The ethics and politics of the brain drain: A communal alternative to liberal perspectives

In Debating Brain Drain, Gillian Brock and Michael Blake both draw on a liberal moral-political foundation to address the issue, but they come to different conclusions about it. Despite the commonly held value of free and equal persons having a dignity that grounds human rights, Brock concludes that many medical professionals who leave a developing country soon after having received training there are wrong to do so (if they do not provide compensation) and that the state may place some limits on their ability to exit, whereas Blake infers that there is neither any wrongdoing on their part, nor rightful restrictions placed on them. In this article, rather than sort out which has the better interpretation of what liberalism entails, I consider the medical brain drain in the light of an alternative normative framework, one informed by ideals of communion salient in the sub-Saharan moral tradition. I argue that a principle of prizing communal relationships more naturally entails Brock’s conclusions than does her appeal to liberalism.     

Doctors with borders? An authority-based approach to the brain drain1

According to the brain drain argument, there are good reasons for states to limit the exit of their skilled workers (more specifically, healthcare workers), because of the negative impacts this type of migration has for other members of the community from which they migrate. Some theorists criticise this argument as illiberal, while others support it and ground a duty to stay of the skilled workers on rather vague concepts like patriotic virtue, or the legitimate expectations of their state and co-citizens. In this article, on the contrary, we suggest that the liberal conception of states’ legitimate political authority demands, and not just permits, that developing states from which migration of skilled workers occurs set up contractual mechanisms. These mechanisms will ensure that state-funded training in the health sector is provided against a commitment on the part of future professionals to reciprocate with their services for the benefits obtained. If one of the conditions for the state to maintain legitimate political authority is to provide basic services such as healthcare to its subjects (while respecting at the same time their autonomy and freedom), then this is what developing states affected by the brain drain ought to do. What we call the authority-based approach to the brain drain also helps to clarify the obligations that other states have not to interfere with these contractual mechanisms when they exist, and not to profit from their absence. Inspired by FIFA’s legal instruments of training compensation and solidarity mechanism for the transfer of players, we conclude by suggesting a plausible global policy to complement this authority-based approach.     

Debating brain drain: Three objections that complicate the picture

In my contribution to this brain drain debate sparked by Brock and Blake’s book, Debating Brain Drain, I respond only to Brock’s position, and raise three objections which I suggest complicate the picture that she sketches. First, I take issue with the way in which she frames the moral question, namely by limiting her focus to what home countries may legitimately do to address the problems associated with the brain drain. I argue that the way in which she frames the question has important ideological consequences, because she does not adequately account for the larger context, in particular, by leaving out the moral obligations of the host countries who are the main beneficiaries of the brain drain. My second objection is rooted in the distinction between technical knowledge and practical knowledge found in the work of Habermas – an important distinction which gets obscured in Brock’s analysis in precisely the kind of ideological ways that Habermas was concerned about. She namely attempts to solve what are mainly practical (political) problems through purely instrumental, technical means. Several distortions accompany this fundamental confusion. My third point of critique has to do with the problem that an ethics of care (an ethics of responsibility and obligation) encounters within a liberal paradigm strongly shaped by an ethics of rights. Drawing on the work of Kroeger-Mappes, I argue that Brock arbitrarily singles out a group of people and holds them to an ethics of care which is strictly supererogatory within her own liberal paradigm.     

Reverse migration,brain drain and global justice

This paper contributes to the discussion of the ethics of brain drain against the background of the book Debating Brain Drain co-authored by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake. Whereas Gillian Brock argued in this book that a plausible response of global justice would, under certain conditions, permit that developing countries impose taxes or demand compulsory service from their professionals who emigrate, Michael Blake rejects such claims in his defence of the right to emigrate. Extending this debate to the context of reverse immigration, I attempt in this paper to establish if the arguments provided by both scholars are capable of accounting for the cogency or otherwise of preference in reverse immigration. My proposal is that the arguments provided by both Brock and Blake require further contextualisation to make them capable of deciding the question of preference in reverse immigration.     

Emigration and community

In this paper I consider Gillian Brock’s and Michael Blake’s discussion of emigration in Debating Brain Drain in relation to the particular case of South Africa, and explore whether skilled white people have a duty to remain in the country. Focusing on the role of community in this debate, I argue that communities and allegiances in South Africa are still too divided and antagonistic for them to play the duty-grounding role that Brock requires.     

