Cognitive strategies for coping with uncertain outcomes

It was proposed that, when faced with highly desirable but uncertain outcomes, people may employ cognitive strategies in an attempt to influence their future affective responses to the outcomes in question. The present study attempted to demonstrate the use of two such strategies. First, it was hypothesized that when people are faced with a low probability of obtaining a highly desirable outcome, they tend to derogate that outcome by perceiving it as less attractive. Second, it was proposed that when people are faced with uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a highly desirable outcome, they tend to underestimate the likelihood of its occurrence, in an attempt to avoid future disappointment. These hypotheses were tested within the context of a lottery in which subjects were given a low, moderate, or high chance of winning a prize that was either high or low in attractiveness. As predicted, subjects viewed the highly attractive prize as less valuable and attractive when they had a low probability of winning than when the probability of winning was moderate or high. Subjects also perceived themselves as less likely to win when the prize was high in attractiveness than when it was low in attractiveness. The relationship of these findings to studies of self-handicapping and attribute ambiguity is discussed.     

The Preconditions and Consequences of Relative Deprivation: Two Field Studies1

Two field studies assessed the preconditions and behavioral consequences of relative deprivation. A sample of single mothers receiving government assistance participated in Study 1, and a sample of working women participated in Study 2. We found general support for a 2-factor model of the preconditions of relative deprivation, in which wanting the desired state and deserving the desired state were the best predictors of discontent. In both studies, discontent regarding the status of one's group (i.e., single mothers or working women) was specifically predictive of reports of group-directed protest behaviors. In Study 2, discontent regarding one's own status was specifically predictive of willingness to engage in self-improvement behaviors. Participants in both studies reported more group discontent than personal discontent. These findings provide support from naturalistic settings for the construct of relative deprivation.     

Prechoice awareness of relative deprivation as a determinant of cognitive dissonance

Two experiments were conducted to clarify whether negative information presented after a person has committed himself to a course of action is capable of creating cognitive dissonance. Subjects were exposed to high or low relative deprivation either before they chose to participate in a tedious task, after they chose to participate, or without the option not to participate. The results indicated that there was greater satisfaction about participation under high relative deprivation than under low, but only when subjects were aware of the relative deprivation prior to their choice to participate. Information presented after decision was not effective in arousing dissonance. The implications of the experiments for modified views of dissonance theory were discussed.     

Microanalysis of Smokers' Beliefs about the Consequences of Quitting: Results from a Large Population Sample1

Using an expectancy-value approach, personal beliefs about the consequences of quitting were studied in a sample of 1,305 cigarette smokers derived from a representative sample of the United Kingdom population. Subjects evaluated 32 outcomes of continuing to smoke or stopping smoking in terms of how much they “wanted” or “feared” them (outcome evaluation, or OE) and then rated the likelihood of each outcome occurring under the two alternatives, yielding a likelihood difference (LD) score for each outcome. Subjects with relatively strong and relatively weak intentions to try to quit were compared with respect to their OE, LD, and OE × LD scores. The results showed consistent differences between intenders and nonintenders. Intenders rated every positive outcome as more desirable and every negative outcome as more undesirable. Intenders also believed that stopping smoking would lead to a larger increase in their chances of obtaining the benefits (health, financial, social, self-esteem) and a smaller increase in their chances of incurring the costs (negative affect, loss of enjoyment), compared with nonintenders. The product scores showing the largest relationships with intention were for the outcomes “feel proud of yourself”, “feel a sense of achievement”, “enjoy yourself”, “feel energetic”, and “set a good example to children”. The findings are discussed in terms of their implications for efforts to encourage more smokers to try to quit.     

Reactions to perceived deprivation in ingroup and outgroup: a cross-cultural comparison

An experiment is reported in which the reactions of observers to the relative and absolute deprivation of others are assessed. Eighty German and 80 Italian subjects made decisions about ingroup (own nationality) or outgroup (foreign) protagonists suffering high or low relative and absolute deprivation. Results showed that subjects were more likely to take social action that violated some rule when the protagonist was in high rather than low absolute deprivation. Racist subjects were somewhat more likely to satisfy the request of a deprived ingroup protagonist whereas non-racist subjects favoured the deprived outgroup. No differences emerged for non-deprived protagonists. Overall, Germans tended to take social action only when the protagonist suffered high absolute deprivation whereas Italians took action regardless of degree of absolute deprivation. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fact and fantasy: the roles of accuracy and variability in confusing imaginations with perceptual experiences

