Locus of control,perceived responsibility for prior fate,and helping behavior

One-hundred-and-sixty adolescents participated in two studies designed to investigate the relationship between $\text{I}\text{E}$ and helping behavior as mediated by the perceived cause of another's need. In the first study, Ss were given the opportunity to help, either “indirectly” or “directly,” a supervisor who had been over- or underpaid in a prior similar task. Internals helped more in the “direct” help than the “indirect” help conditions but their helping behavior and their perceptions of their supervisors were not consistent. The perceptions of the externals were relatively consistent with their greater help of the “overpaid” supervisor. In study 2, the Ss were given additional information to increase the possibility of their making causal attributions as a function of the supervisor's prior fate. Once again, the external subjects' helping behavior reflected their perception of their supervisor's merit. The internal subjects exhibited relatively little helping behavior regardless of their supervisors' prior fate or perceived competence.     

On the basis of early transitivity judgments

This research had two aims. The first was to test three explanations of performance on N-term series tasks by young children: the labeling model of B.DeBoysson-Bardies and K. O'Regan (1973), Nature (London), 246, 531–534, the sequential-contiguity model of L. Breslow (1981, Psychological Bulletin, 89, 325–351), and the ordered array or image model of C. A. Riley and T. Trabasso (1974, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 17, 187–202). In the first experiment, 5-year-old children were taught additional premises which would interfere with labeling and sequential-contiguity processes, but not with forming an ordered array. Reasoning performance was essentially comparable to previous results with the paradigm, thus supporting the ordered array model. The second aim was to reexamine children's ability to learn sets of premises which can be assembled into an ordered array, since there was reason to believe that previous studies had created false positives. In the second experiment, 3- to 7-year-old children were taught either overlapping (a > b, b > c, …) or nonoverlapping (a > b, c > d, …) premises. Overlapping premises can be integrated into an ordered array (a, b, c, d, e), but nonoverlapping premises cannot. However, the overlapping condition proved more difficult, and the success rate for preschoolers ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-olds}$) was of zero order. This raises doubts about their ability to learn a set of premises of the kind required for transitive inference. These doubts were strengthened by the third experiment which showed that when premises were not presented in serial order, preschool ($\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{to 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-old}$) children could not learn the premises of an N-term series task.     

Decision making in a case of mixed uncertainty: A normative model

We consider a case of uncertainty which is frequently met in various fields, e.g., in parametric statistics: Events {θ}, θ ∈ ∵, are members of family $\text{E}$ on which the decision maker possesses no information at all; however, conditionally on the realization of {θ}, he is able to affix probabilities to all members of another family of events, $\text{F}$. We assume that the decision maker: (1) has a rational behavior under complete ignorance, for decisions whose results only depend on events of $\text{E}$; (2) with {θ} known, maximizes his conditional expected utility for decisions whose results only depend on events of $\text{F}$; (3) has (unconditional) preferences which are consistent with his conditional ones. These assumptions are shown to be sufficient to ensure an approximate representation of the decision maker's preference by a real-valued function W which has the form $\text{W(f) = v[}\text{Inf}{}_{\mathrm{\theta \in \because }}\text{E}{}_{\mathrm{\theta }}\text{(u°f),}\text{Sup}{}_{\mathrm{\theta \in \because }}\text{E}{}_{\mathrm{\theta }}\text{(u°f)]}$, where u and v, respectively, characterize the decision maker's attitudes toward risk and toward complete ignorance.     

Propositional self-control in children

The scope of Dulany's (1968) Theory of Propositional Control was examined using 54 $\text{11}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-, 8}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-,}\text{and 4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-year-olds}$. Significance of the reinforcer was manipulated orthogonally to value of the reinforcer. With a six attribute concept attainment task $\text{4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{year-olds}$ did not learn in either of two significant ways: a performance change over blocks, nor the acquisition of a rule of reinforcement. Children of $\text{8}\text{1}\text{2}$ and $\text{11}\text{1}\text{2}$ learned in both of the above senses. In addition, for the latter subjects the central equations of the theory held with strength and subjects' intentions accounted for more variance in performance than did the experimental manipulations. In supplementary experiments using a simplified task some $\text{4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{year-olds}$ learned. When only the $\text{4}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-}\text{year-olds}$ who learned to a criterion were examined the central equations of the theory were nearly as strong as for subjects at ages $\text{8}\text{1}\text{2}$ and $\text{11}\text{1}\text{2}$. There was no evidence for learning without awareness at any age level.     

The emergence of functional play in infants: Evidence for a major cognitive transition

Sixty-four infants, eight boys and eight girls at each of four ages, $\text{9}\text{1}\text{2}\text{, 11}\text{1}\text{2}\text{, 13}\text{1}\text{2}\text{,}\text{and}\text{15}\text{1}\text{2}$ months, were observed during a 15-minute free play session. Three types of play (stereotypical, relational, and functional) and the number of appropriate uses for specific realistic toys were recorded. Stereotypical play (87% of total active play at $\text{9}\text{1}\text{2}$ months) gave way to relational (35% at $\text{13}\text{1}\text{2}$ months) and functional play (52% at $\text{15}\text{1}\text{2}$ months) as the dominant activity. Both functional play and the number of different appropriate uses of toys were rare at $\text{9}\text{1}\text{2}$ months, appeared reliably at $\text{11}\text{1}\text{2}$ months and increased lineraly through $\text{15}\text{1}\text{2}$ months. A change in the quality of play from indiscriminate mouthing, waving, banging, and fingering of objects to the matching of appropriate uses for a large array of toys indicates that the child's manipulations become more object specific and functional over this 6-month age span. Among possible explanations for the linear increase in the frequency and diversity of appropriate toy uses is the suggestion that an important cognitive change occurs toward the end of the first year of life. A case study is presented to illustrate the application of the play procedure for both assessment and treatment.     

Psychometric characteristics of Chicano and non-Hispanic White children's performance on the preschool inventory

Two studies are reported that independently examined the psychometric characteristics of children's performance on the Preschool Inventory. The sample in Study I consisted of 100 Chicano children tested longitudinally at ages $\text{3}\text{1}\text{2}$ and 4 years. The sample in Study II consisted of 200 Chicano and non-Hispanic White children matched on mothers' schooling level in a cross-sectional design involving two age levels—prekindergarten-age children and children enrolled in kindergarten. Comparisons were made by ethnic group, sex, and age level with regard to item characteristics, internal-consistency reliabilities, test—retest stability, standard errors of measurement, validity, and performance level. Comparisons also were made between the psychometric characteristics of the Chicano children's performance on the Preschool Inventory and the psychometric characteristics reportedly by other investigators for the same instrument administered to children of other ethnic, socioeconomic, and sociolinguistic backgrounds. The results provide impressive evidence of the Preschool Inventory's psychometric strengths and demonstrate that the examined psychometric characteristics of the Preschool Inventory are as exemplary when the test is administered to Chicano children as they are exemplary when it is administered to children of other ethnic backgrounds. Certain limitations of the Preschool Inventory are identified. Recommendations are made regarding possible avenues for future test development efforts.     

The relationship between Eysenck's major personality dimensions and simultaneous and sequential processing in children

The present study reexamined Eysenck's hypothesis that intelligence and personality are uncorrelated. Intelligence was measured with the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, yielding scores for simultaneous and sequential processing and achievement, and the Woodcock-Johnson Brief Scale. Personality was assessed with the Junior Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. Ss were 105 children, ages 8$\text{1}\text{2}$10$\text{1}\text{2}$yr. Although a process as well as a product-oriented intelligence test was employed, the correlational and discriminant analyses supported Eysenck's original hypothesis.     

