TO RODNEY HOLDER

Abstract:  In this article I examine a common objection to the fine-tuning argument (an objection which may be referred to as the atheistic many universes (AMU) objection). A reply to this objection due to Roger White has been the subject of much controversy; White's reply has been criticized by Rodney Holder, on the one hand, and Neil Manson and Michael Thrush on the other. In this paper I analyze Holder's work in an effort to determine whether the AMU objection successfully defeats the fine-tuning argument. I conclude that the fine-tuning argument can be reformulated so as to avoid the AMU objection.     

Relevant implication and the case for a weaker logic

We collect together some misgivings about the logic R of relevant inplication, and then give support to a weak entailment logic DJ^d. The misgivings centre on some recent negative results concerning R, the conceptual vacuousness of relevant implication, and the treatment of classical logic. We then rectify this situation by introducing an entailment logic based on meaning containment, rather than meaning connection, which has a better relationship with classical logic. Soundness and completeness results are proved for DJ^d with respect to a content semantics, which embraces the concept of meaning containment.Dedicated to Robert K. Meyer on the occasion of his 60th birthdayThis paper was presented to the Australasian Association for Logic Conference, A.N.U., Canberra, in July, 1992. This Conference commemorated the 60th birthday of Robert K. Meyer, in recognition of the enormous contribution he has made to Logic, especially to Relevant Logic, and of the general lift he has given to the field in his adopted country, Australia. This paper owes its inspiration to Robert Meyer's Farewell to Entailment [37] and his earlier Why I am not a Relevantist [35]. This paper also owes a great deal to Richard Sylvan who has consistently supported weaker relevant logics at a time when stronger relevant logics were in vogue (see especially [47], Chapter 3). In writing this paper, I have also benefited from conversations with Nuel Belnap, Michael Dunn, Kit Fine and Alasdair Urquhart during a period of study leave in 1991. I also thank Robert Meyer, Michael Dunn, Martin Bunder and John Slaney for useful comments on my conference paper. I would also like to thank the referees of this Journal for their helpful comments, which led me to make substantial improvements to this paper.     

On an alleged problem for Frege's account of number

I am grateful to Michael Dummett for his criticism of an earlier draft of this paper.     

‘Coordinative definition’ and Reichenbach''s semantic framework: A reassessment

My greatest debt is to Prof. Hilary Putnam, without whose inspiration and encouragement this paper would not have been written. Thanks are also due to Prof. Michael Friedman for detailed and helpful comments on an earlier version, and to two anonymous referees. This paper is based in part on research conducted while supported under a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship.     

Sellars,concepts and conceptual change

Much discussion in recent philosophy of science assumes an holistic view of conceptual systems without providing any analysis of the nature of such systems. For several decades, however, Sellars has been attempting to develop and defend such a view. In this paper I examine Sellars' version of an holistic theory of concepts, discuss some of the objections to this view, and consider what insight Sellars' analysis can provide for problems concerning the introduction of new scientific concepts, and the nature of conceptual change in science.I want to thank Peter Barker, Gary Gutting, Paul Teller, Michael Tye, and especially Richard Burian, for comments on earlier versions of this paper.     

Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice

Philosophical attention to problems about global justice is flourishing in a way it has not in any time in memory. This paper considers some reasons for the rise of interest in the subject and reflects on some dilemmas about the meaning of the idea of the cosmopolitan in reasoning about social institutions, concentrating on the two principal dimensions of global justice, the economic and the political.Opening address of the Mini-Conference on Global Justice, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, 2004 Annual Meeting, Pasadena, California, March 27, 2004. I am grateful for comments to Darrel Moellendorf and to my copanelists Michael Blake, Kristen Hessler, Jon Mandle, Mathias Risse and Leif Wenar.     

Empathy,Tact and the Freedom to be Natural

This paper explores the concepts of tact and empathy in the context of the Freud–Ferenczi correspondence around Ferenczi’s “The Elasticity of Psycho-Analytic Technique” paper. It goes on to explore the problems that they encounter in the neighborhood of reconciling science and subjectivity, in relation to the work on personal knowledge of the Hungarian philosopher Michael Polanyi and concludes with some implications for psychoanalytic training.     

Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness

Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most developed view to this effect is Michael Huemer ’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Luca Moretti has recently shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates.     

Notes on conditional logic

This paper consists of some lecture notes in which conditional logic is treated as an extension of modal logic. Completeness and filtration theorems are provided for some basis systems. These notes were originally drafted for a course given at the University of Auckland in 1987 (Philosophy 29.308). The work reported in Section 5 is due to Michael Strevens, who took the course and presented his conception of a filtration in a term paper [5]. The author wishes to thank Strevens for many stimulating discussions and for permission to include his results here     

Aristotle’s Concept of Potentiality in Metaphysics Book Θ

It is controversial whether δ?ναμι? in Metaphysics Book Θ has two distinct senses, one of which is strict, called “power,” and the other is the “more useful sense,” called “potentiality.” This paper argues that there are indeed two senses of δ?ναμι? in Metaphysics Θ, refuting Michael Frede’s “unitarian interpretation.” Distinguished from power, potentiality is neither Aristotelian nature, nor possibility, nor capacity for being, but rather a way of being. This paper examines the ontological meanings and the features of potentiality as a way of being. Basically, potentiality has a dual status, that is, it is being, on the one hand, and not-being on the other. Furthermore, it has a teleological direction toward its correlative actuality, which explains how potentiality ontologically depends on actuality and why actuality is substantially prior to potentiality.     

On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth

An intuitive argument for scientific realism suggests that our successes in predicting and intervening would be inexplicable if the theories that generate them were not approximately true. This argument faces many objections, some of which are briefly addressed in this paper, and one of which is treated in more detail. The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth-as-correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds to that criticism, in versions proposed by Michael Williams, Michael Levin, and, especially, Paul Horwich, by arguing that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation. If we probe more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth.