A formal framework for modelling the developmental course of competence and performance in the distance,speed, and time domain

The developmental course in the distance–speed–time domain is still a matter of debate. Traditional stage models are contested by theories of continuous development and adaptive thinking. In the present work, we introduce a formal framework for modelling the developmental course in this domain, grounding on Competence-based Knowledge Space Theory. This framework, as a more general case, widely includes assumptions and facets of previous models and covers empirical findings collected based on different experimental paradigms. By a distinction of latent competences and observable performance, model validation is not bound to a certain experimental paradigm and no one-to-one correspondence between competences and tasks is required. Therefore, the framework has the potential to bridge the gap between stage models and models of continuous development. The approach also precisely defines misconceptions, for example overgeneralization, and empirically investigates their occurrence. In the present work, we established a prototypical model for the development of understanding the distance–speed–time system. We extended this model with definitions based on different perspectives of overgeneralization. The assumptions of the model and its extensions were examined on the basis of the results of two empirical investigations using six judgment task types. The results yielded a reasonably good fit of model and data. No evidence was found for the occurrence of overgeneralization in this domain. The theoretical model and empirical results are discussed with respect to their relationship to other developmental models and theories.     

The Duhem‐Quine thesis revisited

The Duhem‐Quine thesis is generally presented as the radical underdetermi‐ nation of a theory by experimental evidence. But there is a much‐neglected second aspect, i.e. the coherence or interrelatedness of the conceptual components of a theory. Although both Duhem and Quine recognised this aspect, they failed to see its consequences: it militates against the idea of radical underdetermination. Because scientific theories are coherent conceptual systems, empirical evidence penetrates, as it were, the periphery and allows the localisation of central, not just peripheral hypotheses. There is then no reason to deny the existence of crucial experiments. Both these ideas are denied in the Quine‐Duhem thesis. A discussion of the famous Stem‐Gerlach experiment and the role of fundamental physical constants shows, however, that localisation is not only possible but essential for the validity of scientific theories. Quine's famous ‘latitude of choice’ turns out to be severely restricted.     

Four meanings of “categorization”: A conceptual analysis of research on person perception

It is widely assumed that people tend to “categorize” other people. However, the term “categorization” has been used with qualitatively different underlying definitions in the person perception literature. We present a conceptual analysis in which we disentangle four existing definitions: (a) categorization as representing, (b) categorization as dichotomizing, (c) categorization as organizing, and (d) categorization as grouping. Subsequently, we show that seemingly antagonistic viewpoints in the literature may be reconciled by disentangling these definitions. Furthermore, we argue that disentangling these definitions is vital for theoretical interpretations of (past and future) empirical findings. Overall, our work aims to contribute to the clarity of person perception theories, provide novel perspectives on existing debates, and serve as a stepping stone for more differentiated models of person perception.     

Shades of support: An empirical assessment of D&I policy support in organizations

In this research, we aim to develop a better understanding of the different ways in which employees can advance or resist the diversity and inclusion (D&I) policies implemented by their organization. To this end, we complement prior work by distinguishing between employees' attitudinal and behavioral opposition versus support for D&I policies. We combine these to distinguish different combinations of attitudinal and behavioral responses that characterize specific groups of employees, which we label opponents, bystanders, reluctants, and champions. In a large-scale survey study conducted among employees from seven organizations located in the Netherlands (n = 2913), we find empirical support for the validity of this taxonomy and its value in understanding the likelihood that employees advance or resist D&I policies. Furthermore, we find more convergence between attitudinal and behavioral support when employees perceive a more positive climate for inclusion. Together, these results advance existing scholarly work by providing both a theoretical account of and empirical evidence for the different ways in which D&I policies may find support or resistance from employees. In addition, our work offer practitioners a practical tool to examine the likelihood that D&I policies meet support or opposition from their employees and therefore enables them to design and implement more effective D&I interventions.     

Career proactivity: A bibliometric literature review and a future research agenda

Individuals often need to be proactive in order to successfully navigate their career development journeys. To what extent one is vocationally proactive has critical implications for his or her attitudes, behaviors, and other outcomes in career and work-related settings. However, research in career proactivity has been accumulating from divergent perspectives, resulting in a substantially fragmented literature that has not been comprehensively, objectively synthesized to guide the field to move forward. To advance the domain of career proactivity, this paper synthesizes theoretical and empirical literatures using two major bibliometric analyses. We first analyze the intellectual basis of the career proactivity literature by performing document citation analysis. We then review the developmental trends of main conceptual themes in career proactivity literature using a temporal co-word analysis. Informed by these bibliometric findings, we propose a roadmap for future research highlighting the need to clear up concepts, account for context, develop new meso-level theories, and bridge the domains of organizational behavior and vocational development.     

From Perceptual Categories to Concepts: What Develops?