Keeping track of locations during movement in 8- to 10-month-old infants

Infants of $\text{8}\text{1}\text{2}$ and $\text{9}\text{1}\text{2}$ mo of age were tested for the ability to “keep track,” i.e., to determine the location of an object hidden in one of two covered containers before their left-right positions were reversed. Infants in both age groups for whom the covers were the same color and younger infants for whom the covers were different colors were generally unable to keep track. Only the older infants provided with different colored covers were able to do so. An analysis which separated keeping track from the sensorimotor stage 4 error indicated that (a) there was no contingency between the two and (b) there were developmental differences in the nature of the error.     

Convergence between attention variables and factors of psychometric intelligence in older adults

The purpose of the present study was to examine the hypothesis that individual differences on measures of attention would converge with select factors of psychometric intelligence, especially fluid intelligence and short-term acquisition and retrieval. A sample of 83 elderly adults $\text{(}\text{X}\text{= 71}\text{years}\text{)}$ was administered a battery of 17 psychometric ability tests. Tests were selected to mark four psychometric ability factors (Cattell and Horn's dimensions of fluid and crystallized intelligence, short-term acquisition and retrieval, and perceptual speed). Also, seven tasks representing four aspects of attention—decoding processes, selective attention, attention switching, and concentration—were administered. A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to examine the relationships among the four psychometric ability factors and 11 variables obtained from the attention tasks. Results were only partially consistent with the hypothesized pattern of convergence. Two attention measures had significant loadings on a fluid-type intelligence factor, and one had a marginally significant loading on a short-term memory factor. In general, the greatest convergence occured between attention variables and the ability factor of Perceptual Speed. Results were discussed with respect to previous research on psychometric abilities and cognitive processes, the theory of fluid-crystallized intelligence, and their implications for understanding intellectual aging.     

Piaget's logical formalism for formal operations: An interpretation in context

Two interpretations of the equations used by B. Inhelder and J. Piaget in The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958) are discussed, with implication as the central example. The expression (p ? q) (p implies q) is said to be equal to $\text{(p · q)}\text{V}\text{(}\text{p}\text{· q)}\text{V}\text{(}\text{p}\text{·}\text{q}\text{)}$ (i.e.,p and q, or not p and q, or neither p nor q). According to one, (p ? q) asserts the existence of each case mentioned. According to the other, (p ? q) only asserts that current knowledge allows the possibility of each of the cases. Neither interpretation makes sense of all the relevant passages. Both can be combined in a consistent interpretation when attention is paid to the functional context of the subject's use of logical operations in this book: the “operations” describe the knowledge states which the subject can differentiate and relate, on his way to solving Inhelder's tasks. The logical notation used to represent these states is not a representational format attributed to the subject and manipulated by his cognitive processes, but part of a structuralist account of the subject's reasoning capacities.     

A follow-up developmental study of hypothesis behavior among mentally retarded and nonretarded children

To clarify the roles of IQ and mental age (MA) in hypothesis behavior, MA-matched subjects at three levels of IQ (70, 100, and 130) and three levels of MA ($\text{5}\text{1}\text{2}\text{, 7}\text{1}\text{2}\text{,}\text{and}\text{9}\text{1}\text{2}\text{years}$) received blank-trial discrimination learning problems using procedures designed to discourage position-oriented responding. With position responding discouraged, earlier findings were contradicted in that no hypothesis measure showed a main effect of IQ. This suggest that previously reported IQ group differences in hypothesis behavior may not reflect cognitive deficits inherently linked to low IQ, but instead may reflect the influence of specific methodological factors. The finding and interpretation are consistent with Zigler's (American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1969, 73, 536–556) “developmental” theory of retardation and inconsistent with the general “difference” position. In additional findings, the predictions that subjects at all three MA levels would use hypotheses, and that retarded children from special-education classes would use hypotheses more often than retarded children “mainstreamed” in classes for the nonretarded were confirmed.     