In Experiment 1, pictures were presented to subjects two, five, or eight times, and subjects were asked to imagine each pciture two, five, or eight times. Subsequently, subjects estimated the number of times each picture had been presented. Their estimates of the frequency of these external events were influenced by imagination trials; this effect was greater for good imagers than for poor imagers. Experiment 2 involved a similar design in which subjects were asked either to imagine the same referent for a word or to imagine a different referent for a word on successive imagination trials. Consistency (same referent) did not increase the influence of imaginations on immediate judgments of external frequency. Thus, the results of Experiment 1 were attributed to the greater accuracy (as opposed to greater consistency) of good imagers' internal generations of the stimuli. Furthermore, variation (imagining different referents), like greater accuracy, increased the effects of imagination trials on immediate but not on delayed judgments of frequency. Possible mechanisms underlying these effects are discussed. In general, the two studies show that qualitative characteristics of completely covert generations influence their impact on estimates of the frequency of external events.     

The effect of constant outcome value on judgments and decision making given linguistic probabilities

Two experiments were performed to determine whether judgments of the relative chances of two independent events occurring are biased by constant outcome values contingent on the events when the uncertainties are specified by linguistic expressions (e.g. doubtful). In Experiment 1, subjects directly judged the relative chances of the two events, of which one was represented by a spinner and the other by a linguistic probability expression. In Experiment 2, only linguistic probability expressions were used to describe the two events and a betting procedure was used. A bias was evident in both studies, such that the relative judgments tended to favour the event with the positive rather than the negative contingent outcome. The bias was smaller for the low- than for the high-probability phrases. Individual differences were great, with the bias appearing strongly in only about one-third of the population. Theoretical implications of the present and related results are discussed.     

Coalition Preference as a Function of Expected Values in a Tetradic Weighted-Majority Game

Eighty male subjects participated in a tetradic weighted-majority game in which a coalition was required to control the division of the payoff. The amount of the payoff and/of the probability of receiving the payoff were varied. The data strongly supported the hypothesis that subjects would prefer the coalition with the largest expected value (size of payoff x probability of success = expected value) rather than the coalition with the largest payoff or the coalition with the highest probability of success. However, contrary to expectations, the 'division of rewards was found to be a function of the relative assigned resources of the coalition members, despite the lack of a logical connection between the assigned resources and the rules governing obtaining the payoff.     

Effects of food deprivation upon cue utilization as measured by novelty-incentive

A series of three experiments was done to test the hypothesis that high levels of food deprivation would adversely affect cue utilization from a complex stimulus goal as tested by its novelty-incentive value when that goal was later opposed to food for hungry subjects in a T-maze. It was found that the hunger drive level under which the male rats had originally experienced the complex stimulus goal determined its later incentive value, whether the original experience was in a latent learning type II situation (Experiment I, 20 subjects), a drive-shift situation (Experiment II, 40 subjects), or a free exploration situation (Experiment III, 30 subjects). In each experiment, having first experienced the complex goal under low levels of deprivation significantly decreased the frequency of choices of that goal in a later test relative to the performance of the more deprived animals. The data was interpreted as indicating that utilization of cues, in the sense of input and possibly retention of information, was hindered by the higher levels of deprivation.     

The informativeness and frequency of presentation of a social stimulus as determinants of its efficacy as a reinforcer

It was demonstrated that variations in the informativeness of a social stimulus place important limitations on the generality of the proposition that deprivation heightens, while satiation lowers, responsiveness to a social stimulus. Using 60 children 5 to 6 years of age as subjects, a social stimulus (“good”) was presented at either a high or a low frequency in one of three information-value contexts (high, medium, or low). Immediately following the exposure treatment the same social stimulus was employed as a reinforcer of nonpreferred responses in a two-choice discrimination learning task. The findings indicated that the heightened efficacy of deprivation relative to satiation only held for low information value; when initial information value was high the subsequent efficacy of a social stimulus was enhanced by its initial recurrent usage. Trend analyses revealed that the effects of variations in information value were strongest within the high-frequency-of-praise treatment. Possible mechanisms underlying the significant Information Value × Frequency interaction were discussed.     