People are remarkably smart: they use language, possess complex motor skills, make non-trivial inferences, develop and use scientific theories, make laws, and adapt to complex dynamic environments. Much of this knowledge requires concepts and this paper focuses on how people acquire concepts. It is argued that conceptual development progresses from simple perceptual grouping to highly abstract scientific concepts. This proposal of conceptual development has four parts. First, it is argued that categories in the world have different structure. Second, there might be different learning systems (sub-served by different brain mechanisms) that evolved to learn categories of differing structures. Third, these systems exhibit differential maturational course, which affects how categories of different structures are learned in the course of development. And finally, an interaction of these components may result in the developmental transition from perceptual groupings to more abstract concepts. This paper reviews a large body of empirical evidence supporting this proposal.     

Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience

According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.     

Semantic approaches in the philosophy of science

In this article I give an overview of some recent work in philosophy of science dedicated to analysing the scientific process in terms of (conceptual) mathematical models of theories and the various semantic relations between such models, scientific theories, and aspects of reality. In current philosophy of science, the most interesting questions centre around the ways in which writers distinguish between theories and the mathematical structures that interpret them and in which they are true, i.e. between scientific theories as linguistic systems and their non-linguistic models. In philosophy of science literature there are two main approaches to the structure of scientific theories, the statement or syntactic approach—advocated by Carnap, Hempel and Nagel—and the non-statement or semantic approach—advocated, among others, by Suppes, the structuralists, Beth, Van Fraassen, Giere, Wójcicki. In conclusion, I briefly review some of the usual realist inspired questions about the possibility and character of relations between scientific theories and reality as implied by the various approaches I discuss in the course of the article. The models of a scientific theory should indeed be adequate to the phenomena, but if the theory is ‘adequate’ to (true in) its conceptual (mathematical) models as well, we have a model-theoretic realism that addresses the possible meaning and reference of ‘theoretical entities’ without relapsing into the metaphysics typical of the usual scientific realist approaches.     

Unifying theories of creativity: Metaphorical thought and the unification process

Theories of creativity collectively provide a rich but fragmented knowledge base for research. In order to better understand the nature of creativity, investigators must provide a more coherent theoretical foundation by integrating many theories from different disciplines. Unfortunately, interdisciplinary groups of theorists who attempt collaborative theoretic integration have trouble finding common conceptual ground for their unification efforts. The implicit influence of metaphor on thought causes some of these difficulties, but metaphor also holds potential for bridging the conceptual gaps between differing theoretical and philosophical positions. Interdisciplinary teams of theorists can engage in parallel processes of metaphorical exploration and nonmetaphorical verification to illuminate the barriers to integration, and to capitalize on the integrative potential of metaphoric thought.     

后经验主义时代的理论心理学

随着经验实证主义的衰落,心理学迎来了后经验主义时代。在后经验主义时代,人们对理论和经验观察的关系有了新的理解。理论不再是经验观察的附属物,相反,经验事实是被理论决定的。理论不是经验事实的概括和归纳,而是一种文化历史的建构。后经验主义时代的理论心理学以库恩的范式论、现象学、释义学和社会建构论作为自己的哲学基础。理论的评价标准不再是与经验事实的一致性。因为经验事实由于受到理论的污染,不再是一种客观的标准。在后经验主义条件下,理论的评价标准可建立在概念和逻辑、价值观和意识形态、修辞与叙事以及实践和应用的水平上     

Reglobalizing Realism by Going Local, or (How) Should Our Formulations of Scientific Realism be Informed about the Sciences?

In order to examine the fit between realism and science, one needs to address two issues: the unit of science question (realism about which parts of science?) and the contents of realism question (which realism about science?). Answering these questions is a matter of conceptual and empirical inquiry by way local case studies. Instead of the more ordinary abstract and global scientific realism, what we get is a doubly local scientific realism based on a bottom-up strategy. Representative formulations of the former kind are in terms of the truth and reality of the posits of current science, in terms of warranted belief, in terms of mind-independent unobservable entities. Using illustrations mainly from the social sciences, doubly local scientific realism denies the global applicability of such formulations and seeks to make adjustments in their elements in response to information about local units of science: It is sufficient for a realist to give the existence of an entity (and the truth of a theory) a chance, while in some areas we may be in s position to make justified claims about actual existence (and truth). Logical inquiry-independent existence is sufficient for the social and human sciences, while mind-independence will be fine for many other domains. It should not be insisted that the theoretical posits of realist science be strict unobservables in all areas: most theoretical posits of the social sciences are idealized commonsensibles, such as elements in folk psychology. Unsurprisingly, this sort of local strategy will create space for realism that is able to accommodate larger areas of science without sacrificing traditional realist intuitions.     