Why Migration Justice Still Requires Open Borders

I revisit themes from Against Borders: Why the World Needs Free Movement of People (2020) in dialogue with Gillian Brock's Justice of People on the Move (2020) and Sarah Song's Immigration and Democracy (2019). We share the conviction that current border regimes are deeply unjust but differ in what migration justice requires. Brock and Song continue to give states significant discretion to exclude people from entering and settling in their territories, whereas I contend that migration justice demands open borders. I reject the claim that state self-determination justifies migration restrictions. Central arguments for open borders highlight the role that restrictive border controls and the state category of ‘immigrant’ play in upholding racialised hierarchies and exploitative economic relations, as well as in inflicting violence against mobile people.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

Do you have to let it linger? – Political membership that remains after territorial exit

In this paper, I argue that one permissible solution to the problem of brain drain from less developed countries is to level a tax on the money skilled emigrant workers earn within more developed countries. Contrary to both Brock and Blake, this tax may be levelled even if it was not announced to the emigrants in advance of their training in their home country, and even if they never explicitly agreed to accept that tax as a condition on that training. This is because the emigrants are still political members within their home country – though their membership fades away gradually with time spent in their new country – and can thus be subjected to the burdens of political membership, including redistributive taxation.     

“Caught in the Same Webs”<Emphasis Type="Italic">—</Emphasis>Service Providers’ Insights on Gender-Based and Structural Violence Among Female Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada

Drawing on the experiences of service providers supporting live-in caregivers and migrant agricultural workers in two Canadian provinces (Ontario and Quebec), we explore how structural violence shapes the precarious conditions of female temporary foreign workers. Service providers emphasized how transnational social pressures on women to maintain employment, the captivity involved in women’s employment contracts, the limits on unionization, and women’s isolation and lack of privacy, act together to create an unbalanced relationship between the employer and female worker. In turn, this leads to precarious migration and work conditions that foster a vulnerability to violence and abuse while at the same time limiting access to and delivery of services and social support to female temporary foreign workers. Amid these restrictions, service providers focus on making a difference where they can through initiatives such as human rights education workshops, offering support, understanding Canadian regulation, and empowerment workshops. Greater Canadian national options for permanent residency status could provide a basis for adequate services to temporary foreign workers as part of their universal human rights. Temporary foreign workers contribute to Canadian society, making it encumbant upon the Canadian state to ensure the respect of their universal human rights.     

Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument

According to John Searle’s well-known Is-Ought Argument, it is possible to derive an ought-statement from is-statements only. This argument concerns obligations involved in institutions such as promising, and it relies on the idea that institutions can be conceptualized in terms of constitutive rules. In this paper, I argue that the structure of this argument has never been fully appreciated. Starting from my status account of constitutive rules, I reconstruct the argument and establish that it is valid. This reconstruction reveals that the soundness of the argument depends on whether collective acceptance as such can generate obligations. Margaret Gilbert has argued that it can, and thus far some of her central arguments have not been addressed. The upshot is that the Is-Ought Argument deserves to be taken seriously once again.     

Truth and consequences

In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself.     

Examining the Unique Characteristics of a Non-Probability Sample of Undocumented Female Sex Workers with Dependent Children: The Case of Haitians in the Dominican Republic

Haitians in the Dominican Republic (DR) are increasingly marginalized due to recent legislation that stripped Haitian-Dominicans of their citizenship and increased Haitian migrants’ deportation risk. Haitian female sex workers (FSWs) are particularly vulnerable, though little is known about them. This study will help public health efforts targeted at sex workers to better reach Haitian FSWs and address their needs by identifying a profile of characteristics unique to this group compared to Dominican FSWs. Data were collected in 2014 among Haitian and Dominican FSWs in Puerto Plata, DR. Surveys assessed respondents’ demographics, health consciousness, depression, and stigma. Adjusted logistic regressions showed that Haitian FSWs were disadvantaged: they had significantly lower rates of education, more children, and less permanent income. Furthermore, Haitian FSWs were more likely to work independently and for fewer hours. Interestingly, Haitian FSWs internalized less stigma than Dominicans. Though we can only speculate, this could be due to migration for sex work, or the lack of formal employment for Haitians. Initiatives to alleviate poverty, create formal jobs, and overturn discriminatory legislation may have the most impact for Haitian FSWs.     

‘Mutual Obligation’ and ‘New Deal’: Illegitimate and Unjustified?

It is now commonplace for governments in Western countries to require the unemployed to work in exchange for their unemployment benefits. In this article I raise some serious doubts about the most promising and philosophically interesting defence of this argument, which relies on the ‘principle of reciprocity’. I argue that it is seriously unclear whether the obligations imposed on welfare claimants by ‘workfare’ schemes are legitimate and justified according to the principle of reciprocity. I do this by reconstructing the arguments for the obligations of the unemployed put forward in both the United Kingdom and Australia.     

Welfare, Work Requirements, and Dependant-Care

abstract This article considers the justice of requiring employment as a condition of receiving public assistance. While none of the main theories of justice prohibits work requirements, the arguments in their favour are weak. Arguments based on reciprocity fail to explain why only means‐tested public benefits should be subject to work requirements, and why unpaid dependant care work should not count as satisfying citizens’ obligations to reciprocate. Arguments based on promoting the work ethic misattribute recipients’ nonwork to deviant values, when their core problem is finding steady employment consistent with supporting a family and meeting dependant care responsibilities. Rigid work requirements impose unreasonable costs on some of the poor. A welfare system based on a rebuttable presumption that recipients will work for pay, conjoined with more generous work supports, would promote justice better than either unconditional welfare or strict requirements [ 1 ].     