Effect of prolonged deprivation on attributional style

The effects of prolonged deprivation and outcome on attributional style were examined in a 2 x 2 factorial design with two levels of deprivation (high and low) and two levels of outcome (good and bad). Indian subjects (N = 80) were selected on the basis of extreme scores on a prolonged deprivation scale; they provided an attributional style scale of good and bad outcome situations. High-deprived subjects attributed bad outcomes to more internal, stable, and global causes compared with low-deprived subjects. In addition, high-deprived subjects showed internal attributions of a stable and global type for both bad and good outcomes.     

The Effects of Hindsight Bias and Causal Attribution on Human Response to Environmental Events1

This research examined the influence of hindsight bias and causal attribution on perceptions of a technological disaster. After reading a fictitious account of a toxic substance spill near a populated area, subjects were provided with information that disease rates had either increased or had remained stable (hindsight conditions), or were presented with no outcome information (control condition). Subjects were then asked to predict the likelihood of increases in disease rates and to make causal attributions regarding the target company and residents of the disaster community. When compared to subjects provided with either no outcome information or with information that disease rates remained stable (positive-outcome condition), subjects told that disease rates had increased (negative-outcome condition) showed elevated predictions regarding future disease rates, ascribed greater responsibility for the accident to the target company, and reported more anger toward the company and greater sympathy for the residents. Subjects receiving positive outcome information and no outcome information did not significantly differ on these measures. In addition, results from a path analysis supported the efficacy of attribution theory to account for the cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences resulting from hindsight bias following a negative environmental event.     

When Equal Chances = Good Chances: Verbal Probabilities and the Equiprobability Effect

When six equally qualified candidates compete for the same position, p = 1/6 for each. People seem to accept this principle more readily for numerical than for verbal probabilities. Equal chances with three to six alternatives are often verbally described in a positive vein as "entirely possible" or "a good chance" and rarely negatively as "doubtful" or "improbable." This equiprobability effect of verbal probabilities is demonstrated in five studies describing job applicants, lottery players, competing athletes, and examination candidates. The equiprobability effect is consistent with a causal (propensity) view of probabilities, where chances are believed to reflect the relative strength of facilitating and preventive causes. If important conditions in support of the target outcome are present (the candidate is qualified for the position), and there is little to prevent it from occurring (no stronger candidates), chances appear to be good. In the presence of obstacles (one stronger candidate), or in the absence of facilitating conditions (the candidate is poorly qualified), chances appear to be poor, even when numerical p values remain constant. The findings indicate that verbal and numerical probability estimates can reflect different intuitions. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.     

Effects of choice and relative frequency elicitation on overconfidence: further tests of an exemplar‐retrieval model

An experiment is reported in which participants rendered judgments regarding the disease states of hypothetical patients. Participants either reported likelihoods that patients had the target disease (no choice), or classified patients into disease categories and then reported likelihoods that their classifications were correct (choice included). Also, participants' likelihood judgments were made in response to either a probability probe question, or a relative frequency probe. Two distinct exemplar‐memory models were compared on their ability to predict overconfidence under these procedures. Both propose that people learn and judge by storing and retrieving examples. The exemplar retrieval model (ERM) proposes that amount of retrieval drives choice inclusion and likelihood probe effects. The alternative model assumes that response error mediates choice inclusion effects. Choice inclusion and the relative frequency probe reduced overconfidence, but the combined effects were subadditive. Only the ERM predicted this pattern, and it further provided good quantitative fits to these results. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ambiguity of acceptance,social desirability,and dating choice

Male subjects differing in social desirability (likableness, physical attractiveness) chose a date from an array of females of three levels of physical attractiveness. Choices were made under two conditions: one where acceptance was assured regardless of whom subject chose; the other where acceptance was left ambiguous. The findings were as follows: (a) subjects selected a more physically attractive female when assured of acceptance than when acceptance was left ambiguous; (b) subjects estimated that highly physically attractive females were less likely to accept them as a date than were either moderately physically attractive or physically unattractive females; (c) subjects' self-ratings of their likableness were not related to the physical attractiveness of their choices under either choice condition nor to their estimates of their chances that the females would accept them as a date; and (d) subjects' self-evaluated physical attractiveness, although unrelated to the physical attractiveness of the subjects' choices, did relate to subjects' estimates of their chances of acceptance. Highly physically attractive subjects estimated their chances of acceptance as better than did subjects who considered themselves low in physical attractiveness. The implications of the findings for the “matching hypothesis” are discussed.     