Why expectations do or do not change after expectation violation: A comparison of seven models

Individuals are often confronted with events that violate their expectations, but disconfirming evidence does not always lead to expectation change. We review seven theoretical models on how individuals cope with disconfirming expectations: associative learning theories, the ViolEx Model, the model of coping with expectation disconfirmation (Roese & Sherman, 2007), the Meaning Maintenance Model, the Predictive Processing Framework, Expectancy Violations Theory, and the Expectation-Disconfirmation Model of consumer satisfaction. We focus on the proposed processes that relate to persistence or change of expectations. We discuss similarities and differences between the models. Three core coping processes are identified across most of these models – minimization of the importance of expectation-disconfirming evidence, search for/production of future expectation-confirming evidence, and expectation change. Suggestions for refinements and extensions of the models as well as for future empirical work on model testing are drawn.     

A sharp image or a sharp knife: norms for the modality-exclusivity of 774 concept-property items

According to recent embodied cognition theories, mental concepts are represented by modality-specific sensory-motor systems. Much of the evidence for modality-specificity in conceptual processing comes from the property-verification task. When applying this and other tasks, it is important to select items based on their modality-exclusivity. We collected modality ratings for a set of 387 properties, each of which was paired with two different concepts, yielding a total of 774 concept-property items. For each item, participants rated the degree to which the property could be experienced through five perceptual modalities (vision, audition, touch, smell, and taste). Based on these ratings, we computed a measure of modality exclusivity, the degree to which a property is perceived exclusively through one sensory modality. In this paper, we briefly sketch the theoretical background of conceptual knowledge, discuss the use of the property-verification task in cognitive research, provide our norms and statistics, and validate the norms in a memory experiment. We conclude that our norms are important for researchers studying modality-specific effects in conceptual processing.     

Science, metaphysics and method

While there are many examples of metaphysical theorising being heuristically and intellectually important in the progress of scientific knowledge, many people wonder how metaphysics not closely informed and inspired by empirical science could lead to rival or even supplementary knowledge about the world. This paper assesses the merits of a popular defence of the a priori methodology of metaphysics that goes as follows. The first task of the metaphysician, like the scientist, is to construct a hypothesis that accounts for the phenomena in question. It is then argued that among the possible metaphysical theories, the empirical evidence underdetermines the right one, just as the empirical evidence underdetermines the right scientific theory. In the latter case it is widely agreed that we must break the underdetermination by appeal to theoretical virtues, and this is just what should be and largely is done in metaphysics. This is part of a more general line of argument that defends metaphysics on the basis of its alleged continuity with highly theoretical science. In what follows metaphysics and theoretical science are compared in order to see whether the above style of defence of a priori metaphysics is successful.     

Children's judgments in theory choice tasks: scientific rationality in childhood.

The current research examined whether children could use certain metaconceptual criteria such as the range of explanation, non-ad hocness of explanation, empirical consistency, and logical consistency to choose between competing accounts of physical phenomena. The tasks were constructed so that the conceptual content of the explanations to be evaluated was either consistent, inconsistent, or neutral with regard to children's prior knowledge. It was found that even 7-year-olds could use metaconceptual criteria such as the range, empirical consistency, and logical consistency of theories when the theories did not violate their beliefs. However only older children (11-year-olds) showed a systematic preference for non-ad hoc theories over ad hoc ones. The findings are consistent with recent work in the philosophy of science showing that, in evaluating theoretical alternatives, scientists are influenced by their prior beliefs about the domain being considered. This research demonstrates that even young children share some of the cognitive underpinnings of scientific rationality that scientists do.     

Psychotherapy integration in the treatment of personality disorders: a commentary

Whereas research on the treatment of personality disorders over the past several decades has focused primarily on comparing the efficacy of various treatment packages associated with different theoretical models, there is increasing evidence that the field would benefit from focusing more attention on developing integrative treatments that are both informed by research and capable of scientific verification. The articles assembled for this special section each propose a different approach to integrative treatment for personality disorders. In this commentary, we outline a number of reasons for making such a shift to more integrative treatments, consider some of the potential challenges to integration, and discuss the different approaches to integration illustrated in these articles. We highlight some of the difficult tradeoffs that must be made in developing an integrative approach and discuss similarities and differences in the response to such challenges by the contributors to this special section. Finally, we point to several areas for future research that we believe will contribute to the development of increasingly effective treatments for individuals with personality disorders.     

Conscious emotional experience emerges as a function of multilevel, appraisal-driven response synchronization

In this paper we discuss the issue of the processes potentially underlying the emergence of emotional consciousness in the light of theoretical considerations and empirical evidence. First, we argue that componential emotion models, and specifically the Component Process Model (CPM), may be better able to account for the emergence of feelings than basic emotion or dimensional models. Second, we advance the hypothesis that consciousness of emotional reactions emerges when lower levels of processing are not sufficient to cope with the event and regulate the emotional process, particularly when the degree of synchronization between the components reaches a critical level and duration. Third, we review recent neuroscience evidence that bolsters our claim of the central importance of the synchronization of neuronal assemblies at different levels of processing.