Place and World: On Jeff Malpas’ Second Edition of Place and Experience

ABSTRACT

Jeff Malpas’ book Experience and Place has become a significant landmark in philosophy. I take the publication of the revised and extended second edition of the book in 2018 as an opportunity to reflect on some key issues in Malpas’ thought. After briefly outlining Malpas’ commitment to topophilia and topoanalysis, I address, in the first part of my essay, the relation of place to subjectivity and normativity, pointing out certain shortcomings or ambiguities in Malpas’ account. I also critically discuss the omission of an account of migration, or, rather, immigration, which seems called for, especially if we realize that the inhabited place always comes with its limit or border, which implies that there is also a view from outside, and that we have moral obligations to the stranger and/or immigrant coming into our place from outside. In the second part of my essay, I engage Malpas’ argument according to which Heidegger ‘derived’ space from time. By an analysis of relevant texts in Heidegger, I show that this argument does not hold.     

Fiduciary Duties and the Ethics of Public Apology

The practice of official apology has a fairly poor reputation. Dismissed as ‘crocodile tears’ or cheap grace, such apologies are often seen by the public as an easy alternative to more punitive or expensive ways of taking real responsibility. I focus on what I call the role‐playing criticism: the argument that someone who offers an apology in public cannot be appropriately apologetic precisely because they are only playing a role. I offer a qualified defence of official apologies against this objection, considering them through the lens of fiduciary duties. This focus draws our attention to formal or impersonal relationships that are nevertheless normatively rich, capable of sustaining trust, concern, and care. At the same time, I highlight several pitfalls for fiduciary apologisers, including the tension between apology as a mode of truth telling and the duty of confidentiality. I consider whether the fiduciary apologiser, in reflecting on her fiduciary obligations, has ‘one thought too many’ for genuine apology, and argue that the issue of mixed motives is not limited to fiduciary contexts, cautioning against excessive idealism in our conception of apology. I conclude with some reflections on possible conflicts between fiduciary obligations and the conscientious desire to apologise.     

Approximating Cartesian Closed Categories in NF-Style Set Theories

I criticize, but uphold the conclusion of, an argument by McLarty to the effect that New Foundations style set theories don’t form a suitable foundation for category theory. McLarty’s argument is from the fact that Set and Cat are not Cartesian closed in NF-style set theories. I point out that these categories do still have a property approximating Cartesian closure, making McLarty’s argument not conclusive. After considering and attempting to address other problems with developing category theory in NF-style set theories, I conclude that NF-style set theories are not a good foundation for category theory, because of numerous limitations introduced by their stratification restrictions.     

The impact of visual exploration of judgments of whether a gap is crossable

When observers look down into a gap in the ground plane, their judgments of the widest gap they can step across (gapmax) decrease as gap depth increases (Y. Jiang & L. S. Mark, 1994). This study investigated the possibility that Jiang and Mark's viewing conditions did not afford observers a sufficient opportunity to perform exploratory movements needed to detect information about gap width. Experiment 1 showed that the gap depth by gaze interaction disappeared only when restrictions were not imposed on observers' exploratory activities (eye, head, and body movements). Experiment 2 showed that observers tended to see the vertical surface as slanted away from them, which made the bottom of the surface appear farther away from them than the top. Only when observers were able to view the gap binocularly under conditions that did not restrict exploratory activity did their slant perception improve and their gapmax judgments no longer covary with gap depth. The data indicate that the exploratory movements of prospective actors are essential for the pickup of information about their action capabilities.     

Caught in a Lie: The Rise and Fall of a Respectable Deviant

ABSTRACT

In this study, we draw on the concept of respectable deviance to understand the journey into deviance – from her rise as an alternative health expert through to her public disgrace – of Belle Gibson, a young Australian blogger, app publisher, and alternative medicine advocate who falsely claimed to have cured cancer without reverting to science-based medicine. Through the rigorous analysis of a series of media and documentary sources where Ms Gibson provided autobiographical accounts of her life experience, the argument is presented that the promotion of one’s self as a health expert and subsequently being outed as a fraudster encourages techniques of neutralization and particular presentations of self to respond and manage negative labeling and the stigma attached.     

Feminist Pioneer: Annette Brodsky Paving the Way

ABSTRACT

Even when the culture imposed stringent limitations on women’s roles, Dr. Annette Brodsky refused to succumb to these restrictions. As one of only a few women in her graduate school cohort, she broke new ground during her pre-doctoral internship, her post-internship military placement, and in her faculty position at the University of Alabama. Her renowned work advocating for and studying the effect of consciousness-raising groups engendered critical scholarship that revealed the harm of therapists’ sexual abuse and facilitated improved ethics and guidelines for psychologists in their work with clients. Dr. Brodsky has served as a pioneering feminist psychologist for several generations of women.