Semantic guidance of attention within natural scenes

When viewing real-world scenes composed of a myriad of objects, detecting changes can be quite difficult, especially when transients are masked. In general, changes are noticed more quickly and accurately if they occur at the currently (or a recently) attended location. Here, we examine the effects of explicit and implicit semantic cues on the guidance of attention in a change detection task. Participants first attempted to read aloud a briefly presented prime word, then looked for a difference between two alternating versions of a real-world scene. Helpful primes named the object that changed, while misdirecting primes named another (unchanging) object in the picture. Robust effects were found for both explicit and implicit priming conditions, with helpful primes yielding faster change detection times than misdirecting or neutral primes. This demonstrates that observers are able to use higher order semantic information as a cue to guide attention within a natural scene, even when the semantic information is presented outside of explicit awareness.     

Kinship recognition by unrelated observers depends on implicit and explicit cognition

Previous studies have shown that neutral observers are able to identify kinship in strangers by matching photographs of children with their parents. We asked whether this ability depended on implicit and/or explicit cognitive processes. Fifty unrelated male observers viewed triads of photographs (one woman in her early 20's and two older women) and had to select which of the two older women was the mother, and rate their confidence in their decision. Observers identified 62.5% of mother-daughter pairs correctly (p < .001). Signal detection analyses showed that confidence was related to accuracy (d' = .28) and observers could report the cues they utilized. However, those who failed to show a relationship between confidence and accuracy (d' ≤ 0) still performed significantly above chance, and both confidence and d' decreased over trials whereas accuracy did not. Results show that neutral observers spontaneously used both explicit and implicit cognitive processes in the task. Recognition of kinship by neutral observers may be a task which allows the interplay between explicit and implicit cognition for a system relevant to ancestral social environments to be observed in the laboratory.     

Why Self-enhancement Provokes Dislike: The Hubris Hypothesis and the Aversiveness of Explicit Self-superiority Claims

Most people believe that they are in many respects superior to others. When they publicly express their superiority, they may do so in an explicitly or implicitly comparative manner (“I am better than others” vs. “I am good”). According to the hubris hypothesis, observers dislike explicit self-superiority claims, because these suggest a negative view of others and hence of the observers. The results of two experiments were consistent with the hubris hypothesis. Participants evaluated explicit self-superiority claimants more unfavorably than implicit self-superiority claimants (Experiments 1–2). They attributed less warmth, but not less competence, to explicit than implicit self-superiority claimants (Experiment 2), and this occurred to the extent that participants inferred a negative view of others (Experiments 1–2) and hence of them (Experiment 2).     

Eastern observers cannot inhibit their gaze to eye and nose regions in face perception

It has been found that Western observers cannot inhibit their gaze to the eye region, even if they are told to avoid doing so when they observe face stimuli because of the importance of the eye region. However, studies indicate that the nose region is more important for face processing among Eastern observers. We used the “don’t look” paradigm with Eastern observers, in which participants were told to avoid fixating on a specific region (eye, nose, and mouth). The results extend previous findings as both the eye and nose regions attracted their gaze. Interestingly, the fixation behaviors differed for the eyes and nose in terms of the time-dependent view, in which reflexive saccades to the eye with a persistent fixation to the nose were observed. The nose regions could have stronger attractiveness than previously thought.     

Recollective performance advantages for implicit memory tasks

A commonly held assumption is that processes underlying explicit and implicit memory are distinct. Recent evidence, however, suggests that they may interact more than previously believed. Using the remember–know procedure the current study examines the relation between recollection, a process thought to be exclusive to explicit memory, and performance on two implicit memory tasks, lexical decision and word stem completion. We found that, for both implicit tasks, words that were recollected were associated with greater priming effects than were words given a subsequent familiarity rating or words that had been studied but were not recognised (misses). Broadly, our results suggest that non-voluntary processes underlying explicit memory also benefit priming, a measure of implicit memory. More specifically, given that this benefit was due to a particular aspect of explicit memory (recollection), these results are consistent with some strength models of memory and with Moscovitch's (2008) proposal that recollection is a two-stage process, one rapid and unconscious and the other more effortful and conscious.     

Musical stem completion: humming that note

This study looked at how people store and retrieve tonal music explicitly and implicitly using a production task. Participants completed an implicit task (tune stem completion) followed by an explicit task (cued recall). The tasks were identical except for the instructions at test time. They listened to tunes and were then presented with tune stems from previously heard tunes and novel tunes. For the implicit task, they were asked to sing a note they thought would come next musically. For the explicit task, they were asked to sing the note they remembered as coming next. Experiment 1 found that people correctly completed significantly more old stems than new stems. Experiment 2 investigated the characteristics of music that fuel retrieval by varying a surface feature of the tune (same timbre or different timbre) from study to test and the encoding task (semantic or nonsemantic). Although we did not find that implicit and explicit memory for music were significantly dissociated for levels of processing, we did find that surface features of music affect semanticjudgments and subsequent explicit retrieval.     

Detecting Changes in Novel,Complex Three-dimensional Objects

Four experiments assessed change detection performance for displays consisting of a single, novel, multipart object, leading to several new findings. First, larger changes (involving more object parts) were more difficult to detect than smaller changes. Second, change detection performance for displays of a temporarily occluded moving object was no more or less sensitive than detection performance for displays of static objects disappearing and reappearing; however, item analyses did indicate that detection may have been based on different representations in these two situations. Third, training observers to recognize objects before the detection task had no measurable effect on sensitivity levels, but induced different biases depending on the training conditions. Finally, some participants' performance revealed implicit change detection on trials in which they explicitly responded that they saw no change.     

The relationship between change detection and recognition of centrally attended objects in motion pictures

Observers typically detect changes to central objects more readily than changes to marginal objects, but they sometimes miss changes to central, attended objects as well. However, even if observers do not report such changes, they may be able to recognize the changed object. In three experiments we explored change detection and recognition memory for several types of changes to central objects in motion pictures. Observers who failed to detect a change still performed at above chance levels on a recognition task in almost all conditions. In addition, observers who detected the change were no more accurate in their recognition than those who did not detect the change. Despite large differences in the detectability of changes across conditions, those observers who missed the change did not vary in their ability to recognize the changing object.     

内隐觉察的行为和神经活动特征

变化盲视是指在某些条件下人们往往觉察不到视觉场景中实质性的改变。最近研究表明,变化盲视发生时个体虽然不能有意识地报告变化,但却能无意识地对变化刺激进行加工和反应,也就是产生了内隐觉察。内隐觉察能够引导注意、影响反应速度。与觉察和无觉察相比,内隐觉察的眼动模式具有鲜明的特征。与无变化试次相比,盲视试次可以观察到显著的脑电活动变化以及不同的脑区激活。内隐觉察的研究虽然取得了丰富的成果,但也还存在着一些需要明确和解决的问题,如左侧前额叶在内隐觉察中的作用,以及如何将没有视觉干扰的范式应用到变化觉察的神经活动测量中等。     

Gender moderates the relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem

Relative to men, women are more strongly socialized to trust their feelings and intuitions. We thus expected that the association between implicit and explicit self-esteem would be stronger for women than for men. That is, if implicit self-esteem contains a large intuitive, experiential or affective component, then people who are in touch with their feelings and intuitions should be more likely to report explicit self-esteem scores that are congruent with their implicit self-esteem scores. Six studies supported this idea by showing that the association between implicit and explicit self-esteem is indeed stronger for women than for men. This finding held in three different cultures and for two different measures of implicit self-esteem. We discuss the implications of this finding for debates regarding the nature and validity of implicit self-esteem.     

“Making it explicit” makes a difference: Evidence for a dissociation of spontaneous and intentional level 1 perspective taking in high-functioning autism

The ability of perspective taking is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. The ability to decide, what another person can or cannot see is referred to as “level 1 perspective taking.” This is thought to be a process that we can make use of intentionally, but which also takes place spontaneously. Autism is characterized by impairments of social interaction, which are thought to be related to deficits in implicit rather than explicit perspective taking. In order to assess both levels of processing with regard to perspective taking, we employed an established task in patients and controls. Our results demonstrate that both groups engage in spontaneous level 1 perspective taking. In contrast to controls, however, patients reacted more slowly if they had to verify the other’s as compared to their own perspective, which shows that participants with high-functioning autism have selective difficulties in explicit, but not implicit, level 1 perspective taking. These findings demonstrate that while spontaneous level 1 perspective taking appears to be intact in autism, this ability is impaired in patients when used explicitly.     