Tower of Hanoi performance of retarded young adults and nonretarded children as a function of solution length and goal state

Three experiments were conducted with the Tower of Hanoi task to assess problem solving ability in 6-, 7-, 8-, and 10-year-old nonretarded children and mentally retarded young adults of varying maturational ages. In Experiment 1 we gradually reduced the number of moves required for solution until subjects could solve the 3-disk tower-ending problem. Although all groups experienced difficulty with the standard 7-move problem, all but the trainable retarded group readily solved the 6-move problem. The trainable group did not reach a comparable level of success until the 4-move problem. On the 7-move problem the retarded groups performed at the level of nonretarded groups that were maturationally $\text{1}\text{1}\text{2}$ to 3 years younger. An analysis of first moves indicated that subject groups differed in the strategies they used to solve the problems. In Experiment 2, practice effects were ruled out as a source of the superior performance on the 6- than on the 7-move problem. In Experiment 3, 7- and 10-year-old nonretarded children and mentally retarded young adults did not differ on 5-move problems in which configuration of the goal states was varied. A comparison of all 5-move problems judged to have the same depth of search requirements indicated that the tower-ending problems were significantly easier to solve than the partial-tower-ending problems, which in turn were easier than the flat-ending problems. A limited depth of search capacity sets boundaries on the use of sophisticated strategies and, to a large extent, accounts for the retarded groups' maturational lag.     

Training research in aging on the fluid ability of inductive reasoning

The modifiability of older adults' performance on Induction tasks was examined through cognitive training. The posttraining performance of 52 older adults ($\text{X}\text{age = 70.3}\text{years}$) was assessed with regard to a transfer-of-training paradigm and maintenance of training effects at three posttests (one week, one month, six months). A pattern of differential training transfer across the posttest battery of fluid and crystallized intelligence measures was predicted, with the largest training effects expected for near transfer (Induction) measures. The predicted pattern of training transfer was obtained at one-week and one-month posttests, with significant training effects to the nearest Induction measure. Large retest (practice) effects across posttests also occurred for training and control groups. This research contributes to the position that modifiability of intellectual performance through cognitive intervention extends across the adult life span.     

Individual differences in the game motives of Own,Relative, and Joint gain

Two hundred and eighteen undergraduates (94 males and 124 females) made decisions in same-sex dyads across four types of 3-choice decomposed games. An analysis of each subject's choices was performed to see if he or she consistently pursued one of the three motives of Own (Individualism), Relative (Competition) or Joint (Cooperation) gain across all four decomposed games. Sixty-six percent of the subjects manifested such consistency, and sex of subject was unrelated to which goal was pursued. Of the remaining 32%, a sizable subgroup ($\text{1}\text{3}$) was shown to be making its choices in an Altruistic fashion, attempting to maximize the outcomes of the other subject. An analysis of variance of the F scale scores of subjects in these motivational categories yielded an effect (p < .025), with the Competitive group having the highest, and the Altruistic group having the lowest mean authoritarianism score. Correlational analyses indicated negative r's between degree of Competition and F score, positive r's between degree of Altruism and F, but no apparent relation between F and either Individualistic or Joint gain choice.     

Limitations on children's short-term memory for left-right orientation

The time course of kindergarten children's memory for left-right orientation during the first $\text{2}\text{1}\text{2}\text{sec}$ after receptor stimulation was investigated by means of a successive matching-to-sample task with tachistoscopically presented abstract figures. The first study indicated that young children have difficulty encoding left-right orientation into short-term memory and treat left-right orientation as low-priority information that is likely to be lost when there is an information overload. A second study indicated that kindergarten children who are able to encode left-right orientation do so more slowly than adults. An unexpected finding occurring in both studies was that the presentation of the comparison figures appeared to terminate initial processing of the standard figure. It is argued that this effect was due to cognitively based visual masking.     

