Where is here? When is now?1

With a Kleinian perspective influenced by Betty Joseph, the author describes the distinctive ‘here and now’ of a psychoanalysis as the place and the time of the patient’s inner subjective world as it emerges in the work of patient and analyst. This psychoanalytic ‘here’ and ‘now’ is examined with clinical material from the analysis of Mr X; first, with an account of the way his analysis begins and then through a detailed session five years later.The author identifies Mr X’s problems with place and time, and how these change over the course of the analysis. He moves from sequestered dyadic relationships towards an Oedipal and family space, and from disconnection and timelessness to acquiring a sense of duration, of being in the present with a past and a future – all of which, the paper aims to show, has implications for technique.     

‘What works?’ Response to the paper by James Astor

Abstract :  A personal account of an analysis with Michael Fordham and subsequent conversations with James Astor. A number of themes are developed concerning the expression of feeling, use of language, and the relevance of aesthetic values to the practice and reporting of analysis.     

Is schizotypy taxonic? Response to

Beauchaine, Lenzenweger, and Waller (2008) criticize our taxometric study of schizotypy (Rawlings, Williams, Haslam, & Claridge, in press) on a variety of methodological and philosophical grounds. We argue that their critique selectively applies more stringent standards to our work than to studies supporting their view that schizotypy is taxonic (i.e., categorical). Many of their criticisms apply at least equally to existing studies that offer support for a schizotypy taxon, and these studies are vulnerable to biases favouring taxonic conclusions that were controlled for in our study. Contrary to their criticisms, we did not claim to have disconfirmed previous taxonic findings about schizotypy, and our findings positively support dimensional models of schizotypy rather than merely being null results. Similarly, our findings are not artefacts of the sampling or measurement decisions that they question. Even well-replicated taxometric findings are not immune to empirical challenge, and evaluation of such challenges must be even-handed.     

Response to commentary: is collaboration a viable target for family therapists?

In response to Zimmerman's commentary, ‘Is collaboration a viable target for family therapists?’ we explore more conventional perspectives of therapeutic collaboration featured in the family therapy literature, including Zimmerman's commentary. In particular, we critique essentialist and universal formulations that portray the client–therapist relationship to be inherently unequal as inconsistent and limiting. We conclude by addressing what appear to be some misunderstandings in Zimmerman's commentary and clarify what we see as differences between his ideas and our stance on collaboration and power in family therapy.     

Where is the gender in gendered language?

The purpose of these studies was to examine how women and men react and accommodate to gender-preferential language in e-mail messages. In Experiment 1, participants wrote messages to two assigned 'netpals.' These netpals were actually one of the experimenters. For each participant, one netpal used female-preferential language and the other used male-preferential language. Analyses revealed that the netpals' language style, and not the participants' gender, predicted the language used by participants in their e-mail replies. Female and male participants used the gender-preferential language that matched the language used by their netpals. In Experiment 2, the gender labels and language styles of netpals were independently manipulated. As before, linguistic style had the greatest impact on participants' language use. These results have implications for how people think about gendered behavior, and highlight how gendered language is constructed in social interaction.     

Where in the brain is the self?

Localizing the self in the brain has been the goal of consciousness research for centuries. Recently, there has been an increase in attention to the localization of the self. Here we present data from patients suffering from a loss of self in an attempt to understand the neural correlates of consciousness. Focusing on delusional misidentification syndrome (DMS), we find that frontal regions, as well as the right hemisphere appear to play a significant role in DMS and DMS related disorders. These data are placed in the context of neuroimaging findings.     

Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein

Foundationalist, Coherentist. Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating. chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Intinitism"—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored Infinitism as a viable option in epistemology.     

Where is the randomness for the human computer?

Psychologists traditionally have employed both statistical and process assumptions in models of human learning and performance. The corresponding tradition in the field of artificial intelligence is to minimize or eliminate the use of statistical assumptions. This article reviews some stochastic and nonntochastic models of human memory, probability learning, medical diagnosis, and concept identification. Some stochastic models are found to have a larger deterministic component than was previously realized; deterministic models applicable with random selection of stimuli can be represented in stochastic form. A policy of methodological determinism is recommended in which the model builder originally assumes that no random processes take place within the organism. If necessary, and as a last resort, such processes can be appended to an otherwise deterministic model for predictive convenience.