认知疲劳效应对内隐记忆与外显记忆的影响

本研究通过比较内隐记忆与外显记忆受到认知疲劳影响的情况,以了解内隐记忆的自动化加工机制。实验采用被试内设计,使用词汇判断与词汇再认任务测量内隐记忆与外显记忆。实验结果发现,相对于控制组,疲劳组的被试在完成疲劳任务后内隐记忆成绩显著下降,而外显记忆没有受到影响。结果说明相对于外显记忆,内隐记忆更容易受到认知疲劳影响。内隐记忆虽然是无意识的认知加工,但是与其他自动化加工具有不同的特征。     

Exploring patterns of explicit and implicit anti‐gay attitudes in Muslims and Atheists

Research into the relationship between religion and anti‐gay attitudes frequently focuses on Christianity. We explored the role of religiosity dimensions, previous contact, and factors in the dual‐process motivation model as predictors of explicit and implicit anti‐gay attitudes in samples of Muslims and Atheists. The explicit and implicit attitudes of Muslims were more negative than the attitudes of Atheists. Explicit attitudes were more negative towards gay men than lesbians; implicit attitudes were negative towards gay men but were unexpectedly positive towards lesbians. In regression analyses, religious fundamentalism and extrinsic religious orientations (Study 1), and contact and right‐wing authoritarianism (Study 2) were strong significant predictors of explicit anti‐gay attitudes. Interestingly, none of the factors of interest predicted implicit anti‐gay attitudes. These findings reveal a strong link between Islam and explicit anti‐gay attitudes, but suggest that the relationship between religion and implicit anti‐gay attitudes may be more complex than previously thought.     

Visual search for changes in scenes creates long-term,incidental memory traces

Humans are very good at remembering large numbers of scenes over substantial periods of time. But how good are they at remembering changes to scenes? In this study, we tested scene memory and change detection two weeks after initial scene learning. In Experiments 1–3, scenes were learned incidentally during visual search for change. In Experiment 4, observers explicitly memorized scenes. At test, after two weeks observers were asked to discriminate old from new scenes, to recall a change that they had detected in the study phase, or to detect a newly introduced change in the memorization experiment. Next, they performed a change detection task, usually looking for the same change as in the study period. Scene recognition memory was found to be similar in all experiments, regardless of the study task. In Experiment 1, more difficult change detection produced better scene memory. Experiments 2 and 3 supported a “depth-of-processing” account for the effects of initial search and change detection on incidental memory for scenes. Of most interest, change detection was faster during the test phase than during the study phase, even when the observer had no explicit memory of having found that change previously. This result was replicated in two of our three change detection experiments. We conclude that scenes can be encoded incidentally as well as explicitly and that changes in those scenes can leave measurable traces even if they are not explicitly recalled.     

认知疲劳效应对内隐记忆与外显记忆的影响

本研究通过比较内隐记忆与外显记忆受到认知疲劳影响的情况,以了解内隐记忆的自动化加工机制。实验采用被试内设计,使用词汇判断与词汇再认任务测量内隐记忆与外显记忆。实验结果发现,相对于控制组,疲劳组的被试在完成疲劳任务后内隐记忆成绩显著下降,而外显记忆没有受到影响。结果说明相对于外显记忆,内隐记忆更容易受到认知疲劳影响。内隐记忆虽然是无意识的认知加工,但是与其他自动化加工具有不同的特征。     

A model of dual attitudes

When an attitude changes from A1 to A2, what happens to A1? Most theories assume, at least implicitly, that the new attitude replaces the former one. The authors argue that a new attitude can override, but not replace, the old one, resulting in dual attitudes. Dual attitudes are defined as different evaluations of the same attitude object: an automatic, implicit attitude and an explicit attitude. The attitude that people endorse depends on whether they have the cognitive capacity to retrieve the explicit attitude and whether this overrides their implicit attitude. A number of literatures consistent with these hypotheses are reviewed, and the implications of the dual-attitude model for attitude theory and measurement are discussed. For example, by including only explicit measures, previous studies may have exaggerated the ease with which people change their attitudes. Even if an explicit attitude changes, an implicit attitude can remain the same.     