Sex and handedness differences in EEG measures of hemispheric specialization

EEG alpha asymmetry was studied in 90 normal adults: right-handed, left-handed, and ambidextrous, male and female. Recordings were made from homologous central, parietal, and occipital leads, referenced to vertex, while subjects engaged in writing, speaking, reading, listening to speech, singing, and block design construction. These data confirm our previous findings that alpha asymmetry is task-dependent and extend them to a broader range of tasks, subjects, and leads. Among right-handers significant differences were found between the language tasks and the musical and spatial tasks: the $\text{R}\text{L}$ alpha ratio is higher in the language tasks. In addition, significant ordering of $\text{R}\text{L}$ alpha ratios was found among the language tasks themselves: WRITE å SPEAK > READ > LISTEN. No one “verbal” task can be considered representative of all language behaviors. Task differences in asymmetry were greater at the central than at the parietal leads, and no differences were found at the occiput. Differences among the handedness groups were found in $\text{R}\text{L}$ alpha ratio in specific tasks, in the relationship among tasks, and in alpha power level. Non-right-handers showed less task-dependent asymmetry. On some measures ambidexters appear to be a distinct group, not simply representing the middle range of a left-handed/right-handed continuum. Reversal of the “expected” right-handed pattern (SPEAK $\text{R}\text{L}$ ratio > BLOCKS $\text{R}\text{L}$ ratio) was seen in 10% of right-handers, and in 36% of left-handers, particularly among left-handed females (46%), suggesting a possible sex difference among non-right-handers. No sex difference was found among right-handers on any task with any measure at any lead.     

Factor structure of the McCarthy scales for school-age children with low GCIs

This study aimed to cross-validate the factor analysis of the McCarthy Scales and to determine the construct validity of these scales for children who score one standard deviation below the normative mean on general cognitive ability. The sample was comprised of 77 children aged 6 to $\text{8}\text{1}\text{2}$ with a mean General Cognitive Index (GCI) of 61.6. Principal factor analysis produced four meaningful factors which corresponded closely to four of the scales on McCarthy's battery. The present findings discourage the interpretation of the Quantitative Scale for school-age children with GCIs below 84. Other implications of the results for the interpretation of McCarthy profiles for low-scoring school-aged children are discussed.     

Black-white differences at ages 212−812 on the McCarthy scales of children's abilities

Comparisons were made between matched groups of black and white children on the new McCarthy Scales of Children's Abilities. Using the standardization sample as the data source, 148 matched pairs were obtained. These were grouped as follows: ages $\text{2}\text{1}\text{2}\text{?3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{(}\text{N}\text{= 60), 6}\text{1}\text{2}\text{8}\text{1}\text{2}\text{(}\text{N}\text{= 45)}$. The blacks and whites did not differ significantly on any of the cognitive scales at ages $\text{2}\text{1}\text{2}\text{?3}\text{1}\text{2}\text{and}\text{4?5}\text{1}\text{2}$, although at ages $\text{6}\text{1}\text{2}\text{-8}\text{1}\text{2}$ the whites scored about $\text{1}\text{2}\text{SD}$ higher. The blacks scored significantly higher on the Motor Scale at ages $\text{4?5}\text{1}\text{2}$ but there were no differences at other ages. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Development of binocular fixation in human infants

Two experiments measured changes in binocular eye alignment from 1- to 6-month-old human infants. In Experiment 1 changes in binocular eye alignment were recorded from 1, 2, and 3 month olds using corneal photography. A luminous target was moved along the infant's midline at one of two constant speeds. Infants at all three ages showed some evidence of appropriate changes in binocular eye alignment (convergence as the target approached and divergence as the target receded). The likelihood of appropriate convergence and divergence increased with age, as did the ability to respond appropriately to the faster target motion. A measure of convergence lag (further decrease in interpupillary distance after target motion had ended) was obtained for trials on which the target approached the infant. Convergence lag decreased with age and was greater on trials at the faster target speed until 3 months of age. Experiment 2 measured the responses of 3, $\text{4}\text{1}\text{2}$, and 6 month olds as a wedge prism was placed alternately in front of each eye. The prism displaced the image nasally (either 2.5° or 5°), creating inappropriate binocular eye alignment. A refixation eye movement in response to the prism was not present consistently until 6 months of age. Hypotheses as to the mechanism controlling infant binocular eye alignment are discussed with respect both to the present findings and to findings from human adults and animals.