A negativity bias in interpersonal evaluation

Two studies were conducted to demonstrate a bias toward negativity in evaluations of persons or their work in particular social circumstances. In Study 1, subjects evaluated materials written by peers. Those working under conditions that placed them in low status relative to the audience for their evaluations, or conditions that made their intellectual position within a group insecure, showed a clear bias toward negativity in those evaluations. Only individuals who believed their audience to be of relatively low status and at the same time believed their intellectual position to be secure did not show this bias. In Study 2, subjects viewed a videotape of a stimulus person and rated him on several intellectual and social dimensions. Again, subjects believed their audience to be of either relatively high or relatively low status. As a cross dimension, they were given instructions to focus on either the intellectual or the social abilities of the stimulus person while viewing the videotape. A strong main effect of audience status was demonstrated, but only in ratings of intellectual traits; subjects who believed their audience to be of relatively high status rated the stimulus person's intellectual qualities significantly more negatively. Moreover, this effect was independent of the instructional focus subjects had been given. The negativity bias is discussed in the context of previous demonstrations of biases toward weighting negative information more heavily than positive information, as well as previous demonstrations of seemingly pervasive positivity biases in memory and judgment.     

Group norms and excessive absenteeism: The role of peer referent others

Drawing from social identity and social influence theory, we propose that the absence-related norms of an individual’s work-based referent others will have a significant effect on the likelihood of excessive absence behavior. We then develop and test a model of the social mechanisms potentially underlying the relationship between referent absence norms and the likelihood of excessive absence behavior. Our findings indicate that referent group norms significantly explain excessive absence behavior, even when taking into account the absence norms associated with the formal organizational units within which these referent groups are often nested. They also indicate that permissive referent group norms are likely to have a greater impact on the probability of target excessive absence when the target has a more conformist disposition. Finally, post-hoc findings suggest that the more negative targets’ perceptions of the consequences of absenteeism, the more attenuated the impact of permissive group norms on excessive absence behavior.     

Restrained and unrestrained eating.

Nisbett's (1972) model of obesity implies that individual differences in relative deprivation (relative to set-point weight) within obese and normal weight groups should produce corresponding within-group differences in eating behavior. Normal weight subjects were separated into hypothetically deprived (high restraint) and non-deprived (low restraint) groups. The expectation that high restraint subjects' intake would vary directly with preload size while low restraint subjects would eat in inverse proportion to preload size, was confirmed. It was concluded that relative deprivation rather than obesity per se may be the cirtical determinant of individual differences in eating behavior. Consideration was given to the concept of "restraint" as an important behavioral mechanism affecting the expression of physiologically-based hungar.     

When does giving voice or not matter? Procedural fairness effects as a function of closeness of reference points

The present study examined whether manipulating the closeness of reference points can provide further insights into explaining why people care so much about receiving voice (i.e., the opportunity to express one’s opinion with respect to allocation decisions). Participants read a scenario portraying a situation where they had always been a member of the relevant team (i.e., distant referent point condition) or where they had just become a member of the relevant team (i.e., close referent point condition). Thereafter, they were either told that they would receive voice or no voice with respect to the issue of distributing a financial bonus. The results showed that people cared more about voice when they were placed in the distant referent condition rather than in the close referent condition. This effect was strongest on participants’ positive emotions (i.e., being positive when receiving voice vs. receiving no voice) than on their negative emotions. The findings are discussed in light of procedural fairness, counterfactual thinking, and emotion literature.     

When does giving voice or not matter? Procedural fairness effects as a function of closeness of reference points

The present study examined whether manipulating the closeness of reference points can provide further insights into explaining why people care so much about receiving voice (i.e., the opportunity to express one’s opinion with respect to allocation decisions). Participants read a scenario portraying a situation where they had always been a member of the relevant team (i.e., distant referent point condition) or where they had just become a member of the relevant team (i.e., close referent point condition). Thereafter, they were either told that they would receive voice or no voice with respect to the issue of distributing a financial bonus. The results showed that people cared more about voice when they were placed in the distant referent condition rather than in the close referent condition. This effect was strongest on participants’ positive emotions (i.e., being positive when receiving voice vs. receiving no voice) than on their negative emotions. The findings are discussed in light of procedural fairness, counterfactual thinking, and emotion literature.