Business or pleasure? Utilitarian versus hedonic considerations in emotion regulation

It is widely accepted that emotions have utilitarian as well as hedonic consequences. Nevertheless, it is typically assumed that individuals regulate emotions to obtain hedonic, rather than utilitarian, benefits. In this study, the authors tested whether individuals represent the utility of pleasant and unpleasant emotions and whether they would be motivated to experience unpleasant emotions if they believed they could be useful. First, findings revealed that participants explicitly viewed approach emotions (e.g., excitement) as useful for obtaining rewards, but viewed avoidance emotions (e.g., worry) as useful for avoiding threats. Second, this pattern was replicated in implicit representations of emotional utility, which were dissociated from explicit ones. Third, implicit, but not explicit, representations of emotional utility predicted motives for emotion regulation. When anticipating a threatening task, participants who viewed emotions such as worry and fear as useful for avoiding threats preferred to engage in activities that were likely to increase worry and fear (vs. excitement) before the task. These findings demonstrate that utilitarian considerations play an important, if underappreciated, role in emotion regulation.     

Implicit and explicit false belief development in preschool children

The ability to represent the mental states of other agents is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). A developmental breakthrough in ToM consists of understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. Recently, infants younger than 2 years of age have been shown to pass novel implicit false belief tasks. However, the processes underlying these tasks and their relation to later‐developing explicit false belief understanding, as well as to other cognitive abilities, are not yet understood. Here, we study a battery of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children, relating their performance to linguistic abilities and executive functions. The present data show a significant developmental change from failing explicit false belief tasks at 3 years of age to passing them at the age of 4, while both age groups pass implicit false belief tasks. This differential developmental trajectory is reflected by the finding that explicit and implicit false belief tasks do not correlate. Further, we demonstrate that explicit false belief tasks correlate with syntactic and executive functions, whereas implicit false belief tasks do not. The study thus indicates that the processes underlying implicit false belief tasks are different from later‐developing explicit false belief understanding. Moreover, our results speak for a critical role of syntactic and executive functions for passing standard explicit false belief tasks in contrast to implicit tasks.     

Changes in implicit and explicit exercise-related attitudes after reading targeted exercise-related information

The purpose of this research was to examine if reading exercise information targeted at pretest explicit attitudes were related to changes in corresponding implicit or explicit attitudes. The associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model guided the research. Participants (N = 154) completed pretest measures of implicit and explicit attitudes; one week later they read information that targeted pretest explicit affective or instrumental attitudes and again completed the attitude measures. Results showed changes in implicit attitudes in both instrumental message conditions that supported the hypotheses that counter-attitudinal information would result in implicit attitude change in the opposite direction to the reading whereas information that targeted congruent attitudes would show changes in keeping with the information. This study demonstrates the importance of considering how implicit cognitions may change as a result of reading exercise-related information, and the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes.     

People use the memory for past-test heuristic as an explicit cue for judgments of learning

When people estimate their memory for to-be-learned material over multiple study–test trials, they tend to base their judgments of learning (JOLs) on their test performance for those materials on the previous trial. Their use of this information—known as the memory for past-test (MPT) heuristic—is believed to be responsible for improvements in the relative accuracy (resolution) of people’s JOLs across learning trials. Although participants seem to use past-test information as a major basis for their JOLs, little is known about how learners translate this information into a judgment of learning. Toward this end, in two experiments, we examined whether participants factored past-test performance into their JOLs in either an explicit, theory-based way or an implicit way. To do so, we had one group of participants (learners) study paired associates, make JOLs, and take a test on two study–test trials. Other participants (observers) viewed learners’ protocols and made JOLs for the learners. Presumably, observers could only use theory-based information to make JOLs for the learners, which allowed us to estimate the contribution of explicit and implicit information to learners’ JOLs. Our analyses suggest that all participants factored simple past-test performance into their JOLs in an explicit, theory-based way but that this information made limited contributions to improvements in relative accuracy across trials. In contrast, learners also used other privileged, implicit information about their learning to inform their judgments (that observers had no access to) that allowed them to achieve further improvements in relative accuracy across trials.